Anselm's Ontological Proof, Your thoughts?

[itinerant1]

I think St. Thomas would disagree. Any who truly knows what God is would know that He necessarily exists. Indeed, God and the blessed both have certain knowledge of this. St. Thomas says that “God exists” is evident in-itself. You discuss this below.

The problem as Aquinas addresses it deals with the nature of our knowledge. To know what God is, or, to put it in other terms, to know the meaning of the word “God”, is not to know automatically, or without further ado, that God exists. To move from an understanding of the meaning of the word “God” to affirming His existence as self-evident, is to make an illicit transition from the conceptual to the existential order. More on this below.

The problem is that this begs the question against St. Anselm and other defenders of the ontological argument. St. Anselm, no fool, would have probably responded that God’s existence is self-evident to the learned. Indeed, if I were St. Anselm this is the very tack I would take. Isn’t this the essence of Anselm’s discussion of the problem of the “fool” who “has said in his heart that there is no God?” Namely, that he has a merely verbal and not truly mental conception of what God is. In other words, if he were more learned about what he was speaking about, that he would see God’s existence as self-evident.

This ignores, as did Anselm, how our knowledge of God is actually acquired. Biographically, in regard to St. Anselm, who grew up always knowing that God existed, he found it difficult to understand how anyone could not know He exists. I have a similar difficulty trying to understand the atheistic mindset.

My foregoing comment about how we come to know the existence of God will be continued below.

St. Thomas is right, of course, that we do not know the essence of God. Nevertheless, Anselm’s argument does not require that we know the essence of God but only that we pick out some object by a definite description (to adopt a more modern terminology-- we pick out some object such that it is the “being that than which no greater can be conceived”-- and if you pay close attention this is not a definition, as it lacks any sort of genus or specific difference). For that reason, it also avoids St. Thomas’s charge that we cannot use an ontological argument because we don’t know God’s essence (although if you check my earlier critique, there is a sense in which God’s essence becomes a stumbling block to the argument).

“Being that than which no greater can be conceived” is a descriptive definition. The observation that it lacks a genus and specific difference is irrelevant because God is not in a genus, as He is Being itself, or Existence itself. Nothing greater than Being itself can be conceived and that is what or who God is: “I Am” as He told Moses.

The argument Aquinas presents is that we cannot start with either the idea of God or a definition of God and immediately conclude that God exists. (We could immediately and licitly conclude that God exists if the proposition were truly self-evident.)

If we possessed an intuition (direct knowledge) of the divine essence then God’s existence would be self-evident because His essence and existence are one. However, since we do not possess in this life an intuition of the divine essence the proposition that “God exists” is not self-evident or analytical to the human mind.

The reason Aquinas will not allow for the existence of God to be self-evident is grounded in his understanding of human knowledge. All of our knowledge begins with sense experience. From the particulars of sense data the intellect abstracts the universal element and knows a thing by means of the universal concept.

Accordingly, we reason from our knowledge of created beings, and any knowledge of being that transcends the natural order is attained by reflection on the data of the senses. In regard to this natural knowledge, it is through the mind’s understanding of created things that we come to knowledge of the Creator, as St. Paul says, “Ever since the creation of the world, the invisible existence of God and his everlasting power have been clearly seen by the mind’s understanding of created things.”

It is through this process of reflection, when carried out systematically, that constitutes the proof of the proposition “God exists.” Hence, our knowledge of God’s existence is not self-evident.

 

[Dranu]

Leibniz has a rather ingenious argument in favor of God’s possibility. He reasons that a perfection is a positive property such that it cannot contradict with any other positive property. He reasons, thus, that God who has all and only positive properties must have a coherent notion. The problem with Leibniz’s argument is the rather heavy theoretical baggage which one must accept in order to get to his conclusion.

Unfortunately I do not have a great deal of time to respond (exams are coming), but this is a thread on my patron (St. Anselm) so I feel obligated to say at least something.

I am not so sure Leibniz’s argument requires ‘heavy theoretical baggage’, though maybe I have just been drinking the cool-aid . I agree with your characterization of Leibniz’s argument otherwise, though I think a more formalistic rendition of it will at least make it sound more powerful (and with replacing ‘perfection’ with ‘unlimited’, which I am sure you will agree are synonyms anyhow when left unqualified):

1.) Contradictions can only arise by the conflict of limits between two things; and
2.) Things are only impossible if they involve contradictions; and
3.) If something is necessarily not impossible then it is necessarily possible (simple negation of impossible=possible)

Therefore, that which admits of no limits (the unlimited) cannot admit of contradiction (1) and thus is necessarily possible (2+3).

