Another reason why philosophers are useless

[Innoruk]

Perhaps you’re just not doing Mr. George Smith’s argument justice, but this does not seem logical. If one wanted to demonstrate that the senses are unreliable, what one would do is assume that they are reliable, and then see if such an assumption leads to a contradiction. If the sense of touch tells you that the pencil is unbroken and the sense of sight tells you that the pencil is broken, then two senses are contradicting each other. Since they contradict, they would therefore not be reliable: if they contradict each other then they definitely cannot both be correct (principle of non-contradiction).

It is true that I used only a few lines from the argument (from memory), but there is no contradiction.

The Law of Contradiction states that an object cannot be A and non-A at the same time and in the same respect. And in the attempted demonstration the pencil is perceived straight in one respect (touch the pencil) while it is perceived disjointed in another respect (look at the pencil). Therefore no “contradiction” at all.

If you are interested, after I made the previous post, I found that the whole book is available on-line, in PDF format: andrew.cmu.edu/user/jksadegh/A%20Good%20Atheist%20Secularist%20Skeptical%20Book%20Collection/George%20H.%20Smith%20-%20Atheism-%20The%20Case%20Against%20God%20(v1.1).pdf. If you access it, do a find on “5. - Skepticism and Sense Perception” and you can read the whole argument. It is easy read, since it is presented as a dialog.

But we would not even have to go through the indirect proof. We could just go straight to sense experience without assuming that they are either correct or incorrect.

Impossible. You are in the same “boat” as the solipsist - who starts a conversation. As soon as you start a conversation, you rely on the assumption that your partner is “real”, you expect that the partner will see and hear you, that is you must assume that your partner relies on his sensory (name removed by moderator)ut as valid. If you do not start from this standpoint, you literally make no sense to even start a conversation.

They could both be wrong, even, but if they contradict each other, the principle of non-contradiction would still show that senses are unreliable because one of them, at least, must be wrong. (This, of course, relies on the principle of non-contradiction, which is a properly basic belief as you are alleging sense experience is, but I’d say the principle of non-contradiction is more basic. Giving it up to maintain that senses are reliable would probably lead to a much less coherent worldview.)

Sure, but you are supposed to use the law of (non-)contradiction precisely - not forgetting about the “in the same respect” clause. If you say that sense “A” shows one result and sense “B” shows a different result, you use the non-contradiction clause incorrectly.

It doesn’t matter if the proof is contingent on the position of standing. The counterexample would only have to demonstrate unreliability in a single circumstance. So the senses are reliable is not a properly basic belief; it is in principle falsifiable, and its opposite does not problematically presuppose it.

How could you falsify it? Any “demonstration” to show the “unreliability” of the senses, must start with the assumption that the senses are reliable - so the attempted “demonstration” is nonsense from the get-go. Moreover, if you would claim that you have a direct access to the “reality” which is not dependent on the senses… how could you demonstrate that your direct result is correct? As soon as you start to talk about it, you must assume that the other party correctly relies on his sensory experience.

The other issue with claiming that the senses are reliable a priori is that solipsism demonstrates that it is at least conceivable that they are not, ie. there would be no way for you to know if you were in the matrix, hallucinating, being experimented on by mad scientists, or being manipulated by a demon.

Solipsism is exactly as self-refuting as the assumption that senses are not reliable. As soon you attempt to communicate with the non-existent and imaginary external world, you admit your own insanity. And why should anyone care what a self-proclaimed insane person says?

However, the world “reliable” seems problematic anyway. Does it mean that everything they give you is correct (the pencil will both feel and appear unbroken)? Does it mean that you could theoretically infer the actual state of affairs (even though the pencil looks broken, you could understand that it’s not)?

It simply means that your must consider the circumstances.

Does it mean the senses can be used to find anything? Does it mean that the senses can be used to help you survive (even this would seem to have its share of counterexamples, since sensory errors lead to people’s deaths)?

