Aquinas' Second Proof

[Oreoracle]

I’m having a problem with Aquinas’ second proof:

1. We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world.
2. Nothing exists prior to itself.
3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results.
5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists.
6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now.
7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

I disagree with premises (4) and (5). A first cause did have to exist, but it doesn’t have to exist now. If my parents ceased to exist, my non-existence would not necessarily follow. Even if I bought into the idea that the Christian god was the first cause, how do these premises necessitate his existence now?

Can anyone help me to understand?

 

[Other_Eric]

In the first place, it is important to understand what Aquinas’ proofs are and what they are not. They are not meant to be airtight intellectual formulations demonstrating the unquestionable existence of what you are calling the “Christian God.” In the same way that no one in Scriptures could look upon the face of God, we cannot use human reason to directly observe Him. We are only capable of using our terrestrial reasoning to infer His existence based on what He does. This is an important point. You will notice that in his conclusion, Aquinas only admits to a first cause, which he calls God.

Secondly, your logic seems to fail you in your inability to accept premises (4) and (5) because it appears that you do not have an appreciation for what a “first cause” must be. If you accept premise (3), that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, then it must follow that any first cause is a thing without origin. Such a thing would also, by necessity, be immutable, otherwise it would have external effects operating on it to cause a change, impossible for a “first cause” by definition. Since one of its attributes is that it is without origin and the other that it is immutable, its continued existence to the present day must be a logical consequence of what it is.

 

[Shike]

I disagree with premises (4) and (5). A first cause did have to exist, but it doesn’t have to exist now. If my parents ceased to exist, my non-existence would not necessarily follow. Even if I bought into the idea that the Christian god was the first cause, how do these premises necessitate his existence now?

Is the parent/child analogy you give sufficient to describe efficient causality? Maybe partially, but as you correctly point out you don’t really need the cause after the effect loosed.

But try replacing the parent/child analogy with something like the laws of physics. For instance, if you took away the forces that held atoms and molecules together, you would not continue to exist.

Efficient causality should be viewed more in line as the efficient explanation. If you take away the explanation for why something exists, it ceases to exist.

You have brought up a good question that has a good answer to it, forgive me if I did not do it justice… I am just starting to read Aquinas. A really good book that briefly touches upon this and gives many helpful hints to understanding Aquinas is the book Aquinas by Copleston.

peace,
Michael

 

[Shike]

In the first place, it is important to understand what Aquinas’ proofs are and what they are not. They are not meant to be airtight intellectual formulations demonstrating the unquestionable existence of what you are calling the “Christian God.”

Good point. But they are meant to be airtight intellectual formulations demonstrating the unquestionable existence of something that (eerily) has the characteristics of the “Christian God”. If it looks like a duck…

 

[Other_Eric]

Good point. But they are meant to be airtight intellectual formulations demonstrating the unquestionable existence of something that (eerily) has the characteristics of the “Christian God”. If it looks like a duck…

I'm not convinced that we could even take it that far. We definitely can say that these proofs, taken by themselves, point to the existence of *something* which is possessed of *some* of the characteristics of the Christian God. Absent Revelation, we would be unable to differentiate this something from the God of Judaism, Islam or even the "Force" of the Jedi.

 

[JDaniel]

I’m having a problem with Aquinas’ second proof:

1. We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world.
2. Nothing exists prior to itself.
3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results.
5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists.
6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now.
7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

I disagree with premises (4) and (5). A first cause did have to exist, but it doesn’t have to exist now. If my parents ceased to exist, my non-existence would not necessarily follow. Even if I bought into the idea that the Christian god was the first cause, how do these premises necessitate his existence now?

Can anyone help me to understand?

Oreoracle:

What is the nature of your disagreement with (4) and (5)?

jd

 

[PJM]

I’m having a problem with Aquinas’ second proof:

Philosophy Forum

Aquinas’ Second Proof

 

[Oreoracle]

In the first place, it is important to understand what Aquinas’ proofs are and what they are not. They are not meant to be airtight intellectual formulations demonstrating the unquestionable existence of what you are calling the “Christian God.” In the same way that no one in Scriptures could look upon the face of God, we cannot use human reason to directly observe Him. We are only capable of using our terrestrial reasoning to infer His existence based on what He does. This is an important point. You will notice that in his conclusion, Aquinas only admits to a first cause, which he calls God.