Now one may discuss the question of this necessary logical possibility connecting to real instantiation in the world, but that’s where the father of the scholastics comes in (St. Anselm ). There is also a criticism I have heard that ‘just because the That than which none greater can be conceived is necessarily possible does not mean that it is necessarily possible in our world’, but I think that has answers too. If we were to attempt to prove the soundness of any argument we would likely go on *ad infinitum *in justifying the premises.

In my opinion it (St. Anselm’s argument mind you not Descartes, etc necessarily) is a sound argument, but like most everything I am not certain of it. I think theism seems to be almost rationally certain under this proof. However, I don’t think it will do one much good in experiences of big bouts of irrational skepticism or deep dark nights of the soul. Something much more than an argument is needed to guide a person down the path to salvation. Not to mention that belief in this philosopher’s God, although very good in itself, does not guarantee much knowledge of the personal God that embodies love as revealed by Christ (which is perhaps faaaaar more important).

On a side note brother, I enjoy your posts and find many of them insightful (not to try to build pride or anything )

 

[o_mlly]

This has been discussed before, that is because a unicorn is not the greatest conceivable being, so his existence isn’t absolute. A unicorn’s existence is possible. There is no reason why a Unicorn couldn’t exist, but there is also no reason why a Unicorn must exist.

The GCB on the other hand, would have necessary existence, and therefore, if his existence is possible, it must be.
…

I think you still beg the question. That I can imagine a being, imperfect or perfect in essence, does not in itself give that being existence. What is true of the less than greatest being conceivable is also true of the greatest being conceivable: there is no reason either must exist.

 

[RobNY]

Itinerant,

I never thought to ask you, but now that I read your name and I see your interest in the angelic doctor, you wouldn’t happen to be affiliated with the Order of Preachers, would you? They are especially dear to my heart.

The problem as Aquinas addresses it deals with the nature of our knowledge. To know what God is, or, to put it in other terms, to know the meaning of the word “God”, is not to know automatically, or without further ado, that God exists. To move from an understanding of the meaning of the word “God” to affirming His existence as self-evident, is to make an illicit transition from the conceptual to the existential order. More on this below.

I think there are more or less two similar objections here. The first is (i) the methodological objection and the second (ii) is the mental to real transition objection, and I honestly think both objections are flawed.

This ignores, as did Anselm, how our knowledge of God is actually acquired. Biographically, in regard to St. Anselm, who grew up always knowing that God existed, he found it difficult to understand how anyone could not know He exists. I have a similar difficulty trying to understand the atheistic mindset.

Although I have been raised Catholic, my reflexive mindset is very skeptical. In my past I’ve lapsed into atheism briefly and returned to the Catholic faith. All of this, however, is strictly irrelevant. Whatever the genesis or genealogy of an idea is, is strictly irrelevant to whether or not a demonstrative proof may be made. In order to evaluate an argument I need only know two things: is the argument valid? Is the argument sound?

This is the problem with the typical objection: “but that confuses the real order with the logical order!” Or, “that confuses the real order with the mental order!”

Why? Because in any argument the question when evaluating an argument is always whether it is valid and sound. It simply isn’t even the right sort of thing to object to an argument as whole based on whether or not it has ‘an illicit transition’ from a logical to the real order.

Indeed, I suspect that these sorts of objections must either boil down to a denial of the validity or soundness of the argument. If the conclusion doesn’t really follow from the premises, then the argument is invalid. Fine! If the argument is invalid, then show according to the rules of logic how it is invalid. Or perhaps the argument is unsound. Then deny one of the premises, and explain that you don’t think it is a truth accessible to reason or sense experience.

This after all, is what I did in my evaluation. I granted that it was a valid argument, but denied its soundness, by noting the compossibility problem prevents us from truly conceiving such a being.

If we possessed an intuition (direct knowledge) of the divine essence then God’s existence would be self-evident because His essence and existence are one. However, since we do not possess in this life an intuition of the divine essence the proposition that “God exists” is not self-evident or analytical to the human mind.

