Aquinas' Third Proof for God

[Charlemagne_III]

The concept of “nothing” obviously exists. The assumed ontological object of “nothing” does not and cannot exist, because if it existed, it would be “something” - and that is NOT a game of semantics.

Aquinas never said that “nothing exists” as an ontological reality.

Nothing signifies the absence of ontological reality. It has no existence in its own right. The concept “nothing” only points to the absence of being, not to some thing other than being.

 

[ccmnxc]

The concept of “nothing” obviously exists. The assumed ontological object of “nothing” does not and cannot exist, because if it existed, it would be “something” - and that is NOT a game of semantics. The phrase “nothing exists” or “it is conceivable that there was a time, when nothing existed” are both meaningless word-concoctions. From this it obviously follows that the question: “why is there something rather than nothing” is equally meaningless.

This doesn’t address the content of my post, though. You are ascribing to Aquinas a position he does not hold, namely that he reifies nothing. He holds to the following:

Domain of x: universal
C=Is composed of matter and form
~(Ex)Cx

You are ascribing to Aquinas this position, however:
Domain of x: universal
N=Is nothing
(Ex)Nx

They are logically inequivalent statements. The rationale for the predicate “C” in my formulation of Aquinas’s position is that he says “We find in nature,” and things in nature are hylemorphic composites. And it goes without saying that an absence of something (or anything & everything) does not in-and-of-itself comprise a matter/form unit. That would be contradictory.
Now, you say that Aquinas makes nothing into something, and the most straightforward rendition of that is what I gave above. (Ex)Nx is, I will grant, hopelessly contradictory. Luckily, Aquinas does not use it.

Thus, your position relies on an equivocation, and the conclusions you draw about the meaningless of the statements you listed rely on the incorrect latter formulation, whereas with the former being logically coherent and retaining the validity of Aquinas’s argument, your conclusions no longer follow.

 

[thinkandmull]

How can it be proven that the world is contingent in the sense that a completely necessary cause is *needed *absolutely. That’s where I’m at

 

[Charlemagne_III]

How can it be proven that the world is contingent in the sense that a completely necessary cause is *needed *absolutely. That’s where I’m at

If the world is contingent, how else can it exist than by a completely necessary cause?

Are you thinking infinite multiverse? How is that an avoidance of the completely necessary cause?

And how is that any more likely than the existence of God?

 

[Solmyr]

This doesn’t address the content of my post, though. You are ascribing to Aquinas a position he does not hold, namely that he reifies nothing. He holds to the following:

Domain of x: universal
C=Is composed of matter and form
~(Ex)Cx

You are ascribing to Aquinas this position, however:
Domain of x: universal
N=Is nothing
(Ex)Nx

They are logically inequivalent statements. The rationale for the predicate “C” in my formulation of Aquinas’s position is that he says “We find in nature,” and things in nature are hylemorphic composites. And it goes without saying that an absence of something (or anything & everything) does not in-and-of-itself comprise a matter/form unit. That would be contradictory.
Now, you say that Aquinas makes nothing into something, and the most straightforward rendition of that is what I gave above. (Ex)Nx is, I will grant, hopelessly contradictory. Luckily, Aquinas does not use it.

Thus, your position relies on an equivocation, and the conclusions you draw about the meaningless of the statements you listed rely on the incorrect latter formulation, whereas with the former being logically coherent and retaining the validity of Aquinas’s argument, your conclusions no longer follow.

1. The expression E(A) means “A exists”.
2. The expression ~E(A) means: “it is not true that A exists”, in other words: “A does not exist”, which is the logical equivalent of
3. E(~A) “not A exists”.

There is no equivocation here. Simple, elementary logic.

Of course this whole dancing around is supposed to lead to “creation ex nihilo”. And since “nothing” does not and cannot exist, there is no need to assume any creation.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Of course this whole dancing around is supposed to lead to “creation ex nihilo”. And since “nothing” does not and cannot exist, there is no need to assume any creation.

You persist in alleging that Aquinas speaks of nothing as something that exists.

Can’t you bring yourself to admit that he might not be so absurd?