I agree. His arguments offer very little about the nature of what he calls God, if any.

Secondly, your logic seems to fail you in your inability to accept premises (4) and (5) because it appears that you do not have an appreciation for what a “first cause” must be. If you accept premise (3), that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, then it must follow that any first cause is a thing without origin. Such a thing would also, by necessity, be immutable, otherwise it would have external effects operating on it to cause a change, impossible for a “first cause” by definition. Since one of its attributes is that it is without origin and the other that it is immutable, its continued existence to the present day must be a logical consequence of what it is.

So if object A does not originate from object B, it cannot be affected by it? I’m having trouble accepting that, unless I misunderstood you.

You have brought up a good question that has a good answer to it, forgive me if I did not do it justice… I am just starting to read Aquinas. A really good book that briefly touches upon this and gives many helpful hints to understanding Aquinas is the book Aquinas by Copleston.

peace,
Michael

Thank you. I know that every philosopher (or theologian, for that matter) has a different background and perspective. I would have to know more about Aquinas to know what he meant, I think.

Oreoracle:

What is the nature of your disagreement with (4) and (5)?

Let’s say I have a series of erected dominoes on a table. I knock over one, causing the fall of the next, and so on. I now have a series of fallen dominoes before me. According to Aquinas, if I scooped up the first cause (the first fallen domino) the series would cease to exist (the other fallen dominoes would no longer be as such) even after it has been caused. It is not necessary for the first cause to continue to exist as premises (4) and (5) assert.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

It’s interesting that even Charles Darwin paid tribute to the First Cause argument (if this is relevant to your discussion). I have no idea whether he ever read Aquinas, but it is said that in his youth he first intended to be a clergyman before changing his mind for biology.

See the second quote at the bottom of this post.

 

[Shike]

Let’s say I have a series of erected dominoes on a table. I knock over one, causing the fall of the next, and so on. I now have a series of fallen dominoes before me. According to Aquinas, if I scooped up the first cause (the first fallen domino) the series would cease to exist (the other fallen dominoes would no longer be as such) even after it has been caused. It is not necessary for the first cause to continue to exist as premises (4) and (5) assert.

That’s not a proper analogy for efficient causality, a better one would be the one I referenced in my post. The word “cause” in the work of Aristotle is more akin to the word “explanation” rather than what we think of as cause and effect. Efficient cause is somewhat similar to what we mean when we use the word “cause” nowadays, but not totally (especially when talking about it in the context of existence). Since Aquinas relies heavily on Aristotilean philosophy, it would be best to understand what Aristotle meant by his 4 causes.

Again, plug for the book Aquinas by Copleston; it’s a short read and provides crucial insights into trying to understand Aquinas. That, and a basic understanding of some of Aristotle’s tools is necessary.

peace,
Michael

 

[JDaniel]

Let’s say I have a series of erected dominoes on a table. I knock over one, causing the fall of the next, and so on. I now have a series of fallen dominoes before me. According to Aquinas, if I scooped up the first cause (the first fallen domino) the series would cease to exist (the other fallen dominoes would no longer be as such) even after it has been caused. It is not necessary for the first cause to continue to exist as premises (4) and (5) assert.

Ah, I “see” your problem.

The “effector” of efficient causality (which is, in fact, where the word “efficient” comes from) is not the first domino. It is, in fact, you. The first efficient cause of a house is the architect/planner who starts the erecting of the house into motion. Efficient causality is causation the effect of which is substantial change. Substantial change would be something on the order of “coming to be”, for example.

A simple example would be: separating the atoms of water into hydrogen and oxygen by the efficient cause of electrolysis, or, more precisely, electricity. Now, if we take the fact that some other efficient cause caused the electricity, to the person who put everything in the jar, and his coming to be, then, to his parents’ coming to be, and to his grand parents’, we now have a chain of efficient causes and effects. If we take away the first efficient cause - BEFORE the start of said causal chain - nothing would have happened.

From our common, human experience we witness - and, therefore, know - that everything in our universe comes to be and goes out of existence. If we did not have a Primary and Uncaused cause, we would have to have an infinite causal chain - no beginning and no end. But, that is absurd, as we know everything comes to be and goes out of existence. At any point in that sequence, or, in its time, there would be at least one point, on an infinite chain, where everything would be out of existence simultaneously (either sequentially, or time-wise). If this is the way it really is, then nothing would exist now.

