Another reason why philosophers are useless

[Linusthe2nd]

EDIT: Did not see Peter Plato’s response. But here are my thoughts anyway.

That is not exactly the claim.

First of all, in Aristotelian metaphysics, the language of which Thomas used because it was the default philosophy of the time, motion meant what we now mean by change. I would completely agree that motion in Newtonian and relativistic physics refers to a completely separate phenomenon. But it is simply false to say that motion, as it is understood in the Thomistic sense, is not change. Furthermore, change is a transformation from potency to act by something else in act. No matter how you look at change, that is what it is. Contradicting that statement is incoherent.

Second of all, the word “external” is yours - not mine, and not Thomas’s. It is not exactly wrong, although the way you are using it is distorting the argument. My hand is actually open but has a potential to be closed. When I close my hand (a move from potency to act), that is a change. There is not (at least not obviously) a cause of that external to me, so is it therefore coherent to say that the closing of my hand was uncaused? Of course not, that would either be a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the problem. The muscles in my hand contracted because certain ions were released into my muscle cells. Those ions were released into my muscle cells because an action potential reached them by way of axons. (And so on.) So in a sense the cause of each change is external to the entity undergoing change, but what on the macroscopic level looks like internally generated change is on a more microscopic level external change.

This is one of the two issues with the example of radioactive atoms. They are not acted on by something external to them, but that’s not what the proof requires. The radiation does not have to be caused by something external to the atom because the atom is made up of other entities which have potentialities and actualities inherent in them, in the same way that there is not a cause for the closing of my hand external to me, but there are causes within the relevant parts of my anatomy which are always external to what is actually being changed. If your observation is fixated on a certain scale of observation (whether it is a human individual or a single atom), you have committed an error and should not expect to get the correct result. The fact that something appears uncaused at one level does not imply that it is actually uncaused. It is, again, incoherent to suppose that a potentiality comes into act without being acted upon.

The related issue is the confusion between indeterminacy and a lack of causality. Radiation is indeterminate (as far as we can tell), but it is simply a non-sequitur to claim that it is therefore uncaused. The first reason is that, strictly speaking, indeterminate events are not uncaused. The second reason is that our understanding of radiation is an empirical model, not a complete reality of what actually happens to a particle. Darwin knew that differences in phenotype lead to differential reproductive success, but did not know anything about the mechanisms of heritability of genes, alleles, etc. Gregor Mendel discovered more about those mechanisms, but still didn’t know about DNA and many of the specifics of heritability, though his model pierced through to a deeper level than Darwin’s. Neither of them could have coherently claimed that differences in phenotype were uncaused and “just happened,” even though they did not have a full explanation of them. Part of the reason is that it would be presumptuous. The other reason is that it is flatly incoherent to maintain that a potentiality can come into actuality by anything other than something else in act, regardless of how committed someone is to disputing the premise.

Likewise, it does not follow from your examples that any change can occur without a cause. Radiation is a consequence of the particular structure of certain isotopes. Probabilistic models ignore the particulars because they are too small to observe and because what is usually important is the rate at which a given sample of an element is decaying. There is nothing in the theory that suggests that radiation occurs without a cause.

What is outdated in this discussion is not Aristotle’s notion of change, but the idea that atoms are just bunches of neutrons and protons that suddenly send off a radiation particle without a cause.

If it isn’t Tyrion, it is his twin brother !

Linus2nd

 

[Peter_Plato]

That is your personal problem. Get over it. Others do not share your view.

Interesting. An ambiguous non-response wrapped up in a denial.

 

[polytropos]

Some changes are due to external factors, others are inherent to the object in question. To lead to some “external deity” one would need to argue that all changes are due to some external agent.

The fact is that change is a transformation from potency to act by something else in act. A transformation from potency to act is inconceivable unless caused by something else in act. For something to go from potency to act without any external act would be for what is not to come into being uncaused.

You continue to claim that “some changes…are inherent to the object in question,” but as we’ve seen, your examples of this (radioactive decay, Brownian motion of electrons) don’t work. It is not simply the nature of, say, Carbon-14 atoms to decay at some rate; they decay at some rate because they have a particular composition which leads them to decay, because of the acts and potencies of the neutrons and protons of which they are composed. They are not some homogenous substance that represents a brute fact of pure, uncaused change.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

…Another translation is due here: “If some believer utters a prayer to a recently deceased person (JPII or Mather Theresa) - which seems to be answered, then it qualifies as a “miracle”, and thus evidence for God. However if a skeptic points out zillions of prayers; none of which was fulfilled, that does not qualify as evidence against God.”

Or to be put more bluntly, in the “game” between the believer and the skeptic, if the result is “heads”, the believer wins, but if it is “tails”, the skeptic loses. Sorry, this game is rigged. Of course the price the believer pays for this “victory” is very steep: the offered definition of God includes the unmentioned trait, namely that God is a shameless cheater, impostor. I am sure the believers will deny this simple observation, but that is not surprising.

Yes, this is a very serious post, despite the smiley’s.

There is no “game” at all and your translation is wanting. A believer does not consider answered prayers as evidence for God vis-à-vis physicalists’/skeptics’ critiques of Judeo-Christian (J-C) theology. We already encounter and live in relation to God prior both to answered/unanswered prayers of petition and skeptic/physicalist critiques. That’s the starting point.