The other problem for the ‘illicit transition’ argument is that if someone were given a true idea of what God is, he would clearly be legitimized in concluding that God exists. The problem, the cogent Thomist ought to object, is not that such a transition is illicit, but merely impossible since we lack that concept.

The reason Aquinas will not allow for the existence of God to be self-evident is grounded in his understanding of human knowledge. All of our knowledge begins with sense experience. From the particulars of sense data the intellect abstracts the universal element and knows a thing by means of the universal concept.

The problem is that your proposition, namely:

“All knowledge begins with sense experience.”

begs the question against the Anselmian.

As a generality, I think most of us would agree that most human knowledge is tied to sense experience, but the Anselmian would not affirm your premise.

Indeed, one can hold either that:

(A) All knowledge begins with sense experience.

or

(B) Not all knowledge begins with sense experience.

Thesis (A) is a positive philosophical thesis. Thus, if we wish to hold it we need reasons in favor of it. What could count as evidence in its favor? I suspect that putting forward a Thomistic psychology will not help us here, because you will need to give a reason why you are justified in holding (A) on the basis of something which underdetermines it. It seems that the best statement we can make from our own introspective state is:

(1) All of my knowledge happens to be through sense experience. [if this is really the case] (another way to word it: “As a matter of fact, all my knowledge is from sense experience”)

But it doesn’t at all follow that, because my knowledge happens to consist wholly in things known through sense experience that it only can, or must consist wholly in things known through sense experience.

In the absence of compelling reasons to hold to (A), i.e., as long as we are agnostic about (A), we are free to search for examples which might substantiate thesis (B). Indeed, even one counter example will substantiate (B) over (A).

It isn’t even necessary to hold to (B) in order to do an ontological proof. It is merely necessary not to hold to (A).

God bless,
Rob

 

[RobNY]

Unfortunately I do not have a great deal of time to respond (exams are coming), but this is a thread on my patron (St. Anselm) so I feel obligated to say at least something.

And on his feast day! God be praised!

I am not so sure Leibniz’s argument requires ‘heavy theoretical baggage’, though maybe I have just been drinking the cool-aid . I agree with your characterization of Leibniz’s argument otherwise, though I think a more formalistic rendition of it will at least make it sound more powerful (and with replacing ‘perfection’ with ‘unlimited’, which I am sure you will agree are synonyms anyhow when left unqualified):

Almost any theoretical commitment is considered excessive in these days of so-called “analytic” philosophy. Mind you, I don’t find it implausible.

Now one may discuss the question of this necessary logical possibility connecting to real instantiation in the world, but that’s where the father of the scholastics comes in (St. Anselm ). There is also a criticism I have heard that ‘just because the That than which none greater can be conceived is necessarily possible does not mean that it is necessarily possible in our world’, but I think that has answers too. If we were to attempt to prove the soundness of any argument we would likely go on *ad infinitum *in justifying the premises.

Indeed, it really isn’t controversial that a necessary being must exist-- as the possible world semantics would put it-- “in all possible worlds.” That’s simply definitional of what a GCB is.

In my opinion it (St. Anselm’s argument mind you not Descartes, etc necessarily) is a sound argument, but like most everything I am not certain of it. I think theism seems to be almost rationally certain under this proof. However, I don’t think it will do one much good in experiences of big bouts of irrational skepticism or deep dark nights of the soul. Something much more than an argument is needed to guide a person down the path to salvation. Not to mention that belief in this philosopher’s God, although very good in itself, does not guarantee much knowledge of the personal God that embodies love as revealed by Christ (which is perhaps faaaaar more important).

I know from the light of faith that it is sound. The problem is substantiating the premises by reason alone. I think that people of good will can disagree about this.

On a side note brother, I enjoy your posts and find many of them insightful (not to try to build pride or anything )

Thanks.

 

[itinerant1]

Itinerant,

(A) All knowledge begins with sense experience.

or

(B) Not all knowledge begins with sense experience.

It isn’t even necessary to hold to (B) in order to do an ontological proof. It is merely necessary not to hold to (A).

Sorry, but I am not associated with the Order of Preachers.

I don’t follow your A / B logic. If one does not hold to A, then the logical option of holding to B is necessitated.

What evidence or argument would you present that questions the proposition “All knowledge begins with sense experience”?.

Do think we have ideas that are innate?

 

[RobNY]

Sorry, but I am not associated with the Order of Preachers.