The senses are only an (name removed by moderator)ut device. They could be better (the eye could perceive the infrared or the ultraviolet), there could be other devices (perceiving magnetic forces), etc. But what they do is give us the information about the external world - as raw data. What we do with that information is whole different ballgame.

 

[Innoruk]

That’s a horrible thing to say.

What can I tell you? I am a horrible person.

 

[anthony022071]

That would require a method to find out which opinion reflects reality. And philosophers have only opinions, nothing else.

Philosophers sometimes have opinions that are in accord with truth. Do you believe that there is supernatural and moral truth?

The “heart” is simply an organ pumping blood.

It is also the organ of emotions.

And next time, when the “free will defense” will come up in the discussion of the “problem of evil”, I hope you will come forward and tell the apologists that God should take away the “physical ability to rape, maim and torture”, since the “ability” to carry out these wishes/wills/desires is not important, as long as the perpetrator’s mind is left intact…

I didn’t say the ability to carry out acts is unimportant,I said that will originates from the mind and heart,and has to do with thought,which is free. So the freedom of will does not depend upon the ability to carry out its intentions. It is freedom of thought.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk

And philosophers have only opinions, nothing else.

And all you seem to have is the opinion that philosophers have nothing but opinions.

As has been pointed out scores of times in all such threads as this one, it was the philosophers who crafted the scientific method from which so many scientists have benefited. This is a well documented fact (see for example the works of Roger Bacon in the 12th Century and Francis Bacon in the early 17th Century). But since you seem to know little history of science, you are excused for not having anything but an idle and ignorant opinion about the importance of philosophy.

“I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today - and even professional scientists - seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is - in my opinion - the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth.” Albert Einstein. letter to Robert A. Thornton, 7 December 1944. EA 61-574.

 

[Innoruk]

Philosophers sometimes have opinions that are in accord with truth. Do you believe that there is supernatural and moral truth?

First: there is no such “THING” (ontological object) as “TRUTH”. (Truth is a concept.) Yes, sometimes the opinions of philosophers reflects REALITY. The question is: “how do we separate the opinions, which correctly reflect reality from those which do not”. I am aware of only one such method: “compare the opinion to reality”. No, of course I don’t believe that there is “supernatural” or “moral” truths, these are meaningless concepts.

It is also the organ of emotions.

Only in the somewhat nauseating language of lousy poets. Such language is inappropriate in a serious discussion.

I didn’t say the ability to carry out acts is unimportant,I said that will originates from the mind and heart,and has to do with thought,which is free. So the freedom of will does not depend upon the ability to carry out its intentions. It is freedom of thought.

We are not talking about what is “important”. The usual “free will defense” is that God does not prevent the “evil actions”, since the free will of even the most evil person is so important, that it should not be tempered with. Now, if the “free will” is only the freedom to wish to do something, but it does not entail the ability to carry out that action, then God could prevent the actual action, while leaving the “free will” to stay “free”.

 

[davidv]

First: there is no such “THING” (ontological object) as “TRUTH”. (Truth is a concept.) Yes, sometimes the opinions of philosophers reflects REALITY.

This is a faith based claim and you have provided no rational evidence to believe it. The rest of your conclusions are based on this likely faulty premise and thus must be dismissed as they are invalid.

{snip}

 

[Innoruk]

A short post to those who make substantial contribution to this thread (the rest never gets an answer for their useless, puny little remarks).

I am about to go for a nice one week vacation. Will return and answer your contribution in about one week. Until then … best wishes.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk

I am about to go for a nice one week vacation. Will return and answer your contribution in about one week. Until then … best wishes.

Looks like you really need the rest you are about to get. Enjoy it.

 

[polytropos]

Innoruk, I will be gone this weekend, but I will respond to your various posts when I get back.

 

[jonathan_hili]

A short post to those who make substantial contribution to this thread (the rest never gets an answer for their useless, puny little remarks).

I think everyone could use a break from this and gain a bit of humility and care for others.

Sometimes we think we know all the answers.

