Anselm's Ontological Proof, Your thoughts?

[MindOverMatter2]

The point is if i can substitute anything in for god, then it does not get you anywhere.

No you cannot, since the examples you are giving cannot possibly be the greatest conceivable being; since you can always add more to them. Which means that you have not demonstrated your point; you are just jumping to that conclusion while ignoring the invalid aspects of your argument.

And that is while ignoring that fact that “the greatest conceivable being” need NOT have existence.

Perhaps one cannot know whether or not the greatest possible being exists simply by analyzing the meaning of the words.

But if we know that such a being is a metaphysically “possible” being, then we must admit that it exists, simply because the greatest possible being is that which objectively exists; otherwise it would not be the greatest conceivable being, which is a contradiction. If we agree that evil is a privation of Good, then the greatest possible being must be perfectly good. Quantitatively speaking; we know that if there can be such a thing as the greatest conceivable being, nothing which is finite can be apart of its nature; since the finite and the contingent are dependent beings and can be added to. But, qualitatively speaking, we also know that the greatest possible being cannot be lesser in its nature than that which is finite. If we agree that having knowledge of the self is greater in proportion to having no knowledge at all; we must agree that to have no mind would make the greatest conceivable being lesser than that which is finite; which would be a logical contradiction. Therefore the greatest conceivable being has perfect knowledge and thus a perfect mind. If the greatest conceivable being wasn’t the creator of all finite things, it wouldn’t be the greatest conceivable being. Therefore the greatest conceivable being is the creator of all finite things. The greatest conceivable being is that which is existence by nature rather than by participation.

Thus the real question is not whether such a being exists, but rather whether such a being is metaphysically possible. Its not possible to positively know from the ontological argument that such a being is metaphysically possible, and that’s why the argument fails as an ontological arguement. If somebody holds to the argument as being valid it is because they feel it reasonable to think that such a being is possible; not because they know that such a being is possible; and thus the argument is reduced to a probabilistic argument. So, whether or not an atheist will accept it will depend on one thinking that such a being is possible. The Theist could however argue in defense of the ontological argument epistemologically by saying that there is no good reason to deny that such a being is possible and that it is up to atheist to prove that it is “impossible” if they want to validly deny the arguments conclusion.

 

[Hooding_Trees]

Its not possible to positively know from the ontological argument that such a being is metaphysically possible

Agreed. Hmm well there is a first .

My main issue is with the word “conceivable” just because something is conceivable does not mean is is possible. As you have rightly pointed out above…

PS nothing can be added to my hamster for it has all the best properties that have ever been conceived.

 

[bdelykleon]

PS nothing can be added to my hamster for it has all the best properties that have ever been conceived.

Did your hamster create matter, time and space?

 

[bdelykleon]

No you cannot, since the examples you are giving cannot possibly be the greatest conceivable being; since you can always add more to them. Which means that you have not demonstrated your point; you are just jumping to that conclusion while ignoring the invalid aspects of your argument.

Funnily enough, this line of “rebuttal” of this argument is centuries old and can be traced back to the Middle Ages. The point here is that you can’t use finite objects like and island, a hamster of a noodle monster, because they are all finite by definition. The point of the ontological argument is that the concept of God includes the perfection, and therefore it draws the automatic conclusion that God exists.

 

[Hooding_Trees]

Did your hamster create matter, time and space?

Better than that, my hamster made your god for that.

 

[bdelykleon]

Better than that, my hamster made your god for that.

This is pure parody. I can do it better:
Your hamster exists.
Your hamster is god
therefore God exists, you only chose to call it “red hamster”.

 

[SenorSalsa]

My hamster has every attribute of the greatest conceivable being, except multiplied by ten.

If that were the case, I would say you are mistaken to say he is a hamster. Because one of the things I would attribute to the GCB is that he is not a physical being. Not necessarily because spiritual is better than physical, but because infinite is better than finite, and it is impossible to have an infinite physical being (because I am not God, and yet am physical, so an infinite physical God would have to have an end where I begin; an impossibility)

The point is if i can substitute anything in for god, then it does not get you anywhere.

