Aquinas's Five definitions of God

[JDaniel]

I just realized something. I said entities B, C, D and E are all bound to A.

By the definitions, A, C, D and E are also bound to B,
A, B, D and E are all bound to C,
and so forth.

So they are functionally one, each dependent on the rest.
Which means they are necessarily one.

Norain:

May I suggest that we look at this in a different manner? Each of the Five Ways is distinct from the others in that each has to do with a different aspect of the natures of things. They can be said to be bound, in some sense, since all have the same objects of study. The First Way has to do with motion, and stands on its own. the mobility, or immobility, of creatures and things is the first thing we notice as we are able to see. A baby, in a crib, remains fascinated (at least for a while) by the movement of things before its eyes.

Causation takes a while to learn. I won’t p(name removed by moderator)oint an age, but usually when a child begins to regard things in, shall we say, a more scientific manner? He is taught that if he eats all of his dinner, he gets dessert. Simple cause and effect. Soon, he notices that a new plant sprouts up and grows with each passing day. But, if deprived of water, dies. More and more complex cause and effect.

The third and fourth ways don’t register maybe until his early years in college. The fifth, may be ascribed by analogy. Again, the child is usually older.

But, all five are distinct from each other. Motion is the activity of mobile beings, including coming-to-be. Causation is the antecedents and consequences of the interactions of mobile beings. Necessity is the relation requirements between mobile beings or immobile beings. The order of things is obvious from such things as the growth of living things, or the growth of inert things such as crystals. And, finally, we notice that all things strive for fairly unique goals, in very consistent ways.

As you can see, each one can be fully removed from the others, and can stand on its own as an incontrovertible proof. Neither you nor I can help other people when it comes to assimilating and comprehending each. We can try, but as we have seen, there are no guarantees. I just think we’re much better off not becoming wrapped around the axle on some non-provable relationship between the proofs.

God bless,
jd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You are correct, I cannot see it. I strongly suspect that the reason I cannot see it is because you haven’t actually written it. And each time I repeat my request and you decline to provide a clear argument supporting your assertion you reinforce this suspicion.*

So, how about one more time? Please can you show that all the five ways refer to a first something? A clear simple argument leading to your conclusion would be great.

I believe you are wrong on several counts. First, I have pointed out to you several times where to go in St. Thomas to find the answer. By the time you finish Question 119 you will have your answer. Secondly, a reasonable mind will see the answer much sooner, say by the end of Question 3. In one of my posts on another thread I believe I said I would try and show you the assertion was true. I made an attempt which you immediately rejected as inadequate. I think your answer was wrong, I think I did show you enough proof. You said no I didn’t. So there we are. I am sorry my attempts have been so unsatisfactory in your mind.

 

[norain]

Each of the Five Ways is distinct from the others in that each has to do with a different aspect of the natures of things.

jd,

the problem with what you propose is that each of the five ways enforce themselves on everything else. That is not my choice, but the way they have been defined. Five aspects that control **everything **else, and that everything **includes **the other four.

That’s how I see it, anyway. And in that, it binds them as one, in a way, mathematically.

 

[Candide_West]

Candide,

Thanks for your lengthy reply. I think you are making an honest attempt to understand this, and I appreciate that. I can only hope to make as honest an attempt to respond to your questions.

My pleasure.*

I’m at work right now and don’t have much time, but I’ll work on it in bits.

No worries, I know that writing on CAF isn’t anyone’s Number 1 life priority.*

I’m still somewhat puzzled by A and B coz they seem to point to the same thing.*

They are very closely related but not quite the same. The reason I made a distinction was because you said that B needed to be moved to actualise something by A.

C is clearly something else. For C to create something, it needs a little push into actuality. Why? Because we have postulated that A moves everything else, and “everything” includes C.*

But this assumes a chronological or ontological sequence. Since we are speaking of timeless existence here there is no need for such sequences (indeed it would be logically problematic).*

Yet A needs C as well, since everything, including A, necessarily comes from C.

So A and C are interdependent, and by that I think they are necessarily functionally one.

