Aquinas on God's knowledge

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I am well versed in episteology and I have been reading Aquinas in God’s foreknowledge; it seems as though Thomas says that there are no contingent future truths. He says that we humans in the temporal might think that the future is contingent since we cannot foresee with perfect knowledge but God knows all things since He exists outside of time. It appears that to Thomas free will is an illusion of sorts.

So it seems that Thomas is teaching a form of determinism which precludes free will? Or does he teach that God has a special knowledge that somehow allows for what we would call true libertarian free will?

I know that Augustine was a determinist and I think this was part of his Manichean influence but I thought Aquinas always taught a compatiblism?

Does anyone know Aquinas’ views on free will and God’s foreknowledge that they can express in today’s terminology?

Does God know all things or all that is knowable? If the future doesn’t exist, can God know it with perfect knowledge other than induction and if so, how does this knowledge not preclude free will. I know that Thomas tried to get around this paradox of perfect foreknowledge and free will by stating different types of knowledge such as knowledge of possibilities and knowledge of actualization…I got lost in his midevel vernacular…

Any help out there?

Thanks,

John
 
I just finished with a philosophy course and this is what the test book says on his view,“a human being is a unified substance, though the rational part of the soul has independent existence.” My understanding from my phil courses is that although transciendent (all knowing, existing out of time, an “unmoved mover”), we as people have soul which makes us different from all beings. All other beings are designed to exist with a purpose, designed by the divine, but people have soul which is free, thus free will. God does not control soul only the design of beings. Hope this helps. The rest of your questions are beyong my reach…but now I’m wondering…
 
Thanks for the answer. I think one of the problems with free will and foreknowledge is this. Lets say that God in eternity past could have created 1,000 worlds; and in world 560 I started this thread, but in every other world I did not. Now God did create world 560 so here we are on the thread; doesn’t this imply that God foreordained my actions by NOT creating another world?

I think this was and still is the issue between free will and foreknowledge. Some have gone as far to say that God doesn’t know all things but only those things which are knowable and if an action is truly free it is not knowable with “perfect” knowledge. Also if the future doesn’t exist then it too is unknowable apart from induction.

So we have a real dilema on our hands because there doesn’t seem to be any way to allow for free will except for limiting God’s knowledge. This is what Thomas was trying to get around in that God knows all possibilities but maybe not the ones that become actualized…I think this is what he was saying.

John
 
John,

I’m interested in this topic. But first, just to double check, did you mean "“epistemology” in your first post? I assumed it was just a typo, but I want to make sure I’m not missing something.

Second, perhaps it would be helpful to cite or otherwise indicate which passages of St. Thomas you are thinking of?

Thanks,and welcome to the forums,
VC
 
I am well versed in episteology and I have been reading Aquinas in God’s foreknowledge; it seems as though Thomas says that there are no contingent future truths. He says that we humans in the temporal might think that the future is contingent since we cannot foresee with perfect knowledge but God knows all things since He exists outside of time. It appears that to Thomas free will is an illusion of sorts.
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It’s not that St. Thomas taught that free will is an illusion, it’s more that he had a different (and more reasonable, IMO) notion of free will than the modern libertarian one.

In the modern libertarian notion of free will, no event is determined until it happens, and all determining factors towards a decision come from within the will. This is a very flawed understanding of free will on both counts, as in some cases only one decision is possible (and therefore the act itself is pre-determined), and no choices arise purely from within without any determining influence from outside. Furthermore, we aren’t the source of our own wills, so in a very real sense our wills are exteriorly determined from the word go, because we can’t will to be a non-willing thing. Our nature is set from before our birth and self-awareness.

Aquinas argued that free will means that the will itself makes the determination, and that’s the definition of free will. This means that something can be influenced from outside, and it can even be pre-determined as an event, so long as the will assents to the activity directly. If, within the context of the world surrounding it, the motivation for an action comes from the will, it is an act freely willed.

