Anyone interested in a formal debate on God's existence?

[punkforchrist]

Since we are told in Scripture that God made man in his image and likeness, a starting point for describing the God being debated could be that God is a personal, rather than an impersonal force. That eliminates Deism and Pantheism and various forms of Paganism from the discussion. God is viewed as capable of possessing traits we see in human beings but to a higher degree of course: power, intelligence, love, justice, mercy, etc. (in other words, the Christian God without reference to the Trinity since that is strictly a matter of revelation rather rational conjecture).

Caution: some consideration has to be made in this debate for excluding scientism as a refutation of the existence of God. That is to say, the principles of evidence required by science concerning material beings and forces should not be applicable to a transcendent and personal God. If such a being is allowed to exist, the way we connect with such a being should certainly transcend scientism.

No?

Hi Charlemagne,

As I mentioned before, I’ll be defending three arguments for God’s existence:

1. The Modal Third Way, which argues for a necessary and personal cause of all contingent entities.
2. The Modal Perfection Argument, which argues that an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists in all possible worlds (necessary existence).
3. The Argument from Desire, which is basically an argument for heaven, or eternal life with God.

I won’t be arguing for some distant deistic God, but rather for a God who’s concerned with our welfare. As for scientism, I’m sure Squishes won’t appeal to that argument. However, even if he does, I’m well-equipped to answer such an objection. At the risk of sounding pretentious, I’m a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham (England) and my expertise is in natural theology (arguments for and against God’s existence). So don’t worry. I’m not a philosophical layman.

 

[Foofaraw]

As far as my definition being “weak,” a necessary and personal cause of contingent reality is at least very much like God. A thing is contingent if and only if it possibly exists and possibly does not exist. A thing is necessary if and only if it exists and cannot possibly not exist. A person is an entity with consciousness and an ability to reason. Aristotle once remarked that human beings are rational animals, in contrast to the brute beasts he was comparing humans to.

Now, the definition I provided only applies to the modal third way argument I’ll be defending. The second argument, the modal perfection argument, seeks to demonstrate the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect and necessary entity. That most certainly would qualify as God.

So, we’ve finally gotten to your agenda-- the argument you’ll be defending. Why not put it out there, up front?

Pretentious phrases are great for impressing those who want to be impressed, but for the benefit of others, how about expressing your “modal perfection” argument, just for kicks?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Hypnotoad
**
I think it would be interesting to find statistics on how many people come to God by way of addiction. **

I also would like to know!

 

[Charlemagne_II]

punk

** So don’t worry. I’m not a philosophical layman.**

Now I’m really interested!

 

[ngill09]

So, we’ve finally gotten to your agenda-- the argument you’ll be defending. Why not put it out there, up front?

Pretentious phrases are great for impressing those who want to be impressed, but for the benefit of others, how about expressing your “modal perfection” argument, just for kicks?

I think the modal perfection argument is in the family of ontological arguments. I’m guessing its the Plantinga version, which goes something like this:

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
5. Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

It requires a good bit of unpacking and support, and I’m not sure that this is what punkforchrist is talking about, so I wouldn’t try to start debunking it (which is a pain, and lies in the hidden problems with a “possibly necessary” being under axiom S5).

 

[punkforchrist]

So, we’ve finally gotten to your agenda-- the argument you’ll be defending. Why not put it out there, up front?

Pretentious phrases are great for impressing those who want to be impressed, but for the benefit of others, how about expressing your “modal perfection” argument, just for kicks?

I’m really not interested in personal attacks, so I’ll only mention once that I won’t further address your remark about my “pretentious phrases.” Now, here’s the modal perfection argument. I’m not going to defend it here, so feel free to rip it to shreds. I’ll only be defending it in the debate.