I agree that they would be interdependent, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they must be one thing. In order for either A or C to exist they must be ontologically prior to time. So they exist timelessly. If they exist timelessly then there is no need for a sequence so they could have mutually caused each other from eternity.

By the same process of argument, you can pretty much expand it *to the other relationships (i.e. A-D, B-D, etc).

Now there I think you might have difficulty since the argument is based on A, B and C all referring to “first something’s” (which they do in their different ways) and only requires that you eliminate the possibility of separate entities with interdependencies. However D and E are not “first something’s” I think what you need to show there is that in order for something to cause the universe it must be “perfect” or alternatively that for something to be perfect it must have caused the universe.*

The former is logically problematic as you’ll need to show that perfection is a requirement for creation in this specific case even though it isn’t in every other case. And the latter is theologically difficult as if you show it to be true then it would mean that God wasn’t perfect prior to creating the universe.*

Of the two I think the former would be the better target to aim for but I’ve got no idea how you might actually achieve it.*

More later, maybe.

Cool, see you later then.*

 

[Candide_West]

I believe you are wrong on several counts. First, I have pointed out to you several times where to go in St. Thomas to find the answer. By the time you finish Question 119 you will have your answer. Secondly, a reasonable mind will see the answer much sooner, say by the end of Question 3.

So… just to be clear, are you saying that the argument which shows that the five ways all refer to a first something is somewhere in the first 3 questions of the summa? Is there a specific article which you think hits the mark? It would simplify things if you could be specific and if you have a particular argument or arguments in mind then why not just say which one(s)?

*In one of my posts on another thread I believe I said I would try and show you the assertion was true. I made an attempt which you immediately rejected as inadequate. I think your answer was wrong,

Well let’s be fair I didn’t simply reject your attempt did I? I showed that your argument didn’t work. From memory I believe we were talking about Aquinas then as well and you were employing a tautological argument.*

*I think I did show you enough proof. You said no I didn’t. So there we are.*I am sorry my attempts have been so unsatisfactory in your mind. *

No need to apologise. You made an attempt to answer a question from someone you’ve never met over the Internet. That’s a nice thing to do. Don’t ever be ashamed of trying to do something nice even if you don’t quite achieve what you sought to.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

QUOTE=Candide West;9835242]So… just to be clear, are you saying that the argument which shows that the five ways all refer to a first something is somewhere in the first 3 questions of the summa? Is there a specific article which you think hits the mark? It would simplify things if you could be specific and if you have a particular argument or arguments in mind then why not just say which one(s)?

You must understand, Thomas was not writing for someone like you in mind. So he doesn’t come right out and say " this proves that the Prime Mover is God. In his mind he already proved that. Because he showed the Prime Mover is Pure Actuality ( at least in his mind). And in his day the people would immediately recognize a Pure Actuality as their God because they understood that a Being that was Pure Actuality summed up all possible existence in his very being, in the Onenss of His Eternal Almighty Intellect, His Omnipresent Spirit.

You must keep in mind that in the History of Salvation ( per the Jewish People of the First Covenant and we Christians of the New Covenant) God has been revealing himself through nature and through the Fathers and the Prophets, etc. from the Fall). So the people of Thomas’ day could easily “see” God in nature. They just said ( metaphorically ) " … oh, yea, that is God moving things, causing things, ordering things…" So his conclusion was not a problem to them.

Now I did say that Thomas could have done a better job of explaining things right when he gave the proof. But he was not that kind of writer. He shows how he reached these conclusions else where but not in so many words. The more and more you read the more and more the light dawns but you have to be constantly filling in between the lines.

And that is what I tried to show you. Now if you say no he did not prove there was a Prime Mover who was Pure Actuality then of course you cannot say the Prime Mover is God. So the question I have for you is did he prove that? If you think not do you have a reason for saying it. Don’t say you don’t think so, give me a reason why? Where does his reasoning fail?