That’s alright! We all love the Dominican saints anyway.

I don’t follow your A / B logic. If one does not hold to A, then the logical option of holding to B is necessitated.

As a matter of logical necessity, either A or its denial is true. But as a matter of what we know, we need not affirm either proposition if we lack enough knowledge to do so. In other words, I can be at the point where I don’t think I have good reason to affirm (A), but at the same time don’t think I have reason to affirm its denial either. Hence, one would be “agnostic” about A or ~A.

What evidence or argument would you present that questions the proposition “All knowledge begins with sense experience”?

For any given philosophical thesis, evidence must be given in favor of it, not against it. In the absence of evidence for it, I don’t need to hold to it.

Do think we have ideas that are innate?

I’m not sure that the modern way of putting the debate-- “innate ideas,” or so-called “a prior” knowledge and such-- is particularly helpful. But I do think that there are such things as truths of reason.

The problem isn’t really whether there are truths of reason, which I think most sane philosophers will grant. The problem is whether existence proofs may be truths of reason. This is, of course, the old Thomistic chestnut. But I would say this: there are at least negative existence proofs. And by the philosophical principle of symmetry, it would seem simply special pleading to exclude positive existence proofs a priori.

-Rob

 

[itinerant1]

That’s alright! We all love the Dominican saints anyway.

As a matter of logical necessity, either A or its denial is true. But as a matter of what we know, we need not affirm either proposition if we lack enough knowledge to do so. In other words, I can be at the point where I don’t think I have good reason to affirm (A), but at the same time don’t think I have reason to affirm its denial either. Hence, one would be “agnostic” about A or ~A.

It looks like you must put the status of the Ontological Argument on hold while you do some epistemological research to resolve your agnosticism.

Those of us who follow the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition do not doubt that all human knowledge begins with sense experience. And we have the facts and arguments to support the position. So, we humbly believe we are competent to judge the OA in regard to the nature of our knowledge about God.

 

[RobNY]

It looks like you must put the status of the Ontological Argument on hold while you do some epistemological research to resolve your agnosticism.

Not at all, friend.

Consider this. One could only know (B) to be the case if one could produce examples, perhaps. But you are requiring that we know (B) in order to produce examples. And so you are requiring (I think, unfairly) a circular style of explanation.

(1) One must be able to produce examples to prove (B).

(2) One must know (B) to produce examples.

Now, if (A) is the case, then there cannot be any purported examples of this type. For, if one were to produce examples, as per (1), they would simply be ruled out by our prior conviction of (A).

For instance, let’s say we know (A) to be the case. Then someone comes up to us and says, “I’ve found this truth of reason!” But we’d be justified in rejection any such purported truth of reason with reference to (A), which is prior to it. This is the rather reasonable step which you are taking. I do not deny that this is a reasonable conclusion.

What I disagree with is whether (A) is known to be the case. For if it’s not known to be the case, then presumably one is open to finding examples a la (1).

Now, in the case of the ontological argument, as long as (2) isn’t the case-- and no one has given a reason to think it is-- then we can proceed, merely being open to the possibility that there could be things that fulfill thesis (B). Indeed, if one had no examples to substantiate (B), one could even use the ontological argument as proof of (B). i.e., I know (B) to be true because of this ontological argument. As strange as it may sound, it is also logically possible.

Those of us who follow the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition do not doubt that all human knowledge begins with sense experience. And we have the facts and arguments to support the position. So, we humbly believe we are competent to judge the OA in regard to the nature of our knowledge about God.

I do understand the position, I merely disagree that any such proof has been offered.

But let me be a bit of pain. After all, I can either charge (i) that no such proof has been substantiated, or I can directly contradict your position and say that (ii) I have evidence against it.

So I’ll shift to (ii) briefly, although I fear it will take us off track.

Are “a priori” existence proofs possible? And the answer is: manifestly!

(1) There are no Round Squares.

Not only is (1) true… it is a truth of reason! Indeed, it is a necessary truth.

That is an existence proof, namely, a negative existence proof, which is necessarily true a priori. And no Thomist-- including myself! if you can believe that I consider myself a Thomist!-- denies it.

But this gives us strong reason to consider that excluding positive existence proofs a priori is simply philosophical special pleading, by the usual principle of symmetry.

God bless, it’s been a blast having this discussion!