X is the greatest conceivable being
X the greatest conceivable being must have existence
Therefore X must exist

You now have the problem of demonstrating that X is “god”, in your case yahweh, and not harry the super powerful hamster.

And that is while ignoring that fact that “the greatest conceivable being” need NOT have existence.

X is god because god is just a name for the “supreme being”, its basically just shorthand for “Greatest Conceivable Being” and does not imply any traits about it, like harry the supper powerful hamster does. I have never implied that god here is taken to be the God of Abraham, although, once this proof is accepted, I would argue that point next. I’m simply trying to prove that a GCB must exist, that there must be a god. a point that many deny

This is pure parody. I can do it better:
Your hamster exists.
Your hamster is god
therefore God exists, you only chose to call it “red hamster”.

exactly. Unfortunately, I think green is a better color. And in that we see that color choice is a subjective preferential thing, so it would be wrong to attribute color to the GCB. Same goes for hamster. I personally think that a hedgehog is a much better animal. They have all the good traits of hamsters, with the addition of a painful (I can attest to this) defense mechanism.

 

[Hooding_Trees]

This is pure parody. I can do it better:
Your hamster exists.
Your hamster is god
therefore God exists, you only chose to call it “red hamster”.

I can do even better

Harry is the greatest conceivable magic hamster
the greatest conceivable magic hamster must have existence
Therefore Harry the magic hamster must exist

The argument is utter nonsense for just because i concieve of something does not mean it must exist.

 

[bdelykleon]

I can do even better

Harry is the greatest conceivable magic hamster
the greatest conceivable magic hamster must have existence
Therefore Harry the magic hamster must exist

The argument is utter nonsense for just because i concieve of something does not mean it must exist.

The greatest conceivable magic hamster is not a necessary being, what is argued int he ontological argument is that God is a necessary being. This parody failed.

 

[SenorSalsa]

I can do even better

Harry is the greatest conceivable magic hamster
the greatest conceivable magic hamster must have existence
Therefore Harry the magic hamster must exist

The argument is utter nonsense for just because i concieve of something does not mean it must exist.

The reason that the GCB must have existence is this:

It is better to exist than to not exist
it is better to exist necessarily than contingently*
necessary existence is not only possible, but (pardon the double use) necessary**
a thing that has necessary existence must exist

*Contingent existence means a possibility not to exist. It is possible that I not be (evidenced by the fact that there was a time when I was not).
Necessary existence is not possible to not be, it is an infinite existence, with no possible beginning or end. It persists, not because of some outside reason, but from its own essence.
**Contingent existence must get its existence from somewhere else, for example, my physical body exists because of my parents. This creates an infinite regress, unless there is some being that does not derive its existence from elsewhere, something that exists because it exists, and could be no other way. That is necessary existence, and it is a quality we would ascribe to the GCB

The Greatest Conceivable being does not have existence because I conceive it, but rather, I conceive of a being that has existence. For example the eiffel tower doesn’t exist because I conceive of it, but rather I can conceive of the eiffel tower, and it exists.

 

[Biff_Hooper]

Hi Senor Salsa,

You say above:

"The reason that the GCB must have existence is this:

It is better to exist than to not exist
it is better to exist necessarily than contingently*
necessary existence is not only possible, but (pardon the double use) necessary**
a thing that has necessary existence must exist "

Therein are two criteria for greatness, the first being “It is better to exist than to not exist,” and the second being “it is better to exist necessarily than contingently.”

The first criterion is found in Anselm’s Pros. II, and most scholars agree it provides a faulty basis for the argument. However, the second criterion, which is articulated in Pros. III, has been championed by folks such as Hartshorne and Malcolm et al as being the true ontological principle as it avoids the charge that it treats existence as an attribute.

Here is how I like to lay out the stronger (modal) version of the OA:

1. God is the greatest conceivable being (GCB)
2. There are two modes of existence for any being, necessary and contingent.
3. It is better (greater) to exist necessarily than contingently.
4. Only necessary existence is compatible with greatness.
5. Therefore God necessarily exists.