Well let’s be fair I didn’t simply reject your attempt did I? I showed that your argument didn’t work. From memory I believe we were talking about Aquinas then as well and you were employing a tautological argument.*

And I showed you it wasn’t. Not in the logical sense. What he left out was that the essence of the Prime Mover was that of Pure Actuality. That is assumed by the argument. Only the actual can move the potential to actuality. ( see my poste 17). Now a Being with the essence of Pure Actuality was called by the Philosophers the Prime Mover but since the Christian God has Pure Actuality as His Essence ( i.e. His Nature ) Thomas can call It God. How so? God is a Pure Spirit of absolute Perfection and Simplicity, therefore His Essence is Pure Existence or Pure Actuality ( the Prime Mover).

So look over the First Way again, then my post 17, then the immediate paragraph above and see where we are.

Questions 3-13 cover the first basic thing about God’s nature ( but you may just call him First Being if you wish or Prime Mover). Questions 14-26 cover the biggies about the nature of the First Being - Intellect, Will, and Power ( See how close we are coming to your famous ’ person ?’ ).

But just read this from Question 105, Article 5. Read the two objections and then Thomas’ reply. One thing you will see is how the Prime Mover moves creatures. That is very important. He does not move things like a locomotive at the head of a train. You will now understand how capital the notion of a mover/changer is to Thomas and why he called the First Way the Most Manifest Way. It wasn’t just that change and movement were so obvious it was because the fact of movement had vast analogical implications. Because as creatures move by contact, the Prime Mover moves by power, the hardly conceiveable analogical projection of Intellectual Power in a fecundative influx resulting in existence, movement, form, and directedness in all creatures beneath him.

So the Prime Mover is not a part of the physical universe of space time but can operate in it.

Well, give it a try and we will see where we are.

 

[norain]

Candide,

You bring up a good point about time, or absence of, uncoupling causality. For simplicity, let’s just deal with the interaction of A (the mover) and C (the maker). The maker cannot make, for it requires a nudge from the mover. The mover cannot move until the maker has made it. If A existed prior to C, then we are faced with a paradox. Same thing if C existed prior to A. But we’re talking timeless entities here, so such issues do not apply!

Remember though that the definitions as put forth did not say A moves everything else, with the exception of B, C, D and E. A moves everything else, including B, C, D, and E.

If C were an entity separate from A, it still requires A regardless. Same thing with A towards C. If neither can exist or function without the other, then they are functionally one.

The concept of separation or distinctness is better applied to objects with form and shape, the stuff the world is made of. A and C are formless and timeless, they have no boundaries. We can only judge them distinct if they can function independently, which we are unable to do.

 

[Candide_West]

You must understand, Thomas was not writing for someone like you in mind. So he doesn’t come right out and say " this proves that the Prime Mover is God. In his mind he already proved that. Because he showed the Prime Mover is Pure Actuality ( at least in his mind).*

Right, so we can expect to find omissions in Aquinas’s argument, because he was carrying those unspoken assumptions.*

…So the people of Thomas’ day could easily “see” God in nature. They just said ( metaphorically ) " … oh, yea, that is God moving things, causing things, ordering things…" So his conclusion was not a problem to them.

Indeed, for example in his time people didn’t know about plate tectonics, so “saw” God in earthquakes (a view that was widely held until the 1755 earthquake in Lisbon made it effectively untenable).

Now I did say that Thomas could have done a better job of explaining things right when he gave the proof. But he was not that kind of writer. He shows how he reached these conclusions else where but not in so many words. The more and more you read the more and more the light dawns but you have to be constantly filling in between the lines.*

So you are saying that Aquinas doesn’t actually show anywhere that the five ways all refer to one thing? But you’ve managed to work it out anyway? If so then please can you show your reasoning please?*

And that is what I tried to show you. Now if you say no he did not prove there was a Prime Mover who was Pure Actuality then of course you cannot say the Prime Mover is God. So the question I have for you is did he prove that? If you think not do you have a reason for saying it. Don’t say you don’t think so, give me a reason why? Where does his reasoning fail?*

No, he didn’t show that thePrime Mover was Pure Actuality. Even if we ignore the problems with each of the arguments individually then we still lack an argument to show that the two both refer to the same thing. This isn’t so much an error in Aquinas’s reasoning as a gap in it. He simply renamed the conclusion of each of the five ways as God without justifying doing so. That’s why his reasoning fails.