To give an illustration of how choice is not the same as will, and that one can be free while the other isn’t, let’s say that I tell you that tomorrow, for a fact, you will be performing a space walk. You don’t have the choice about wearing a space suit, but your will can either be for or against walking in space regardless of the fact that you will be doing it. You don’t have a choice in the event, nor do have a choice in the equipment, but your will is not determined by the exterior facts.

Another example is that tomorrow you will exist. Period (we’re assuming an immortal soul). You can will yourself to exist, or you can will yourself not to exist, but you will exist. You don’t have the choice of existing or not existing, but you can will it or not will it.

An example of freedom of choice without the determination of will would be my telling you to choose between being executed by lethal injection or hanging. Your will may not be to die by either method, but you still have a choice in the matter.

The point of these illustrations is merely to show that choice and will are not identical; they aren’t meant to illustrate how our freedom interacts with God. For that, and for an understanding of Aquinas’ teaching, the best example I know of is that of literary characters.

Let’s take Romeo and Juliet. Within the context of their world their will is indeed free, and they have free choice. Their choices lead to their deaths and sorrow for their families, but the choices and will is theirs. Transcending the context of their world is Shakespeare who writes the story, and who “writes” their wills and choices. Their freedom is not an illusion within the context of their world, because their choices do come from their own wills, but since they can’t possibly be source of their own wills (as stated above), it is no contradiction to say that Shakespeare gave them their nature and free wills that choose certain things. Romeo and Juliet are completely free because they choose exactly what they will, and their wills are not constrained; the fact that their nature is specifically determined by a transcendent cause has no bearing on the freedom of their will (any more than the fact that you’re naturally a human and not a dog, or that you exist at all, limits your freedom of will).

So it is a very different idea from libertarian free will, but as I said libertarian free will is in fact the illusion and doesn’t even make sense within the context of the natural world we know and see. Since we can’t determine our natures, nor can we determine whether or not we will anything, libertarian free will is a false notion on its face.

Peace and God bless!
 
Verbum_Caro said:
John,

I’m interested in this topic. But first, just to double check, did you mean "“epistemology” in your first post? I assumed it was just a typo, but I want to make sure I’m not missing something.

Second, perhaps it would be helpful to cite or otherwise indicate which passages of St. Thomas you are thinking of?

Thanks,and welcome to the forums,

VC
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Yes that was a typo I meant epistemology
 
Thanks Ghostly, I will have to ponder this but you did explain the original question about Aquinas’ views -than you.

I do question your definition a bit because it sounds like Jonathan Edward’s “motive determinism” in that we always choose what we want to choose based on the strongest motive (which is impossible to prove without begging the question). I don’t want to comment too much more on your post until I have some time to digest it.

I do acknowledge that eveyone has a definition of free will that they hold to and they all seem to vary just a bit. I personally acknowledge that we live in a sensible world and we are constantly being presented with motive objects; however, I believe that as free moral agents when our minds are presented with these motive objects we have the ability to suspend volition; and subject these motive objects to reflection and judgement and then freely choose our decision. We in a sense can be the first cause of our effects. I don’t think that anyone who believes in free will would deny that our environment has an impact on us or that we can will anything into existence. The will is in a sense “passive” and it is the agent that makes the choice. I think of the will as another “sense” that the agent can use to make his choice through. Granted we are not always free to do anything and everything I think it is most important when it comes to moral decisions; to sin or not to sin are we free to sin or not sin. This seems to be the classic issue of the debate since determinists will tell you that you are not morally neutral and cannot use your will to choose to not sin. I personally disagree and believe that at the Great Judgement we will see that no nature or gun held to our heads forced us to break God’s laws; we always have the power to say no to sin. Now we can become slaves to sin but that would be from our repeated involvement in sin. Paul says in Romans 6 that whomever we present ourselves to, to that we will be enslaved, therefore become slaves of righteousness. I think there is an implicit statement of moral neutrality here and we are not born with a proclivity to sin…

Although regardless of anyone’s views, Aquinas wrestled with the friction of free will and God’s omniscience which does preclude any sort of free will if God did indeed before time began, choose what world He would create.

