Another reason why philosophers are useless

[Peter_Plato]

You are assuming that the purpose of philosophers is to be useful. Perhaps philosophers just are.

Or another way of putting this is that the true good is not good as a means to some other end but rather as an end in itself. It is like that with truth and the pursuit of truth, which is the point of philosophy. If it were done for the sake of some other good, then it would not be a good in itself. Love of wisdom is its own end and not done for some other, more mundane purpose.

If anyone wants to make the case that philosophy is not useful, they would have to offer an end that is more worthwhile than knowing the truth. Innoruk’s case seems to be that survival is more important than possessing wisdom or truth. It is not clear that is the case, however, because the quality of one’s life ultimately depends upon knowing the truth of what it means to not merely to survive but to be fully alive, which involves the exercise of all of one’s faculties, especially, as a human, those pertaining to the intellect and the proper ordering of one’s life towards the true, the good and the beautiful.

 

[jonathan_hili]

I suppose, Innoruk, I’d put it like this:

Imagine you were conducting an empirical experiment. You had two teams of the same number of people, each in a locked room. Down one end you had a hungry lion in a cage, down the other, ropes to lead them to freedom. You told one group that once the lion was out of the cage, they should follow their instinct to run for safety by climbing the ropes. You told the other group that once the lion was out of the cage, you guessed that it wanted to play tag and the best way to win was to climb up the rope and escape before the lion could tag you. In such an experiment either side could have more survivors - it is even possible that the side that is “playing tag” with the lion could have more survivors. But surely it doesn’t follow from this that this interpretation of reality is truthful because it promoted survival. That’s the main problem I have with justifying our interpretation of sense data on survival value - it does not have to be truthful.

Now, presumably one could respond by saying: “But if it wasn’t truthful, we wouldn’t survive.” Yet this is presumed rather than proven, that is, one takes the accuracy of our noetic faculties on faith. The question is what metaphysical worldview justifies such faith.

 

[Innoruk]

In fact, if the alternative were true (i.e. our interpretation of our senses need not be accurate for survival value and the natural world is all there is), then we could never know, which basically leads to epistemological agnosticism.

Yes, we never “know”, IF by the word “know” you mean an absolute, 100%, infallible, never-to-be-updated model of reality. “Knowledge” does not work like that. Reality does not work like that. You may call it “agnosticism”, but in reality all of our interpretations are tentative. And that is perfectly fine. We ascertain our model by constantly comparing it to the perceived reality. If the model is incorrect, or the perception of reality is incorrect - then we shall die.

No other “justification” is needed. As always, there are one-off exceptions, like the ones Plantinga brings up, but we do not care about the once-in-a-billion exceptions, we care about the rules we must live by - if we wish to survive - because that is what epistemology is all about.

Sigh But the point is - even if it did help you survive, that doesn’t prove that it’s true.

Two problems here:

1. What is “true” here? A model is true, if it reflects reality correctly enough so we can make predictions, perform experiments and verify their results. What other “truth” are you (or Plantinga) advocating?
2. One cannot “prove” a principle. One can only **substantiate **it. And the constant substantiation by zillions of experiments is the only justification we ever need.

 

[tonyrey]

Or another way of putting this is that the true good is not good as a means to some other end but rather as an end in itself. It is like that with truth and the pursuit of truth, which is the point of philosophy. If it were done for the sake of some other good, then it would not be a good in itself. Love of wisdom is its own end and not done for some other, more mundane purpose.

If anyone wants to make the case that philosophy is not useful, they would have to offer an end that is more worthwhile than knowing the truth. Innoruk’s case seems to be that survival is more important than possessing wisdom or truth. It is not clear that is the case, however, because the quality of one’s life ultimately depends upon knowing the truth of what it means to not merely to survive but to be fully alive, which involves the exercise of all of one’s faculties, especially, as a human, those pertaining to the intellect and the proper ordering of one’s life towards the true, the good and the beautiful.