I get how if one is already a skeptic/physicalist, Judeo-Christian convictions concerning God and prayer could lead to your value judgments above. I accept that these are your value judgments–God is “unreliable,” and a “a shameless cheater, impostor”–and you have every right to evaluate theism.

But when, in advancing your critique of the J-C God and prayer to us, you are go on to make truth claims (not just value judgments) about theism based on your epistemology, then you need start with the God and theology of prayer as defined in the J-C tradition and then show that the SM can legitimately be brought to bear on Him, and, more fundamentally, show why a theist is rationally necessitated to abandon his and adopt your epistemology.

You still have done neither. When I ask you to meet this burden since you advanced the critique against theism in the first place, you cry foul . . . not surprisingly.

And, as we all know, the devil is in the details. The article you linked is jus a summary, without any details.

I’ll give you some details–you could always look up the articles in the footnotes.

As I intimated, [my background in biology and chemistry] leads me to see flaws in the studies. The authors below also see these studies as flawed. And that has been my point all along: they are incapable of settling the issue.

“We argue that close attention to construct validity of cause-and-effect variables invalidates distant intercessory prayer as a scientific construct. Further, the application of statistical techniques to metaphysical causal phenomena is critiqued.”
[John T. Chibnall, Joseph M. Jeral, Michael Cerullo. “Experiments on Distant Intercessory Prayer.” *Archives of Internal Medicine 161 (Nov. 26, 2001): 2529–2536]

. . . What you brought up is simply a bunch of anecdotal stories, without any control built into them. It is precisely as convincing as the testimony of those baffled people who had a dream about some strange incident and then that incident happened. Even if you would produce a million of such anecdotes, that would be totally meaningless.

Again, not the case at all. They do not rely for their conclusions on anecdotal reports. I’ll repost what I said before. “Further, how would even a documented miracle (in RC terminology) really count as any evidence of God to a physicalist? Say a person goes to Lourdes, France with late stage degenerative bone cancer. X-rays prove it. That individual comes out of the water and it is gone. X-rays prove this too. The facts are then documented by the International Medical Association of Lourdes run only by doctors, who critically evaluate purported cures and document inexplicable ones… All the SM can say is that it is inexplicable at present.”

Here’s some information, so that you can form your opinion based on facts.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lourdes_Medical_Bureau
en.lourdes-france.org/deepen/cures-and-miracles/the-international-medical-committee

These cures are a phenomenon capable of empirical study and documentation and in fact they are documented empirically. After scientific investigation involving medical records including diagnoses before and after (not anecdotal reports) the cure is found to be medically inexplicable. This is a perfectly valid object of scientific investigation. But, as I said all the SM itself can yield on the issue is “inexplicable,” which again serves my initial point that the SM per se is not a likely tool to adjudicate the question of God and His action in the J-C tradition.

Experiments and statistical correlations are not the only method used in scientific research by a long shot. In fact direct observation of phenmoena is the very origin of all scientific work including formal experiments. Take the discovery of deep sea life forms and eco-systems miles below the surface, far below the level at which light or organisms based on photosynthesis penetrate. This phenomena needs an explanation based on the present state of scientific knowledge. How do they get the energy necessary for metabolism? No experiments could possibly be done until this phenomenon were observed and an explanation sought.

. . . Anecdotal stories are dime a dozen. If you really wish to challenge present something to examine, perform the experiment as indicated in the previous post, with control groups, etc…

Both assertions answered above.

 

[Peter_Plato]

No real difference. Some changes are due to external factors, others are inherent to the object in question. To lead to some “external deity” one would need to argue that all changes are due to some external agent.

Not at all. To lead to an “external deity,” indeed any external cause, it is only necessary to demonstrate that the changes that result from factors that are are inherent to an entity do not adequately explain the existence of that entity. Clearly, if the physical universe, including the time-space continuum, matter and energy all came into existence at the Big Bang instant, along with the laws of physics that govern the interactions that determine the inherent makeup and functioning of the universe, then the universe does not, internally speaking, explain itself and the principle of sufficient reason requires that we look “outside” the universe precisely because nothing inside of it explains how it came to be.

 

[jonathan_hili]

No, I don’t. Look at all the animals, who use a very simple form of induction. They see (or hear, or smell) an enemy, they flee if they can - to preserve their existence. They encounter a food which they ate before, and they “bet” their life that the food will be edible again. Inductive “epistemology” in an instinctual form.

As a matter of fact, rats are extremely observant, and that is why they will avoid food tainted with fast actions poisons. They see other rats tasting something, they see their death soon thereafter, and they “hypothesize” that the “food” is not good for them. Since they do not have a long-term memory, people use slow-acting poisons (blood-thinners) against them.

Those rats do not have a sophisticated “epistemology”, but they sure survive.

Be that as it may, it really doesn’t tackle the problem, since your observation of rats is still based on your observation. How do we know that our empirical faculties are trustworthy at all? I mean, if they are not trustworthy, rats or no rats, you are still getting unreliable results.

Consider Plantinga’s criticism that if our faculties have evolved for survival or functional value, how can you be sure that they are accurate, since as long as the creature survives or functions, they could produce any result?

I don’t. If a method works, it does not need external justification. (This is what the proof of the pudding is all about.)

So are you a pragmatist with regards to epistemology? Again, I’m not sure how this deals with Plantinga’s criticism. Just because a method works, it doesn’t mean that it’s accurate or provides true information.