The absence of existence is not an existent.

 

[Partinobodycula]

If the world is contingent, how else can it exist than by a completely necessary cause?

But how does one establish contingency? And how does one establish cause? And can they possibly be the same thing?

Aquinas’ Third Way argues that among the things that exist, there is only one thing that is necessary to exist, and that is existence itself. He argues that there must be something, rather than nothing. But the form that that something takes (You, me, and everything else), isn’t fixed. They aren’t, in and of themselves, necessary. The form, he argues, could be something other than what it is. So Aquinas’ Third Way argues that the things that exist are contingent upon existence itself. But ultimately, it’s only existence itself, that’s necessary. You, me, and everything else, aren’t necessary. And because our existence isn’t necessary, it’s possible for us to exist, or not to exist.

But what the Third Way doesn’t do, is argue that existence itself is the cause of the form that that existence ultimately takes. Basically it’s not an argument for causation at all, but merely an argument for contingency.

Now a scholar of Aquinas might agree with this, that it isn’t the purpose of the Third Way to argue for causation, but rather it’s the First and Second Ways that argue for causation. The question then becomes, can the first cause, and the necessary cause, be one and the same thing?

I would argue that they can’t. Because if they’re one and the same thing, then the first cause becomes a necessary cause. And accordingly, it becomes a fixed cause, because if it wasn’t fixed, then it could be this or that, and which one it was, would be contingent upon something. And if it’s contingent upon something, then it’s not the necessary cause, which isn’t contingent upon anything.

On the other hand if the first cause is indeed the necessary cause, then it’s effects (You, me, and everything else) are fixed. Which means that it’s not possible for us, not to exist. Which means that we must exist. Which means that we’re necessary, we’re not contingent.

I would argue therefore, that the first cause, and the necessary cause, can’t be the same thing.

 

[hasantas]

How can it be proven that the world is contingent in the sense that a completely necessary cause is *needed *absolutely. That’s where I’m at

In physical universe everything requires a cause to be exist. So if it assumed that there was a first cause so everything emerged from that? But that first cause must be physical so that itself requires another cause. How can we solve that? There must be a cause which is not in time and matter. And that is God. Because God can create everything from “nothing”.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

On the other hand if the first cause is indeed the necessary cause, then it’s effects (You, me, and everything else) are fixed. Which means that it’s not possible for us, not to exist. Which means that we must exist. Which means that we’re necessary, we’re not contingent.

Necessary means eternally necessary for Aquinas. Obviously we are not necessary, but rather are contingent, since at one time we were not and now we are. It is also contingent that at some point we will not be. But the Necessary First Cause will still be Necessary since it is not subject to the contingency of time, having been the Creator and First Cause of time.

Moreover, given modern cosmology, Aquinas is vindicated. The Big Bang was a contingent event, not a necessary invent. We know that because time begins with the Big Bang. So whatever produced the Big Bang had to be the Necessary and First Cause rather than the contingent cause of the Big Bang.

 

[Partinobodycula]

Necessary means eternally necessary for Aquinas. Obviously we are not necessary, but rather are contingent, since at one time we were not and now we are. It is also contingent that at some point we will not be.

Is it necessary for me to exist?

The answer, according to Aquinas, is no.

Other than existence itself, is there anything who’s existence is necessary?

Again, according to Aquinas, the answer is no.

If nothing is necessary to exist, other than existence itself, than a first cause isn’t necessary to exist either. Unless you wish to argue that the necessary cause requires a first cause.

If you, me and everything else aren’t necessary, then a first cause isn’t necessary either.

Which leads to the conclusion, that if the first cause is necessary, then its effects must also be necessary, for one cannot exist without the other.

Either neither of them are necessary, or both of them are necessary.

Those appear to be your only logical choices.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Is it necessary for me to exist?

The answer, according to Aquinas, is no.

Other than existence itself, is there anything who’s existence is necessary?

Again, according to Aquinas, the answer is no.

If nothing is necessary to exist, other than existence itself, than a first cause isn’t necessary to exist either. Unless you wish to argue that the necessary cause requires a first cause.