Love of wisdom is certainly a good in itself but it cannot be isolated from personal fulfilment - which is not a mundane purpose (unless one unrealistically - and immorally - equates persons with things). Of course this doesn’t make sense to those whose philosophy is obtaining as much wealth, power and pleasure as possible…

 

[jonathan_hili]

Yes, we never “know”, IF by the word “know” you mean an absolute, 100%, infallible, never-to-be-updated model of reality. “Knowledge” does not work like that. Reality does not work like that. You may call it “agnosticism”, but in reality all of our interpretations are tentative. And that is perfectly fine. We ascertain our model by constantly comparing it to the perceived reality. If the model is incorrect, or the perception of reality is incorrect - then we shall die.

No other “justification” is needed. As always, there are one-off exceptions, like the ones Plantinga brings up, but we do not care about the once-in-a-billion exceptions, we care about the rules we must live by - if we wish to survive - because that is what epistemology is all about.

While, again, I don’t disagree with the general thrust, the sceptic still can contend here:
(i) If all our interpretations are tentative, why even trust them? Surely, there must be some interpretive basis that isn’t tentative but certain (as Descartes tried to determine)?
(ii) If we can’t be absolutely certain about our interpretation of reality, why should we think that Plantinga’s suggestions are one-off exceptions? How do we know that our interpretation of reality isn’t exactly as Plantinga suggests - that is, our noetic faculties are highly inaccurate - but that just happen to have survival value?

Two problems here:

1. What is “true” here? A model is true, if it reflects reality correctly enough so we can make predictions, perform experiments and verify their results. What other “truth” are you (or Plantinga) advocating?
2. One cannot “prove” a principle. One can only **substantiate **it. And the constant substantiation by zillions of experiments is the only justification we ever need.

Well, for “truth” I would say “that which corresponds to reality”. It doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with making predictions or performing experiments. If life truly exists on another planet, we might not know it but it would still be true. I’m not talking about models but rather reality as it is.

Let’s assume one cannot prove a principle, that you take it on faith. What then substantiates the principle that “experimentation justifies principles”? There doesn’t seem to be an experiment that justifies that.

 

[Innoruk]

While, again, I don’t disagree with the general thrust, the sceptic still can contend here:
(i) If all our interpretations are tentative, why even trust them? Surely, there must be some interpretive basis that isn’t tentative but certain (as Descartes tried to determine)?
(ii) If we can’t be absolutely certain about our interpretation of reality, why should we think that Plantinga’s suggestions are one-off exceptions? How do we know that our interpretation of reality isn’t exactly as Plantinga suggests - that is, our noetic faculties are highly inaccurate - but that just happen to have survival value?

The reason is simple. The reliability of the claims is not necessarily the same. One is much better established than the other. Before you ask: we know this by testing the claims against the reality.

Well, for “truth” I would say “that which corresponds to reality”.

I agree, of course. But how do you know if a claim corresponds to reality, or not? This is the fundamental question of epistemology.

It doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with making predictions or performing experiments.

What else? This is the other fundamental question. Give me examples.

If life truly exists on another planet, we might not know it but it would still be true. I’m not talking about models but rather reality as it is.

How do you know it is true? That is the next fundamental question.

Let’s assume one cannot prove a principle, that you take it on faith.

What do you mean by the word: “faith”? This is one of the most abused words around here. Preemptive observation: “Faith is not the same as less than 100% knowledge”. There are level of certainty. The “expectation” that my car will start tomorrow is not the same as my “expectation” that I will win a jackpot this week. To act equally based upon on these expectations would be extremely foolish. I suggest to drop the word “faith”, since it is much too ambiguous.

What then substantiates the principle that “experimentation justifies principles”? There doesn’t seem to be an experiment that justifies that.

Not ONE experiment. Millions of them. Not a proof (as we agree) but a very, very strong indication.

 

[jonathan_hili]

The reason is simple. The reliability of the claims is not necessarily the same. One is much better established than the other. Before you ask: we know this by testing the claims against the reality.

But we are testing the claims against the same perceived reality. If the perception or interpretation of reality is untrustworthy to begin with, how does such a test help?

I agree, of course. But how do you know if a claim corresponds to reality, or not? This is the fundamental question of epistemology.

I don’t disagree with testing such claims, Innoruk. As I said, I don’t really disagree with your position. I just think we need a metaphysical foundation that supports such a position (such as Christian theism).