-Rob

 

[itinerant1]

As we know, a self-evident proposition is one that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof. For example, “A finite whole is greater than any of its parts” is a self-evident proposition. Once the meaning of the terms, “finite whole”, “parts”, etc. are understood, no proof is required.

No one who grasps the meaning of a self-evident proposition can think the opposite of that which is self-evident. But the opposite of the proposition “God exists” can be thought (eg. atheism, agnosticism) by those who grasp the meaning of the terms. Therefore, the proposition that God exists is not self-evident.

 

[itinerant1]

Not at all, friend.

Consider this. One could only know (B) to be the case if one could produce examples, perhaps. But you are requiring that we know (B) in order to produce examples. And so you are requiring (I think, unfairly) a circular style of explanation.

(1) One must be able to produce examples to prove (B).

(2) One must know (B) to produce examples.

Now, if (A) is the case, then there cannot be any purported examples of this type. For, if one were to produce examples, as per (1), they would simply be ruled out by our prior conviction of (A).

For instance, let’s say we know (A) to be the case. Then someone comes up to us and says, “I’ve found this truth of reason!” But we’d be justified in rejection any such purported truth of reason with reference to (A), which is prior to it. This is the rather reasonable step which you are taking. I do not deny that this is a reasonable conclusion.

What I disagree with is whether (A) is known to be the case. For if it’s not known to be the case, then presumably one is open to finding examples a la (1).

Now, in the case of the ontological argument, as long as (2) isn’t the case-- and no one has given a reason to think it is-- then we can proceed, merely being open to the possibility that there could be things that fulfill thesis (B). Indeed, if one had no examples to substantiate (B), one could even use the ontological argument as proof of (B). i.e., I know (B) to be true because of this ontological argument. As strange as it may sound, it is also logically possible.

I do understand the position, I merely disagree that any such proof has been offered.

But let me be a bit of pain. After all, I can either charge (i) that no such proof has been substantiated, or I can directly contradict your position and say that (ii) I have evidence against it.

So I’ll shift to (ii) briefly, although I fear it will take us off track.

Are “a priori” existence proofs possible? And the answer is: manifestly!

(1) There are no Round Squares.

Not only is (1) true… it is a truth of reason! Indeed, it is a necessary truth.

That is an existence proof, namely, a negative existence proof, which is necessarily true a priori. And no Thomist-- including myself! if you can believe that I consider myself a Thomist!-- denies it.

But this gives us strong reason to consider that excluding positive existence proofs a priori is simply philosophical special pleading, by the usual principle of symmetry.

God bless, it’s been a blast having this discussion!

-Rob

Can you describe something you know, real or imaginary, that did not originate with sense data?

 

[RobNY]

Can you describe something you know, real or imaginary, that did not originate with sense data?

It’s really not fair of me to start my discussion in the middle of things, so to speak. So let me give a little background that might help explicate my position.

I fear that the modern debate, which focuses on things like ‘innate ideas’ and divides philosophers roughly into ‘empiricists’ and ‘rationalists’ is very unhelpful. I feel as though false dichotomies are thus too easily made.

There is great ambiguity in “originate in sense data.” There are obviously some truths which take physical things as their ‘occasion’ by which they become apparent to us. For instance, as number is known to us by examining collections of objects. This is different, though, than knowledge which comes to us strictly from sense perception, for instance, that the grass is green.

Truths of the first sort are ‘truths of reason.’ They are known as truths of reason because to deny them is to make a contradiction. Truths of reason are known because their denial is a contradiction. Strictly speaking, it is irrelevant what the occasion is by which I came to know something, because for a truth of reason what is essential is that its denial is a contradiction.

This is why we can know things like the truths of mathematics and other truths like, “there are no round squares.” These are truths of reason. Yet I think it is a red herring to try to ask the question in terms of “whether they originated in sense perception.” That is a properly genealogical question. The essential question is whether we can produce a contradiction by its denial.

“Grass is green,” on the other hand, does not form a contradiction when denied, and so its difference from truths of reason can be clearly seen.

Does this account help at all?

God bless,
Rob

 

[RobNY]

No one who grasps the meaning of a self-evident proposition can think the opposite of that which is self-evident. But the opposite of the proposition “God exists” can be thought (eg. atheism, agnosticism) by those who grasp the meaning of the terms. Therefore, the proposition that God exists is not self-evident.