Now, what is meant by “take away” is the removal of the absolute primary efficient cause. That would be who we call God. If we take away God, or change God into a secondary, or, “caused” cause, there would be no effects and nothing would now exist. I am stopping here, now, because, remember, you said you had no problem with any of the other postulates you provided!

PS: Beyond here, you get into what is a necessary efficient cause.

jd

 

[MindOverMatter]

I disagree with premises (4) and (5). A first cause did have to exist, but it doesn’t have to exist now. If my parents ceased to exist, my non-existence would not necessarily follow. Even if I bought into the idea that the Christian god was the first cause, how do these premises necessitate his existence now?

Can anyone help me to understand?

The first cause is neccesarilly one and the same with “existence”; as in, the first cause is “being” in itself, through which other beings have the pontential to exist, hence time. Otherwise it is not the first Cause. The first cause is therefore transcendent of time or change, since it is the ground of all pontential beings. If the first cause transcends time and change, then it cannot be spoken of as being something that only exists in the past, but rather it is something that is immanently present to all time. Because time, as having the nature of becomming, cannot transcend existence; thus existence transcends all change.

Does that answer your Question?

You would be an astute person to agree with me.

 

[fhansen]

Let’s say I have a series of erected dominoes on a table. I knock over one, causing the fall of the next, and so on. I now have a series of fallen dominoes before me. According to Aquinas, if I scooped up the first cause (the first fallen domino) the series would cease to exist (the other fallen dominoes would no longer be as such) even after it has been caused. It is not necessary for the first cause to continue to exist as premises (4) and (5) assert.

I believe he’s simply saying that if the first cause never existed, then it’s effects can’t exist either. If the first domino never fell, the other dominoes would not be fallen.

 

[Contarini]

I’m having a problem with Aquinas’ second proof:

1. We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world.
2. Nothing exists prior to itself.
3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results.
5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists.
6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now.
7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

I disagree with premises (4) and (5). A first cause did have to exist, but it doesn’t have to exist now. If my parents ceased to exist, my non-existence would not necessarily follow. Even if I bought into the idea that the Christian god was the first cause, how do these premises necessitate his existence now?

Can anyone help me to understand?

None of these arguments are to be understood temporally. Aquinas didn’t think that you could prove that the world had a beginning in time. The argument is not that back billions of years ago (or whatever) something had to start things going. The argument is that everything that happens now has a chain of causes currently operating on it, which goes back to God.

Edwin

 

[Oreoracle]

Ah, I “see” your problem.

The “effector” of efficient causality (which is, in fact, where the word “efficient” comes from) is not the first domino. It is, in fact, you. The first efficient cause of a house is the architect/planner who starts the erecting of the house into motion. Efficient causality is causation the effect of which is substantial change. Substantial change would be something on the order of “coming to be”, for example.

I don’t think I should use any more examples, since, as has been noted, these examples are an attempt to minimize a large scheme of causes, the first cause being “God” no matter how the example is formed.

A simple example would be: separating the atoms of water into hydrogen and oxygen by the efficient cause of electrolysis, or, more precisely, electricity. Now, if we take the fact that some other efficient cause caused the electricity, to the person who put everything in the jar, and his coming to be, then, to his parents’ coming to be, and to his grand parents’, we now have a chain of efficient causes and effects. If we take away the first efficient cause - BEFORE the start of said causal chain - nothing would have happened.

That’s my problem; Aquinas does not qualify his statement as you did in your last sentence (“BEFORE”). He says something like “if the first cause does not exist” instead of “if the first cause did not exist”. The former allows for the absurd idea of an effect necessarily dissipating anytime after it has been caused because the initial cause has disappeared. This makes it appear that “God” must exist at this time, but the premises supporting this are false. The argument only proves that a first cause occurred, not that what caused it must continue to exist.

 

[TheWhim]

That’s my problem; Aquinas does not qualify his statement as you did in your last sentence (“BEFORE”). He says something like “if the first cause does not exist” instead of “if the first cause did not exist”. The former allows for the absurd idea of an effect necessarily dissipating anytime after it has been caused because the initial cause has disappeared.

Well, it seems to me the other posters have already seen and dealt with your objection.

MindOverMatter wrote:

The first cause is therefore transcendent of time or change, since it is the ground of all pontential beings. If the first cause transcends time and change, then it cannot be spoken of as being something that only exists in the past, but rather it is something that is immanently present to all time.