If you, me and everything else aren’t necessary, then a first cause isn’t necessary either.

Which leads to the conclusion, that if the first cause is necessary, then its effects must also be necessary, for one cannot exist without the other.

Either neither of them are necessary, or both of them are necessary.

Those appear to be your only logical choices.

Everything in the world, including the world, is contingent.

The Big Bang has demonstrated this.

But whatever created the world cannot be contingent, for then it would not have existed at some point. And if it never existed, neither would the world exist. Therefore, whatever created the world is a necessary eternal Being who keeps all contingent beings in play. That’s all Aquinas is saying in this proof.

I guess that’s about all I have to say on the subject.

 

[Ghosty]

Is it necessary for me to exist?

The answer, according to Aquinas, is no.

Other than existence itself, is there anything who’s existence is necessary?

Again, according to Aquinas, the answer is no.

If nothing is necessary to exist, other than existence itself, than a first cause isn’t necessary to exist either. Unless you wish to argue that the necessary cause requires a first cause.

If you, me and everything else aren’t necessary, then a first cause isn’t necessary either.

Which leads to the conclusion, that if the first cause is necessary, then its effects must also be necessary, for one cannot exist without the other.

Either neither of them are necessary, or both of them are necessary.

Those appear to be your only logical choices.

The First Cause is necessary for things to exist, but the existence of the First Cause does not depend on its effects. We call the First Cause “cause” from its effects, but it doesn’t follow that it changes or comes into being by causing contingent things; rather we see things that are caused, and through reason identify a necessary first being that must be their cause.

In short, first cause isn’t the essential identity of God, but rather a term referring to a contingent relationship with created things. A necessary First Cause isn’t essentially necessary, but contingently necessary; contingent things exist, therefore there must be a First Cause that exists by its very essence. The necessity of the First Cause is in the “therefore”, not in its essence. Of course the First Cause is essentially necessary, but not due to being First Cause.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Partinobodycula]

Everything in the world, including the world, is contingent.

Contrary to what you may have gathered from my previous posts, I actually agree with this statement. Having been a solipsist for nearly forty years, I’ve spent a great deal of time doing what I imagine Aquinas did, contemplating the nature of what is. As a solipsist I don’t have the luxury of books and dogmas to tell me what’s true. But I do have the gift of a rational mind, with which to discern what’s true. And in this particular instance, my discernment isn’t so different from that of Aquinas. There must be a necessary cause. The difference between Aquinas and I lies in our understanding of the nature of that cause.

But whatever created the world cannot be contingent, for then it would not have existed at some point.

You have the idea that one thing precedes another. That one thing causes another. But as Catholic apologists are want to point out, you view the world from a perspective of time. A perspective that God doesn’t have. To God, there is no past, present, and future. There’s only now. And to God, everything exists in this one eternal now. There’s no were, or will be, there’s only is. I am. As blasphemous as it may seem, that statement is true, as much for me, as it is for God. I am.

From God’s perspective outside of time, I have always existed. That which has always existed cannot have a cause which precedes it.

But this doesn’t mean that I am God, for my existence is contingent upon existence itself. Neither does it mean that I was created, or that I have a cause. It simply means, that I am.

And so Aquinas is correct in saying that I’m a contingent being, but he’s not correct in saying that I have a cause. I simply am.

 

[Bradski]

Two people are in a room. Full of beautiful things. They didn’t make them, so they look for who did. There is a corridor leading from the room with no other doors and gets smaller and smaller as it disappears into the distance. One guy looks down the corridor, sees no other doors and ponders on the matter.

The other guy sets off and eventually gets back to a point where he cannot continue and the corridor is in complete darkness.

When he gets back to the room, someone asks him if he found out anything. The first guy replies: ‘No. I went back as far as I could, but I reached a point where I couldn’t go any further. It’s impossible to even see the end of the corridor let alone find out what’s beyond it’.

The other guys says: ‘God made all the beautiful things’.