How do you know it is true? That is the next fundamental question.

I thought we were talking about truth? If so, whether we know something is true or not, it remains true.

What do you mean by the word: “faith”? This is one of the most abused words around here. Preemptive observation: “Faith is not the same as less than 100% knowledge”. There are level of certainty. The “expectation” that my car will start tomorrow is not the same as my “expectation” that I will win a jackpot this week. To act equally based upon on these expectations would be extremely foolish. I suggest to drop the word “faith”, since it is much too ambiguous.

By “faith” I mean trust in something or position that isn’t based on evidence. Principles such as “the reliability of our noetic faculties” are taken on faith, since they cannot be proved.

Not ONE experiment. Millions of them. Not a proof (as we agree) but a very, very strong indication.

It’s not an indication at all. There is no experiment that can justify or even indicate that “experimentation justifies principles”, for the obvious reason that this principle needs to be accepted a priori.

 

[Innoruk]

But we are testing the claims against the same perceived reality. If the perception or interpretation of reality is untrustworthy to begin with, how does such a test help?

I did not say it is “untrustworthy”. I only said that we need to be aware that our perception or our interpretation might not be 100% correct. And we “test” for a possible discrepancy, while “betting” our life on it. Reality does not care about our perception or our interpretation. If our perception or interpretation is really “off the mark”, we pay with our life. If they are just a little bit off the mark, we suffer some disadvantage.

But the final point is that our life, or well-being are the final arbiters of the precision of the perception, or interpretation. There is no “perception” problem when it come to our biological well being. We cannot be “mistaken” when it comes to: “am I alive?”. There is no need for any “metaphysical” underpinning.

I don’t disagree with testing such claims, Innoruk. As I said, I don’t really disagree with your position.

You seem to misunderstand. You said (and I agree) that a “claim is true, if it corresponds to reality”. My question is: “how do you know if a claim corresponds to reality”? My suggested method is simple: compare the claim to reality - but this involves our perception, and you suggest that perception can be incorrect. So you insinuate the existence of a “better” method which does not include “perception”.

I just think we need a metaphysical foundation that supports such a position (such as Christian theism).

Animals have no metaphysics and yet they function just fine.

I thought we were talking about truth? If so, whether we know something is true or not, it remains true.

If you cannot separate a “true” and a “false” proposition, then to say that a proposition is “true” is meaningless.

By “faith” I mean trust in something or position that isn’t based on evidence. Principles such as “the reliability of our noetic faculties” are taken on faith, since they cannot be proved.

This usage of faith is much too broad. You cannot “prove” that the Earth will not fall into the Sun five minutes from now, but call that “faith” only serves to spread confusion.

It’s not an indication at all. There is no experiment that can justify or even indicate that “experimentation justifies principles”, for the obvious reason that this principle needs to be accepted a priori.

The principle is not accepted a-priori. It is the distillate of innumerable (unreliable???) observations and also innumerable (unreliable???) interpretations. One can function perfectly well without ever even thinking about such principles, but implicitly live according them. Once more: “The proof of the pudding is that it is edible” - all philosophical mumbo-jumbo aside.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Animals have no metaphysics and yet they function just fine.

Animals function fine at survival. But what do we know about their ability to discern the truth?

This usage of faith is much too broad. You cannot “prove” that the Earth will not fall into the Sun five minutes from now, but call that “faith” only serves to spread confusion.

I disagree. I think it makes perfect sense to use the word “faith” to describe a trust in something unproved.

The principle is not accepted a-priori. It is the distillate of innumerable (unreliable???) observations and also innumerable (unreliable???) interpretations. One can function perfectly well without ever even thinking about such principles, but implicitly live according them. Once more: “The proof of the pudding is that it is edible” - all philosophical mumbo-jumbo aside.

Here we go again! The problem is - as I’ve said before - the only way you can make that claim is if you believe, a priori, on faith, that our interpretation of reality is reliable. How can “experimentation justifies principles” be based on experimentation (i.e. observation and interpretation) without presuming beforehand that experimentation is a valid form of justification for principles since you are using experimentation?

