Anselm of Canterbury's tract "That God truly exists"

[Charlemagne_II]

**Maximally great being cannot be an empty concept to have any meaning. Potency is definitionally part of maximal greatness and maximal potency is most appropriate to maximal greatness. I am not “adding” anything that is not part of the concept of maximal greatness! **

But that is the problem with this argument from the atheist’s point of view. Just because you can conceive of omnipotence it doesn’t follow that omnipotence exists. When you make it an attribute of the “maximally great being,” you are just saying the maximally great being I conceive of must be omnipotent … but that is not proving omnipotence exists.

That is why I prefer any of the other proofs (cosmological, teleological, wager) because at least you can point to something about the world the atheist experiences and must try to explain or explain away ( such as the Big Bang [cosmological argument], Natural Law [teleological argument], Self Interest [wager argument]).

 

[Peter_Plato]

**Maximally great being cannot be an empty concept to have any meaning. Potency is definitionally part of maximal greatness and maximal potency is most appropriate to maximal greatness. I am not “adding” anything that is not part of the concept of maximal greatness! **

But that is the problem with this argument from the atheist’s point of view. Just because you can conceive of omnipotence it doesn’t follow that omnipotence exists. When you make it an attribute of the “maximally great being,” you are just saying the maximally great being I conceive of must be omnipotent … but that is not proving omnipotence exists.

That is why I prefer any of the other proofs (cosmological, teleological, wager) because at least you can point to something about the world the atheist experiences and must try to explain or explain away ( such as the Big Bang [cosmological argument], Natural Law [teleological argument], Self Interest [wager argument]).

The matter it seems to me is a simple one.

Think of the concept “necessary being.” You don’t have to be a modal logician to figure this one out. The idea of necessary being means that it “must exist.” If you can conceive of a necessary being as not existing then what you have, logically speaking is an “unnecessary necessary” being. That is a logical contradiction - impossible from a conceptual point of view. It would be like conceiving of a square circle.

So you would have to concede (and so would Aquinas and every other Catholic philosopher) that either the modal form of the ontological argument is true and a necessary being must of necessity exist or that the idea of “unnecessary necessary being” is a logically sound one. Good luck with that!

As soon as Aquinas, in the third way, proposes the idea of necessary being, he is compelled by that very statement to conclude that the necessary being must exist and, therefore, the modal form of the ontological argument is sound. To conclude otherwise is to allow for a self-contradiction, that the necessary being is unnecessary, i.e., might not exist. I would hope that Aquinas was a better philosopher than that!

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Peter

**I would hope that Aquinas was a better philosopher than that! **

I believe he was a better philosopher than Anselm.

 

[Ghosty]

One major objection to the cosmological argument I have, and which I haven’t seen taken up, is that we can’t actually have a proper idea of God in the first place. We can say things like eternal and omnipotent, but such traits transcend human comprehension and therefore are empty of weight when it comes time to go from idea to reality. In otherwords, the greatest being we can actually conceive of is still a creature, something on our level of existence by definition, and therefore not actually God. The only way for the human mind to have a proper idea of God is through Grace, where God shares His own mode of being with us and elevates our minds to His level. Even then experience can’t be translated into what we could call a proper idea of God.

This is why the most proper things we can say about God are negations, such as eternal and infinite. Such notions have no actual content, but are really negations of actual concept s we can hold. We can speak of God’s qualities to some extent, in a limited and inadequate manner, but we can never have a proper conception of God apart from His direct sharing of His Divine Life with us, elevating our minds to the supernatural, uncreated level, and this is known as the Beatific Vision.

The beauty and brilliance of Aquinas’ proofs is that none of the require a proper concept of God, which would be impossible. They all point to limitations in creation that point to and require a transcendent being, and then he says “that being is what we call God”. It never requires a concept of God, but rather of the created world that is within our mode of existence.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Peter_Plato]

One major objection to the cosmological argument I have, and which I haven’t seen taken up, is that we can’t actually have a proper idea of God in the first place.