 

[hasantas]

Two people are in a room. Full of beautiful things. They didn’t make them, so they look for who did. There is a corridor leading from the room with no other doors and gets smaller and smaller as it disappears into the distance. One guy looks down the corridor, sees no other doors and ponders on the matter.

The other guy sets off and eventually gets back to a point where he cannot continue and the corridor is in complete darkness.

When he gets back to the room, someone asks him if he found out anything. The first guy replies: ‘No. I went back as far as I could, but I reached a point where I couldn’t go any further. It’s impossible to even see the end of the corridor let alone find out what’s beyond it’.

The other guys says: ‘God made all the beautiful things’.

So if we do not believe in God hence there will be always a darkness point!

 

[Ghosty]

From God’s perspective outside of time, I have always existed. That which has always existed cannot have a cause which precedes it.

God’s eternal knowledge of us comes from His eternal nature, not because of your nature. God knows you from eternity in your temporal nature. You being known by God in His eternal nature no more makes you eternal than you knowing a dog in your rational nature makes the dog rational.

This can be seen from the fact that despite God’s eternal knowledge of you, you experience time sequentially. If you “just are” then you can’t grow or change or learn. Your experience of everything would be seamless and all at once if you “just are”. Your experience is composed of parts and portions in sequence, therefore you are certainly temporal.

Peace and God bless!

 

[thinkandmull]

The premise that hasn’t been defended in the third was is “if everything is contingent, at some point there would have been nothing”. I don’t see anything illogical about an infinite past series of contingent events. It is not an essential infinity, sure. An infinity of Gods, one higher than the other, could not produce anything. But if an infinity of past events is possible (which I am not sure I agree with Aquinas on its possibility) then there is no need to posit a God, because if He did produce it, the series is still physically dependent on the previous event and so there is not an argument for God at that point. I highly doubt science can know what was behind the Big Bang. Proving God likewise requires that His personhood be proved, otherwise you have just proven an impersonal heaven like Confucius believed in, which is not God at all. I think Descartes approach was much more poignant than Aquinas’s

 

[Ghosty]

The premise that hasn’t been defended in the third was is “if everything is contingent, at some point there would have been nothing”. I don’t see anything illogical about an infinite past series of contingent events. It is not an essential infinity, sure. An infinity of Gods, one higher than the other, could not produce anything. But if an infinity of past events is possible (which I am not sure I agree with Aquinas on its possibility) then there is no need to posit a God, because if He did produce it, the series is still physically dependent on the previous event and so there is not an argument for God at that point. I highly doubt science can know what was behind the Big Bang. Proving God likewise requires that His personhood be proved, otherwise you have just proven an impersonal heaven like Confucius believed in, which is not God at all. I think Descartes approach was much more poignant than Aquinas’s

There is “horizontal causality”, where one event leads to another in sequence, and “vertical causality”, where the whole set of events under consideration is caused by a greater entity.

My hands are caused by my human nature, not in sequence but “vertically”. The coat is caused to float in the air by the hook, which is caused by the nail. This isn’t a sequence, but rather happens all at once. Analogically we can think of the whole universe as the coat on the hook that needs an explanation for its floating. The coat doea not have it in its own essence to float, and the universe does not have it in its own nature to exist as it is composed entirely of contingent things. This doesn’t change even if there is an infinite series of contingent things, just as an infinite series of hooks on hooks wouldn’t explain the coat floating in the air.

The universe doesn’t exist essentially, but is contingent whether as a series or considered as a single event. It is a coat suspended in the air, and it requires a hook to explain it.

Peace and God bless!

 

[thinkandmull]

You need to provide arguments for those claims instead of basically just saying “science is not enough”. I think Aquinas left too many unsupported premises

 

[Ghosty]

You need to provide arguments for those claims instead of basically just saying “science is not enough”. I think Aquinas left too many unsupported premises

I’m not sure who you are responding to. I’m not referring to scientific theories.

Aquinas’ premises are all very well supported, but they aren’t in the Summa. You have to study Aristotle’s metaphysics and Aquinas’ other works. The Summa was the equivalent of a graduate-level textbook; it builds upon a ton of material that the reader is assumed to have read and comprehended.