My question to you is: Why should I not believe that my noetic faculties are unreliable? If you say, because they have survival value, I respond with Plantinga: survival value does not equal truth. If you say, because of all these innumerable observations and interpretations that have taken place over time, I respond by saying: sure, but since it is these very noetic faculties that make the observations and interpretations, we are not really in a better position; unless, which I’m contending you do - and indeed I myself do - take it on faith that our noetic faculties are geared to truth and can accurately interpret reality. But if this is the case, which I believe it is, what worldview best makes sense of this?

 

[Innoruk]

Animals function fine at survival. But what do we know about their ability to discern the truth?

Nothing at all. That shows that the ability to “discern THE truth” is not important. The animals can build a model of reality (instinctively, of course) and they perceive reality sufficiently well, and so they survive. Your question is the evidence that this “nebulous truth” is irrelevant.

I disagree. I think it makes perfect sense to use the word “faith” to describe a trust in something unproved.

Only if you wish to muddy the waters. To put the “reasonable expectation” (that the Earth will not fall into the Sun within the next five minutes) and the “ridiculous expectation” (that one will hit the jackpot at the next drawing) into the same basket - and call both “faith” (trusting both and acting upon them) is as irrational as it can be. And I refuse to entertain such irrationality.

You forgot to answer my question: “how do you know if a claim corresponds to reality”? This is still the most important question of all. You keep talking about this “truth”, and keep on evading the question: “how do you know that your model of reality is true or false?”

Before this question is answered, there is nothing to talk about.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Nothing at all. That shows that the ability to “discern THE truth” is not important. The animals can build a model of reality (instinctively, of course) and they perceive reality sufficiently well, and so they survive. Your question is the evidence that this “nebulous truth” is irrelevant.

Exactly! That’s the point I’ve been trying to make all along. Now, if the ability to discern the truth is not important for survival, or “functioning”, why should we believe any of our models of reality are actually true, even if they do work?

Only if you wish to muddy the waters. To put the “reasonable expectation” (that the Earth will not fall into the Sun within the next five minutes) and the “ridiculous expectation” (that one will hit the jackpot at the next drawing) into the same basket - and call both “faith” (trusting both and acting upon them) is as irrational as it can be. And I refuse to entertain such irrationality.

But there is a difference between the occurrence of events based on probability and the acceptance of principles based on nothing. That’s why I think that such acceptance of principles is based on faith, because it presupposes a truth that cannot itself be demonstrated or evidenced.

You forgot to answer my question: “how do you know if a claim corresponds to reality”? This is still the most important question of all. You keep talking about this “truth”, and keep on evading the question: “how do you know that your model of reality is true or false?”

Haven’t I already said that I don’t actually disagree with your perspective on how we discern some truths: I’m all for observation, experimentation, induction and deduction. But I’m trying to stress that we need a metaphysic that actually substantiates all this.

I trust in my noetic faculties because I believe God has created the human mind to know truth, not simply to survive, because ultimately we are created to know God, who is Truth. Consequently, I see no problem with using empirical or deductive methods to reach the truth in some circumstances because the faculties upon which these methods depend are essentially trustworthy.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Worldwide from the dawn of human history philosophers and religious founders have asserted that the world had a beginning. Many of the stories about that beginning, it is true, were fanciful. Yet all those stories are tied to a common universal instinct. Only in modern times has science begun to confirm the story of Creation with the Big Bang theory. So religion and philosophy after all were not useless in affirming universally the idea of Creation as a special event which needs to be somehow explained. Science, while it has not explained the details of the Big Bang, still has been able to affirm that the religious impulse was valid. As Pope Pius XII put it: “True science to an ever-increasing degree discovers God as though God were waiting behind each closed door opened by science.”

 

[Innoruk]

Exactly! That’s the point I’ve been trying to make all along. Now, if the ability to discern the truth is not important for survival, or “functioning”, why should we believe any of our models of reality are actually true, even if they do work?

You are playing word-games. What is actually true? Does it mean that it corresponds to reality? If so, then how do you know it? I have only one method: “compare the model to the reality” - even though I am aware that neither the model nor the comparison process are foolproof. But again, based upon the frequencies of survival, I can say with almost 100% probability (or practically 100% probability) that the model correctly represents reality - and as such it is “true”.

