Aquinas' First Way

[Perplexity]

As Fergus Kerr notes in After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, the five ways have incompatible, seemingly equi-plausible interpretations. He notes, that the neo-thomist’s have introduced new readings of the arguments utilizing metaphysical principles. This is contrasted by the French interpretation heralded by theologians like the Jesuits Marcel Chossat (1862–1926) and Henri de Lubac (1896-1991). The prestigious Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique describes this position clearly:

“As for the argument of the prime mover such as Saint Thomas understood it, it is a long time since it has been taught, even in the Thomist camp. . . If the argument is taken in the sense in which Saint Thomas borrowed it historically from the Arabs, it is not conclusive, and the criticism offered by Scotus is decisive . . . The Neo-Thomists, by adverting to metaphysical considerations . . . actually abandon the physical argument of the prime mover, just as do all the other members of the Thomistic school . . . [The argument has only] survived in the ranks of Protestant scholasticism, among certain philosophers and well-intentioned apologists’.” [1]

So, it seems there will be trouble in trying to figure out what Aquinas means in the First Way.

To make matters worse, the logic of his first way seems elusive. Graham Oppy formalizes a popular understanding of the Quinque Viae’s form as follows:

1. The two-place relational predicate ‘R’ is instantiated – that is, there are a and b such that Rab.
2. R is irreflexive – that is, nothing can stand in this relation to itself.
3. R is transitive – that is, if Rab and Rbc, then Rac.
4. There cannot be a beginningless series of things that stand in the relation R to one another – that is, there cannot be…e, f, g such that…Ref, Rfg.
5. (Hence) There is a unique thing to which other things stand in the relation R but which does not stand in the relation R to anything. [2]

In the first way, the relation Rxy = x is changed by y.

The first way instantiates this form as follows:

1’. Some things are in a process of change.

2’. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.

3’. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.

4’. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change. [3]

[He seems to place (3) into (2’)]

“For starters, the argument seems to be plainly invalid: the most that could follow from the premises is that there are first causes of change that are not themselves in a process of change. There is nothing in the premises of this argument that justifies drawing the conclusion that there is a unique first cause of change that is not itself in a process of change.” 4

I agree. Aquinas’ first way is definitely logically invalid. The thomist has two roads from here. He can either proffer the first way as an ampliative argument (a deductively invalid argument which still affords considerable inductive support for the conclusion)[5], or, he may revise the argument to make it valid.

If he tries to use this as an ampliative argument, to ensure that we best protect ourselves from error, I will employ Bayes’ theorem. That’s gonna get messy, especially if you’re unfamiliar with it. So, for simplicity’s sake, let’s just revise it.

So, how should we revise it?

I suggest, and will be working with the following:

1. Some things are in a process of change.
2. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4. If (1)-(3), then there is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.
5. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change. (4), (1)-(3), M.P.]

Finally, I’ll be understanding the terms of the First Way such as ‘motion’ in the typical Thomist metaphysical sense. This isn’t because I think this is how Aquinas understood them; but, because if we don’t do this the argument can’t even get off the ground.

I’ll post my critiques of this argument on this thread once I can find time to do my best in doing so.

Foot Notes:

[1]: Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, vol. 4 (Paris: Letouzet et Ané, 1939): col. 932–5. As cited by Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism. Malden (Ma.): Blackwell, 2008. p. 53.

[2]: Oppy, Graham. Arguing about Gods. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. p. 98.

[3]: ibid., pp. 102-103

[5]: Interestingly, most inference to best explanation (IBE, also called abductive) arguments are ampliative:

"An abduction (or inference to the best explanation, or retroduction) is an inductive argument whose premise (or premises) constitute the avaliable evidence, and whose conclusion is a hypothesis regarding what best explains the evidence. Abduction often takes the same general form as the fallacious deductive argument affirming the consequent:

A → B
B_____
A" - Cook, Roy T. A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009. p. 4.

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

Does this allow a finite cyclic set of changes?
For example A changes B and B simultaneously (or subsequently) changes A.

 

[Perplexity]

Does this allow a finite cyclic set of changes?
For example A changes B and B simultaneously (or subsequently) changes A.