I think the proponent of the ontological argument (and I am not a proponent of any strong version, like the Anselmian version) would respond this way. The person who entertains God’s non-existence has failed to attend closely enough to the premises and to form a real mental conception of them, or he would see that the denial of any of the premises is absurd.

I think we’re at an impasse on this one with the fervent supporter of the ontological argument.

Incidentally, what do you think of my argument from the beginning against the ontological argument. Namely,

(1) If God is possible, then God exists.
(2) God is possible.
Therefore, (3) God exists.

The argument is valid but unsound. Premise (2), that God is possible, is not known to reason. Something is usually considered impossible when its very notion is incoherent, i.e., forms a contradiction. Thus, if God were impossible then the concept of God would be contradictory. But if God’s concept is not contradictory, then God is possible. All the proponent of the argument needs to do to substantiate God’s possibility is to show that God’s concept is coherent.

But how could one do this? Simply, by comparing God’s perfections with one another. The problem is this: although we know some of what God’s perfections are, we lack a complete list. And as long as we lack a complete list of what God’s perfections are, we cannot declare that God’s concept is coherent. But then we can’t affirm (2).

I think that’s a pretty good argument. What do you think?

-Rob

 

[itinerant1]

It’s really not fair of me to start my discussion in the middle of things, so to speak. So let me give a little background that might help explicate my position.

I fear that the modern debate, which focuses on things like ‘innate ideas’ and divides philosophers roughly into ‘empiricists’ and ‘rationalists’ is very unhelpful. I feel as though false dichotomies are thus too easily made.

There is great ambiguity in “originate in sense data.” There are obviously some truths which take physical things as their ‘occasion’ by which they become apparent to us. For instance, as number is known to us by examining collections of objects. This is different, though, than knowledge which comes to us strictly from sense perception, for instance, that the grass is green.

Truths of the first sort are ‘truths of reason.’ They are known as truths of reason because to deny them is to make a contradiction. Truths of reason are known because their denial is a contradiction. Strictly speaking, it is irrelevant what the occasion is by which I came to know something, because for a truth of reason what is essential is that its denial is a contradiction.

This is why we can know things like the truths of mathematics and other truths like, “there are no round squares.” These are truths of reason. Yet I think it is a red herring to try to ask the question in terms of “whether they originated in sense perception.” That is a properly genealogical question. The essential question is whether we can produce a contradiction by its denial.

“Grass is green,” on the other hand, does not form a contradiction when denied, and so its difference from truths of reason can be clearly seen.

Does this account help at all?

God bless,
Rob

No the account does not help.

Mathematics for instance deals with quantities abstracted from sense experience.

We can deny that a round square exists but that is trivial at best and perhaps meaningless. That is, a round square is a contradiction and no proper idea or meaning of it can be engendered, yet the separate notions of round and square are abstracted from sense experience.

And this dependency of our intellectual conceptions on sense experience is such that it is also the means for how we come to know from the natural light of reason that God exists.

 

[itinerant1]

I think the proponent of the ontological argument (and I am not a proponent of any strong version, like the Anselmian version) would respond this way. The person who entertains God’s non-existence has failed to attend closely enough to the premises and to form a real mental conception of them, or he would see that the denial of any of the premises is absurd.

I would differ on that. I don’t accept that a person who truly understands the premisses must logically agree that God exists. I think to accept the existence of God requires additional analytical steps then just a jumping straight from the conceptual realm to the existential.

I think we’re at an impasse on this one with the fervent supporter of the ontological argument.

Incidentally, what do you think of my argument from the beginning against the ontological argument. Namely,

(1) If God is possible, then God exists.
(2) God is possible.
Therefore, (3) God exists.

The argument is valid but unsound. Premise (2), that God is possible, is not known to reason. Something is usually considered impossible when its very notion is incoherent, i.e., forms a contradiction. Thus, if God were impossible then the concept of God would be contradictory. But if God’s concept is not contradictory, then God is possible. All the proponent of the argument needs to do to substantiate God’s possibility is to show that God’s concept is coherent.

But how could one do this? Simply, by comparing God’s perfections with one another. The problem is this: although we know some of what God’s perfections are, we lack a complete list. And as long as we lack a complete list of what God’s perfections are, we cannot declare that God’s concept is coherent. But then we can’t affirm (2).

I think that’s a pretty good argument. What do you think?