And I showed you it wasn’t. Not in the logical sense.*

In fact you didn’t. I identified the errors in your logic and you responded that the fact that you’d made errors of logic didn’t prove that you were wrong. Then you said that your argument had been badly stated and declined to attempt to improve it.*

What he left out was that the essence of the Prime Mover was that of Pure Actuality. That is assumed by the argument.

It also assumes (without justification) that the Prime Mover is also the Perfect Thing and that the Prime Mover is the Intelligent Governor etc. That is the gap I have identified here. Sure we can simply assume the gap away if we like, but then again if we are happy to assume away the gaps in an argument then we might as well not bother with the argument and just skip straight to assuming the conclusion.*

How so? God is a Pure Spirit of absolute Perfection and Simplicity, therefore His Essence is Pure Existence or Pure Actuality ( the Prime Mover).

Right, that what I’m looking for an argument for (as opposed to an assertion of).

So look over the First Way again, then my post 17, then the immediate paragraph above and see where we are.

As far as i can tell we are looking at the same gap in reasoning that we were at the start of this thread.

Questions 3-13 cover the first basic thing about God’s nature ( but you may just call him First Being if you wish or Prime Mover). Questions 14-26 cover the biggies about the nature of the First Being - Intellect, Will, and Power ( See how close we are coming to your famous ’ person ?’ ).

The problem there is that there seems to be no argument showing personal being, again, it is assumed.

But just read this from Question 105, Article 5. Read the two objections and then Thomas’ reply. One thing you will see is how the Prime Mover moves creatures. That is very important. He does not move things like a locomotive at the head of a train. You will now understand how capital the notion of a mover/changer is to Thomas and why he called the First Way the Most Manifest Way. It wasn’t just that change and movement were so obvious it was because the fact of movement had vast analogical implications. Because as creatures move by contact, the Prime Mover moves by power, the hardly conceiveable analogical projection of Intellectual Power in a fecundative influx resulting in existence, movement, form, and directedness in all creatures beneath him.

None of this seems to address the gap at hand.*

So the Prime Mover is not a part of the physical universe of space time but can operate in it.

The first part of this statement is reasonable, the second part (“but can operate in it”) I have not yet read a reasoned argument for. Do you have one?*

Well, give it a try and we will see where we are.

No worries, thanks for your efforts, alas I don’t think we’ve made much progress to closing the gap yet, but we’ll see how it goes.

 

[Candide_West]

Candide,

You bring up a good point about time, or absence of, uncoupling causality. For simplicity, let’s just deal with the interaction of A (the mover) and C (the maker). The maker cannot make, for it requires a nudge from the mover. The mover cannot move until the maker has made it. If A existed prior to C, then we are faced with a paradox. Same thing if C existed prior to A. But we’re talking timeless entities here, so such issues do not apply!

Agreed.*

Remember though that the definitions as put forth did not say A moves everything else, with the exception of B, C, D and E. A moves everything else, including B, C, D, and E.

Yes, but A says that anything that is in motion must be put into motion (in this case we are really referring to action, not just motion per se). But the need to be put into action requires there to have been an ontological point (as a minimum) when the action wasn’t taking place. Since we don’t seem to be supposing the existence of any point at which C was not being the act of existence there doesn’t seem to be a need to require A to get it to that point.*

In other words if C was always being the necessary thing then there is no need for something else (ie A) to move it to being the necessary thing.

If C were an entity separate from A, it still requires A regardless. Same thing with A towards C. If neither can exist or function without the other, then they are functionally one.

Hmmm, interesting point but I’m not sure that “functionally one” (which in this case really means mutually dependent) is sufficient.*

The concept of separation or distinctness is better applied to objects with form and shape, the stuff the world is made of. A and C are formless and timeless, they have no boundaries. We can only judge them distinct if they can function independently, which we are unable to do.