But there is a difference between the occurrence of events based on probability and the acceptance of principles based on nothing. That’s why I think that such acceptance of principles is based on faith, because it presupposes a truth that cannot itself be demonstrated or evidenced.

To base something on probabilities IS a basic principle. Basic principles in the real world are exactly like the axioms in the abstract sciences. Neither of them can be “proven”, but that does not make them accepted on “faith”. We don’t need “faith” that “A is A”. The attempt to wash away differences between reasonable expectations and widely improbable expectations is dishonest (if you know what you doing) and dumb (if you don’t). Sorry for the “harsh” words, but I am sick and tired of the attempts to “smuggle in” faith. The word “faith” means to accept the veracity of something for which there is “scant evidence” or “no evidence” at all. In the worst case scenario faith means to believe something contrary to evidence (blind faith).

Haven’t I already said that I don’t actually disagree with your perspective on how we discern some truths: I’m all for observation, experimentation, induction and deduction.

In this conversation we are only talking about the “external reality”, not the abstract sciences. And no, you did NOT say explicitly (and you do NOT say it now) that the way to know if a proposition about the external reality is “true” or not if you compare the proposition to the reality. You - very ingeniously - answered my question with a question (which, by the way is against the forum rules). Now, I am going to hypothesize: “you are attempting to AVOID to come clean and say explicitly that actual comparison is needed to find out if a proposition about external reality is true or not - because then my next question will be - ‘and how about the postulated God and his ilk’?” After all you are a smart person.

But I’m trying to stress that we need a metaphysic that actually substantiates all this.

And the merry-go-round continues. The animals need no “metaphysic”. You have no argument “why” should one need any special “metaphysic”.

I trust in my noetic faculties because I believe God has created the human mind to know truth, not simply to survive, because ultimately we are created to know God, who is Truth. Consequently, I see no problem with using empirical or deductive methods to reach the truth in some circumstances because the faculties upon which these methods depend are essentially trustworthy.

Ah, but does not help at all. Your metaphysical foundation does not help you to make more correct observations or build a better model of reality. As a matter of fact, it needlessly complicates the issue. The “survival” model is simple and sufficient to build “good models”. The “God gave us the ability” model does not add anything. It is more complicated without any added benefits. Not just does not explain the “observation” method and the “model building” facility, it obscures the simple evolutionary method and adds a layer of “unknowable”. Not that this makes this model “false”. Occam’s razor does not help to decide if a model is true or false. It simply discards the more complicated model in favor of the simpler one, as long as both have equal explanatory value. It only makes the “theistic model” unnecessary and useless, but NOT false.

 

[jonathan_hili]

You are playing word-games. What is actually true? Does it mean that it corresponds to reality? If so, then how do you know it? I have only one method: “compare the model to the reality” - even though I am aware that neither the model nor the comparison process are foolproof. But again, based upon the frequencies of survival, I can say with almost 100% probability (or practically 100% probability) that the model correctly represents reality - and as such it is “true”.

But don’t you see what you’re saying? The question is this: How do we know that our noetic faculties correspond to reality? Your answer seems to be (and correct me if I’m wrong), “compare the model to the reality”. Yet if it is our very noetic faculties that are in question, any “reality” we perceive as a comparison point to a hypothesised model might still be wrong. Saying that “frequency of survival” suggests it isn’t wrong doesn’t help, since the survival of X does not mean that X can properly discern truth, i.e. reality.

As I’ve said, we need a worldview that first substantiates our noetic faculties as “truth gathering”. If we can do that, we have a basis on which to stand. Don’t you agree?

To base something on probabilities IS a basic principle.

Of course it is - and it’s accepted on faith. “I base the truth of X on the probability that X has more often than not occurred.” Oh, so why believe the principle: “That which has more often than not occurred is true or more likely true”? The only answer can be: “Because it has more often than not occurred”, which means, it is taken on faith. Hume, I think, argued convincingly that induction cannot deal with this problem.

Basic principles in the real world are exactly like the axioms in the abstract sciences. Neither of them can be “proven”, but that does not make them accepted on “faith”. We don’t need “faith” that “A is A”.