Regarding what section of the Summa I am questioning it is question 14 titled God’s Knowledge.

Thank you all for the thoughtful and insightful remarks; I will re-read them over the weekend.

God bless,
 
Just bumping this thread to encourage thegrons to continue posting on the subject. I’ve some thoughts on your last post, but I’m waiting to see if you have more to say after you’ve digested all the information. 🙂

Let me just say that this is one of the most fascinating philosophical questions to me, and I’m always thinking about it. I strongly recommend the movie “Stranger Than Fiction” for perhaps the best portrayal of how free will and “author determinism” (a la my Romeo and Juliet example) can go hand in hand without violating eachother. In short, the movie is about a man who suddenly finds his every action and thought narrated, even when he tries to “trip up” the voice. His choices are his own, but they are still part of a story. It’s not the greatest movie of all time by any stretch, but its approach to this subject is very interesting.

Peace and God bless!
 
Ghosty;

I believe that man as a free moral agent has the intrinsic ability to be the first cause of many of his effects. This is not to say that sometimes we do not act in a brute manner and simply react to antecedent events in our lives; but again when my mind is presented with antecedent conditions I can suspend my volition, subject the motive stimuli to reflection and judgement and do nothing or do A or not A. This is how I would define free will "the ability to either do A or not A in a given situation". Of course there are times when we are not free to act; we can’t will the laws of nature to change…

But I still maintain that if God had perfect knowledge of all the possible worlds that He could have created in eternity past; and then creates the actual world, this precludes our free will Even though I might make a decision that I subjected to reflection and judgement.

I say this because take an example ‘w’ A and ‘w’ B: in world A I freely choose Christ as my savior and in world B I deny Christ and go to hell. If God is omniscient in the absolute sense; then whatever world He chooses to actualize will determine my eternal salvation and I am not free after all. In fact if God knows every single event of every possible world, than nothing is free. If God actualizes world B, then He has predestined me to hell. So Edwards and maybe Aquinas are “soft determinists”.

Now I understand what you had posted but I wouldn’t call that free. Jonathan Edwards had a doctrine of Moral Necessity which stated that man always chooses what he wants to and therefore has free will - even though man is compelled to choose something because of a sin nature, yet since it was his choosing…he is free. Edwards also taught that we always choose based on the strongest motive, which is mere tautology.

So if God has perfect foreknowledge than man is not truly free but merely playing out the world that God has decided to actualize. If God knew that Hiltler in another possible world would freely choose to be a God fearing Christian; and then actualized that world; then Hitler would have not done what he did not because Hilter freely chose to do so but because this is the world God foreknew and He decided to actulize it. Again another version of soft determinism.

Now us Libertarian free will guys don’t deny that there are cause and effects in the world that often cannot be avoided but some acts are truly free as well, if not, then everything has been determined.

But since none of us can know the mind of an infinite God nor how He knows things (except for the Spirit), in my limited human capacity I would have to say that libertarian free will is self evident and this “self-evident truth” will steer the rest of my thinking on the subject of foreknowledge and free will.

P
 
I wanted to add that Edwards view of free will was double talk; if I am forced to sin because of a sin nature, than I am operating under necessity and not free will (even though I choose to sin). Again I don’t deny that man can forfeit his freedom to the degree that by willingly placing himself in bondage to sin, yet I believe he always has the power to not sin. If man is born with a sin nature that compels him to sin, he is not truly free to choose, add to this God’s foreknowlege in the world He created and we see that Edwards is really trying to put the spin on free will.

