D
Daniel_Monroe
Guest
I have long been an avid reader of Aquinas, but from time to time I am stumped by his reasoning. Here is an example.
In the Summa I-II, A. 23, Q. 1, we read as follows.
Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): “It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man’s predestination is done away.
Then we read this rebuttal.
Reply to Objection 1. Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: “He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.
My problems are as follow.
(1) Damascene does not seem to call predestination “an imposition of necessity” (at least not in my version of the Exposition).
(2) Damascene does not seem to limit his discussion of predestination to “natural things which etc.”
(3) Is it possible in re (2) that by saying “He does not will malice etc.” Aquinas takes Damascene to mean that God does not will malice in “natural things etc.”?
(4) The claim that God “does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue” seems to exclude predestination (at least in some versions of predestination).
My thanks to anyone who can enlighten me.
Thanks, Dan
PS. For reference, Damascene’s discussion of predestination may be found at orthodox.net/fathers/exactii.html#BOOK_II_CHAPTER_XXX.
In the Summa I-II, A. 23, Q. 1, we read as follows.
Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): “It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man’s predestination is done away.
Then we read this rebuttal.
Reply to Objection 1. Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: “He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.
My problems are as follow.
(1) Damascene does not seem to call predestination “an imposition of necessity” (at least not in my version of the Exposition).
(2) Damascene does not seem to limit his discussion of predestination to “natural things which etc.”
(3) Is it possible in re (2) that by saying “He does not will malice etc.” Aquinas takes Damascene to mean that God does not will malice in “natural things etc.”?
(4) The claim that God “does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue” seems to exclude predestination (at least in some versions of predestination).
My thanks to anyone who can enlighten me.
Thanks, Dan
PS. For reference, Damascene’s discussion of predestination may be found at orthodox.net/fathers/exactii.html#BOOK_II_CHAPTER_XXX.