1. If X is a perfection, then ~X is not a perfection. (Premise)
2. Being a necessary condition is a perfection. (Premise)
3. Being maximally great is a perfection. (Premise)
4. If it is not possible that a maximally great being exists, then every being has the property of not being maximally great. (Premise)
5. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a necessary condition. (Premise)
6. If not being maximally great is a necessary condition, then not being maximally great is a perfection. (From 2)
7. Not being maximally great is not a perfection. (From 1 and 3)
8. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being exists. (From 4 - 7)
9. A being is maximally great if and only if it is maximally excellentin all possible worlds. (Premise)
10. A being is maximally excellent if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. (Premise)
11. Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in all possible worlds. (From 8 - 10 and S5)
12. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists. (Implied by 11)

 

[ngill09]

I’m really not interested in personal attacks, so I’ll only mention once that I won’t further address your remark about my “pretentious phrases.” Now, here’s the modal perfection argument. I’m not going to defend it here, so feel free to rip it to shreds. I’ll only be defending it in the debate.

1. If X is a perfection, then ~X is not a perfection. (Premise)
2. Being a necessary condition is a perfection. (Premise)
3. Being maximally great is a perfection. (Premise)
4. If it is not possible that a maximally great being exists, then every being has the property of not being maximally great. (Premise)
5. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a necessary condition. (Premise)
6. If not being maximally great is a necessary condition, then not being maximally great is a perfection. (From 2)
7. Not being maximally great is not a perfection. (From 1 and 3)
8. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being exists. (From 4 - 7)
9. A being is maximally great if and only if it is maximally excellentin all possible worlds. (Premise)
10. A being is maximally excellent if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. (Premise)
11. Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in all possible worlds. (From 8 - 10 and S5)
12. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists. (Implied by 11)

Oh fun! I haven’t seen this version before.

On first glance, I think the faults in the argument lie in the problems with a “possibly necessary” being under S5 (8), and with P2.

Also, for fun, you can substitute any set of qualities in (10) and define a being with those qualities into existence with this argument. For example, try to see what’s wrong with this argument:

1. If X is a perfection, then ~X is not a perfection. (Premise)

1. Being a necessary condition is a perfection. (Premise)

1. Being maximally great is a perfection. (Premise)

1. If it is not possible that a maximally great being exists, then every being has the property of not being maximally great. (Premise)

1. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a necessary condition. (Premise)

1. If not being maximally great is a necessary condition, then not being maximally great is a perfection. (From 2)

1. Not being maximally great is not a perfection. (From 1 and 3)

1. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being exists. (From 4 - 7)

1. A being is maximally great if and only if it is maximally evil in all possible worlds. (Premise)

1. A being is maximally evil if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly morally depraved. (Premise)

1. Hence, a maximally evil being exists in all possible worlds. (From 8 - 10 and S5)

1. Therefore, a maximally evil being exists. (Implied by 11)

Ontological arguments aren’t very compelling, but it can be a real bear trying to figure out what’s going on in them and where the problems lie.

 

[punkforchrist]

I expect a parody to be used as an objection, so it’ll make things interesting. Quentin Smith, one of the world’s leading atheistic philosophers by my estimation, remarked that, “we don’t know how to refute this argument,” referring to Robert Maydole’s formulation. Of course, that doesn’t mean he accepted it, either.

 

[Eleve]

I agree that the second premise is dubious, or at least question-begging. Someone who doesn’t think that a maximally great being is possible will think that everything is necessarily imperfect. Naturally, such a person will not think that the necessary property “being imperfect” is a perfection.

 

[belorg]

I expect a parody to be used as an objection, so it’ll make things interesting. Quentin Smith, one of the world’s leading atheistic philosophers by my estimation, remarked that, “we don’t know how to refute this argument,” referring to Robert Maydole’s formulation. Of course, that doesn’t mean he accepted it, either.