I assume you mean the ontological, not cosmological argument. I agree with you on this, but the limitation is the fact that much of the data for comprehension comes from the senses so forming a proper, in the sense of complete, concept of God from such data is impossible as the treatment of ontologism by the Vienna Council confirmed.

We can say things like eternal and omnipotent, but such traits transcend human comprehension and therefore are empty of weight when it comes time to go from idea to reality. In otherwords, the greatest being we can actually conceive of is still a creature, something on our level of existence by definition, and therefore not actually God. The only way for the human mind to have a proper idea of God is through Grace, where God shares His own mode of being with us and elevates our minds to His level. Even then experience can’t be translated into what we could call a proper idea of God.

This is why the most proper things we can say about God are negations, such as eternal and infinite. Such notions have no actual content, but are really negations of actual concept s we can hold. We can speak of God’s qualities to some extent, in a limited and inadequate manner, but we can never have a proper conception of God apart from His direct sharing of His Divine Life with us, elevating our minds to the supernatural, uncreated level, and this is known as the Beatific Vision.

The beauty and brilliance of Aquinas’ proofs is that none of the require a proper concept of God, which would be impossible. They all point to limitations in creation that point to and require a transcendent being, and then he says “that being is what we call God”. It never requires a concept of God, but rather of the created world that is within our mode of existence.

Peace and God bless!

Yes but Aquinas never proposed that we couldn’t have some concept of God despite our limitations. Claiming that idem est quid ess et esse (that God is and what He is are the same), is a concept of a sort. In fact, Aquinas’ view was that with creatures, existence is not an essential “property” but a separate “add-on” which makes the existence of creatures contingent. However, with God, his existence is integral to His essence. His essence is “to Be” thus He is Being itself or Existence itself, not a being that just happens to exist or not, but He who exists necessarily.

Aquinas understood that Anselm’s argument is true in itself, but that it does not appear true to us who are in no position to verify the essence of God. The concept of necessary being, one whose existence and essence are one, is logically true, but cannot be verified by human understanding. This was the point of several posts on this thread, but some make a further claim that Aquinas thought the ontological argument was false. That step is not a correct understanding of Aquinas.

 

[Ghosty]

I assume you mean the ontological, not cosmological argument. I agree with you on this, but the limitation is the fact that much of the data for comprehension comes from the senses so forming a proper, in the sense of complete, concept of God from such data is impossible as the treatment of ontologism by the Vienna Council confirmed.

I did indeed mean ontological, thank you.

The limitation is not merely about the senses, however, but also about the very nature of God and His transcendence. The angels do not learn by senses, but they would not be able to have a true concept of God either, apart from Grace. Created nature, anything less than Divinity, can’t hold God “in the mind”.

Yes but Aquinas never proposed that we couldn’t have some concept of God despite our limitations. Claiming that idem est quid ess et esse (that God is and what He is are the same), is a concept of a sort. In fact, Aquinas’ view was that with creatures, existence is not an essential “property” but a separate “add-on” which makes the existence of creatures contingent. However, with God, his existence is integral to His essence. His essence is “to Be” thus He is Being itself or Existence itself, not a being that just happens to exist or not, but He who exists necessarily.

Actually, Aquinas was quite clear that we can’t know God’s nature. We can have ideas about God, through analogy, but we can’t have an idea of God Himself. When we speak of such things as “His essense and being are the same thing”, we are speaking a truth, but it is a truth that doesn’t really contain God; we can speak of qualities of God analogically, but we can’t know the nature of God and can only speak of it negatively. Even the statement “His essense is His existence” actually comes by way of negation, namely that God is without composition of any kind. It is not a true “positive” proposition, merely the negating of everything we actually know about essence and existence.

Aquinas understood that Anselm’s argument is true in itself, but that it does not appear true to us who are in no position to verify the essence of God. The concept of necessary being, one whose existence and essence are one, is logically true, but cannot be verified by human understanding. This was the point of several posts on this thread, but some make a further claim that Aquinas thought the ontological argument was false. That step is not a correct understanding of Aquinas.