I’m sure sages like Confucius, Socrates and our Lord himself would be laughing heartily at our ignorance.

 

[polytropos]

No rational argument can prove what music is, or that we must make music, let alone prove that a given piece of music is transcendent. That’s the same for just about every question to do with a life worth living, there are no rational proofs, we are far too complicated.

But we can find answers by looking at all that went before, for instance why has Bach’s music survived when lots of others never get performed any more. So again we find that survival is the final arbiter of truth.

As that’s a very complicated process and life is short, an alternative is to create satisfying simplifying myths. But even there, survival is the final arbiter of myths.

I find this position pretty unclear. To say there are no rational arguments regarding the nature of music or purpose of life is just an assertion. The fact that we are complex does not necessarily mean that it’s impossible to find purpose through rational argument. Such a conclusion actually does not follow at all. It’s a non-sequitur.

Even if you don’t apprehend philosophical arguments for the purpose of life, you could not conclude that such arguments are impossible without begging the question. To say we’re too complex and life is too short doesn’t really do anything for your case but demonstrate that you’re unwilling to engage in philosophy, and that’s just a matter of taste, not truth.

What you are saying about survival is unclear as well. Are you saying that you do not know anything about the intrinsic nature of Bach’s music, but you get some truth by observing that it has survived while other music has not? What truths, exactly, do you know about Bach’s music by virtue of its survival?

 

[polytropos]

The correct definition of “evil” is “to do harm intentionally to someone with a nervous system”, where harm is understood as physical or emotional. Pointing a gun is only a “thought-sin” (paraphrased from 1984), especially if the intended victim is not even aware of the intent. And “thought-sin” (thought crime) does not matter - no matter what Jesus allegedly said.

Again, the question is the definition of “evil”. The usual catholic definition “the privation of good” is woefully incorrect; the absence of rain is definitely a lack or privation of good, but it is not “evil”. That being said people would be munch better off, if God would prevent those “evils” which actually harm others. For example, the “sin of missing mass” would be permitted, or performing masturbation would be permitted, along with the “evil” of contraception and extra-marital “fornication”. (By the way the personalized license plate of “4NICK8” is one of my all time favorites. ) You seem to fall into the all-or-nothing or black-or-white fallacy. Of course in the eyes of an atheist none of these are evil, nor are they sinful - since the concept of “sin” is a christian concept.

We’re discussing the problem of evil. You can’t make an argument by indirect proof (like the argument from evil) about the inconsistency of religion by choosing which doctrines of the religion you accept. What you would have to show is that Christianity and problem of evil necessitate a contradiction. It doesn’t matter if you personally disagree with the Church’s definition of sin, as it includes intention rather than just ends. Your argument from evil would be a straw man if you did not assume that Christianity is true and demonstrate a contradiction; by rejecting the full definition of sin, you are not actually assuming that Christianity is true.

The same goes for sin as privation of good. It doesn’t matter whether you agree with it. You have to assume it’s true for the sake of the problem of evil. If you want to argue that the idea of sin as privation is unintelligible, that would be a different topic which logically speaking could not be part of an argument from evil. But then it’s not evil that you are arguing is problematic for Christianity; you are making a claim that it lacks internal consistency because of its definition of sin. Evil is pretty irrelevant to such an argument. (This is also a counterexample to atheists like Dawkins who claim that it is not necessary to know theology to argue against religion. Evil is strictly speaking not problematic for traditional Christianity, and the “success” of the argument from evil would rely on rejecting certain Christian doctrines so that the desired contradiction actually follows. One must study theology, or else such an argument is simply a fallacious straw man.)

In a similar way, you are smuggling your own conceptions of evil into the problem, but in doing so you simply beg the question. In Christian thought, you have no more right to do evil to yourself than you have to do evil to others. Saying God should permit evil against self and not against others basically represents a failure to assume that Christianity is true, in which case the argument of evil would be a straw man. If you find those doctrines problematic, then that is a separate argument. (However, there is also a sense in which evils committed towards the self often negatively impact others, hence the designation of scandalous sin etc. Other examples are masturbation affecting the intimacy of a couple or making a person more selfish.)