I am not sure whether your version is the same as Maydole’s but premise (3) of your argument translates as, “Being maximally great is a perfection IFF it is possible to be maximally great”.
I can illustrate this with an example. Suppose maxmial greatness entails om(name removed by moderator)otence and someone believes omnipotence entails the ability to create a rock so heavy that it can’t be lifted.
Then (3) in your version actually says that the ability to create a rock so heavy that it can’t be lifted is a perfection. And your argument would actually conclude that a being capable of creating such rocks exists, something you probably do not believe yourself.

And this is the basic problem with all ontological arguments. “Maximally great” can only mean “as great as possible”, which makes most (if not all) OA’s tautological, because it’s hardly suprising that a being that is as great as possible is possible.
The real problem ,regardless of any ontologicla argument, is whether the kind of maximal greatness needed to prove the existence of God is possible. Theists will of course say yes, atheists will say no. I do not see how an OA adds anything to this.

 

[Foofaraw]

I’m really not interested in personal attacks, so I’ll only mention once that I won’t further address your remark about my “pretentious phrases.” Now, here’s the modal perfection argument. I’m not going to defend it here, so feel free to rip it to shreds. I’ll only be defending it in the debate.

1. If X is a perfection, then ~X is not a perfection. (Premise)
2. Being a necessary condition is a perfection. (Premise)
3. Being maximally great is a perfection. (Premise)
4. If it is not possible that a maximally great being exists, then every being has the property of not being maximally great. (Premise)
5. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a necessary condition. (Premise)
6. If not being maximally great is a necessary condition, then not being maximally great is a perfection. (From 2)
7. Not being maximally great is not a perfection. (From 1 and 3)
8. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being exists. (From 4 - 7)
9. A being is maximally great if and only if it is maximally excellentin all possible worlds. (Premise)
10. A being is maximally excellent if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. (Premise)
11. Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in all possible worlds. (From 8 - 10 and S5)
12. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists. (Implied by 11)

PFC,
Thank you for actually showing up with an argument. Let’s take a look at it.

From an overall perspective, the argument contains so many negatives that it is difficult to follow. I don’t see any reason to construct an argument in such a manner unless its intention is to impress by befuddlement.

Rather than attempt to unravel the multiplicity of negatives, let’s look at the premises. If any one of them fails, the rest of the argument is moot.

2. Being a necessary condition is a perfection. (Premise)

This is a definition, not a premise. Worse, it is a redefinition of existing language, a typical neurolinguistic ploy.

In effect you are declaring “necessary condition” and “perfection” to have the same meaning. That is the function of the “is” in your statement. If indeed that is true, you should be able to replace either term with the other elsewhere in your argument, with the same meaning.

Let’s do that with your statement #5, which then reads:
*
5. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a perfection. (Premise)*

At this point your entire argument collapses into the equivalent of a tail chasing its dog. There are other flaws, but why beat a dead canine for refusing to play “fetch”?

 

[Foofaraw]

I think the modal perfection argument is in the family of ontological arguments. I’m guessing its the Plantinga version, which goes something like this:

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
5. Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

It requires a good bit of unpacking and support, and I’m not sure that this is what punkforchrist is talking about, so I wouldn’t try to start debunking it (which is a pain, and lies in the hidden problems with a “possibly necessary” being under axiom S5).

This argument suffers from indefinable terms within its premises.

“Excellence,” for example, is a relative term. It is as impossible to define as the concept of “absolute motion” within the universe, because it can only be defined with respect to something else.

The same is true for “greatness.”

Your statement #1 equates “maximum excellence” with “omnipotence and omniscience,” but this is another redefinition of common language, in the tradition of neurolinguistic programming, for the sole point of making an argument.

How does one define “maximum excellence” in the context of a definable activity, such as playing left tackle for an NFL football team? Ideally, that would mean never letting an opponent past the area of the football field that your job is to control. You might be such a player, but if the right side of the offensive line is weak, your quarterback could be sacked a dozen times a game, rendering your excellence irrelevant to the game.

Then, one area of excellence might be at odds with another, rendering absolute excellence in one area undesirable.