I agree with you here. The ontological argument is not “false”, it’s just not an argument nor a proof, but rather a kind of tautology. It is equally true to say “God is God”, but it does nothing to prove the existence of God, and this is where the ontological argument fails in its entire purpose.

On another note, the modal ontological argument is perhaps more flawed than the traditional ontological argument, it’s just less obvious. The best example, IMO, is that the modal ontological argument can just as easily be used to prove its opposite, to contradict itself. When we say that “it is possible that a maximally great being exists”, we are also saying that it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist. If there is a possible world in which a maximally great being does not exist, then there is no possible world in which a maximally great being does exist, because such a being would exist in all possible worlds. This is sometimes presented as the “modal anti-ontological argument”.

There is no reason within either argument that one should be favored over the other; they are both logically consistent, so we are left needing other arguments and proofs of persuasion, which defeats the whole purpose of the argument in question. The only reason to favor one argument over the other is that you already accept it (that God exists, or doesn’t exist), and that is simply begging the question.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Peter_Plato]

I did indeed mean ontological, thank you.

The limitation is not merely about the senses, however, but also about the very nature of God and His transcendence. The angels do not learn by senses, but they would not be able to have a true concept of God either, apart from Grace. Created nature, anything less than Divinity, can’t hold God “in the mind”.

Actually, Aquinas was quite clear that we can’t know God’s nature. We can have ideas about God, through analogy, but we can’t have an idea of God Himself. When we speak of such things as “His essense and being are the same thing”, we are speaking a truth, but it is a truth that doesn’t really contain God; we can speak of qualities of God analogically, but we can’t know the nature of God and can only speak of it negatively. Even the statement “His essense is His existence” actually comes by way of negation, namely that God is without composition of any kind. It is not a true “positive” proposition, merely the negating of everything we actually know about essence and existence.

Yes this is clearly what Aquinas holds. Thank you for correcting the false impression I left in my wake.

On another note, the modal ontological argument is perhaps more flawed than the traditional ontological argument, it’s just less obvious. The best example, IMO, is that the modal ontological argument can just as easily be used to prove its opposite, to contradict itself. When we say that “it is possible that a maximally great being exists”, we are also saying that it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist. If there is a possible world in which a maximally great being does not exist, then there is no possible world in which a maximally great being does exist, because such a being would exist in all possible worlds. This is sometimes presented as the “modal anti-ontological argument”.

The counter argument to the anti- argument is that by saying “it is possible that a maximally great being exists” what is meant is there is no inherent logical contradiction in the idea of maximally great being, so if there is no contradiction then it is necessary that a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds. That would entail there is no possible world in which a maximally great being does not exist. The anti- modal argument would have to prove a logical flaw in the concept maximally great being before taking the step of claimIng it is possible that one does not exist. It would be like saying a necessary being is merely possible. In which case a necessary being is not necessary. That seems logically flawed unless the idea of necessary being is itself illogical. You could not have a possible necessary being. Perhaps the premise in the modal argument needs to be restated to clear up this ambiguity.

There is no reason within either argument that one should be favored over the other; they are both logically consistent, so we are left needing other arguments and proofs of persuasion, which defeats the whole purpose of the argument in question. The only reason to favor one argument over the other is that you already accept it (that God exists, or doesn’t exist), and that is simply begging the question.

Peace and God bless!

I think the argument is stronger than that. To defeat the argument it would have to be shown that a necessary being is impossible. You could not consistently hold that it is possible that one not exist, you would have to hold that it is impossible for one to exist. Just as it is logically inconsistent to hold that it is possible for a necessary being to exist, you are compelled by the internal logic of the idea to say that a necessary being could not be possible but would have to be necessary.

 

[tafan]

…
The beauty and brilliance of Aquinas’ proofs is that none of the require a proper concept of God, which would be impossible. They all point to limitations in creation that point to and require a transcendent being, and then he says “that being is what we call God”. It never requires a concept of God, but rather of the created world that is within our mode of existence.