Yes, that’s what I mean. To say an axiom can’t be proven means you take it on faith that it’s true. “A is A” is true by definition - it cannot be wrong. But “that the sun will rise tomorrow” can most certainly be wrong, and nothing - i.e. no principle - can prove that it will. “Faith” does not mean believing something with “scant” or “no evidence” - it means trust. You don’t trust the laws of identity or non-contradiction because you can’t be wrong about them. But you do trust - have faith in - your wife’s love because you could be wrong about it. Likewise, the principle of probability is based on trust because it is essentially inductive and you can’t prove inductive arguments (you can only show the balance of probability but - as Hume points out - that is the very principle in question).

Does anyone else see a problem with using the word “faith” in this context?

In this conversation we are only talking about the “external reality”, not the abstract sciences. And no, you did NOT say explicitly (and you do NOT say it now) that the way to know if a proposition about the external reality is “true” or not if you compare the proposition to the reality. You - very ingeniously - answered my question with a question (which, by the way is against the forum rules). Now, I am going to hypothesize: “you are attempting to AVOID to come clean and say explicitly that actual comparison is needed to find out if a proposition about external reality is true or not - because then my next question will be - ‘and how about the postulated God and his ilk’?” After all you are a smart person.

Sorry dude, you are jumping to massive conclusions here. I don’t have a problem with using induction, experiment and observation to see whether something is true. What else do I have to say? The scientific method is great for what it can accomplish.

And the merry-go-round continues. The animals need no “metaphysic”. You have no argument “why” should one need any special “metaphysic”.

Ummm haven’t I been trying to argue that we need a metaphysic that substantiates that our noetic faculties are “truth gathering”?

Ah, but does not help at all. Your metaphysical foundation does not help you to make more correct observations or build a better model of reality. As a matter of fact, it needlessly complicates the issue. The “survival” model is simple and sufficient to build “good models”. The “God gave us the ability” model does not add anything. It is more complicated without any added benefits. Not just does not explain the “observation” method and the “model building” facility, it obscures the simple evolutionary method and adds a layer of “unknowable”. Not that this makes this model “false”. Occam’s razor does not help to decide if a model is true or false. It simply discards the more complicated model in favor of the simpler one, as long as both have equal explanatory value. It only makes the “theistic model” unnecessary and useless, but NOT false.

Innoruk, I still don’t see how you can escape the sceptical criticism.
Question: How do we know that our noetic faculties are accurate, that is, geared to truth?
Answer: We survive.
Question: But survival is not of itself geared towards truth, only survival, so how does this justify truth?
Answer: ???

The problem with the “survival” model is that survival has nothing to do with truth. As I’ve tried to show, there are innumerable possibilities where an entity can survive but still not have truth.

 

[Innoruk]

But don’t you see what you’re saying? The question is this: How do we know that our noetic faculties correspond to reality? Your answer seems to be (and correct me if I’m wrong), “compare the model to the reality”. Yet if it is our very noetic faculties that are in question, any “reality” we perceive as a comparison point to a hypothesised model might still be wrong. Saying that “frequency of survival” suggests it isn’t wrong doesn’t help, since the survival of X does not mean that X can properly discern truth, i.e. reality.

As I’ve said, we need a worldview that first substantiates our noetic faculties as “truth gathering”. If we can do that, we have a basis on which to stand. Don’t you agree?

No, I don’t agree. The “comparison” we speak of is not something “abstract” method performed in an armchair. It is the burning sensation of your finger if you put it into fire. It is suffocation if you hold your head under water for too long. It is starvation, if you try to sustain yourself on pebbles. It is your body that does the comparison, not your mind. You cannot mistake the beating with a cat’o’nine tail with a loving caress. You cannot confuse the smell of a rose with the stench of a rotting carcass. And that is why we trust our senses. Our senses are the “window” to the world.

It is our long-range sensory organ (our vision) which can be incorrectly interpreted. That is where this “doubt” in the senses came from. How to solve it? Appeal to more sensory (name removed by moderator)ut. The usual example is the “mirage”. Yes, it is possible to see a mirage and think that there is a lake in the distance. But if you get close, and can drink that water, can get into the water, then you cannot reasonably assume that “maybe your taste-buds gave you the wrong information”. Without any metaphysical consideration.