For example, one might expect God to be the maximally excellent creator of new and imaginative ideas. However, monotheistic religions have attributed “maximum excellence” as a repository and retriever of knowledge (omniscience) to this same God.

However, maximum excellence in both areas is not possible. An entity who knows all things, including future events, cannot imagine a new event.

 

[ngill09]

This argument suffers from indefinable terms within its premises.

“Excellence,” for example, is a relative term. It is as impossible to define as the concept of “absolute motion” within the universe, because it can only be defined with respect to something else.

The same is true for “greatness.”

Your statement #1 equates “maximum excellence” with “omnipotence and omniscience,” but this is another redefinition of common language, in the tradition of neurolinguistic programming, for the sole point of making an argument.

How does one define “maximum excellence” in the context of a definable activity, such as playing left tackle for an NFL football team? Ideally, that would mean never letting an opponent past the area of the football field that your job is to control. You might be such a player, but if the right side of the offensive line is weak, your quarterback could be sacked a dozen times a game, rendering your excellence irrelevant to the game.

Then, one area of excellence might be at odds with another, rendering absolute excellence in one area undesirable.

For example, one might expect God to be the maximally excellent creator of new and imaginative ideas. However, monotheistic religions have attributed “maximum excellence” as a repository and retriever of knowledge (omniscience) to this same God.

However, maximum excellence in both areas is not possible. An entity who knows all things, including future events, cannot imagine a new event.

Of course, like all arguments, ontological arguments require a good bit of argumentative support and explanation. However, the precise definitions of terms like “excellence” aren’t particularly important to the argument - what’s important is the definition as provided by the argument. With Plantinga’s argument, “excellence” is defined as being “omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good”.

I was thinking more about these arguments today and I thought of a better parody. I’ll call it “The Rosencrantz Proof”

Let’s suppose that we have an unsolved mathematical conjecture, C. For example, let’s forget that it’s been solved recently and use Fermat’s conjecture (also known as “Fermat’s Last Theorem”). It states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two. A conjecture in mathematics is a mathematical statement that has not been proven or disproven mathematically. Fermat’s Last Theorem was unsolved for over 350 years, until it was proven to be true in 1995.

Now suppose Rosencrantz, an ambitious mathematician, wants to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem and become the most famous mathematician of his day. So he submits the following proof:

(1) Conjecture C is true only if no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two.
(2) If Conjecture C is mathematically true, it is true in all possible worlds (mathematical proofs are generally accepted to be necessary in this way).
(3) It is possible that Conjecture C is true. (Premise)
(4) Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that Conjecture C is true.
(5) Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that Conjecture C is true
(6) Therefore, Conjecture C is true.

What’s the problem with this proof? Well, it’s hidden in (3) and the limitations of axiom S5. The same problem is present in Plantinga’s argument. In general, people are unwilling to deny (3) and say “No, it is not possible that Conjecture C is true” (or in Plantinga’s case, to say “No, it is not possible that a maximally excellent being exists”). The appropriate response is to say that we don’t know Conjecture C is possibly true, or that a maximally excellent being possibly exists, because by axiom C5 and the necessary nature of these statements, there is no difference between saying it is possible that these statements are true and saying that they are true.

Very fun arguments to analyze though. Reminds me of some of Lewis Carroll’s stuff.

 

[Eleve]

From an overall perspective, the argument contains so many negatives that it is difficult to follow. I don’t see any reason to construct an argument in such a manner unless its intention is to impress by befuddlement.

As it turns out, complex arguments don’t really lend themselves to simple expression. This is why not every high school math student goes on to abstract algebra.

2. Being a necessary condition is a perfection. (Premise)

This is a definition, not a premise. Worse, it is a redefinition of existing language, a typical neurolinguistic ploy.

In effect you are declaring “necessary condition” and “perfection” to have the same meaning. That is the function of the “is” in your statement. If indeed that is true, you should be able to replace either term with the other elsewhere in your argument, with the same meaning.