In a deductive system we define that a proposition is true, if it can be reached from the axioms. Again, this method “works”.

True. Yet this seems to further suggest your position is pragmatic rather than truth-seeking. Does that sound right to you?

No, did not mean that. Mathematics and logic are part of the axiomatic (deductive) sciences, while morality is simply a set of rules of socially acceptable behavior. By the term of “non-physical reality” I mean the alleged existence of gods, angels, demons, and the like. These are alleged entities, which are not material in nature, yet can influence the physical reality, and they can be influenced by our physical reality (prayers, exorcisms, etc). I ask to see an objective, repeatable epistemological method which will enable a skeptic to decide whether propositions concerning this “hypothesized reality” are true or not.

So is what you mean “non-physical creatures” or “beings”? I’d still classify maths, logic and morals as “non-physical reality”, since I think these things are real and also non-physical.

I can see what you are asking, but the only problem is that your method (i.e. pragmatism, at least it seems) does not have an objective, repeatable epistemological method to test it either. I mean, how do you test your proposition? You can test the results of your method but not the actual method itself.

Furthermore, I don’t think you can reach all reality through this kind of repeatable epistemological method. There are many things we take as true that are not subject to such a method, for example, the love of our wives.

 

[Innoruk]

There is no “game” at all and your translation is wanting. A believer does not consider answered prayers as evidence for God vis-à-vis physicalists’/skeptics’ critiques of Judeo-Christian (J-C) theology. We already encounter and live in relation to God prior both to answered/unanswered prayers of petition and skeptic/physicalist critiques. That’s the starting point.

Nevertheless the existence of a few “answered prayers” and miracles are considered and brought up as evidence for the existence of God. (I did not say that it is a primary reason, but it is definitely considered “evidence”) And the existence of zillions of “unanswered prayers” is discarded as irrelevant, and explained away by stipulating that God only answers prayers when he wishes… As I said, the game (and it is a game) is rigged. The believer wishes to “define” the game (and God!) as “if it is heads, I win, if it is tails, you lose”. That is exactly how God’s attitude toward prayers is defined.

I get how if one is already a skeptic/physicalist, Judeo-Christian convictions concerning God and prayer could lead to your value judgments above. I accept that these are your value judgments–God is “unreliable,” and a “a shameless cheater, impostor”–and you have every right to evaluate theism.

You mean that the lack of answered prayers is just a figment of my imagination, or a “value judgment” and not a FACT?

Again, not the case at all. They do not rely for their conclusions on anecdotal reports. I’ll repost what I said before. “Further, how would even a documented miracle (in RC terminology) really count as any evidence of God to a physicalist? Say a person goes to Lourdes, France with late stage degenerative bone cancer. X-rays prove it. That individual comes out of the water and it is gone. X-rays prove this too. The facts are then documented by the International Medical Association of Lourdes run only by doctors, who critically evaluate purported cures and document inexplicable ones… All the SM can say is that it is inexplicable at present.”

That IS the anecdotal evidence for “miracles”. Did they exclude the possibility of a misdiagnosed cancer? Did they exclude the possibility of a misplaced X-ray film? Did they rule out a spontaneous remission? Even if they did all that, it would not point to a “miracle”. As soon as the exit from Lourdes will be covered by abandoned crutches and a demand of a new pair of shoes, there will be something to contemplate. Until then, there is no “miracle”.

Sure, there are lots of unexplained events out there. But that cannot be taken as an indication of the inadequacy of the scientific method. The starting point remains. If there is an interface between the natural and the supernatural, then the supernatural can be detected via the scientific method.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The starting point remains. If there is an interface between the natural and the supernatural, then the supernatural can be detected via the scientific method.

Perhaps, but prayer experiments are not the only means by which the scientific method can be applied to detecting that interface, since they rely on the subjective expectations of individuals who typically have a great deal vested in the outcome and may not, themselves, have a full sense of what constitutes, objectively, the best outcome in the long term.

Secondly, prayer experiments are based upon an unfounded expectation that God answers all prayer according to the terms put forth by the supplicant. This would depend upon some kind of assurance by God that he would indeed answer prayer under those terms. Could you provide evidence that God has actually committed himself by making that kind of promise? As far as I know, no such promise has ever been made by God so there ought not be an expectation that God is constrained to those terms when someone engages in prayer,

This would be another reason for discounting prayer experiments as a legitimate means of detecting the interface between God and the universe, since God is, if anything, an omniscient and omnipotent will who can act according to his own determination concerning how each prayer ought to be answered. That determination, being far superior to human expected results would seem to nullify any reason for thinking that God would engage in a lesser option given that his resources would virtually always come up with a better one than any human supplicant could imagine. Prayer experiments certainly don’t account for the fact that God would have to compromise his goodness, intellect or power in some way if he were to opt for carrying out what an inferior moral intellect could muster by way of a request.

 

[Innoruk]

Be that as it may, it really doesn’t tackle the problem, since your observation of rats is still based on your observation. How do we know that our empirical faculties are trustworthy at all? I mean, if they are not trustworthy, rats or no rats, you are still getting unreliable results.

The rats survive, whether we observe them or not. See the answer about the reliability of the senses below.

Consider Plantinga’s criticism that if our faculties have evolved for survival or functional value, how can you be sure that they are accurate, since as long as the creature survives or functions, they could produce any result?