Skepticism is great, but universal skepticism (assuming that we MAY be wrong every time) is ridiculous. There needs to be a specific reason why one is skeptical in any specific case.

Of course, the problem is even more serious than that. If one doubts one’s senses, then what else is there to find out the “true” nature of reality?

Yes, that’s what I mean. To say an axiom can’t be proven means you take it on faith that it’s true. “A is A” is true by definition - it cannot be wrong. But “that the sun will rise tomorrow” can most certainly be wrong, and nothing - i.e. no principle - can prove that it will. “Faith” does not mean believing something with “scant” or “no evidence” - it means trust. You don’t trust the laws of identity or non-contradiction because you can’t be wrong about them. But you do trust - have faith in - your wife’s love because you could be wrong about it. Likewise, the principle of probability is based on trust because it is essentially inductive and you can’t prove inductive arguments (you can only show the balance of probability but - as Hume points out - that is the very principle in question).

Does anyone else see a problem with using the word “faith” in this context?

I do. First, you said that WHATEVER cannot be proven is accepted on “faith”. That “whatever” includes the axioms in a formal system. So, your definition was incorrect to begin with, and you seem to have corrected it.

But you don’t need “trust” when you feel pain after you placed your hand into a fire. You don’t need “trust” that jumping off a high cliff will kill you. You don’t need “trust” to figure out that sulfuric acid will play havoc with your mouth. Trust is only needed when you have insufficient information or no information. And you need a “truckload” of trust if the evidence contradicts whatever you happen to believe in. None of these experiments above are parts of some axiomatic system, so they cannot be “proven” in the formal sense. But to expect a rock to drop to the ground if you let it fall is not “faith”.

Sorry dude, you are jumping to massive conclusions here. I don’t have a problem with using induction, experiment and observation to see whether something is true. What else do I have to say? The scientific method is great for what it can accomplish.

Yes, it is the only way to gather information about the external reality.

Ummm haven’t I been trying to argue that we need a metaphysic that substantiates that our noetic faculties are “truth gathering”?

You merely stated it.

Innoruk, I still don’t see how you can escape the sceptical criticism.
Question: How do we know that our noetic faculties are accurate, that is, geared to truth?
Answer: We survive.
Question: But survival is not of itself geared towards truth, only survival, so how does this justify truth?
Answer: ???

The problem with the “survival” model is that survival has nothing to do with truth. As I’ve tried to show, there are innumerable possibilities where an entity can survive but still not have truth.

Answer: Survival is the “truth”. If you die, your assessment of reality was wrong. The once-in-a-blue-moon examples to the contrary are just that. Very rare exceptions. Yes, for a while, in some lucky circumstances one can get away with incorrect model forming. But eventually, reality will catch up with you, and will remove you from the gene-pool.

Of course we already went through this far too many times.

Is there anything else?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Jonathan

How many more times can you stand to bang your head against the wall with Innoruk? :banghead::banghead::banghead:

 

[davidv]

Jonathan

How many more times can you stand to bang your head against the wall with Innoruk? :banghead::banghead::banghead:

Could it be for the benefit of the lurkers?

 

[Innoruk]

Jonathan

How many more times can you stand to bang your head against the wall with Innoruk? :banghead::banghead::banghead:

What a great question!

I would think that an empiricist would realize that if you keep banging your head against the wall, it is only your head that will be the loser. The wall is much stronger. Moreover, you don’t even need any “metaphysic” to realize that! The simple experience of pain will give you all the information you need… as long as you trust your senses. And if you don’t, then eventually your head will break, and you will die.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk

I would think that an empiricist would realize that if you keep banging your head against the wall, it is only your head that will be the loser. The wall is much stronger

Yes, it is much stronger. But it isn’t intelligent.

 

[Innoruk]

Yes, it is much stronger. But it isn’t intelligent.

The one who is NOT intelligent is the one who keeps banging his head - fully knowing that only his head will suffer. The wall is stronger, because it has “physics” aka. “reality” on its side. One does not need “metaphysic” when there is “real physics” to rely on.