Hi,
Candide West in this thread,and specifically this post, (
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=9677050&postcount=348) raised an interesting question.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that the Five Ways prove what they intend to prove. Why do we assume all five proofs prove one God? Wouldn’t the five proofs actually prove five different “gods”, each responsible for some different aspect of the world?
Marc:
Actually, in theory, at least one of them could refer to more than one being. But, four of them contain within themselves proofs for a singular God.
I’ll put it another way. We know that the first proof proves that there must be a Prime Mover-a thing that sets everything else in motion.
The aforementioned description is a tad too heavy. St. Thomas’ first proof shows that whatever moves is moved by another, and if that one is moved, it too is moved by another, and so on and on. But, such a series cannot traverse back to infinity because there would then be no first mover, and therefore no subsequent movers or motion. This proof requires that the reader understand what “infinity”
actually means.
Now, were there more than one Prime Mover, all things would be in senseless, helter-skelter motion. Each initiating mover moving what he wants, when he wants and where he wants. And, considering the enormous numbers of mobile beings, consultation would be out of the question. “Order” would be a referent to a joke.
-The second proof defines God in terms of efficient causality; God is the “First Cause”, not the “Prime Mover”. So God makes everything else move (like a car rolling) in the first proof, but God causes everything (like a fire lighting) in the second proof. They’re closely related, but different. So now we know that God is the Prime Mover and the First Efficient Cause.
His second proof shows that in the world of sense, there is an order of
agency. Since it is impossible for a thing to cause itself, it must be caused by some other
efficient cause that is itself in act (and not in potency in the same respect). As in the proof by antecedent mover, the order cannot traverse back to infinity because, just as in the order of movers, if the first cause is removed, there would be no effects. In other words, there would be nothing.
Also, like the first mover argument, consultation would be out of the question. You could easily have primary causers causing whatever they wanted to, despite that it might seriously conflict with what another causer is causing.
-The third proof defines God as the Necessary Being. In this proof it is said that God must cause everything else to exits. So here we learn that God also has the ability to create literally anything not logically contradictory.
This third proof shows us that in the world there are things that are possible and things that are necessary. We see this by being aware of generation and corruption, i.e., things come into existence and things go out of existence. Thus, it is possible that all beings may exist at any time, or not exist at another time. But, if every being has the possibility to not be, then at some point in time, all beings could not-be simultaneously. If that were to occur, we would not be here now, and neither would anything else. Therefore, there must be a
necessary being, i.e., a being which makes the possibility of the simultaneous non-existence of everything impossible.
This argument doesn’t argue for a singular Necessary Being, in my opinion. It would seem that there could be two or more.
-The fourth proof defines God as the Perfect Being. God is the “measuring stick” for all that is “perfect” (things like goodness, knowledge, etc…it’s a concept specified more in detail in the rest of the Summa). At any rate, that would mean he is omniscient (maximum knowledge), omnipotent (maximum power), and omnibenevolent (maximum goodness).
The fourth proof shows us that existing things are not equal. In other words, among the various categories of beings, there are those which are “more” noble, good, or true, and those things which are “less” noble, good, or true. However, these are things that we predicate of beings according as they resemble that which is understood to be the maximum in their category. Fire, for example, is predicated to be hottest because fire is the maximum of heat in the category. Further, St. Thomas shows that the maximum being in a category is the cause of all else in the category beneath it. But, we know there are things that are good, noble, and true, in many categories. Since we know that there are things that are “maximum” in all categories, and since there is always something more “perfect” in any category, what “maximum” do they resemble that permits us to predicate their level of being? Now, all that exists exists by
participation in that being that causes them to be. And, this Being, as we have seen, must be the ultimate of perfection in the category of
being,
per se. We call this
being God.
It seems to me that there can only be one Being that possesses ultimate perfection of being and no other. Remember, the category of
being is a singular category that subsumes the totality of all beings. Any more than one would be a huge contradiction.
-The fifth proof defines God as what I’ll refer to as the “Intelligent Director”. Basically since things with no intelligence act the same way nearly every time (i.e., a match when struck on the right surface almost always produces a flame), there needs to be something that “directs” them, called God. So we know that God has the power to will things already in existence.
The fifth proof speaks to purpose. It tells us that all things that are are made for essentially fairly specific purposes, despite that some things seem to have more than one. Throughout our experience we notice that all things act or behave in manners that betoken them. For example, the primary purpose of the spider is to help keep the population of other insects in check. But, the spider is not the cause of its own purpose. And so it is with everything. So, there must be an intelligent, purpose imparting cause of each thing.
This would seem to indicate the need for a singular intelligent, purpose-imparter. More than one could certainly involve us in some very absurd contradictions.
How is it proven that each proof refers to the same being? Why can’t each proof refer to different beings, all of which exist?
Each proof could point to a different being, if we don’t think them through. These proofs are not designed for complete overlap. If they were, they would be redundant. What St. Thomas wished to show is that there is more than one
a priori dialectic to arrive at God through reason. From this point, another set of arguments comes into play. These arguments – once he has proven the existence of at least one fundamental being – essentially derive from Revelation. Revelation teaches us that God is Infinite. Two infinite beings cannot coexist side by side for very obvious reasons: otherwise they would not be “infinite.”
Revelation teaches us that God is Eternal. So, regardless of whether we live in a universe, or a multiverse, God has been always present to fulfill the requirements of the Five Ways. Revelation teaches us that God is Simple, thus God has no parts inside of parts, subjecting Him to corruption. Revelation teaches us that God is Omnipotent and Omniscient, therefore all of the things which St. Thomas has proven that He does, He can do. Revelation teaches us that God is Unsurpassed Love, because if He weren’t and he was Omnipotent, we would be grasshoppers on a clothesline – and, perhaps, an unending clothesline of hell. Revelation teaches us that He is supremely Good, because if He weren’t we wouldn’t know what was Good or what was not. He has done a remarkable job considering that we are in part physical beings.
One striking feature about the five proofs is that every proof is very interrelated. There’s a lot of overlap. If you prove God one way many times you’re over half way there to proving God in another way. Indeed, sometimes the distinctions in-between the proofs were so subtle that it was heard for me to come up with a specific descriptor for each definition proven.
But dissimilar enough to see that they each respond to different, important
a priori underlying qualifiers that directly expose themselves as proofs for God’s existence.
God bless,
jd