Ah, the matrix-problem? By definition, the information provided by senses (the raw data) is accurate, however we may interpret it incorrectly. Yes, some philosophers talk about the “unreliability” of our senses… let me translate this: “we cannot see, because we have eyes, we cannot hear, because we have ears…” in other words, our senses are an impediment to perceive “reality”… and of course this view neglects to answer: “just HOW do we know the exact nature of that reality, so we can say that the senses do not convey the correct information about it”?

So are you a pragmatist with regards to epistemology? Again, I’m not sure how this deals with Plantinga’s criticism. Just because a method works, it doesn’t mean that it’s accurate or provides true information.

This sounds like the concept of Plato, and his famous “cave analogy”, and the “perfect ideals” along with their imperfect “shades” in our reality. I always hope to run into a follower of Plato, so I can ask him, just what is the perfect excrement or the ideal vomit, the imperfect representations of which we produce?

True. Yet this seems to further suggest your position is pragmatic rather than truth-seeking. Does that sound right to you?

Yes, since they are the same. The perception of reality is “correct” or “true”, if it promotes our continued existence. What is this “abstract truth” which is separate from our existence?

So is what you mean “non-physical creatures” or “beings”? I’d still classify maths, logic and morals as “non-physical reality”, since I think these things are real and also non-physical.

They are not “real”, they are our abstractions of reality. Yes, there are some philosophers who talk about some “abstract objects”, but they are unable to follow up a criticism. Abstractions are “inert”, objects are not. You need to add two actual hydrogen molecules and one oxygen molecule to get one water molecule - simply writing 2H + O = H[sub]2[/sub]O does not produce a glass of water. I already gave examples of those “non-physical entities”. Where is the epistemology of those? I cannot get an answer.

I can see what you are asking, but the only problem is that your method (i.e. pragmatism, at least it seems) does not have an objective, repeatable epistemological method to test it either. I mean, how do you test your proposition? You can test the results of your method but not the actual method itself.

The method IS tested and validated by the results.

Furthermore, I don’t think you can reach all reality through this kind of repeatable epistemological method. There are many things we take as true that are not subject to such a method, for example, the love of our wives.

Sure you can. You observe your wife’s behavior, and as long as that behavior conforms with what we call “a loving behavior” you can be pretty sure (though not 100% certain) that she loves you.

 

[Innoruk]

Secondly, prayer experiments are based upon an unfounded expectation that God answers all prayer according to the terms put forth by the supplicant. This would depend upon some kind of assurance by God that he would indeed answer prayer under those terms. Could you provide evidence that God has actually committed himself by making that kind of promise? As far as I know, no such promise has ever been made by God so there ought not be an expectation that God is constrained to those terms when someone engages in prayer,

John 14:12-14 “Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father. And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son.If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it.”

John 15:16 “You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you so that you might go and bear fruit—fruit that will last—and so that whatever you ask in my name the Father will give you.”

John 16;23 “Verily, verily, I say unto you, **Whatsoever **ye shall ask the Father in my name, he **will **give it you.”

 

[jonathan_hili]

The rats survive, whether we observe them or not. See the answer about the reliability of the senses below.

Really. How do you know this? A sceptic like Hume might reply that you cannot draw such a generalisation from induction.

Ah, the matrix-problem? By definition, the information provided by senses (the raw data) is accurate, however we may interpret it incorrectly. Yes, some philosophers talk about the “unreliability” of our senses… let me translate this: “we cannot see, because we have eyes, we cannot hear, because we have ears…” in other words, our senses are an impediment to perceive “reality”… and of course this view neglects to answer: “just HOW do we know the exact nature of that reality, so we can say that the senses do not convey the correct information about it”?

Firstly, I’m not sure that “by definition” sense data is accurate, unless you are saying that “reality” is merely a construction of our perceptions, in which case, fair enough. I’d suggest that our sense data is not always accurate, for example, there may be an impediment in your sight so that you do not receive the full colour spectrum, or in your hearing, so that some tones are muffled, etc.

I’m not sure you’re understanding Plantinga’s argument. His point is that unless you have a metaphysic that justifies the reliability of sense perception, there is no reason (based solely on evolutionary mechanisms) to believe that our senses or interpretation of them are veridical.

This sounds like the concept of Plato, and his famous “cave analogy”, and the “perfect ideals” along with their imperfect “shades” in our reality. I always hope to run into a follower of Plato, so I can ask him, just what is the perfect excrement or the ideal vomit, the imperfect representations of which we produce?

Huh? I’m not a Platonist, and that’s not really what Plato contended anyway. His argument was essentially that X exist in our world because it shares in the ideal form of X, that is to say, that any substance X with properties P, Q, R that we observe are somehow epitomised in an ideal. There wouldn’t be a “perfect” excrement or “ideal” vomit in the sense of a tangible or perceivable example, since if it were so, it wouldn’t be an ideal (which, by definition, is not observable).

My argument wasn’t Plato’s - which I don’t think works - but rather that just because some epistemological method works, it doesn’t necessarily follow that it is true. That’s why you need a metaphysic to justify its truth.

Yes, since they are the same. The perception of reality is “correct” or “true”, if it promotes our continued existence. What is this “abstract truth” which is separate from our existence?