I suppose a lot of this issue gets down to what each of us defines as free will and to what extent. We all agree that we are not free to do or choose to do anything and we all agree that we can become enslaved to certain things; I guess it is a matter as to how we view God as a righteous judge. I personally cannot see God judging me for sinning when I was born with the inate proclivity to sin and God’s choosing to actualize a partcular world.
 
A free will discussion! I’ll throw my hat in the ring.

I would like to discuss this in parts. The first part being God’s omniscience which I think is the easiest part to reconcile with a free will and even free choice, which Ghostly has showed are two separate ideas. =) Secondly, and more difficultly, we can try to reconcile this with God’s sovereignty. Finally, we can discuss how God’s foreknowledge is a special case of act since he wills the existence of things and is the source of all nature. This last topic is, I believe, the case where people have issue. Hopefully I don’t get ahead of myself owed to my excitement in the topic!

First we have to ask ourselves if foreknowledge alone abrogates our free will. I don’t think anyone here is making this argument but it is fairly common, so let’s do a thought exercise. You just read this sentence. You and I both know you just read it. Does the fact we both know this mean you never had the free will (and choice) to read it? Of course not! Why is this? Because the knowledge did not act. Most would argue this is not applicable to God but that will be the topic of the third point. This point was merely to show that knowledge (and consequently foreknowledge) does not nullify the will.

God is sovereign. How does He rule? I am making up these distinctions but I would say God rules by His grace. Specifically, He rules by natural, ordinary, and extraordinary grace. Now natural grace I would describe as the grace we receive through the nature of things. The enviroment around us, the people we meet, our experiences, and the things that help shape us as persons are all natural grace. Ordinary grace I would describe as that which we receive through the sacraments. Rejoice! This is a participation in the life of God which leads to our santification! Finally, I would describe extraordinary grace as miracles. The life of Christ, the message to Saul on the road to Damascus, the tearing icons of the Virgin, and the bleeding hosts are all extraordinary graces.

How is this relevant? I would say each of these graces increase the persuasiveness to transform man’s will to that of God’s. It is obvious that natural grace does not compel us to conform to the will of God, although it may influence and shape us. This is obvious, for if natural grace compelled man to follow God’s will, all men would follow God’s will. It is also obvious that ordinary grace does not compel a man to follow God’s will. If this were the case every man who received the sacraments would follow God’s will. Rather, the ordinary graces transform our will, over time, through penance, to be sanctified in the Lord. However, we would be fools to think we don’t have to cooperate with these graces! Our will must receive these free gifts! Extraordinary graces are the most difficult. After some discussion with my girlfriend, I feel as if extraordinary graces are given to those whose intention of will is already to do the will of God. God then send’s His Spirit to enlighten them to the true path of what is good, because they asked and received.

Finally, there is the special case of God’s foreknowledge and His freedom to create the universe however He sees fit. This is what I believe most persons are talking about when discussing this topic. It is typified in the example of Hitler. Thegrons writes, “…then Hitler would have not done what he did not because Hilter freely chose to do so but because this is the world God foreknew and He decided to actulize it.” A friend of mine always yells “loaded question!” whenever I ask him thigns so I laugh when I will apply the same principle but it is applicable. Some people view God’s creation as His different choices of how to make things knowing their outcome. When He chooses one, He precludes the other; He damns Hitler and saves Francis Assisi. Could God not have “tweaked” nature to allow the opposite or the salvation of both? The problem being, the tweaking of nature to provide a specific outcome which ultimately compels men to salvation is exactly the abrogation of free will. The situation assumes that Hitler’s will is a direct product of God and not something free. However, nature is designed to not compel the will for exactly the purpose of its freedom. It is clear that nature is hardly compelling. It is described as the wilderness; that God comes and leads us back to Him.

How does He do this? The Word of God becomes manifest to us and then we are transformed with His Spirit. God does not force this grace to men but rather allows us to participate in His glory! He has made us His body, His Church, His arms and legs to do the work for the salvation of men. Look at the majesty of the all powerful and loving God! He could subdue all men to His glory but rather allows us to participate in the salvation of men. We work to bring men to the ordinary means of their salvation. This is a gift to us. We then are glorified beyond mere human perfection. Praise God! Praise God for the freedom nature allows us to be glorified as an image of His glory!