The fact that one cannot “do” evil does not mean that one cannot imagine and wish to do “evil”. Right now I could imagige to have an ability to kill remotely all those people whom I despise, but I lack the ability to carry it out. Of course, even by wishing such an act I am already a fodder for hell - if one accepts the concept of “thought crime”. (Isn’t it frightening that the most horrifying concept of the worst possible society is the same which was advocated by Jesus?)

You use an “argument from ignorance” sprinkled with a nonexistent concept. Your “non-argument” would be similar to this: “How do you know that God just did not prevent an invisible dragon in your basement to burn down your house”? I know that because there is no evidence either for the dragon, or for God’s action.

I don’t think you understood the argument. The point is that the argument from evil claims that this world, containing evil, is incompatible with the Christian worldview. It is claimed that God, if He exists, can prevent evil without impairing our freedom. What I am showing is that this is false, because prevention of evil entails a removal of freedom, since prevention of evil acts by an omnipotent being would make it logically and metaphysically impossible to perform such actions - they simply “don’t exist” in the sense that they are not options.

I’m not arguing that there are abstract, inaccessible evils out there, but I am saying that if God prevented evil, there would be unintelligible “evil” acts which, because we cannot even know what it would mean to perform them, cannot be willed. Since they cannot be willed, evil is impossible, and humans cease to be free.

And if I cannot perform it, then no one is hurt. (Please spare me of usual nonsense that it would hurt “my soul”.)

Again, if you’d like to debate the argument from evil, then you would have to assume the Christian worldview and show that evil leads to a contradiction with said Christian worldview. Assuming that intention is irrelevant or that the soul does not exist is fallacious, since you are then not assuming that the Christian worldview is true; you are simply erecting your own weaker version of Christianity which you then attack, ie. a straw man.

 

[inocente]

I find this position pretty unclear. To say there are no rational arguments regarding the nature of music or purpose of life is just an assertion. The fact that we are complex does not necessarily mean that it’s impossible to find purpose through rational argument. Such a conclusion actually does not follow at all. It’s a non-sequitur.

But again that’s not what I said is it? First you misread “survival is the final arbiter of truth" as “survival is truth”, now you’ve mistaken “no rational argument can prove what music is, or that we must make music, let alone prove that a given piece of music is transcendent” to be a blanket “there are no rational arguments regarding the nature of music”.

I even gave an example of how we could make a rational argument about Bach’s music.

Even if you don’t apprehend philosophical arguments for the purpose of life, you could not conclude that such arguments are impossible without begging the question. To say we’re too complex and life is too short doesn’t really do anything for your case but demonstrate that you’re unwilling to engage in philosophy, and that’s just a matter of taste, not truth.

Again, I never said any such thing. There’s another poster who puts words into peoples’ mouths to try to pick arguments, I hope you’re not doing the same.

What I said is that just about every question to do with a life worth living has no rationally provable answer because we are far too complicated. The evidence for that is the immense range of cultures based on all the different ideas people have had about what makes a life worth living, none of which are provably the best, for if there were we’d all live the same way in a single unchanging culture.

And I said that because trying to answer those questions is very complicated, we tend to create satisfying simplifying myths. The evidence for that is that every culture, without exception, has its myths.

I’m not trying to argue with you, if you think I’m wrong on the facts then say where.

What you are saying about survival is unclear as well. Are you saying that you do not know anything about the intrinsic nature of Bach’s music, but you get some truth by observing that it has survived while other music has not? What truths, exactly, do you know about Bach’s music by virtue of its survival?

All of them. If his music hadn’t survived we wouldn’t know any of it.

 

[polytropos]

But again that’s not what I said is it? First you misread “survival is the final arbiter of truth" as “survival is truth”, now you’ve mistaken “no rational argument can prove what music is, or that we must make music, let alone prove that a given piece of music is transcendent” to be a blanket “there are no rational arguments regarding the nature of music”.