Just because something promotes continued existence doesn’t mean it’s true. For example - to use Plantinga’s example - when humans first made contact with tigers, we developed the belief through observation that tigers wanted to chase us because they wanted to play tag, and the best way to play this game was to run away and hide or climb a tree. This is certainly survival-promoting behaviour, since our ancestors would have continued to hide from tigers or climb trees to continue this great game of tag, and therefore they survived. However, while this behaviour has survival value, it is certainly not “correct” or “true” epistemologically, since tigers obviously are not interested in tag but in dinner!

The method IS tested and validated by the results.

How is the method tested? I mean, you can’t observe the method or put it under a microscope. You could argue that the results justify the method, but really the results are interpreted in the light of this method. Yet there is no reason to see why only this method is validated by the results. Why not another method, or else an elaborated form of this method?

Sure you can. You observe your wife’s behavior, and as long as that behavior conforms with what we call “a loving behavior” you can be pretty sure (though not 100% certain) that she loves you.

Often people who love us act in ways we would suggest isn’t “loving behaviour”. I think the problem with the solely observational approach is that behaviour doesn’t equal being. Someone can love someone else but behave horribly towards them. Likewise, someone may despise someone else but (for one reason or another) treat them nicely.

 

[Innoruk]

Really. How do you know this? A sceptic like Hume might reply that you cannot draw such a generalisation from induction.

But I do not use any “induction” or “deduction” here. I use the simple, raw, empirical data: “I survived” therefore the data given to me by the senses was accurate enough, and my interpretation of it was accurate enough. What other method is there to decide the nature of reality? I am curious what your suggestion is: “how do we ascertain that our current model of reality is good enough, without referring to our sensory (name removed by moderator)ut?” What kind of “pure” metaphysical consideration is there which does not need the (name removed by moderator)ut of our senses?

'd suggest that our sense data is not always accurate, for example, there may be an impediment in your sight so that you do not receive the full colour spectrum, or in your hearing, so that some tones are muffled, etc.

Sure thing. What our senses report is not the whole picture. We developed a whole lot of “auxiliary” devices, to enhance and improve on our senses. If our senses are deficient (for example the loss of sight) then our model built upon the remaining data can be deficient, so our survival is less likely.

I’m not sure you’re understanding Plantinga’s argument. His point is that unless you have a metaphysic that justifies the reliability of sense perception, there is no reason (based solely on evolutionary mechanisms) to believe that our senses or interpretation of them are veridical.

And what kind of “evidence” does he present for such an outrageous claim? I would like to see the final part of this sentence: “Our senses do not paint an accurate picture of reality, because we know the actual nature of reality … <how?>”. And make sure that the makes absolutely no reference to the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.

My argument wasn’t Plato’s - which I don’t think works - but rather that just because some epistemological method works, it doesn’t necessarily follow that it is true. That’s why you need a metaphysic to justify its truth.

What metaphysics? Let me see the details.

Just because something promotes continued existence doesn’t mean it’s true. For example - to use Plantinga’s example - when humans first made contact with tigers, we developed the belief through observation that tigers wanted to chase us because they wanted to play tag, and the best way to play this game was to run away and hide or climb a tree. This is certainly survival-promoting behaviour, since our ancestors would have continued to hide from tigers or climb trees to continue this great game of tag, and therefore they survived. However, while this behaviour has survival value, it is certainly not “correct” or “true” epistemologically, since tigers obviously are not interested in tag but in dinner!

Ok, so again, for the “n”-th time, how do you know all that without referring to the senses?

How is the method tested? I mean, you can’t observe the method or put it under a microscope. You could argue that the results justify the method, but really the results are interpreted in the light of this method.

Nope. The results are interpreted directly at the “raw data” level. I don not need any “metaphysics” to know that I am alive.

Yet there is no reason to see why only this method is validated by the results. Why not another method, or else an elaborated form of this method?

Why not indeed? I did not say that this is the ONLY method. If you wish to suggest and promote an alternate method, by my guest. Let me make a just-kidding-type of a suggestion. A “philosopher” suggests that we can “know” the “true” nature of reality with a successive approximation method. We ask a lot of hypothetical “yes-no” questions about the nature of reality. At each question, we toss a coin. if the result is “heads”, we choose a “yes” for the question. If the result is tails, we choose a “no” as the answer. We can be certain (elementary mathematics) that this epistemological method will yield a **correct answer **about 50% of the time! Would you bet your life on this “method”? No? I did not think so.

Often people who love us act in ways we would suggest isn’t “loving behaviour”. I think the problem with the solely observational approach is that behaviour doesn’t equal being.

Well, let’s play a game: “imagine that a wild lion is charging toward you”. Based upon the “inferior” empirical and observational method, I would try to escape. What would you do? Stay put and contemplate: “Well maybe my senses do not provide sufficiently reliable data… maybe that vicious lion is simply cute, little kitten, which would like to play with me…”. My model of the reality would allow me to survive. Your model would kill you. I am alive and you are dead. That is a “good enough” outcome for me. (Of course I do not want you dead. )

Someone can love someone else but behave horribly towards them. Likewise, someone may despise someone else but (for one reason or another) treat them nicely.

Sure, it is possible. I did not say that the method is foolproof, it is merely good enough.

Anyhow, please! Do present me with your suggested metaphysical “view” which will allow you to build a better model of reality. I don’t even ask to build a 100% model, just a better one. And answer this question: “how do you ascertain that your model fits the objective reality without referring to your senses”. I would be very grateful, if you only concentrated upon this humble request.