Note that the only credible way to attack the OA once it is structured in this fashion is to attack the definition, as some have attempted to do in this thread. IOW, deny that “greatest conceivable being” is a meaningful idea.

This, incidentally, is “Anselm’s Discovery”, according to Charles Hartshorne, namely that either the idea of God makes sense and He exists necessarily, or it is nonsense and he doesn’t exist necessarily.

Biff

 

[ThomasToo]

There is a flipside to Anselm’s argument which was present by Douglas Gasking; I present it below for your consideration.
Gasking’s proof":

http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/gasking.pdf

]
(1) The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.
(2) The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
(3) The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
(4) The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non- existence.
(5) Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being – namely, one who created everything while not existing.
(6) An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greate cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
Ergo,
(7) God does not exist.

 

[Areopagite]

There is a flipside to Anselm’s argument which was present by Douglas Gasking; I present it below for your consideration.

Couple things are wrong here … or at least demand some proof …

(1) The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.

Really? I don’t think so. A bunch of Catholic theologians didn’t think so either (though I think some did).

(3) The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

“Impressive” doesn’t equal “ontological greatness,” so the question of existence doesn’t really apply here.

(4) The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non- existence.

I wouldn’t call that a handicap. Only existing things can have handicaps. My definition, at least. Also, it would already by definition not be God because God doesn’t lack perfection.

(5) Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being – namely, one who created everything while not existing.

No this cannot be conceived. You cannot conceive of a non-existent thing creating an existing thing. You can lie and say that you can conceive it … but obviously you can’t.

(6) An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greate cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

Right there you are neglecting ontological greatness, and equating it to subjective “impressiveness” or something. Quite different.

Ergo,
(7) God does not exist.

Yeah … no.

 

[Areopagite]

The problem is “the greatest conceivable being must have existence.”

Maybe in the convoluted world of medieval theology that made sense, but it’s always been a strikingly thoughtless claim imo. It can’t be justified. No amount of wordplay is going to convince me.

It just flows from the self-evident principle that “existence is greater than non-existence.”

Now, some would deny that principle (though few self-evident principles are safe nowadays) … but if you accept it, then Anselm’s proof seems eerily legit.

But I don’t know.

 

[SenorSalsa]

(1) The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.

If by world, he means the whole of the universe and everything in it, I will accept that claim, even though I’m not entirely convinced.

(2) The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.

This seems reasonable

(3) The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

I disagree with this. Does such an achievement impress us more, yes. But is it, objectively speaking more “marvelous” (to use the word he used in the original premise) no. Notice that he has used in this proof a subjective basis of impressiveness, the ability to evoke an emotion. I think this is dangerous logically.

(4) The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non- existence.

If by handicap you mean completely removing the ability, then yes.

(5) Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being – namely, one who created everything while not existing.

I’m not sure how to respond to this, but it does not seem right…

(6) An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greate cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

The way I view this, he has come to an absurd conclusion “it is better not to exist than to exist” which proves that his premise is false.

Ergo,
(7) God does not exist.

In addition to the ad absurdum pointed out above, note that this proof presupposes the world is a creation, but that it was created by something non-existent. “Ex nihil nihil fit”. Nothing comes from nothing. This has been an accepted premise of basically all philosophical and scientific systems.

 

[jpk1313]

Essentially the Proof is:

God is the greatest conceivable being
the greatest conceivable being must have existence
Therefore God must exist

I personally think this is the greatest proof for God I have seen. It is so simple yet so effective.

However, others think God’s existence is presupposed by the premise, and therefore proves nothing.

Your opinions? Your arguments?

I find this argument compelling yet it does have flaws such as if I thik pigs can fly becuse I think they fly they therefore must fly. Which is not true…or is it? If I think pigs fly than in my mind they do fly. The only things I know are things that are in my mind anything that is not in my mind do not exist or have yet to come into existence. So the fact that I know I exist and that God exist in my mind is evedence that these things exist since there is no evidence to the contrary in my mind. What I think is what determins my reality therefore what I think is what is real. I think therefore I exist, I think God exists there for God exists/

 

[itinerant1]

Essentially the Proof is:

God is the greatest conceivable being
the greatest conceivable being must have existence
Therefore God must exist

I personally think this is the greatest proof for God I have seen. It is so simple yet so effective.