Yes, although the Thomist may not allow that relation to obtain with the First Cause as either A or B. This is because ‘change’ is understood as ‘motion’ which is just the actualization of a potency. Thomists distinguish two kinds of potencies, depending on which one you mean, God cannot enter into this relation:

“(a) Passive potency = the capacity to receive some actual perfection. (b) Active potency = the power to act, do something, given the proper conditions. The former implies some incompleteness on its own, hence cannot be found in God; the second implies no incompleteness or imperfection, hence can be found in God: God has the power (active potency) to create the world or not.” - Clarke, William Norris. The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame, 2001. p. 318.

(I apologize if you already know this, just wanted to cover all bases)

 

[empther]

Only atheists can make incredibly stupid remarks like this:
( From post 54 in the thread: http://forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=649092&page=4 )

I still propose random chance as the reason for the origin of our universe. There existed a timeless possibility that anything could spring into existence. Our universe did.

In a sense, the chance is omnipotent, as all things are possible. However, it does not have a will or awareness.

Atheists are a waste of time.
:extrahappy:

 

[Perplexity]

Only atheists can make incredibly stupid remarks like this:
( From post 54 in the thread: http://forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=649092&page=4 )

Atheists are a waste of time.
:extrahappy:

Dude…wrong thread lol…

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

Yes, although the Thomist may not allow that relation to obtain with the First Cause as either A or B. This is because ‘change’ is understood as ‘motion’ which is just the actualization of a potency. Thomists distinguish two kinds of potencies, depending on which one you mean, God cannot enter into this relation:

“(a) Passive potency = the capacity to receive some actual perfection. (b) Active potency = the power to act, do something, given the proper conditions. The former implies some incompleteness on its own, hence cannot be found in God; the second implies no incompleteness or imperfection, hence can be found in God: God has the power (active potency) to create the world or not.” - Clarke, William Norris. The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame, 2001. p. 318.

(I apologize if you already know this, just wanted to cover all bases)

I do not study theology regularly so I appreciate the background, and indeed you have hinted at my point. The idea, which I’ve been unsuccessfully trying to bounce off of Norman, is that there is a distinction between the First Cause and God. Therefore, if people want to restrict God to certain potencies that is fine, but it is irrelevant until it is established that the First Cause and God are one and the same. In other words, I see no reason to forbid the First Cause from being in such a cycle simply by declaration.

Perhaps you are aware of a “if there is a First Cause, then the First Cause is God” argument and could fill me in.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

…snip…
So, it seems there will be trouble in trying to figure out what Aquinas means in the First Way.

To make matters worse, the logic of his first way seems elusive. Graham Oppy formalizes a popular understanding of the Quinque Viae’s form as follows:

1. The two-place relational predicate ‘R’ is instantiated – that is, there are a and b such that Rab.
2. R is irreflexive – that is, nothing can stand in this relation to itself.

Thomas calls the Act and Being of God, the same. I am not sure that (2) is logical.
Things may not { be and not be } in the same way and at the same “time” without it being a blatant contradiction (loss of logic, entrance of pure chaos).

In scripture, we are told about the Son, eg: that he is less than the father BECAUSE he is doing EVERYTHING that the father is doing. It’s Not predicate followed by consequent, but more of synsequent relationship.

How is this “irreflexive” statement meant? (I may be just misunderstanding its application.)

“For starters, the argument seems to be plainly invalid: the most that could follow from the premises is that there are first causes of change that are not themselves in a process of change. There is nothing in the premises of this argument that justifies drawing the conclusion that there is a unique first cause of change that is not itself in a process of change.” [4]

I agree. Aquinas’ first way is definitely logically invalid. The thomist has two roads from here. He can either proffer the first way as an ampliative argument (a deductively invalid argument which still affords considerable inductive support for the conclusion)[5], or, he may revise the argument to make it valid.

Do recall, that Thomas’ categories are taxonomy of existing paths that people find God. The Summa, as I understand it, is a debate being held on the difficulties of each of these issues. The Summa itself was never finished, and one must look to contra Gentilies to find advanced arguments that Thomas was working on when he died.

If he tries to use this as an ampliative argument, to ensure that we best protect ourselves from error, I will employ Bayes’ theorem. That’s gonna get messy, especially if you’re unfamiliar with it. So, for simplicity’s sake, let’s just revise it.

So, how should we revise it?