This seems reasonable, I’ll paraphrase to make sure I’ve understood correctly.*

Essentially you are saying that A, B and C either:

1. • refer to a single thing,*
     or*
2. • refer to separate things which are mutually dependent.*

However the two cases are in fact indistinguishable as the nature of A, B and C is such that all those characteristics which we might use to identify distinctions (ie physical or temporal limits) are absent and the functions described are mutually dependent.

Assuming that is your argument then it seems reasonable to me, the only outstanding gap would appear to be showing that C does indeed require A in order to perform its function. Perhaps by showing that there must have been a point when C was not being the necessary thing?

 

[norain]

Assuming that is your argument then it seems reasonable to me, the only outstanding gap would appear to be showing that C does indeed require A in order to perform its function. Perhaps by showing that there must have been a point when C was not being the necessary thing?

Yup, that little bit of detail needs to be explicitly stated, but wasn’t.

 

[JDaniel]

jd,

the problem with what you propose is that each of the five ways enforce themselves on everything else. That is not my choice, but the way they have been defined. Five aspects that control **everything **else, and that everything **includes **the other four.

That’s how I see it, anyway. And in that, it binds them as one, in a way, mathematically.

Norain:

I’m not sure that they do “enforce themselves on everything else. . . including each other.” They are nothing more than a posteriori explanations of the quiddities of real things in general. As such, they are abstractions. They don’t require their own quiddities.

For example, were I to similarly regard “bird-ness,” I would first notice that all birds are “feathered.” Second, I would notice that they have “wings.” Third, I might notice that they have a specialized manner of warming their eggs. Etc., etc. Now, these cannot be generalized to encompass all things, but they can be generalized to encompass nearly all birds. But “feathers” do not enforce themselves on “egg laying,” per se, but only in a relational way.

How do you see them bound “mathematically?” You may be right, but you’ve lost me there.

God bless,
jd

 

[norain]

How do you see them bound “mathematically?”

I do some programming on the side so I sometimes think about things that way. Constraints, bounds, definitions.

Let’s look at the first entity A, the mover:

A is “a thing that sets everything else in motion.”

So A is an object that makes every other entity, which we can call not(A) move.

C is not(A), therefore C must require A just like every other thing not(A).

C, the necessary entity, on the other hand, creates everything else not(C).

A is not(C), so A must require C.

As Candide pointed out, all these entities might be postulated to have always existed, not requiring a mover, creator, etc. After all, they are subsets of God.

If we bind them strongly to the definition, which we must, since it is the premise of this thread, I’d place my bet that indeed A is not(C), and C is not(A). They bind each other.

Not sure if that made it clearer or confused more.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Mark, this is for you, Daniel, Norine and the others on this thread and others similar to it. We all know that Thomas has a big " Zero " painted on his back. Why, because Holy Mother, the Church, has made ample use of Thomas in proving the reasonableness not only of the Faith but the reasonableness or many of the elements making up the Doctrine of the Faith. Thomas is by no means the only source the Church uses for all the Fathers are amply used ending with Augustine, perhaps the greatest of all. Therefore, we dismiss the slings, darts, arrows, rocks cast by insincere " objectors " who will object to anything hinting at the existence of anything not made of " matter, " anything which hints at the existence of anything outside the direct measurements of science or outside the order of space, matter, and time. For some odd reason, they regard this as some kind of huge threat to the good order of human existence and societical functioning. It just boggles the mind!!!

But in answer to your question I think the Summa Theologica, Part 1, Question 105, Articel 5, Objections and Reply, shows that each of the Five Ways reference the Same and Only God. In this Question, Thomas shows unquestionably that the One God is the Moving Cause, the Efficient ( Agent ) Cause, The Source of Being, and The Final and Ordering Cause of all creaturely existence and actions. He does not mention the Way of the Necessary Being specifically but we can safely subsume it under the Source of Being.

And as a bonus, this Question and 103 and 104 show that God continues his creative act in moving, sustainin, ordering, and maintaing all in b-e-i-n-g and thus shows exactly how God moves every act of his creatures while allowing for the integrity of their own causality and action.

I found this work on Divine Government and the one on Creation facinating. So continue in your reading and don’t pay attention to the noise from the street.