…

Again, I never said any such thing. There’s another poster who puts words into peoples’ mouths to try to pick arguments, I hope you’re not doing the same.

I apologize if I’ve misrepresented what you’ve said. I didn’t intend to. Thanks for clarifying.

What I said is that just about every question to do with a life worth living has no rationally provable answer because we are far too complicated. The evidence for that is the immense range of cultures based on all the different ideas people have had about what makes a life worth living, none of which are provably the best, for if there were we’d all live the same way in a single unchanging culture.

However, I think most of what I’ve said applies to your summary of your argument here. There seems to be a confusion of epistemology and ontology here. The fact that there is “an immense range of cultures based on all the different ideas people have had about what makes a life worth living” does not lead to the conclusion that “every question to do with a life worth living has no rationally provable answer” (I’ve excluded the phrase “just about” from this quotation, since if you include it, then you would seem to be allowing for some rationally provable answer, even though there is disagreement - which is what I am arguing for - but I will assume you used the phrase colloquially and trivially). It is simply a non-sequitur that disagreement about the purpose of life implies that there is not a rational answer.

Likewise, even if the purpose of life has been rationally proven, it is easy to imagine that not everyone would live according to that standard, especially if, say, that purposeful life were difficult to follow… so the fact that we are not all following it frankly does not imply anything.

And I said that because trying to answer those questions is very complicated, we tend to create satisfying simplifying myths. The evidence for that is that every culture, without exception, has its myths.

All cultures create simplifying myths, but it would be fallacious to assume then that any explanation is just a simplifying myth… particularly if anyone has gone to great lengths to rationally justify said “myth.” You might say that you aren’t saying that any explanation is just a simplifying myth, but then you’d have to clarify the relevance of this comment.

All of them. If his music hadn’t survived we wouldn’t know any of it.

OK, so we learn something about Bach’s music by virtue of the fact that people still play it, while other composers have not persisted to the presence. We also would not know anything about it if it were not played today. But that doesn’t really justify the claim, Survival is the arbiter of truth, because the survival of Bach’s music does not tell us all we know about the nature of music. When Bach composed the music, it had not any need to “survive,” but presumably Bach’s first listeners could understand something of the music he made. Furthermore, take Bach’s peers, whose music did not survive: that music also had listeners at the time, who understood it even though it would not survive. Perhaps some of them could even discern that Bach’s music was “better.”

I don’t really see what the point is in saying survival is the final arbiter of truth. If the point is that we can only know of things that in some way enter our senses, then I am not sure what the implications are. Such an idea would seem to trivialize itself based on evidence of what we know from, say, natural history. In what sense has cosmic background radiation or rock strata deep below the earth or fossils of extinct animals “survived”? We can certainly draw conclusions based on observing these characteristics, but we come to know about things that we can’t directly observe. All that has survived is sufficient evidence for us to know about what once was, but such a remark risks becoming tautological.

Again, I hope I am not misrepresenting your thoughts. Please clarify if I am.

 

[inocente]

I apologize if I’ve misrepresented what you’ve said. I didn’t intend to. Thanks for clarifying.

OK, great, thanks.

However, I think most of what I’ve said applies to your summary of your argument here. There seems to be a confusion of epistemology and ontology here. The fact that there is “an immense range of cultures based on all the different ideas people have had about what makes a life worth living” does not lead to the conclusion that “every question to do with a life worth living has no rationally provable answer” (I’ve excluded the phrase “just about” from this quotation, since if you include it, then you would seem to be allowing for some rationally provable answer, even though there is disagreement - which is what I am arguing for - but I will assume you used the phrase colloquially and trivially). It is simply a non-sequitur that disagreement about the purpose of life implies that there is not a rational answer.