Peace and God bless!

Very well said.

I find Aquinas’ arguments for God so compelling. And helpful.
I find CS Lewis’s argument in Mere Christianity that God must exist because of the existence of a universal moral law compelling.
I find Pascal’s wager a compelling way to arrive at a faith in God.

I do not find Ontological Proofs helpful or convincing at all. And I am contunally befuddled as to why people spend time trying to “fix” the approach.

 

[Ghosty]

The counter argument to the anti- argument is that by saying “it is possible that a maximally great being exists” what is meant is there is no inherent logical contradiction in the idea of maximally great being, so if there is no contradiction then it is necessary that a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds. That would entail there is no possible world in which a maximally great being does not exist. The anti- modal argument would have to prove a logical flaw in the concept maximally great being before taking the step of claimIng it is possible that one does not exist. It would be like saying a necessary being is merely possible. In which case a necessary being is not necessary. That seems logically flawed unless the idea of necessary being is itself illogical. You could not have a possible necessary being. Perhaps the premise in the modal argument needs to be restated to clear up this ambiguity.

While I agree that a necessary being is required, that is the cosmological argument and not the ontological, nor is it even the modal ontological argument. Maybe some restating of the premises would help, but I’m not convinced that it would. I think this is all an attempt to “paint a turd” as it were.

I think the argument is stronger than that. To defeat the argument it would have to be shown that a necessary being is impossible. You could not consistently hold that it is possible that one not exist, you would have to hold that it is impossible for one to exist. Just as it is logically inconsistent to hold that it is possible for a necessary being to exist, you are compelled by the internal logic of the idea to say that a necessary being could not be possible but would have to be necessary.

All that’s needed to defeat the modal ontological argument, as an argument, is to show that an alternative conclusion is equally valid, and the anti-ontological argument does that handily. With both being equally valid we are left without any compelling argument either way, and that is what defeats the modal ontological argument; if it loses its ability to compel a belief, it ceases to be an argument and becomes merely an exercise in logical consistency. While it’s logically consistent to say that a maximally great being, if it exists in one possible world exists in all, it is equally logically consistent to say that if such a being doesn’t exist in one possible world, then it doesn’t exist in any.

Since it’s impossible for us to actually imagine a maximally great being, we can’t say for certain that such a being exists in a possible world (using variations of the ontological argument); we literally can’t imagine a world in which includes such a being, because such a being would transcend that world by definition, and transcends our ability to properly define and imagine. If we can’t have a proper idea of God, and indeed such a thing is inherently impossible apart from a participation in Divinity through Grace (and even then it’s arguable, as we could never achieve comprehension even with that), then we can’t create in our minds a “possible world” where the proper God exists. If we can’t create such a possible world, we can’t compel others to believe in God through a logical argument about such possible worlds.

We can imagine a world created and maintained by a maximally great being, but we can never imagine a world in which one exists. It is literally a logical impossibility, because if a maximally great being existed in any possible or imagined world, it would not be a maximally great being as it would not transcend that world and imagination. A maximally great being is beyond conception by definition, as a maximally great being must transcend the human mind by definition. This doesn’t mean that such a being can’t exist (see the cosmological argument), but rather means that the whole approach of any ontological argument is flawed.

In short, if you can’t imagine a maximally great being, and we can’t because a maximally great being would be beyond imagination by definition, and we can’t conceive of a world that contains a maximally great being, and we can’t because any being contained by a world is not maximally great, then any argument based on such notions is utterly flawed.

For what it’s worth, this invalidates the “anti-ontological argument” as well. I brought it up merely to show that an equally logically consistent counterpoint can be made, not to defend the underlying logic which I consider to be irreparably flawed.

Peace and God bless!

P.S. Perhaps someone could help me translate my argument into an analytic form. I’ve got a basic grasp of it, but I’m not confident in actually writing out a formula. It would be handy to have one available for those who are more comfortable with the analytic style.