This Pentecost, let us pray for the gifts of His Spirit. In Christ’s name,
Gary
 
Buff;

I like your post as well as Ghostly’s comments, give me a few to review and respond…

I will share with you that I am not committing a modal fallacy which states that (if God necessarily knows P, then P must necessarily occur). Knowledge is not causative; however logically speaking this is true viz. necessarily (if God knows P, then P) is true; this is what Aquinas called the necessity of consequence.

The first scenario is refered to as the necessity of the consequent which is a fallacy. It is a fallacy in that it states “whatever God knows must be a necessary truth” where as what I have been saying is the consequent event is necessary in virture of its relationship with the antecedent viz. a conditional proposition.

I will expand on this later…

Grons
 
I wish to address this issue in the nomenclature and reasoning of the philosophical community as well as employ logical reasoning which I believe is an extension of God’s mind.

I would not argue that foreknowledge is causative; the issue of foreknowledge and free will doesn’t turn on the foreknowledge per se but on God’s creation or actualization of the world which He knew all of its events with certainty in time immemorial.

For example: I foreknow that if I take my wife out for dinner tonight, she will not order any beef. Now her not ordering beef is not due to my foreknowledge but rather to her freely choosing not to eat beef.

Yet for the conditional proposition to be true viz. necessarily (if I take my wife out tonight to dinner, then she will not order beef) demands that that if the antecedent is true, then in virtue of the consequent’s relationship with the antecedent; the consequent must of necessity be true. BUT the truth of my wife not ordering beef is NOT a necessary truth.

Let’s apply this to God’s foreknowledge: “Necessarily (if God foreknows Hitler will gas 6 million Jews, then Hitler will gas 6 million Jews)”. Now Hitler’s gassing the Jews was of his free will but if God foreknew it to be true, then by virtue of the relationship between Hitler’s free will act of gassing the Jews and God’s foreknowledge, Hitler of necessity had to gas the Jews. If not then proposition of God’s foreknowledge of this event was false. and there cannot be any falsehood in God.

This is what Aquinas called the necessity of consequence (relationship of an antecedent and consequent in a conditional proposition). This by the way is the view of a compatiblist and soft determinist. NOTE: that I am not saying that if God foreknows an event will happen in the future, that event is a necessary truth. Nor am I saying that God’s foreknowledge caused the event to happen; I am saying that the* relationship *between foreknowledge and the event imposes the necessity on the event.

So If it is true that God foreknows the future of every possible world and then determines to actualize a particular world; those events must take place for God’s foreknowledge to be certain. But again even though these events of the world are technically free will acts they are* in virtue *of their relationship to God’s foreknowledge – necessary.

So herein lies the dilemma between God’s certain or absolute foreknowledge and man’s free will. Open Theists have wrestled with the issue and rather than deny man true free will they have re-defined the concept of omniscience. They would say that God knows all that is knowable instead of God knows all things. This is true by the way. I don’t believe that God can know of a square circle, nor can He know of a heard of Unicorns (if they don’t exist) for this would violate the laws of logic which spring forth from the mind of God. Furthermore if free will acts or acts of free choice or whatever you wish to call them; if they are truly free, they then do not exist until they actualize. And logically speaking it is not possible to know something with certainty that does not exist. God may know these acts by induction; but then He doesn’t know them with certainty.

Actually they do make some good points because God for example is not Omnipotent in the absolute sense. God cannot lie, nor can He deny Himself, He cannot make a square circle or contradict Himself for contradictions are falsehoods. So maybe God is not omniscient in the absolute sense – He cannot know of a square circle nor can He know something to be true that is false…

Again I wish to re-emphasize that foreknowledge is not causative but rather it is the conditional relationship between foreknowledge and the event that imposes the necessity on the event and therefore precludes free choice. Additionally God’s perfect foreknowledge of every possible world does not preclude free will in itself but rather it is His deciding which possible world to actualize is what the dilemma turns on.