Likewise, even if the purpose of life has been rationally proven, it is easy to imagine that not everyone would live according to that standard, especially if, say, that purposeful life were difficult to follow… so the fact that we are not all following it frankly does not imply anything

Trouble is that there are lots of different, incompatible answers which various people claim to be rational. For instance, just take the schools of thought mentioned in this article. You and I might say that the only rational answer is X, but those who don’t agree will say we’re being irrational, and only their answer is reasoned. We object that our answer must be rational as it’s ordained by God, others say no they have more gods than we do who ordained something else, and so on.

It isn’t possible to arrive at a single top-notch answer by synthesis, even from the small range of schools of thought included in the article, since they are so thoroughly incompatible, and anyway philosophers keep inventing new answers to add to the growing pile.

That leaves us with two possibilities: (a) Go to war to kill off everyone who disagrees with whichever purpose we like best, or (b) live and let live by agreeing that there is no provably spiffing answer even though we probably each have our own opinion.

All cultures create simplifying myths, but it would be fallacious to assume then that any explanation is just a simplifying myth… particularly if anyone has gone to great lengths to rationally justify said “myth.” You might say that you aren’t saying that any explanation is just a simplifying myth, but then you’d have to clarify the relevance of this comment.

Agreed, sorry I should have said “myth” wasn’t meant to be derogatory, as if all myths are just fairy tales. Imho all myths contain truths since they tell us something about the people who believe them, and therefore something about ourselves, even if it’s sometimes discomforting (e.g. master race myths).

OK, so we learn something about Bach’s music by virtue of the fact that people still play it, while other composers have not persisted to the presence. We also would not know anything about it if it were not played today. But that doesn’t really justify the claim, Survival is the arbiter of truth, because the survival of Bach’s music does not tell us all we know about the nature of music. When Bach composed the music, it had not any need to “survive,” but presumably Bach’s first listeners could understand something of the music he made. Furthermore, take Bach’s peers, whose music did not survive: that music also had listeners at the time, who understood it even though it would not survive. Perhaps some of them could even discern that Bach’s music was “better.”

Agreed, but each of those composers were influenced by others, who were influenced by others going back over the centuries. Similarly the instruments they wrote for, similarly the notation. The religions and cultures they wrote for were similarly those which survived. Even the range of the human voice has to do with who survived and why. Hearing has to do with there being a survival advantage in sensing sound, our perception is to do with which babies survived by their parents distinguishing their cries, and so on.

 

[inocente]

I don’t really see what the point is in saying survival is the final arbiter of truth. If the point is that we can only know of things that in some way enter our senses, then I am not sure what the implications are. Such an idea would seem to trivialize itself based on evidence of what we know from, say, natural history. In what sense has cosmic background radiation or rock strata deep below the earth or fossils of extinct animals “survived”? We can certainly draw conclusions based on observing these characteristics, but we come to know about things that we can’t directly observe. All that has survived is sufficient evidence for us to know about what once was, but such a remark risks becoming tautological.

Yikes, sorry, wrote too much for one post.

It’s not so much about what phenomena survive but about our knowledge. The issue (for me at any rate) is basically about where knowledge comes from. Going over the terms: a posteriori knowledge is gained from our senses and experiences, while a priori knowledge is independent of them.

We know for sure that a posteriori knowledge exists, we don’t know that a priori knowledge exists. Some people say it does, that you can obtain knowledge just by sitting in a darkened room and thinking really hard. Others say no, that can’t possibly happen.

So take something like the meaning of life. If it can be known a priori, anyone can know it by thinking really hard. Doesn’t matter when in history they live, where they live, etc., they will all get the exact same answer because that knowledge pre-exists in some way.

Which might be nice but of course in practice people don’t all get the same answer. Maybe that’s because some didn’t think hard enough or only certain special mystics have what it takes. But it’s far more probable that the meaning of life is a posteriori, it can only be known through experiences, and therefore as people have differing experiences, they will find different meanings.

Anyway, not sure if I explained that well but it’s what I mean by survival being the arbiter. One implication is some of the questions philosophers ask are useless, they argue over their differing opposing answers not realizing there is no single a priori answer.