-Rob

Interesting scenario. I will have to come back to it later today and study it further. Got to head out for now…

 

[SenorSalsa]

I think you still beg the question. That I can imagine a being, imperfect or perfect in essence, does not in itself give that being existence. What is true of the less than greatest being conceivable is also true of the greatest being conceivable: there is no reason either must exist.

Sure it does.

The solution here is that there are two kinds of existence

Absolute (or Necessary) Existence
and, Contingent (Or Potential) Existence.

All things in the World (world here mans the whole of the physical realm) have contingent existence. That is we could imagine that they not exist, in fact we can prove that they could not exist. There was a time before you were alive, and there will be a time after you die. You have no reason why you have to be alive, except for there is something keeping you in existence. This is why less than GCBs do not have to exist, because while it is possible (I can imagine a unicorn actually existing, why not?) that does not mean it has to be the case at this moment

However, the GCB would not have that kind of existence, because that would mean there is something greater keeping it in existence. Additionally, how could it possibly be the greatest being if it could go away (die, disappear, change, etc.) Certainly, it would be better if it always were, through infinity. We therefore ascribe to the GCB Necessary Existence. Here it would be absurd to say that it could go out of existence. It is certainly better to exist than not exist, and so it would be better to exist all the time than to only exist some of the time. It would also be better to control your own existence than to have something else control it.

For that reason, the GCB would have necessary existence, and if such a being could be conceived of, then it means that that being is possible. and if the GCB is possible, then it must exist, because its existence is either always existing, or not possible, and we have already shown it to be possible

 

[Dranu]

But how could one do this? Simply, by comparing God’s perfections with one another. The problem is this: although we know some of what God’s perfections are, we lack a complete list. And as long as we lack a complete list of what God’s perfections are, we cannot declare that God’s concept is coherent. But then we can’t affirm (2).

The list of perfections is unimportant (thus I deny the idea that “as long as we lack a complete list of what God’s perfections are, we cannot declare that God’s concept is coherent”). All we need to know is that ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ is the same thing as ‘unlimited’.

For curiosity’s sake, how would you specifically deny the Leibniz argument as I presented it earlier? I can see no clear way around it myself:

1.) Contradictions can only arise by the conflict of limits; and
2.) Things are only impossible if they involve contradictions; and
3.) If something is necessarily not impossible then it is necessarily possible
Thus, that which admits of no limits (the unlimited) cannot admit of contradiction and thus is necessarily possible

RobNY:

And on his feast day! God be praised!

Wow, thats a curiosity . Out of all the days to make a post and on this subject. I should know that date, but I don’t (didn’t).

 

[RobNY]

The list of perfections is unimportant (thus I deny the idea that “as long as we lack a complete list of what God’s perfections are, we cannot declare that God’s concept is coherent”).

You are right, of course, that if one takes the Leibnizian course a list of perfections is not at all necessary. My response was assuming that we weren’t taking that route.

All we need to know is that ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ is the same thing as ‘unlimited’.

Leibniz is careful to define perfection circumspectly. He says:

“I call every simple quality which is positive and absolute, or expresses whatever it expresses without any limits, a perfection.”

Under this definition, to be “unlimited” is not strictly a perfection (rather, it is definitional in what a perfection is).

1.) Contradictions can only arise by the conflict of limits; and
2.) Things are only impossible if they involve contradictions; and
3.) If something is necessarily not impossible then it is necessarily possible
Thus, that which admits of no limits (the unlimited) cannot admit of contradiction and thus is necessarily possible

What Leibniz does is to first carefully define what perfections are. Then, given that the GCB has all perfections-- whatever these may be-- the GCB is coherent. He doesn’t take “unlimited” itself as a perfection.

The problem, then, is establishing that the GCB as “that which has no limits.” Presumably, if the concept of what a GCB is incoherent, then it certainly has “limits.”

It seems to me that the GCB has no limits if and only if its concept is coherent.

And that means that showing that the GCB is coherent is logically prior to proclaiming that it has the property of being ‘unlimited.’ In other words, being unlimited seems to be a property which is based on having all those perfections simultaneously, and so we can’t use it as the basis of our proof.

-Rob

 

[Dranu]

RobNY:

And that means that showing that the GCB is coherent is logically prior to proclaiming that it has the property of being ‘unlimited.’

Why does it seem prior to you? It seems that to hold this you must also hold “if unlimited then coherent and if coherent then it is unlimited” is not true and it is merely a one way conditional: “if coherent then unlimited,” for if it is biconditional the priority does not matter.