I will state for the record that I believe that God knows things in ways that are beyond our understanding; and His bible is only a partial revelation of Him and His creation. I see too many prophecies that Christ foreknew that would demand His knowing with certainty – millions of free will events; yet I hold free will or free choice to be a self evident truth. I think it is more reasonable to assume this since the scripture tells us that God’s knowledge is infinite and only the Spirit knows the mind of God. He tells us that His ways are not our ways and I don’t think that it is within the domain of human knowledge to ever know the mind of God (to the degree that we can understand the ostensible dilemma between free will and foreknowledge). I don’t think Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, or any of the theologians will ever know these mysteries. Yet they are enjoyable to ponder and debate.

I appreciate your distinctions between free will and free choice. I agree as well that the will in passive and it is the agent who makes the choice; and these are really in-house debates among Christians. What I have done above is explained the dilemma of free will and foreknowledge as understood in the philosophical community. I think this must be resolved before we can discuss the way God operates through His graces.

Cheers,

Grons
 
Some people view God’s creation as His different choices of how to make things knowing their outcome. When He chooses one, He precludes the other; He damns Hitler and saves Francis Assisi. Could God not have “tweaked” nature to allow the opposite or the salvation of both? The problem being, the tweaking of nature to provide a specific outcome which ultimately compels men to salvation is exactly the abrogation of free will. The situation assumes that Hitler’s will is a direct product of God and not something free. However, nature is designed to not compel the will for exactly the purpose of its freedom. It is clear that nature is hardly compelling. It is described as the wilderness; that God comes and leads us back to Him.

Gary I re-read your post and liked this paragraph. Although I would ask that isn’t it possible that there could have been other worlds that God could have actualized wherein Hitler would have turned out to be a different person of his own free will? And if so, an omniscient God would have known these and then chose to actualize one world and not the other?

grons
 
thegrons said:
. Although I would ask that isn’t it possible that there could have been other worlds that God could have actualized wherein Hitler would have turned out to be a different person of his own free will? And if so, an omniscient God would have known these and then chose to actualize one world and not the other?

grons

My thought is thatGod knows the good, the better and the best, and since He is infinitely perfect, He must always choose the perfect best, i.e. our world is it.
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I hope no one minds if I throw in my two cents;

Does God have free will?

In my opinion, it seems:

The will as a faculty of rationality should work with reason; and by consequence requires “practical knowledge” as the basis for praxis;

Of the two faculties of reason and will, the supremacy is in the will; and although by intellection the will can be preasured for this act or that; the will is essentially supreme;

Speaking causally, the will’s freedom nessecitates that it may not, especially in the context of God; be applied in the capacity of denying itself its own volition or nolition as that would entail a contradiction.

Therein, if the faculties of reason and knowlege are carried to infinity; their consequential praxis may only occur in the presence of with volition – knowing one’s future acts only encourages; not compels those same acts – presuming an infinite will. For compulsion and freedom are contradictory.

Therefore one is led to either;

God’s volition or nolition praxis is not infinite – ie; he has no free will
Wherein, God’s infinite knowlege forces his acts, which to me seems contrary to the idea of the free will.

God’s basis for praxis is not infinite – ie; his volition or nolition is not compelled
In which case, we must accept that God is not essentially omniscient, (which, by incidence makes his will only encouraged) but that this denies the predicates essential too God, and thus I find it repugnant.