 

[Peter_Plato]

John 14:12-14 “Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father. And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son.If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it.”

John 15:16 “You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you so that you might go and bear fruit—fruit that will last—and so that whatever you ask in my name the Father will give you.”

John 16;23 “Verily, verily, I say unto you, **Whatsoever **ye shall ask the Father in my name, he **will **give it you.”

This is an interesting isolation of specific texts from the entire body of a discourse that was addressed only to the disciples after the last supper. It is not clear that it works to support your point. If anything, the discourse demonstrates that Jesus promised his disciples that whatsoever THEY asked would be answered. He did not address this to the crowds at large, so there is no presumption that the promise was intended “for anyone.”

Even if it wasn’t intended as a promise merely to the disciples, however, there is a strong condition for the “whatsoever” you ask, i.e., that it be asked “in my name.” What precisely that condition means would be important to understand before we go off with a complete misunderstanding of the intention.

In the remaining portions of the discourse, Jesus specifies what asking “in his name” entails.

Remain in me, as I remain in you. Just as a branch cannot bear fruit on its own unless it remains on the vine, so neither can you unless you remain in me.
I am the vine, you are the branches. Whoever remains in me and I in him will bear much fruit, because without me you can do nothing.
Anyone who does not remain in me will be thrown out like a branch and wither; people will gather them and throw them into a fire and they will be burned.
If you remain in me and my words remain in you, ask for whatever you want and it will be done for you.
By this is my Father glorified, that you bear much fruit and become my disciples.
As the Father loves me, so I also love you. Remain in my love.
If you keep my commandments, you will remain in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commandments and remain in his love.

Notice the conditions for “whatever you ask” to be done is that “you remain in me” and that “my words remain in you.” (See blue portion above.) This specifies the meaning of “in my name” as something like “in my place” which essentially means united in love with the will and mind of Jesus and presumes keeping “My Father’s” commandments.

So the conditionals for “whatsoever you ask” are something like:

If you keep my commandments, then you will remain in my love.
If you remain in my love, then I will come to you and you will be in me and I in you.
If you remain in me and I in you, then ask for whatever you want and it will be done.

Clearly, what is meant here is not that whatever is asked by anyone of any mind will be done simply because they ask (pray) for it. The implications of such an interpretation would mean that Christ made the promise in such a general sense that even if I willed evil on someone he would accomplish that because he promised that “whatever” I ask he would carry out, which is simply out of the question and defeats such a wide open interpretation (let’s call it the “Magic Genie” version) of the text.

As I admitted before, prayer experiments do work in dispelling the existence of a Magic Genie who complies with every request, but that is not the same as the God of Judeo-Christianity who has moral and intellectual superiority and is capable of making judgements concerning the appropriateness and desirability of requests.

The fact that Jesus was only speaking to the disciples in this discourse and set very specific conditions on the “whatever you ask” as something like “being united with the will and love of the Father” means that the prerequisite for using this entire discourse as a premise for prayer experiments is that the determination must first be made that supplicants are 1) disciples to whom the promise was made or 2) those who are completely complying with God’s commandments, are remaining in the love of Christ and are one with him. Were those prerequisites set when selecting supplicants in any of the prayer experiments? How was the determination made that the supplicants were not a) lying about their state or b) simply mistaken about it.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Nevertheless the existence of a few “answered prayers” and miracles are considered and brought up as evidence for the existence of God. (I did not say that it is a primary reason, but it is definitely considered “evidence”) And the existence of zillions of “unanswered prayers” is discarded as irrelevant, and explained away by stipulating that God only answers prayers when he wishes… As I said, the game (and it is a game) is rigged. The believer wishes to “define” the game (and God!) as “if it is heads, I win, if it is tails, you lose”. That is exactly how God’s attitude toward prayers is defined.

The believer historically has been relating to God and praying within the J-C tradition for his reasons, not vis-à-vis physicalists’/skeptics’ later critiques. The express purpose of Christian teaching is and has been to meet the needs of the human heart and soul, not respond to the recent objections of physicalists. How can there be a game with physicalists/skeptics? Physicalists’ historically-recent critiques based on their epistemology weren’t even in the picture at the time of Christ to say nothing of the Old Testament. The believer’s experience and relationship with God in prayer (of which only a part is prayer of petition) takes place within the context of the whole of the Christian worldview, not as evidentiary ammo to load into their arguments in discussions with physicalists/skeptics and their epistemology.

Now if by “rigged” you mean that God and prayer as defined within the J-C tradition are not amenable to verification by the SM until certain serious difficulties have been resolved, you are making my point.

If you want to say that when you look at the teachings of Christianity on prayer you find the portrayal of God to be unreliable and therefore a fraud, etc., I can discuss why I and billions of Christians let alone other theists don’t experience it that way. You may or may not be convinced. That’s fair enough.

Originally Posted by Fr of Jazz
I get how if one is already a skeptic/physicalist, Judeo-Christian convictions concerning God and prayer could lead to your value judgments above. I accept that these are your value judgments–God is “unreliable,” and a “a shameless cheater, impostor”–and you have every right to evaluate theism.

You mean that the lack of answered prayers is just a figment of my imagination, or a “value judgment” and not a FACT?

Read what I said. The fact of answered/unanswered prayers of petition is contained in Christian theology of prayer. If you don’t like that theology, that’s your value judgment of it to which you have every right. But you have to start with J-C theology as it is.