I suggest, and will be working with the following:

1. Some things are in a process of change.

1. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.

1. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.

It is impossible for what reason? I infer that there must be at least one cause already in act in order to convert potentiality into actuality. Therefore, I think what is impossible is that the universe was ever in total potency by Thomistic argument. Notice also, that this argument predates the ideas of Newton where a thing in motion will remain in motion. Friction was always observed in Thomas’ day to bring all closely observable things to a halt. Hence the things in act were “moved” against friction; and the explanation was extrapolated to the stars and universe without specifically saying that angels were God’s way of perpetuating their motion. This was not an issue in dialogs with Arabs of Thomas’ day, hence there was no reason to study the issue closer.
In today’s climate, one has to consider if Newton’s laws are truly valid on a cosmic scale. The universe may be exploding into nothingness, or gravitationally collapsing; in either event – the endpoints of the universe are not explained with regard to how they can escape potency and become in a state of change.

1. If (1)-(3), then there is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

1. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change. (4), (1)-(3), M.P.]

Finally, I’ll be understanding the terms of the First Way such as ‘motion’ in the typical Thomist metaphysical sense. This isn’t because I think this is how Aquinas understood them; but, because if we don’t do this the argument can’t even get off the ground.

I’ll post my critiques of this argument on this thread once I can find time to do my best in doing so.

Bravo. I like your systematic study; I look forward to seeing how you study the devilish details…

 

[Shike]

1’. Some things are in a process of change.
2’. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3’. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4’. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

“For starters, the argument seems to be plainly invalid: the most that could follow from the premises is that there are first causes of change that are not themselves in a process of change. There is nothing in the premises of this argument that justifies drawing the conclusion that there is a unique first cause of change that is not itself in a process of change.”

Exactly why does this argument seem plainly invalid? Exactly where is the trouble spot(s)?

I think if someone has a non-aristotelian conception of change and rejects hylemorphism then it would seem plainly invalid. 4’ states that the First Cause is not itself in a process of change. Under an aristotelian framework it would mean that having more than 1 First Cause is impossible–something that didn’t undergo change would have to be non-finite… and there can only be one truly non-finite entity.

So I guess you can say that my position is that the formulation seems fine to me, just that more learning is required to understand the terms.

I like the way you are laying thing out. Keep it up.

 

[Perplexity]

Exactly why does this argument seem plainly invalid? Exactly where is the trouble spot(s)?

I think if someone has a non-aristotelian conception of change and rejects hylemorphism then it would seem plainly invalid. 4’ states that the First Cause is not itself in a process of change. Under an aristotelian framework it would mean that having more than 1 First Cause is impossible–something that didn’t undergo change would have to be non-finite… and there can only be one truly non-finite entity.

So I guess you can say that my position is that the formulation seems fine to me, just that more learning is required to understand the terms.

I like the way you are laying thing out. Keep it up.

The argument:

1’. Some things are in a process of change.
2’. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3’. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4’. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

Literally translates as:

1’. ∃x(Cx)
2’. ∀x (Cx → Ax)
3’. ~I
4’. U

U can’t be deduced from (1’)-(3’).

The information you’re talking about that would tell us that U is unique isn’t contained in the argument. We’d have to provide a definition, an assumption or perhaps another premise before 4’ in order for us be able to derive that from the foregoing statements.

 

[Perplexity]

The First Way:

1. Some things are in a process of change.
2. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4. If (1)-(3), then there is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.
5. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change. (4), (1)-(3), M.P.]

I will be advancing three objections against the above argument. The first will undermine (2), the second will override (4), and the third examines the conclusion.

Objection #1:

Br. Benignus [1] describes an objection to premise (2) [2] which I think succeeds. He asks whether something can have a capacity that is perennially being fulfilled. Such a thing would be in the process of change, but wouldn’t be being changed by another.

“Appeal to our experience of movement turns out to be inconclusive. St. Thomas could say in his day that we know by induction that no body is in motion except it be moved by another, but his induction was limited to the bodies of common sensible experience and did not take into account molecular, atomic, and subatomic movements.” [3]

Br. Benignus concludes that induction can’t solve this puzzle because our observances of these entities doesn’t tell us their motion is uncaused, at most, all we can say is we don’t observe any external ‘movers’.