God’s will supercedes his basis for praxis – ie; his exercised will is practically superiour to the reasoned encouragement of praxis.
The infinite reason, and infinite knowlege of God are distinct only formally, and their determination with regards to praxis only suggestive rather than compulsive; by which then - they are reconcilable to the notion of his superiour will

God’s will is not univocally or really identical with our experiential will; ie; God’s will differs from ours.
In which case any reconciliations or assumptions to the nature of its influence over an infinite reason/knowledge is purely speculative,
Does Man have free will?

It is safe to say that man appears to have free will; even our acts of will are suggested by intellection the ultimate election of will is independant of said intellection. This is experientially true in the same sense that one would hold that the external world is in some sense true – and besides, one can never be blamed for holding this view, as those who would contest it nessecarily feel that I am compelled to hold this view without will, and am consequentially blameless; even if incorrect.

Evidently, it is far easier to reconcile man’s will with freedom than God’s, for essentially the nature of omniscience does bear into praxis somewhat;
Can Man have free will and God know man’s future actions?

Yes, either;

The potential acts are numerically finite; if God’s wisdom is to be taken as infinite there is no reconciliation or explanation nessecary.

Or

An application of univocity with regards to intellection between finite and infinite entities is neither helpful nor particularily acheivable (from the side of the finite), and by consence therein, one is led to the earlier conclusion that; experientially we have free will.
But then again, I am verymuch an armchair thinker, with no more papers than extra arms – I do hope however this is useful or helpful in some fashion. 👍
 
Douglas_Kraeger said:
My thought is thatGod knows the good, the better and the best, and since He is infinitely perfect, He must always choose the perfect best, i.e. our world is it.
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I think that I should have used a different example because the Hitler example is causing us to focus on his moral terptutude instead of the logic. Consider this conditional proposition: Necessarily (If God knows thegrons will eat an steak dinner Saturday night October 15 2015, then thegrons will eat a steak dinner). Even though God’s foreknowledge of this event is not causative, His knowing in eternity past and choosing which world to create is, and therefore precludes thegrons free will. This is the case for two reasons:
  1. for the conditional to be true if the antecedent is true viz. God knows the grons will eat a steak…, then the consequent MUST be true viz. the grons MUST eat a steak…
  2. If God knew all possible worlds that He could have actualized, and there were worlds where thegrons didn’t order a steak dinner in October of 2015; BUT He chose to actualize the world where thegrons will eat the steak dinner; then the grons of necessity (not freely) must eat the steak dinner *in virtue *of God’s choosing which world to actualize (or create). So the argument turns on God’s knowledge of all possible worlds and ultimately His choosing which one to create. For God to foreknow something in the future, that future event is thus “fixed” or necessary because God cannot know something that isn’t true.
 
JohnDamian said:
I hope no one minds if I throw in my two cents;

Does God have free will?

In my opinion, it seems:

The will as a faculty of rationality should work with reason; and by consequence requires “practical knowledge” as the basis for praxis;

Of the two faculties of reason and will, the supremacy is in the will; and although by intellection the will can be preasured for this act or that; the will is essentially supreme;

Speaking causally, the will’s freedom nessecitates that it may not, especially in the context of God; be applied in the capacity of denying itself its own volition or nolition as that would entail a contradiction.

Therein, if the faculties of reason and knowlege are carried to infinity; their consequential praxis may only occur in the presence of with volition – knowing one’s future acts only encourages; not compels those same acts – presuming an infinite will. For compulsion and freedom are contradictory.

Therefore one is led to either;

God’s volition or nolition praxis is not infinite – ie; he has no free will
Wherein, God’s infinite knowlege forces his acts, which to me seems contrary to the idea of the free will.

God’s basis for praxis is not infinite – ie; his volition or nolition is not compelled
In which case, we must accept that God is not essentially omniscient, (which, by incidence makes his will only encouraged) but that this denies the predicates essential too God, and thus I find it repugnant.