First of all, I don’t know what makes you say that this is a definition rather than a premise. If I say that acing a test is a perfection and failing it is an imperfection, I’m obviously making a claim - you know what it means to ace a test, and you know what it means to be perfect, or more perfect, and I’m making a claim about how the two relate. Or if I say that losing your car keys is a perfection, it’s pretty obvious that I’m making a claim and that I’m wrong. Unless you’re more clear about what distinguishes definitions or “redefinitions” from premises and why (2) is an example of the former, I can’t see what’s driving your objection.

Second, I don’t know where you get the idea that “necessary condition” and “perfection” are being identified with each other. The claim is clearly that the property “being a necessary state” is “a perfection,” one of many. If I say “Jim is a chiropractor,” am I saying that “Jim” and “chiropractor” are the same thing? If I then say that Sarah is also a chiropractor, should I then have to conclude that Sarah and Jim are the same person?

Let’s do that with your statement #5, which then reads:
*
5. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a perfection. (Premise)*

At this point your entire argument collapses into the equivalent of a tail chasing its dog. There are other flaws, but why beat a dead canine for refusing to play “fetch”?

I’m not entirely sure what you mean by “the equivalent of a tail chasing its dog.” (This is one reason that philosophers use complex language: once you take the time to parse a few extra negations, you can understand clearly and unambiguously what a person is saying. Homey metaphors like “a tail chasing its dog” may be easy to read, but that doesn’t get us much closer to knowing what you’re trying to say.)

My best guess is that you mean that the argument is circular. But I don’t at all see why you find your reformulation of the argument to be circular. Further, even if your reformulation is circular, I don’t see how that demonstrates anything about the original argument. Obviously the conclusions that you can draw from premises are going to be more controversial than the premises themselves; that is why we move from premises to conclusions, and not the other way around. At the limit, you can always replace the premises of a logically valid argument with the conclusion. Then you will have a “circular” argument in which the conclusion is the very same thing as a premise. But that hardly means that there’s anything wrong with the original argument.

 

[Eleve]

punkforchrist, now that I look at it a little more, I think there is a bit of a problem with the way you phrase the argument, though it’s really just a matter of wording. In (3), you treat “perfection” as a second-order predicate: “maximally great,” a first-order predicate, has the property being a perfection. But “being a necessary condition” is already a second-order predicate: some first-order properties are necessary (self-identity, for example), while some are not (e.g., being painted green). In that case, (2) treats “perfection” as a third-order predicate, since it is predicated of the second-order “being a necessary condition.”

Now, that may not be a problem in itself - perhaps it’s fine to have mixed predicates that can be predicated of both first- and second-order predicates. But the issue is that you can’t infer (6) from (2) in the way it’s currently stated. Suppose (2), and suppose that not being maximally great is a necessary condition (i.e., the hypothesis of (6)). Then we can say that “not being maximally great” has some perfection (namely, the perfection being a necessary condition), but we cannot infer from (2) that not being maximally great is a perfection.

It seems to me that you should replace (2) with “Every necessary condition is a perfection.” Then you’ll be predicating perfection of each necessary condition (i.e., of a bunch of first-order properties) instead of predicating it of the second-order property “being a necessary condition.”

 

[Love4All]

Love

Is there God? Of course.

I’m afraid too many people at Catholic Answers will say, “Of course not.”

To such, I would ask a definition for what they are asserting does not exist. God is too basic not to exist. I’m with Anselm on this one.

What is God? That is a good question.

Yes it is, but perhaps it needn’t be separated from the question, “Is there a God?”

William Paley took this approach first in his book Natural Theology. Without relying upon Scripture, he took a completely rational approach to the question, “Is it reasonable to believe in God?” In the course of that book, the most reasonable of divine traits emerged so that the existence of God was not only very plausible, but also revealing as to what kind of God should exist.