That IS the anecdotal evidence for “miracles”. Did they exclude the possibility of a misdiagnosed cancer? Did they exclude the possibility of a misplaced X-ray film? Did they rule out a spontaneous remission? Even if they did all that, it would not point to a “miracle”.

They did do all that–read the details of it. And you made my point: the most that the SM itself can say about what RCs call “miracles” at Lourdes under the most rigorous conditions is that they are unexplained. Again not useful.

As soon as the exit from Lourdes will be covered by abandoned crutches and a demand of a new pair of shoes, there will be something to contemplate. Until then, there is no “miracle”.

So now we’re back to testing for god with the SM based on the paradigm and definition of physicalists that he is like the force, law, or object of nature that can be isolated, tested, predicted, and controlled; and not testing for the J-C God as defined by the very tradition you are evaluating. How on earth could this possibly be a valid test?

Sure, there are lots of unexplained events out there. But that cannot be taken as an indication of the inadequacy of the scientific method. The starting point remains. If there is an interface between the natural and the supernatural, then the supernatural can be detected via the scientific method.

I reaffirm that the SM is adequate for the purpose and objects it was developed in history to investigate, which I outlined and we agreed upon.

The reassertion of your starting point is what remains, but you have even still not defended it and your rebuttal has been unsuccessful.

You have yet to start with the God and theology of prayer as defined in the J-C tradition and then show that the SM can legitimately be brought to bear on them.

Show concretely and specifically what kind of scientific test the physicalists would perform and what kind of scientific results they might expect that would be significant for the J-C theology of God and prayer not the physicalists’ definition. You have not done so and instead give me your value judgment on the theology itself, a separate question.

Scientists themselves find intercessory prayer as an invalid scientific construct and reject on methodological grounds the application of statistical techniques to what, for the SM, is considered to be a metaphysical causal phenomenon.

The most that the SM itself can say about what RCs call “miracles” at Lourdes under the most rigorous conditions is that they are unexplained. Again not useful.

Given that all you are looking for is statistical correlations which scientists themselves find to be invalid for the object under consideration #8 above which is necessary to overcome is not in play at the moment. “It ignores the possibility that God’s interaction with physical reality may be apprehensible only by a cognitive act (by the intellect), and not by direct empirical observation.”

And you still haven’t given us the slightest clue why we should abandon our epistemology and adopt that of the physicalist/skeptic.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Nope. The results are interpreted directly at the “raw data” level. I don not need any “metaphysics” to know that I am alive.

Sure you do. The “raw data” level tells you THAT you are experiencing and aware, but it does not tell you WHAT you are experiencing. To conclude that you know that you are alive presumes some understanding of what “alive” means and that your immediate experience matches that state. That presumes a metaphysic of some sort.

Any awareness in the sense of “knowing” entails the ability to abstract from related experiences a concept of some sort, in this case a concept of what “alive” means. That presumes a metaphysic.

Presumably, some lower life forms are “alive” to some degree but do not know what that means because they cannot build a conception of “alive” to apply to the experience.

There is a further step beyond conceiving which is that of explicating or depicting the metaphysic in words or objective terms. That is the step that you seem to be implying is required to “have” a metaphysic. It is not clear that such a step is necessary. Having a functional metaphysic is one thing, being able to explicate it is something quite different.

Having intelligence and using it to understand experiences (cognition) presumes a functional metaphysic and is not the same as being able to express that understanding in a way that convinces anyone including myself that intelligence is functional (metacognition.)

 

[tonyrey]

The believer historically has been relating to God and praying within the J-C tradition for his reasons, not vis-à-vis physicalists’/skeptics’ later critiques. The express purpose of Christian teaching is and has been to meet the needs of the human heart and soul, not respond to the recent objections of physicalists. How can there be a game with physicalists/skeptics? Physicalists’ historically-recent critiques based on their epistemology weren’t even in the picture at the time of Christ to say nothing of the Old Testament. The believer’s experience and relationship with God in prayer (of which only a part is prayer of petition) takes place within the context of the whole of the Christian worldview, not as evidentiary ammo to load into their arguments in discussions with physicalists/skeptics and their epistemology.

Now if by “rigged” you mean that God and prayer as defined within the J-C tradition are not amenable to verification by the SM until certain serious difficulties have been resolved, you are making my point.

If you want to say that when you look at the teachings of Christianity on prayer you find the portrayal of God to be unreliable and therefore a fraud, etc., I can discuss why I and billions of Christians let alone other theists don’t experience it that way. You may or may not be convinced. That’s fair enough.

Read what I said. The fact of answered/unanswered prayers of petition is contained in Christian theology of prayer. If you don’t like that theology, that’s your value judgment of it to which you have every right. But you have to start with J-C theology as it is.

They did do all that–read the details of it. And you made my point: the most that the SM itself can say about what RCs call “miracles” at Lourdes under the most rigorous conditions is that they are unexplained. Again not useful.

So now we’re back to testing for god with the SM based on the paradigm and definition of physicalists that he is like the force, law, or object of nature that can be isolated, tested, predicted, and controlled; and not testing for the J-C God as defined by the very tradition you are evaluating. How on earth could this possibly be a valid test?

I reaffirm that the SM is adequate for the purpose and objects it was developed in history to investigate, which I outlined and we agreed upon.

The reassertion of your starting point is what remains, but you have even still not defended it and your rebuttal has been unsuccessful.