He argues that such a thing (in motion by its nature) is precluded on Thomism, for a number of reasons that needn’t delay us. His solution is that unless the objector can provide a better theory of ‘change’ than the Thomistic model, we should just adopt it, and therefore reject the objection. [4]

My undermining defeater is that no one would be irrational in simply suspending belief on the matter, rather than adopting Thomism. Until we know whether moved sub-atomic particles (etc.) are moved by another, it’s epistemically healthy, and honest to simply abstain from belief.

How would this effect Aquinas’ first way? First it means we needn’t accept (2). This isn’t equivalent to saying (2) is false. But, unless we accept (2), we can’t accept (5). So, I think this effectively undermines the argument.

This objection actually undermines any form of Thomism which precludes the existence of things in motion by nature (in the specified sense). So all the premises of the argument, and of the other four Ways are undermined.

Interestingly, Sobel also employs this objection against the 1st Way:

“[T]he First Way is vulnerable to the apparent possibility of self-moving things that have always been in motion, for Aquinas’s premise that “whatever is moved is moved by another” (ST I q2,a3 p. 22), is presumably meant to be a statement of strict metaphysical necessity. But it seems that at least things in perpetual motion could be self-movers. It seems, in Aquinas’s Aristotelian terms, that they could be at every moment things actually in motion and potentially in motion in the immediate future, their changing potentialities being continuously actualized by the action of their immediately antecedent actualities. This conception of a self-moving perpetual mover does not involve its being “in the same respect and in the same way…both mover and moved” (ST I q2,a3, p. 22).” [5]

Objection #2:

Since (4) is a conditional statement it’s true only if its antecedent is sufficient for its consequent. [6] Is its antecedent * sufficient for its consequent? Well, I don’t think (1)-(3) need rule out cyclic motion, thus the antecedent is insufficient.

If we suppose that the relation of ‘moving’ in question is transitive (i.e., if a moves b, and b moves c, then a moves c) then, by the irreflexivity of this relation described in premise 2, there are no circles of movers. If the relation isn’t transitive, then there is nothing in the premises to rule out circles of movers (i.e., a moves b, b moves c, and c moves a).

Is this relation transitive? I don’t think Libertarians should think so. Libertarian free-will has it that free agents are ‘unmoved movers’ with respect to free-choices. But, if ‘motion’ is transitive, then all choices and actions (etc.) of agents are moved by God.

What if you’re not a Libertarian? Well, it’s unclear whether this relation is transitive or not. I don’t see anything ‘wrong’ with suspending judgment on this.

Objection #3:

You might find the conclusion too hard to believe, and thus reject the weakest premise on those grounds. e.g., If you’re deeply persuaded by an argument for atheism, or if atheism is a basic belief of yours (which you take to be properly basic), or if (in some unspecified sense) you’re more certain of atheism than any of the premises.

Conclusion:

I don’t think we’re irrational in not accepting the conclusion of this argument. So, this certainly is not a proof of God’s existence.

Footnotes:

[1]: Gerrity, Benignus. Nature, Knowledge and God; an Introduction to Thomistic Philosophy. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub., 1949.

[2]: Premise (2) encapsulates the Scholastic principle: quid quid movetur ab alio movetur, or whatever is moved, is moved by another.

[3]: Ibid., p. 80.

[4]: The inability to provide a better model of change wouldn’t make a bad model good. Clearly, the objector’s failure to meet Benignus’ demand wouldn’t make it any more certain that moved sub-atomic particles (etc.) are moved by another.

[5]: Sobel, Jordan Howard. Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. p. 196.

Interestingly, world-prestigious defender of Theism, William Lane Craig describes this book as an acid bath for theism.

[6]: The antecedent is the ‘if’ part of the conditional statement, the consequent is the ‘then’ part.*

 

[Shike]

The argument:

1’. Some things are in a process of change.
2’. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3’. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4’. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

Literally translates as:

1’. ∃x(Cx)
2’. ∀x (Cx → Ax)
3’. ~I
4’. U

U can’t be deduced from (1’)-(3’).

The information you’re talking about that would tell us that U is unique isn’t contained in the argument. We’d have to provide a definition, an assumption or perhaps another premise before 4’ in order for us be able to derive that from the foregoing statements.

Thank you.