 

[norain]

Linus, I thought about telling Candide that Aquinas wrote this sh**, so he probably meant implicitly to refer to one and only one God.

But, and this is a big but…

but Aquinas would want us to be faithful to logic, and by that, entertain such possibility that the five are indeed possibly separate. Nothing seems to reject that possibility, so it is up to us indeed to prove it ain’t so.

I can go as far as claim they are at the same time bound to each other, and formless, so physical boundaries are meaningless. So operationally one.

Depends too on how exactly we are to define “distinct”. Independent they are not, operationally one, so by that they are one.

I can’t carry the proof further than that, and by that I think Candide has a point.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Linus, I thought about telling Candide that Aquinas wrote this sh**, so he probably meant implicitly to refer to one and only one God.

But, and this is a big but…

but Aquinas would want us to be faithful to logic, and by that, entertain such possibility that the five are indeed possibly separate. Nothing seems to reject that possibility, so it is up to us indeed to prove it ain’t so.

I can go as far as claim they are at the same time bound to each other, and formless, so physical boundaries are meaningless. So operationally one.

Depends too on how exactly we are to define “distinct”. Independent they are not, operationally one, so by that they are one.

I can’t carry the proof further than that, and by that I think Candide has a point.

Well, just read Q 105 and see if that doesn’t answer positively, each of the Five Ways concludes to God in that each concludes in a Being with a specific character trait which can only be found in the Christian God. The One and Only God of Christianity has all five traits and more united in His Almighty Spirit, the nature of His Pure Existence, His Pure Actuality. So there is only One God and indeed, ontologically and logically there can only be one, for to be Purely Actual as the Christian God is to possess All Possible Being.

Two Pure Actualities is a violation of the logical principle of contradiction.
On the Ontological level it is also impossible. Two Beings cannot possess entirely and as its own every Perfection that Exists, for this would result in two Beings in total possission of the same nature.

But to satisfy the objectors we do have the Trinity, Three real Persons in One Godhead. But of course, our objectors would never agree to that kind of Identity!!! They much prefer their own musings into nothingness…

 

[JDaniel]

I do some programming on the side so I sometimes think about things that way. Constraints, bounds, definitions.

Let’s look at the first entity A, the mover:

A is “a thing that sets everything else in motion.”

So A is an object that makes every other entity, which we can call not(A) move.

C is not(A), therefore C must require A just like every other thing not(A).

C, the necessary entity, on the other hand, creates everything else not(C).

A is not(C), so A must require C.

As Candide pointed out, all these entities might be postulated to have always existed, not requiring a mover, creator, etc. After all, they are subsets of God.

If we bind them strongly to the definition, which we must, since it is the premise of this thread, I’d place my bet that indeed A is not(C), and C is not(A). They bind each other.

Not sure if that made it clearer or confused more.

Norain:

You didn’t quite loose me. In another thread I have been discussing “motion” as regards “active potency” and “passive potency,” with Perplexity. I should have stayed with that thread a little more exclusively, because, today I am realizing wherein the problem lies.

Anyway, first of all, let me explain that the terms “active potency” and “passive potency” are nothing more than abstractions derived from a singular act of motion. They are not, therefore, real properties. They are how we know the parts of “motion” so that we can make it intelligible by not being inescapably tautological. The referents of “active potency” and “passive potency” are: (1) the agent, and (2), the recipient. They do not, by any necessity, inhere in one subject, such as the agent.

Whenever we are talking about motion and St. Thomas in the same breath, we are talking about a series of essentially (not accidentally) subordinated movers. So, unlike a series of accidentally subordinated movers, such as the chicken–egg succession, the initial mover must be ever present throughout the motion. For example, if I am mowing my yard, I am continuously pushing or guiding the mower. The parent chickens can both be dead, and the egg brought to hatching by an incubator. Without getting too wrapped up around this analogy, the point I am making is that there are certain things that require the ongoing touch, so to speak, of the agent. But, the agent is nevertheless separate and distinct from the recipient of the motion.