The only other thing I can think of is that you are suggesting it is possible that God is not ‘unlimited’ or not “That than which none greater can be conceived” (for you say “The problem, then, is establishing that the GCB as that which has no limits.”)? If that is the case then it is merely a problem of the name you use. I am merely suggesting that “That than which none greater can be conceived” obviously admits of no limits and thus is necessarily possible (otherwise there is a greater, namely one with no limits, thus more substantial, and this is completely conceivable since the only inconceivable things are those things with conflicting limits, and here there are none). Most people call that God, but the name does not matter. I am merely suggesting that through Leibniz’s argument 'That than which none greter can be conceived" is necessarily possible and most call that being ‘God’.

Under this definition, to be “unlimited” is not strictly a perfection (rather, it is definitional in what a perfection is).

It seems to me to be the essence of what perfection is under this definition. I guess you would have to add that it has to qualify being, but that just points out that when it qualifies something limited, it is just a contradiction anyhow (e.g. unlimited island is like a round square), and perfections are said not to admit of limitation.

As Leibniz says:
“I call every simple quality which is positive and absolute, or expresses whatever it expresses without any limits, a perfection” and a quality cannot be absolute or positive unless it is COMPLETELY unlimited. Furthermore, to “express” requires coherency or there is no expression, or at least it expresses itself limitedly (which also contradicts Leibniz’s definition)

If it is the same as ‘perfection’ it is impossible for God to find any limit of course. A list of perfections would really just be a repitition of the same thing being seen from a different perspective (or put another way, a list of perspectives of limited beings). In fact to suggest that there are actual differences in God’s essence (an actual list of qualities rather than an illusory one) is to suggest that God has limits (which are required for differentiation).

In other words, being unlimited seems to be a property which is based on having all those perfections simultaneously

And to suggest that this is a problem (that it can produce contradiction) is to suggest that the perfections admit of limits, and this is something contrary to the definition of ‘perfection’. Are you just suggesting perfections are inherently with a limit, and that Leibniz is just qualifying a limited thing with ‘unlimited?’ If so, then there is already a contradiction to suggest that the limited can be unlimited, but I don’t think this is the case. There are no perfections in God, there is simply perfection (well at least just like there are no beings in God, just Being). Perhaps we might talk about perfections (like human ones) just like we might talk of beings, but God does not admit of either in His essence.

 

[RobNY]

Why does it seem prior to you? It seems that to hold this you must also hold “if unlimited then coherent and if coherent then it is unlimited” is not true and it is merely a one way conditional: “if coherent then unlimited,” for if it is biconditional the priority does not matter.

In our order of knowing, I think it is.

For this reason. If being “unlimited” is a property (which I grant it is) but not a perfection (which I do not grant that it is, at least under the Leibnizian definition), then we do not know that a GCB is unlimited simply by the fact of its being a GCB.

The only other thing I can think of is that you are suggesting it is possible that God is not ‘unlimited’ or not “That than which none greater can be conceived” (for you say “The problem, then, is establishing that the GCB as that which has no limits.”)? If that is the case then it is merely a problem of the name you use. I am merely suggesting that “That than which none greater can be conceived” obviously admits of no limits and thus is necessarily possible (otherwise there is a greater, namely one with no limits, thus more substantial, and this is completely conceivable since the only inconceivable things are those things with conflicting limits, and here there are none). Most people call that God, but the name does not matter. I am merely suggesting that through Leibniz’s argument 'That than which none greter can be conceived" is necessarily possible and most call that being ‘God’.

The GCB is either a necessary non-existent or a necessary existent, depending on whether it is coherent or not.

It seems to me to be the essence of what perfection is under this definition. I guess you would have to add that it has to qualify being, but that just points out that when it qualifies something limited, it is just a contradiction anyhow (e.g. unlimited island is like a round square), and perfections are said not to admit of limitation.

“Unlimited” ought to qualify a property, indeed, to make it a perfection. Unlimited is certainly a property, but I’m not sure I’m willing to grant it perfection status under the Leibnizian definition.

Are you just suggesting perfections are inherently with a limit, and that Leibniz is just qualifying a limited thing with ‘unlimited?’

No. Perfections are, by definition, unlimited… as we stipulated in the definition of Leibniz.

-Rob