Richard Feynman’s 55 second joke about dopey philosophers

 

[polytropos]

We know for sure that a posteriori knowledge exists, we don’t know that a priori knowledge exists. Some people say it does, that you can obtain knowledge just by sitting in a darkened room and thinking really hard. Others say no, that can’t possibly happen.

I don’t really agree with the a priori/a posteriori distinction as it applies to the purpose of life. Thomism, at least, does not involve sitting in a darkened room (although I suppose it is guilty of requiring some thought). It claims that the purpose of life can be found by observing the world and drawing conclusions from those observations.

However, I think I get what you are saying.

So take something like the meaning of life. If it can be known a priori, anyone can know it by thinking really hard. Doesn’t matter when in history they live, where they live, etc., they will all get the exact same answer because that knowledge pre-exists in some way.

This isn’t true. Even if the purpose of life can be rationally demonstrated, others can still commit errors or be for some reason motivated to reject the demonstration.

I am of course arguing in favor of the classical philosophical tradition (of, broadly, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas), so I do think the truths have been accessible to human reason for a very long time.

Which might be nice but of course in practice people don’t all get the same answer.

Therefore… they are all wrong (or they are all non-demonstrable)?

No one said finding the purpose of life is easy. But a lot of abstract reasoning (in, say, mathematics) is not easy and could not be replicated by the majority of people without error.

 

[tonyrey]

I don’t really agree with the a priori/a posteriori distinction as it applies to the purpose of life. Thomism, at least, does not involve sitting in a darkened room (although I suppose it is guilty of requiring some thought). It claims that the purpose of life can be found by observing the world and drawing conclusions from those observations.

However, I think I get what you are saying.

This isn’t true. Even if the purpose of life can be rationally demonstrated, others can still commit errors or be for some reason motivated to reject the demonstration.

I am of course arguing in favor of the classical philosophical tradition (of, broadly, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas), so I do think the truths have been accessible to human reason for a very long time.

Therefore… they are all wrong (or they are all non-demonstrable)?

No one said finding the purpose of life is easy. But a lot of abstract reasoning (in, say, mathematics) is not easy and could not be replicated by the majority of people without error.

Without mathematics science wouldn’t be so successful and without logic it wouldn’t even exist!

 

[inocente]

Therefore… they are all wrong (or they are all non-demonstrable)?

No one said finding the purpose of life is easy. But a lot of abstract reasoning (in, say, mathematics) is not easy and could not be replicated by the majority of people without error.

You are assuming there is one single purpose of life, and that it can be found by abstract reasoning.

After thousands of years philosophers still can’t agree on the purpose of life, in fact they are still inventing new answers. Ordinary people have no difficulty with concluding that it’s therefore beyond reasonable doubt that there is no single purpose. Meanwhile those philosophers who want there to be a single purpose are forced to dodge all that evidence by claiming there really is a single purpose, honest guv, but it’s exceptionally difficult to find. This is what Fenyman’s joke is about.

 

[polytropos]

You are assuming there is one single purpose of life, and that it can be found by abstract reasoning.

I am assuming no such thing. I am saying that there is a rational demonstration (rooted in sense experience and expounded upon by abstraction) of a single purpose of life in the classical philosophical tradition. It happens that said purpose is mutually exclusive with other “purposes.” So if the arguments for it (which we evaluate using reason) are good, then there is a unique purpose to life.

After thousands of years philosophers still can’t agree on the purpose of life, in fact they are still inventing new answers. Ordinary people have no difficulty with concluding that it’s therefore beyond reasonable doubt that there is no single purpose. Meanwhile those philosophers who want there to be a single purpose are forced to dodge all that evidence by claiming there really is a single purpose, honest guv, but it’s exceptionally difficult to find. This is what Fenyman’s joke is about.

It’s not that anyone is dodging. It’s that these is simply no logical step from “there is disagreement as to what the purpose of life is” to “there is not a singular purpose of life.” I have no need to dodge it because it is a fallacy.