First off, I question the use of predicate logic in general for multiple reasons. For one, it can be extremely tricky to translate sentences. For instance, 1 gives the idea that there are multiple things that are in a process of change while 1’ says that there is at least one object that is in a process of change–although the difference may not matter in this context, they are not the same. But ignoring this slight difference, I’m not too confident with the translation of 2. The line 2’ gives one-way implication. But, it seems to me that two way implication could work and may even be a better interpretation.

Second, the scope of predicate logic in general may be too narrow in that it leaves out arguments that we can know are valid and sound. There may be arguments where the meaning cannot be separated as much from the form to the degree that predicate logic likes.

And third, and I’m sure you know this, instantiating one invalid argument is not enough to show that the argument is invalid (which is why you try to come up with a similar argument). But it is too soon to ditch the original argument. I don’t think you tried very hard to try to translate 3 and 4 into predicate logic.

For the sake of argument, here is an attempt – however good, we shall see. A reductio and 3’’ is enough to pull 4’’ out of the magic hat.

1’. ∃x(Cx)
2’’. ∀x∃y(Cx Ξ Axy)
3’’. ~∀x∃y(Axy & Cy)
4’’. ∃x∃y(Axy & ~Cy)

I don’t agree with this as it passes over all the important metaphysics. If one is really going to engage Aquinas’ summary (for that is what Aquinas’ 5 ways are), one should study the metaphysics.

That said, tomorrow I will try to reply to your latest post that does start to get into the metaphysics of it all.

ciao,
Michael

 

[Shike]

Objection #1:
He argues that such a thing (in motion by its nature) is precluded on Thomism, for a number of reasons that needn’t delay us. His solution is that unless the objector can provide a better theory of ‘change’ than the Thomistic model, we should just adopt it, and therefore reject the objection. [4]

My undermining defeater is that no one would be irrational in simply suspending belief on the matter, rather than adopting Thomism. Until we know whether moved sub-atomic particles (etc.) are moved by another, it’s epistemically healthy, and honest to simply abstain from belief.

I would agree with your comments in relation to Benignus’. But I would say that the aristotelian analysis of change and Hylemorphism is not a hypothesis that allows for better theories–it is a an analysis of what has to be true for any possible change to exist.

The concept of self-moving that Aquinas seems to reject is one closely allied to the law of non-contradiction. It could allow for “self-movers” in a less fundamental sense such as animals or even perhaps libertarian free-will (though I’m not entirely sure as we would need to get into specifics) or whatnot… but the conception of self-moving that is relevant still holds at the more fundamental atemporal existential level.

Even if Benignus’ comments here are wrong or right, I would still say someone isn’t irrational to reject Aquinas’ arguments… they might be wrong to do so but the material is in no way easy–mistakes are understandable. Not only that, there is a long history of presenting Aquinas’ arguments wrongly and attributing things he did not say–for an older example, consult Kant; for a contemporary example, consult Dawkin’s The God Delusion.

Interestingly, Sobel also employs this objection against the 1st Way:

“[T]he First Way is vulnerable to the apparent possibility of self-moving things that have always been in motion, for Aquinas’s premise that “whatever is moved is moved by another” (ST I q2,a3 p. 22), is presumably meant to be a statement of strict metaphysical necessity. But it seems that at least things in perpetual motion could be self-movers. It seems, in Aquinas’s Aristotelian terms, that they could be at every moment things actually in motion and potentially in motion in the immediate future, their changing potentialities being continuously actualized by the action of their immediately antecedent actualities. This conception of a self-moving perpetual mover does not involve its being “in the same respect and in the same way…both mover and moved” (ST I q2,a3, p. 22).” [5]

This objection seems a lot like an objection to the Second Way, that there could indeed exist an infinite series of causes without a first member. But Aquinas had no problem with such a series of causes with no first member, but he didn’t think one could have such a regress in terms of fundamental existence. He thought that there must be an ontological hierarchy with a “first” member here and now at this instant. The aristotelian analysis of change seems to go beyond what we would normally call change to the fundamental philosophical principles that allow for any finite existence whatsoever. Thus, when one removes aristotelian change, one is left with Pure Actuality–and there can only be one such Entity, by pain of contradiction.