In another book, Evidence of Christianity, he proved rather convincingly that the reasonable type of God we could best imagine actually was historically personified in the appearance of Jesus Christ, so that your second question was answered with even greater clarity:

“What is God?”

A stumbling block for many is in spending too much time assessing other people’s opinions, and not enough examining their own. That is how it seems to me.

 

[Love4All]

Love, I think the first question should be “What is God?”, then ask if that thing exists.

There are so many ways to describe He Who Is Beyond All Description.

There, I’ve done it just above! I have described Him as “He Who Is Beyond All Description.”

Is it possible to you that such a Being exists?

Also, I think you’re oversimplifying pantheism. I’d suggest reading up on some Spinoza. While not exactly a pantheist, he’s pretty close.

If it’s all the same to you, I’d rather not require reading lists for each other in this discussion. In general, I draw from the well of my own ideas and experience, and the value I see in this is that I speak of what I know, rather than just what I’ve read in others. I am of the generation that “Won’t Get Fooled Again,” in the words of The Who. It is an astonishing testimony to God’s Omnipotent Power, that I practice the religion that I do, being the rebel that I am.

Now “Pantheism,” etymologically and in its simplest form, is the doctrine that there is but One Substance, and that Substance is God. Since there can exist no other Substance apart from God, consequently everything in the Universe is literally composed of God. This is, as I say, basic. If you have a more subtle nuance on this, by all means present it, but initially, I hold that the Universe was created ex nihilo, “from nothing,” not from God’s Own Substance. I hold that I, also, was created from nothing by God. This is the doctrine of Creation, as opposed to Pantheism, of which there are many variants, but none squares with Creation.

To put it in a way you might be sympathetic with: if the Universe is God’s thought, then would it not follow that the Universe is a part of God? Can God’s thought and being be so easily separated?

My objection to Pantheism is rooted in the violence it does to the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Essentially, if the bread and wine are already the Substance of God in the first place, then Transubstantiation is nothing, the Mass is nothing, the Eucharist is nothing. If everything is God, then what’s the point of anything? May as well just surrender to my natural hedonism and be done with all the difficulty of mastering my passions and overcoming my vices.

But in any case, I wouldn’t necessarily call myself a pantheist. I simply find it the most attractive of the theological positions.

Could you elucidate a little more? What do you perceive as the range of options for theological positions from which you might choose?

Initially, I would classify broadly, three possibilities, which I name, “I”, “A”, and “O.” I can elucidate further, but pantheism tends to fall into the “I” category.

 

[Love4All]

Of course, like all arguments, ontological arguments require a good bit of argumentative support and explanation. However, the precise definitions of terms like “excellence” aren’t particularly important to the argument - what’s important is the definition as provided by the argument. With Plantinga’s argument, “excellence” is defined as being “omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good”.

I was thinking more about these arguments today and I thought of a better parody. I’ll call it “The Rosencrantz Proof”

Let’s suppose that we have an unsolved mathematical conjecture, C. For example, let’s forget that it’s been solved recently and use Fermat’s conjecture (also known as “Fermat’s Last Theorem”). It states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two. A conjecture in mathematics is a mathematical statement that has not been proven or disproven mathematically. Fermat’s Last Theorem was unsolved for over 350 years, until it was proven to be true in 1995.

Now suppose Rosencrantz, an ambitious mathematician, wants to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem and become the most famous mathematician of his day. So he submits the following proof:

(1) Conjecture C is true only if no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two.
(2) If Conjecture C is mathematically true, it is true in all possible worlds (mathematical proofs are generally accepted to be necessary in this way).
(3) It is possible that Conjecture C is true. (Premise)
(4) Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that Conjecture C is true.
(5) Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that Conjecture C is true
(6) Therefore, Conjecture C is true.