Aquinas can well write “if the first cause does not exist” because a first cause that could now not exist wouldn’t be a first cause at all; a first cause must necessarily now, must always exist.

In the same line, though relating to a different argument of Aquinas, are the following reasonings by JDaniel:

If we did not have a Primary and Uncaused cause, we would have to have an infinite causal chain - no beginning and no end. But, that is absurd, as we know everything comes to be and goes out of existence. At any point in that sequence, or, in its time, there would be at least one point, on an infinite chain, where everything would be out of existence simultaneously (either sequentially, or time-wise). If this is the way it really is, then nothing would exist now.

(Perhaps you’d also like to take a look at: forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=324719)

The first cause cannot go out of existence or come into existence. It is always there, shere presence. Therefore, it would have been a contradiction in terms if Aquinas would have wanted us to imagine that “the first cause did not exist” - it is the very nature of the first cause always to exist, as he has shown.

 

[JDaniel]

That’s my problem; Aquinas does not qualify his statement as you did in your last sentence (“BEFORE”). He says something like “if the first cause does not exist” instead of “if the first cause did not exist”. The former allows for the absurd idea of an effect necessarily dissipating anytime after it has been caused because the initial cause has disappeared. This makes it appear that “God” must exist at this time, but the premises supporting this are false. The argument only proves that a first cause occurred, not that what caused it must continue to exist.

Actually he does, but, it is part and parcel of the notion, or, concept of what efficient causality means. Efficient causality means, as Aquinas says, “Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause.” (-New Advent Summa)

So, one must recognize that there exist, in the world, efficient causes, starting with a first one, e.g., me, as the general contractor (or, architect) of a new house. Or, there may be several, e.g., the GC (me) and the architect. Then there may be intermediate causes (again, one or many), e.g., the workmen, bricklayers, carpenters, etc. Then, there are the ultimate causes, e.g., the material, formal and final causes. Now, if you lay out the three types of efficient causes on a table, for instance, then, remove any of them, you won’t produce any subsequent cause(s) or effect(s), from that order. (Actually, since none of these causes is a necessary cause, a reasonably accurate substitute could be inserted and a reasonably accurate substitute effect might be produced. But, this introduces a huge amount of probability into the actions, the results of which could produce something not reasonably close to the effect expected, or, intended. Multiply this by the myriad number of causal activities occurring each second throughout the universe, and we would have pure chaos. IOW, each time a causal activity took place, only God would know what effect would be produced!) However, once the material, formal and final causes are in play (in effect), you can remove any, or, all of the efficient causes and the effect will remain - at least for a while.

The efficient causes, in the above example, are not necessary causes. Rather, they are contingent causes. But, as you can clearly see, if there were no first, uncaused cause, we would have hyper-chaos, and, if we had no first, uncaused necessary cause, we would have nothing. They are all contingent causes. Here is where St. Thomas introduces the concept of necessity. The 3rd proof is the proof from necessity. Are you OK with the 3rd proof. or, would you like to discuss it?

jd

 

[JDaniel]

None of these arguments are to be understood temporally. Aquinas didn’t think that you could prove that the world had a beginning in time. The argument is not that back billions of years ago (or whatever) something had to start things going. The argument is that everything that happens now has a chain of causes currently operating on it, which goes back to God.

Edwin

This is a very important point. Too, often it is precisely this point that mucks up our understanding of causality. We tend to think that the causal relationship is no more than that of bouncing one billiard ball off of another.

Thank you, Contarini.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

Oreoracle:

You see, Edwin’s post exposes and explains the order, or, sequence, of the chain. When I said, in an earlier post, the word “BEFORE”, I meant it in terms of sequence, NOT, time. A causal chain exists sequentially. Time is not absolutely required, although the idea of sequentiality seems to imply time, and, of course, there are causal, local motion chains that do embrace time.

jd

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Oreoracle,

Others have pointed to this, but Thomas’ second way refers specifically to a sustaining cause, and not necessarily to a temporal cause. Think of this way: a house needs a foundation in order to stand. If the foundation is ever removed, then the house will collapse. Likewise, if God-as-first cause is ever removed (conceptually-speaking), then nothing would exist. Given that something exists, however, it follows that there must be some first cause.

Love your username, by the way.