God’s will supercedes his basis for praxis – ie; his exercised will is practically superiour to the reasoned encouragement of praxis.
The infinite reason, and infinite knowlege of God are distinct only formally, and their determination with regards to praxis only suggestive rather than compulsive; by which then - they are reconcilable to the notion of his superiour will

God’s will is not univocally or really identical with our experiential will; ie; God’s will differs from ours.
In which case any reconciliations or assumptions to the nature of its influence over an infinite reason/knowledge is purely speculative,
Does Man have free will?

It is safe to say that man appears to have free will; even our acts of will are suggested by intellection the ultimate election of will is independant of said intellection. This is experientially true in the same sense that one would hold that the external world is in some sense true – and besides, one can never be blamed for holding this view, as those who would contest it nessecarily feel that I am compelled to hold this view without will, and am consequentially blameless; even if incorrect.

Evidently, it is far easier to reconcile man’s will with freedom than God’s, for essentially the nature of omniscience does bear into praxis somewhat;
Can Man have free will and God know man’s future actions?

Yes, either;

The potential acts are numerically finite; if God’s wisdom is to be taken as infinite there is no reconciliation or explanation nessecary.

Or

An application of univocity with regards to intellection between finite and infinite entities is neither helpful nor particularily acheivable (from the side of the finite), and by consence therein, one is led to the earlier conclusion that; experientially we have free will.
But then again, I am verymuch an armchair thinker, with no more papers than extra arms – I do hope however this is useful or helpful in some fashion. 👍
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I’d like to respond to this tonight…after work
 
What God knows and how He knows things is a mystery to all of us. I personally believe that the laws of reason are an extension of God’s mind and we can at least have a glimpse int His mind. These laws of reason have been identified at 1. the law of identity 2. the law of non-contradiction 3. the law of the excluded middle(bivalence). I would not expect to see even God violating any of these laws since they represent in part His nature.

Now does God know everything or everything that is knowable? I believe that per law 1. God had to come down in the flesh to know what it is to be a man. I think even scripture supports this in that since Christ became man, He can now sympothize with us and make ever intercession for us. Secondly I don’t think that God can violate law 2. in that He cannot make a square circle or know that which doesn’t exist. God can know with near certainty the results of various causes through His induction but if the future is indeterminate and not settled; then even God cannot know it. If on the other hand the future is settled, than there is no true free will and we are mere pawns in the grand chess game. In short, for God to violate these laws would run contrary to His nature-even the bible says that God CANNOT lie or deny Himself. So in the absolute sense God’s knowledge is not infinite in the sense that there are no boundries to what He knows and can know, maybe even He is learning things such as He did when He suffered in the person of Christ? Does this take away from His godhood? No. He is still the Supreme being.

So the argument above is similar to that of Molina’s in that God has sort of a “middle-knowledge” because He knows every possible outcome of every possible world. But this still does not solve the dilemma of free will vs foreknowledge because if God chooses in His own counsel to actualize a particular world, He in essence is precluding other events from occuring. Secondly if God foreknows that I will do ~A, am I free to do A? No, because the world He actualized is the world that I do ~A. So Again the dilemma as I see it doesn’t turn on our private concepts of God’s infinite mind and our finitude, but rather on God’s election to actualize a particular world.

Regardless if He knows or sees events outside of time, the world He determines to actualize precludes all other possible worlds and events, hence free will.

So since we all agree on the board that we have free wil and God is omniscient, I think we will have to wait for the answer a little bit longer. In fact I am of the belief that per the law of identity we will never really understand the mind of God even if He tried to explain it to us in heaven. For who knows the infinite mind of God except the Spirit?

Please excuse my 3rd grade level spelling!🙂 I appreciate all the points on this thread especially Gary’s The problem being, the tweaking of nature to provide a specific outcome which ultimately compels men to salvation is exactly the abrogation of free will. The situation assumes that Hitler’s will is a direct product of God and not something free. However, nature is designed to not compel the will for exactly the purpose of its freedom. It is clear that nature is hardly compelling.

This is very thought provoking and worth pondering!

Peace,

The Grons
 
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