My comments are brief but I can give a book recommendation or two that illustrates my counter-claims in more depth.

ciao,
Michael

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

This objection seems a lot like an objection to the Second Way, that there could indeed exist an infinite series of causes without a first member. But Aquinas had no problem with such a series of causes with no first member, but he didn’t think one could have such a regress in terms of fundamental existence. He thought that there must be an ontological hierarchy with a “first” member here and now at this instant. The aristotelian analysis of change seems to go beyond what we would normally call change to the fundamental philosophical principles that allow for any finite existence whatsoever. Thus, when one removes aristotelian change, one is left with Pure Actuality–and there can only be one such Entity, by pain of contradiction.

Was wondering when someone was going to point this out. Most fail to understand St. Aquinas’s metaphysics of change because they are thinking in accidentally ordered series (per accidens), Aquinas was purely concerned with essentially ordered series (per se).

 

[Perplexity]

Shike: If I’m understanding your objection correctly, you’re saying the Thomistic account of change is necessary for us to make sense of change. So, we can’t simply suspend belief in this account because we’re unsure of whether moved sub-atomic particles are moved by another. There are several things I’d want to say to this. The first is you didn’t really motivate this claim, so I don’t see why we should accept it. The second is that this was only one of three objections, so if we grant your response, there are still two other objections standing. But, if we suspended belief in this account of change, we’d suspend belief in pure actuality, so I don’t see how suspending belief can commit one to belief in pure actuality.

 

[Shike]

Shike: If I’m understanding your objection correctly, you’re saying the Thomistic account of change is necessary for us to make sense of change. So, we can’t simply suspend belief in this account because we’re unsure of whether moved sub-atomic particles are moved by another. There are several things I’d want to say to this. The first is you didn’t really motivate this claim, so I don’t see why we should accept it. The second is that this was only one of three objections, so if we grant your response, there are still two other objections standing. But, if we suspended belief in this account of change, we’d suspend belief in pure actuality, so I don’t see how suspending belief can commit one to belief in pure actuality.

Hey Perplexity,

Yes, the aristotelian conception of change underlies any possible change by pain of contradiction. Such a conclusion is the result of a long process of analysis of changing things, to the eventual position of Hylemorphism and the principles of Actuality and Potentiality. I can give some guidance if you wish to study this further, but I’m not sure I’m willing to get into it all here and now—nor perhaps this is the best medium to do so.

Objection #2 isn’t much of a problem. When one gets right down to the heart of the matter, the possibility you describe isn’t actually possible. In terms of existence, something cannot be the cause of its own existence by pain of contradiction. To claim otherwise is nothing other than to deny the law of non-contradiction and say that ‘something can come from nothing’.

Objection #3 is interesting. Justification applies to beliefs. In one sense it would seem that someone isn’t justified in believing something that is wrong. In another sense it would seem that someone is justified—bringing the Gettier problem in epistemology into focus. Regardless if the person is justified or not in rejecting Aquinas’ First Way, I would say that they would be in error.

You might find the conclusion too hard to believe, and thus reject the weakest premise on those grounds. e.g., If you’re deeply persuaded by an argument for atheism, or if atheism is a basic belief of yours (which you take to be properly basic), or if (in some unspecified sense) you’re more certain of atheism than any of the premises.

And based upon what you say here, I would agree that you wouldn’t necessarily be irrational to reject Aquinas’ First Way, but nonetheless, you would still have come to the wrong conclusion and be in error.

Besides, all of this isn’t really engaging the argument at hand.

 

[Perplexity]

Yes, the aristotelian conception of change underlies any possible change by pain of contradiction. Such a conclusion is the result of a long process of analysis of changing things, to the eventual position of Hylemorphism and the principles of Actuality and Potentiality. I can give some guidance if you wish to study this further, but I’m not sure I’m willing to get into it all here and now—nor perhaps this is the best medium to do so.

Hm, thanks but I think I’m adequately familiar with Aristotle’s metaphysics of change, and the Hylemorphist position. (That’s not to say I’m advanced in either, just that I’m not sure what could be said that would change my understanding of it) I’ll try and formulate an account of change to show why I don’t think Aristotle’s is necessary, even if I don’t post it here, it’s an important and interesting challenge.