What’s the problem with this proof? Well, it’s hidden in (3) and the limitations of axiom S5. The same problem is present in Plantinga’s argument. In general, people are unwilling to deny (3) and say “No, it is not possible that Conjecture C is true” (or in Plantinga’s case, to say “No, it is not possible that a maximally excellent being exists”). The appropriate response is to say that we don’t know Conjecture C is possibly true, or that a maximally excellent being possibly exists, because by axiom C5 and the necessary nature of these statements, there is no difference between saying it is possible that these statements are true and saying that they are true.

Very fun arguments to analyze though. Reminds me of some of Lewis Carroll’s stuff.

It seems to me mathematical propositions are either true or false. Modality doesn’t enter the picture. 2 + 2 = 4 is not just “possibly true,” it is, rather, “true.” Assigning the mode of “possibility” to something that is either true or false in every possible world, is nonsense.

 

[Eleve]

It seems to me mathematical propositions are either true or false. Modality doesn’t enter the picture. 2 + 2 = 4 is not just “possibly true,” it is, rather, “true.” Assigning the mode of “possibility” to something that is either true or false in every possible world, is nonsense.

Philosophers and logicians count necessary truths as possible truths. If we want to say that something is possibly true but not necessarily true, then we’d say that it’s contingent.

At any rate, the very argument that ngill is criticizing - Plantinga’s modal ontological argument - also appeals to the idea that God both possibly and necessarily exists. So if there’s a problem with that, there’s a problem with Plantinga’s argument regardless of whether ngill’s criticism succeeds.

 

[ngill09]

There are so many ways to describe He Who Is Beyond All Description.

There, I’ve done it just above! I have described Him as “He Who Is Beyond All Description.”

Is it possible to you that such a Being exists?

Sure. Bit of a useless definition, though. I’d call pretty much every human being on earth “beyond all description” because I think no description would fully encapsulate anyone.

If it’s all the same to you, I’d rather not require reading lists for each other in this discussion. In general, I draw from the well of my own ideas and experience, and the value I see in this is that I speak of what I know, rather than just what I’ve read in others. I am of the generation that “Won’t Get Fooled Again,” in the words of The Who. It is an astonishing testimony to God’s Omnipotent Power, that I practice the religion that I do, being the rebel that I am.

Just suggesting some interesting philosophy you might like.

Now “Pantheism,” etymologically and in its simplest form, is the doctrine that there is but One Substance, and that Substance is God. Since there can exist no other Substance apart from God, consequently everything in the Universe is literally composed of God. This is, as I say, basic. If you have a more subtle nuance on this, by all means present it, but initially, I hold that the Universe was created ex nihilo, “from nothing,” not from God’s Own Substance. I hold that I, also, was created from nothing by God. This is the doctrine of Creation, as opposed to Pantheism, of which there are many variants, but none squares with Creation.

Creation ex nihilo seems incoherent to me, though. “Before” the universe, God was all that existed. What did God cause to become the universe? Nothing? You can’t cause “nothing” to become the universe, that’s no different than saying you didn’t cause the universe. Did God causally effect the universe? That would require a universe to exist. Therefore it would follow that if God caused the universe to begin existing, he used his own substance - his own thoughts.

My objection to Pantheism is rooted in the violence it does to the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Essentially, if the bread and wine are already the Substance of God in the first place, then Transubstantiation is nothing, the Mass is nothing, the Eucharist is nothing. If everything is God, then what’s the point of anything? May as well just surrender to my natural hedonism and be done with all the difficulty of mastering my passions and overcoming my vices.

I don’t see how hedonism follows from divine omnipresence. Isn’t that a Church doctrine, anyway?

Could you elucidate a little more? What do you perceive as the range of options for theological positions from which you might choose?

Initially, I would classify broadly, three possibilities, which I name, “I”, “A”, and “O.” I can elucidate further, but pantheism tends to fall into the “I” category.

I would posit the following range (generally) of theological positions

Atheism - Pantheism - Deism - Theism

Also agnosticism and ignosticism, both of which I find attractive.