Aquinas and Free Will

[Suudy]

I’m reading through Edward Fesser’s Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. I’m trying to understand how free will and Aquinas’ first way can be reconciled.

First, I’ve been in an off and on discussion with a buddy of mine going back to our college days (about 15 years). He is firmly opposed to the idea of free will, believing first that it is impossible to prove and second that in a causal universe it cannot occur.

Now, in reading Fesser’s description of the first way, he talks about causation per se and per accidens. Now, I understand the difference as he describes it. And (if I understand the argument correctly), God is the first cause per accidens, that is, God is continually acting. Now, if this is true, then in reality all causes have their root in God as the first cause (I think, see my aside below). How then can we really say we have free will if they are all the product of causes going back to God as the first cause?

(As an aside, Fesser says Aquinas never admitted that a causal series per se could not go back infinitely, but only a causal serial per accidens. But since God is the first cause, and the cause that brought the universe into being, any causal series per se could not have existed prior to that. So in essence a causal serial per se is finite, and is dependent upon God as the impetus. So I don’t understand why Fesser would bring up the distinction. Any insight would be useful.)

Or when we speak of free will do we mean it in a different sense that is independent of a first cause? That is, are we saying that in the discussion of free will it is limited to that which can be locally observed?

For the record, this what my buddy wrote in our latest correspondence.

The issue of free will is a nut that may never be cracked. Part of the problem, in my opinion, is that the analysis of free will often seems to require that we first resolve certain basic issues in the philosophy of time, and time is as mysterious as anything. The reason is that what we often seem to mean when we say that someone has acted “freely” is that he “could have done otherwise;” he wasn’t forced into his action, deterministically. But to say that “he could ! have done otherwise” is highly problematic; it’s a counterfactual proposition, and counterfactuals have unclear truth conditions. I’m not trying to be too positivistic here, but how does one verify the proposition that he could have done otherwise? It’s a very different sort of thing than to say that he is doing something now; to verify the truth of that, we just observe. But we can’t go back in time to verify the truth of his ability to have done otherwise. So the truth-makers of counterfactual propositions can’t be anything as simple as observation.

 

[James_S_Saint]

All of Thomas Aquinas’ “Ways” are flawed. The first 4 depend entirely on the unsupported presumption that the universe had to have a beginning. Regardless of whether it did or not, the presumption is unsupported. Logic dictates that it did not. The fifth is a bit more complicated, but flawed also.

As far as free-will. This is merely a matter of contrary definitions. Free-will means “the freedom to exercise your will” it does NOT mean “freedom from causality”.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’m reading through Edward Fesser’s Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. I’m trying to understand how free will and Aquinas’ first way can be reconciled.

Well here it is necessary to define **exactly **what is meant by “free will”: Libertarian free will (incompatible with determinism) or compatibilist free will (compatible with determinism)? Aquinas believed in compatibilist free will in which case there is no problem; but you are thinking in terms of a libertarian free will in which case you are right, they are absolutely irreconcilable.

First, I’ve been in an off and on discussion with a buddy of mine going back to our college days (about 15 years). He is firmly opposed to the idea of free will, believing first that it is impossible to prove and second that in a causal universe it cannot occur.

First: true. Free will is an unprovable metaphysical assumption, just like the existence of external minds (which also can’t be proved). There are assumptions we must make (just like the law of non-contradiction) to have a meaningful discussion. If we don’t truly decide what to do and act according to our decisions, then we aren’t deciding to write these things arguing about it either, making the discussion meaningless in the end.
Second: depends on whether one is a compatibilist or a libertarian; moreover, quantum mechanics puts severe doubt on whether our universe is in fact strictly “causal”.

Now, in reading Fesser’s description of the first way, he talks about causation per se and per accidens. Now, I understand the difference as he describes it. And (if I understand the argument correctly), God is the first cause per accidens, that is, God is continually acting. Now, if this is true, then in reality all causes have their root in God as the first cause (I think, see my aside below). How then can we really say we have free will if they are all the product of causes going back to God as the first cause?

(As an aside, Fesser says Aquinas never admitted that a causal series per se could not go back infinitely, but only a causal serial per accidens. But since God is the first cause, and the cause that brought the universe into being, any causal series per se could not have existed prior to that. So in essence a causal serial per se is finite, and is dependent upon God as the impetus. So I don’t understand why Fesser would bring up the distinction. Any insight would be useful.)

Me neither. In Aquinas’ metaphysics every effect is at the end of a per se series of causation, with God as First Cause. The fact that it could also be at the end of an infinite per accidens series of causation is irrelevant.

Or when we speak of free will do we mean it in a different sense that is independent of a first cause? That is, are we saying that in the discussion of free will it is limited to that which can be locally observed?

This is the libertarian idea of free will - nothing “causes” us to make our decisions - clearly opposed to the idea of God as First Cause and an idea which Aquinas himself explicitly rejects - “free will” to him is the idea that acts stem from one’s own inclination, but that God is the First Mover of the will:

newadvent.org/summa/2006.htm

…But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word “voluntary” implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [See Objection 1, the voluntary is defined not only as having “a principle within” the agent, but also as implying “knowledge.” Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found…

Reply to Objection 3. God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it…

For the record, this what my buddy wrote in our latest correspondence.

He is correct, but is operating from a libertarian framework. What would be his objection to compatibilist free wil?
[/quote]

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I’m reading through Edward Fesser’s Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. I’m trying to understand how free will and Aquinas’ first way can be reconciled.

First, I’ve been in an off and on discussion with a buddy of mine going back to our college days (about 15 years). He is firmly opposed to the idea of free will, believing first that it is impossible to prove and second that in a causal universe it cannot occur.

Now, in reading Fesser’s description of the first way, he talks about causation per se and per accidens. Now, I understand the difference as he describes it. And (if I understand the argument correctly), God is the first cause per accidens, that is, God is continually acting. Now, if this is true, then in reality all causes have their root in God as the first cause (I think, see my aside below). How then can we really say we have free will if they are all the product of causes going back to God as the first cause?

(As an aside, Fesser says Aquinas never admitted that a causal series per se could not go back infinitely, but only a causal serial per accidens. But since God is the first cause, and the cause that brought the universe into being, any causal series per se could not have existed prior to that. So in essence a causal serial per se is finite, and is dependent upon God as the impetus. So I don’t understand why Fesser would bring up the distinction. Any insight would be useful.)

Or when we speak of free will do we mean it in a different sense that is independent of a first cause? That is, are we saying that in the discussion of free will it is limited to that which can be locally observed?

For the record, this what my buddy wrote in our latest correspondence.

metaphysical libertarianism, the physical determinism of the universe is broken by a non-physical free will or soul. the free will mechanism is by definition indeterminant in itself, the product of creation but not subject to the usual demands of physical determinism, in that it is not a physical mechanism.

 

[James_S_Saint]

metaphysical libertarianism, the physical determinism of the universe is broken by a non-physical free will or soul.

Broken??

The “non-physical free-will” cannot alter the physical (else it would be physical). The governorship of the divine free-will does not alter the physical, but merely participates in accord with the physical cause components.