Objection #2 isn’t much of a problem. When one gets right down to the heart of the matter, the possibility you describe isn’t actually possible. In terms of existence, something cannot be the cause of its own existence by pain of contradiction. To claim otherwise is nothing other than to deny the law of non-contradiction and say that ‘something can come from nothing’.

I think we can agree that you can’t cause yourself to exist and still accept my objection. It seems possible to me, for instance, that someone travel from the future to the past in order to change the future and in doing so being the mover of their motion. Just think of all the movies out there having such scenarios in them: Back to the Future 1-3, the Terminators, The Time Machine, The Butterfly Effect, The Caller (2011), Primer, Triangle (yes I’ve seen a lot of movies) etc. etc. I doubt many watch these films and says “This is a violation of non-contradiction.”

Objection #3 is interesting. Justification applies to beliefs. In one sense it would seem that someone isn’t justified in believing something that is wrong. In another sense it would seem that someone is justified—bringing the Gettier problem in epistemology into focus. Regardless if the person is justified or not in rejecting Aquinas’ First Way, I would say that they would be in error.

I like this response, it resembles my own view of justification. For instance, I say many theists are justified in believing theism even though I believe theism is false.

 

[Shike]

I think we can agree that you can’t cause yourself to exist and still accept my objection. It seems possible to me, for instance, that someone travel from the future to the past in order to change the future and in doing so being the mover of their motion. Just think of all the movies out there having such scenarios in them: Back to the Future 1-3, the Terminators, The Time Machine, The Butterfly Effect, The Caller (2011), Primer, Triangle (yes I’ve seen a lot of movies) etc. etc. I doubt many watch these films and says “This is a violation of non-contradiction.”

Here is some food for thought on this very subject.
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/12/dreaded-causa-sui.html

Self-causation as understood in aristotelian terms is impossible. There may be an interpretation of “self-caused” that is more plausible, however.

But yes, sometimes when I see a movie I think, ‘gee, that’s not possible… oh yeah, don’t worry about it as it’s just a movie’.

It’s late for me, so I say goodnight!

 

[Sarpedon]

The argument:

1’. Some things are in a process of change.
2’. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3’. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4’. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

Literally translates as:

1’. ∃x(Cx)
2’. ∀x (Cx → Ax)
3’. ~I
4’. U

U can’t be deduced from (1’)-(3’).

The information you’re talking about that would tell us that U is unique isn’t contained in the argument. We’d have to provide a definition, an assumption or perhaps another premise before 4’ in order for us be able to derive that from the foregoing statements.

Obviously there are premises before 4’- do you really think that you can summarize the argument in four lines of symbolic logic?

Why do you use PL so much? It’s just the rules of formal thought (unless you’re an analytic ). Why not skip that step and think about it directly? Sometimes it comes across as though you are confusing yourself…

 

[Perplexity]

Obviously there are premises before 4’- do you really think that you can summarize the argument in four lines of symbolic logic?

Why do you use PL so much? It’s just the rules of formal thought (unless you’re an analytic ). Why not skip that step and think about it directly? Sometimes it comes across as though you are confusing yourself…

I suppose it might look odd that the bulky first way is only a 3-4 premised argument; but, when you look at it, most of the first way is motivation for a few premises. It is a very, very brief argument. Lagrange states it in a sentence:

1. If movement is not self-explanatory, whether the movement is corporeal or spiritual, it necessitates a first mover.

 

[Sarpedon]

I suppose it might look odd that the bulky first way is only a 3-4 premised argument; but, when you look at it, most of the first way is motivation for a few premises. It is a very, very brief argument. Lagrange states it in a sentence:

I actually own the book by Lagrange that you mention, and it is highly abbreviated in other sections (like hylomorphism and knowledge of particulars). He tends to write with the assumption you already have a heavy background in the issue. I would recommend books by Gilson for a better in depth overview. For example, this one:

amazon.com/The-Christian-Philosophy-Thomas-Aquinas/dp/0268008019/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1331303694&sr=8-1

On an unrelated note, Gilson has some fantastic books on realism, though I don’t think he entirely solves the problem (nor claims to):
amazon.com/Methodical-Realism-Etienne-Gilson/dp/1586173049/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331303746&sr=1-1
amazon.com/Thomist-Realism-Critique-Knowledge-Etienne/dp/1586176854/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331303759&sr=1-1