Now, in your summary of the Five Ways, you seem to be considering the agent as a singular thing that singularly moves all other things, except itself, of course. But this ignores the other members (secondary and tertiary movers) of a “series.” Let me give you a simpler analogy. Consider a TV set from 40 years ago. Inside that thing are about 500 separate electrical parts. They are in series. Upon flipping the Off/On switch to the On position, electricity flows through all 500 parts rather instantaneously, resulting in picture and sound. The electricity travels the circuit instantly, warming all of the parts in that instant (except the Cathode tube with takes a few seconds longer). Then, it continues coursing through the TV’s circuitry for as long as you are watching the TV. This is an essentially subordinated series. Removal of one of the transistors or tubes, and no more TV watching.

Real-life examples of such series would be: the coming-to-be of a baby, the growth of a tree, the conversion of foods into proteins and carbohydrates that can be taken up by the body. Now, if most motion is carried out by subordinate movers, once the Prime Mover moves them into being, then what is left is for the Prime Mover to do is to maintain the subordinates until He’s done with each moved-mover or series. So, essentially, we are witnessing one and the same mover/causer/sustainer/superordinate/organizer as if we were watching a good baseball player. Any argument that purports to separate the determinants of a thing is an argumentum ad absurdum. It is no different than separating the ability to get to the ball from the ability to throw it to the first baseman, of a good baseball player. A baseball player that can only do one of these well is not considered a good baseball player. But then, he wouldn’t be on a major league baseball team.

So, how do we tear one or more attributes away from the singular source of each of them? In our imaginations? Since there’s nothing antecedent? Unless we are to believe that a bunch of powers, inhering in nothing, determinant of nothing, existed antecedent to God.

God bless,
jd

 

[Candide_West]

Yup, that little bit of detail needs to be explicitly stated, but wasn’t.

Ok. Cool. Any thoughts on how to go about showing that?*

Also do you have any thoughts about how we might bring in the 4th and 5th ways?

Incidentally, just wanted to say thanks for the discussion. Has proven really interesting thus far and you’ve succeeded in taking the argument further than any of my previous interlocutors. So this is definitely a successful discussion in my book.*

 

[norain]

Ok. Cool. Any thoughts on how to go about showing that?*

Also do you have any thoughts about how we might bring in the 4th and 5th ways?

Briefly, we can assume that Aquinas, in formulating each A, B, C, D, E imply them all to refer to God or God-like entities. After all, they are proof of God.

Elsewhere in the Summa, Aquinas explains how God is necessarily one:

" “One” which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For “one” the principle of number belongs to the “genus” of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But “one” which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one. "

I believe I mentioned it in passing elsewhere but Aquinas goes into more detail:

newadvent.org/summa/1011.htm#article3

So if the five proofs are proofs of God, then we can simply say they are one God, for God is one, per the reference above, which addresses the “oneness” better than the five taken individually or together.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

newadvent.org/summa/1011.htm#article3

On the contrary, It is written “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord” (Deuteronomy 6:4).

I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is one.

First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is “this particular thing” is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the “per se” cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so “per se” and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.

So if the five proofs are proofs of God, then we can simply say they are one God, for God is one, per the reference above, which addresses the “oneness” better than the five taken individually or together.

Again, Part 1, Question 105, Article 5 is one of the most important in the Summa. It shows God operating as the Agent Cause ( efficient/moving cause), Formal Cause, and Final Cause ( the ordering or directing, Provedent cause). It also shows how God’s causality works ( by a ’ touching ’ of power which can only be the fecund operation of His intellect) without destroying the real causality of creatures.

Questions 103-119 really brings together all that came before.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Again, Part 1, Question 105, Article 5 is one of the most important in the Summa. It shows God operating as the Agent Cause ( efficient/moving cause), Formal Cause, and Final Cause ( the ordering or directing, Provedent cause). It also shows how God’s causality works ( by a ’ touching ’ of power which can only be the fecund operation of His intellect) without destroying the real causality of creatures.

Questions 103-119 really brings together all that came before.

That’s about as direct an answer as could possibly be hoped for, and certainly answers any questions I had about simplicity.