However, others think God’s existence is presupposed by the premise, and therefore proves nothing.

Your opinions? Your arguments?

I hate to burst your bubble on the Ontological Argument but here goes. Basically the argument is stating that the existence of God is self-evident; once we know the meaning of the term “God” as the greatest conceivable being, He must therefore exist.

However, the existence of nothing follows from its definition. And it is not self-evident that God exists because what is self-evident cannot be denied. Yet there are those who deny the existence of God.

I think Thomas Aquinas provided the conclusive refutation of the Ontological Argument. A key point in his refutation is the distinction between what is self-evident in itself though not self-evident to us. Since we do not know the essence of God, his existence is not self-evident to us. The following is an excerpt from his argument. The link provided following the excerpt is to the entire argument in the Summa Theologica:

"A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as “Man is an animal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition.

“Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: “Whether all that is, is good”), “that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space.” Therefore I say that this proposition, “God exists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.”

Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

 

[o_mlly]

Essentially the Proof is:

God is the greatest conceivable being
the greatest conceivable being must have existence
Therefore God must exist

I personally think this is the greatest proof for God I have seen. It is so simple yet so effective.

However, others think God’s existence is presupposed by the premise, and therefore proves nothing.

Your opinions? Your arguments?

The second premise is not self-evident and requries proof. For instance, I can conceive a unicorn but its existence does not necessarily follow.

 

[SenorSalsa]

The second premise is not self-evident and requries proof. For instance, I can conceive a unicorn but its existence does not necessarily follow.

This has been discussed before, that is because a unicorn is not the greatest conceivable being, so his existence isn’t absolute. A unicorn’s existence is possible. There is no reason why a Unicorn couldn’t exist, but there is also no reason why a Unicorn must exist.

The GCB on the other hand, would have necessary existence, and therefore, if his existence is possible, it must be.

On a side note: its interesting how often the example used in this objection is “Unicorn”, for some reason, that mythical creature seems to fascinate us more than any other.

 

[RobNY]

However, the existence of nothing follows from its definition.

I think St. Thomas would disagree. Any who truly knows what God is would know that He necessarily exists. Indeed, God and the blessed both have certain knowledge of this. St. Thomas says that “God exists” is evident in-itself. You discuss this below.

I think Thomas Aquinas provided the conclusive refutation of the Ontological Argument. A key point in his refutation is the distinction between what is self-evident in itself though not self-evident to us. Since we do not know the essence of God, his existence is not self-evident to us. The following is an excerpt from his argument. The link provided following the excerpt is to the entire argument in the Summa Theologica:

The problem is that this begs the question against St. Anselm and other defenders of the ontological argument. St. Anselm, no fool, would have probably responded that God’s existence is self-evident to the learned. Indeed, if I were St. Anselm this is the very tack I would take. Isn’t this the essence of Anselm’s discussion of the problem of the “fool” who “has said in his heart that there is no God?” Namely, that he has a merely verbal and not truly mental conception of what God is. In other words, if he were more learned about what he was speaking about, that he would see God’s existence as self-evident.

St. Thomas is right, of course, that we do not know the essence of God. Nevertheless, Anselm’s argument does not require that we know the essence of God but only that we pick out some object by a definite description (to adopt a more modern terminology-- we pick out some object such that it is the “being that than which no greater can be conceived”-- and if you pay close attention this is not a definition, as it lacks any sort of genus or specific difference). For that reason, it also avoids St. Thomas’s charge that we cannot use an ontological argument because we don’t know God’s essence (although if you check my earlier critique, there is a sense in which God’s essence becomes a stumbling block to the argument).

Like I have said, I am highly suspicious of a priori anti- a priorism. Refer to my earlier post for my (decisive, I think) reason why ontological arguments like Anselm’s do indeed fail.

-Rob