You have yet to start with the God and theology of prayer as defined in the J-C tradition and then show that the SM can legitimately be brought to bear on them.

Show concretely and specifically what kind of scientific test the physicalists would perform and what kind of scientific results they might expect that would be significant for the J-C theology of God and prayer not the physicalists’ definition. You have not done so and instead give me your value judgment on the theology itself, a separate question.

Scientists themselves find intercessory prayer as an invalid scientific construct and reject on methodological grounds the application of statistical techniques to what, for the SM, is considered to be a metaphysical causal phenomenon.

The most that the SM itself can say about what RCs call “miracles” at Lourdes under the most rigorous conditions is that they are unexplained. Again not useful.

Given that all you are looking for is statistical correlations which scientists themselves find to be invalid for the object under consideration #8 above which is necessary to overcome is not in play at the moment. “It ignores the possibility that God’s interaction with physical reality may be apprehensible only by a cognitive act (by the intellect), and not by direct empirical observation.”

And you still haven’t given us the slightest clue why we should abandon our epistemology and adopt that of the physicalist/skeptic.

Both are self-destructive.

 

[bcuster]

You are assuming that the purpose of philosophers is to be useful. Perhaps philosophers just are.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Science makes no claims for wisdom. It claims knowledge only of the physical world.

That certainly leaves a vast intellectual territory for philosophers to cover.

 

[jonathan_hili]

But I do not use any “induction” or “deduction” here. I use the simple, raw, empirical data: “I survived” therefore the data given to me by the senses was accurate enough, and my interpretation of it was accurate enough. What other method is there to decide the nature of reality? I am curious what your suggestion is: “how do we ascertain that our current model of reality is good enough, without referring to our sensory (name removed by moderator)ut?” What kind of “pure” metaphysical consideration is there which does not need the (name removed by moderator)ut of our senses?

But that is induction, since you have draw a probabilistic conclusion from empirical data. Again, why should our senses and interpretation be accurate just because we survive? There doesn’t seem to be any logically necessary connection.

I think, to follow on from Plantinga, that we require a metaphysical perspective which guarantees and safeguards our minds’ truthful interpretation of reality through sense data. “Survival value” doesn’t do this on its own.

If our senses are deficient (for example the loss of sight) then our model built upon the remaining data can be deficient, so our survival is less likely.

But again, you are assuming that our senses need to be accurate for us to survive. Why? There are any number of scenarios that could be illustrated where the interpretation of our senses, though woefully inaccurate, could contribute to survival value.

And what kind of “evidence” does he present for such an outrageous claim? I would like to see the final part of this sentence: “Our senses do not paint an accurate picture of reality, because we know the actual nature of reality … <how?>”. And make sure that the makes absolutely no reference to the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.

He doesn’t have to - in fact, he doesn’t believe our senses are inaccurate, and neither do I. All I am arguing is that this criticism serves as a defeater to your position, since you don’t seem to put forward a basis that substantiates our sense interpretation other than survival value or pragmatism.

What metaphysics? Let me see the details.

Well, an obvious one would be that our minds have been designed so as to properly interpret reality, and this would require a greater mind to do so.

Ok, so again, for the “n”-th time, how do you know all that without referring to the senses?

But that’s the whole point - you don’t need to know such an example is true. For it to serve as a potential defeater, it just has to be reasonably possible. In fact, if the alternative were true (i.e. our interpretation of our senses need not be accurate for survival value and the natural world is all there is), then we could never know, which basically leads to epistemological agnosticism. I don’t believe that, and I do believe our senses and interpretation of them are accurate, but my question is how, from your perspective, can you really argue against the defeater?

Nope. The results are interpreted directly at the “raw data” level. I don not need any “metaphysics” to know that I am alive.

Really? Some philosophers would argue that we do not perceive the world directly but only our own perspectives. In which case, we can’t be sure of this.

Well, let’s play a game: “imagine that a wild lion is charging toward you”. Based upon the “inferior” empirical and observational method, I would try to escape. What would you do? Stay put and contemplate: “Well maybe my senses do not provide sufficiently reliable data… maybe that vicious lion is simply cute, little kitten, which would like to play with me…”. My model of the reality would allow me to survive. Your model would kill you. I am alive and you are dead. That is a “good enough” outcome for me. (Of course I do not want you dead. )

Sigh But the point is - even if it did help you survive, that doesn’t prove that it’s true. After all, if a wild lion was charging towards me, I might believe the lion is running to eat the nearest apples, so I might try to beat him up the tree to eat them first. This would still allow me to survive but is hardly an accurate picture of reality.

Obviously, fleeing from a threat like a lion is essentially an instinctive response. But again, why believe that instinctive responses are true pictures of reality? There are some instinctive responses - such as the desire for revenge or to sexually take a woman - which we would question.

Anyhow, please! Do present me with your suggested metaphysical “view” which will allow you to build a better model of reality. I don’t even ask to build a 100% model, just a better one. And answer this question: “how do you ascertain that your model fits the objective reality without referring to your senses”. I would be very grateful, if you only concentrated upon this humble request.

Actually, like you, I’m a philosophical realist. But I also think we need a metaphysic that justifies our noetic structure, why we should trust our perceptions and beliefs. Theism, I believe, can do this.

 

[myelin]

the atheist philosophers are excellent at debunking the heresy’s.