Aquinas's Natural Law

[Betterave]

i wasn’t asked for a definition of morality. i was asked for a basis for it.

at any rate, at least we got that cleared up and have said the things that go without saying.

you haven’t cleared up anything unless you’d like to correct/retract your claim that you were offering an explanation of morality. that *should *go without saying.

 

[Rocinante]

you haven’t cleared up anything unless you’d like to correct/retract your claim that you were offering an explanation of morality. that *should *go without saying.

i already answered your objection about starfish and lions, so i have no idea what you could be trying to get at here.

 

[Betterave]

i already answered your objection about starfish and lions, so i have no idea what you could be trying to get at here.

Evidently, you have no idea. I hope that’s not just because you don’t *want *to have any idea. (I think that what I’ve said is clear enough in itself.)

Your ‘answer’ to my objection completely ignored my point, as I’ve already pointed out. Thus it’s not really an answer to my objection.

I even gave you an analogy, in case you couldn’t understand my point, to explain what is wrong with the pseudo-explanation you offered. Do you also have no idea how analogies work? Or do you just not see how this one works? Or are you just not interested in actually thinking about the shortcomings of the position you’ve offered here?

To remind you, this is the position you offered:

“an explanation for morality? that is simple. there are behaviors, intentions, attitudes, etc. that lead people to increased well-being and others that lead to suffering and death. no great mystery to be solved here.”

I take you to be arguing thus (please correct me if I’m wrong):
P1) IF there are behaviors, intentions, attitudes, etc. that lead x’s to increased well-being and others that lead to suffering and death, THEN x’s are moral beings, and there is morality for those x’s (morality is ‘explained’ by this fact)
P2) there are behaviors, intentions, attitudes, etc. that lead people to increased well-being and others that lead to suffering and death
C) therefore there is morality (for people) (human morality is ‘explained’ by P2)

(I have already explained why this is a bad argument.)

 

[Rocinante]

Evidently, you have no idea. I hope that’s not just because you don’t *want *to have any idea. (I think that what I’ve said is clear enough in itself.)

Your ‘answer’ to my objection completely ignored my point, as I’ve already pointed out. Thus it’s not really an answer to my objection.

I even gave you an analogy, in case you couldn’t understand my point, to explain what is wrong with the pseudo-explanation you offered. Do you also have no idea how analogies work? Or do you just not see how this one works? Or are you just not interested in actually thinking about the shortcomings of the position you’ve offered here?

To remind you, this is the position you offered:

“an explanation for morality? that is simple. there are behaviors, intentions, attitudes, etc. that lead people to increased well-being and others that lead to suffering and death. no great mystery to be solved here.”

I take you to be arguing thus (please correct me if I’m wrong):
P1) IF there are behaviors, intentions, attitudes, etc. that lead x’s to increased well-being and others that lead to suffering and death, THEN x’s are moral beings, and there is morality for those x’s (morality is ‘explained’ by this fact)
P2) there are behaviors, intentions, attitudes, etc. that lead people to increased well-being and others that lead to suffering and death
C) therefore there is morality (for people) (human morality is ‘explained’ by P2)

(I have already explained why this is a bad argument.)

i think you understand what i am saying, but i don’t i understand what the problem is for you.

moral concerns are human concerns about what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of human beings (and perhaps also to maximize the well being of other beings to the extent that they are capable of happiness and suffering). but these concerns are our concerns. human concerns. we humans are moral beings because we have the capacity to make such considerations and because we do make such considerations.

(star fish, rocks, and trees are not moral beings. they do not have the capacity to reason about how to maximize well-being. there is evidence that chimpanzees and perhaps some other animals have rudimentary “moral” instincts in showing a concern for the well-being of others, but they obviously cannot reason about whether or not their instincts ought to be trusted while we can.)

rocinante

 

[Betterave]

i think you understand what i am saying, but i don’t i understand what the problem is for you.

moral concerns are human concerns about what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of human beings (and perhaps also to maximize the well being of other beings to the extent that they are capable of happiness and suffering). but these concerns are our concerns. human concerns. we humans are moral beings because we have the capacity to make such considerations and because we do make such considerations.

Okay, so moral concerns are human concerns (true) about (you say…) what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of human beings (and perhaps other beings too). Now it’s true that we have the capacity for such considerations and we humans (sometimes) do make such considerations (not very often though) - but how do you get from this fact to morality (to the claim that morality has been explained)? What does ‘morality’ mean? Maybe it’s time for a definition. Without one it’s not really possible to understand what you’re claiming here. Without God it seems questionable whether there really is such a ‘thing’ as what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of human beings (and perhaps other beings too) (or perhaps some other more accurate characterization of the basic demand that morality places upon us).

(star fish, rocks, and trees are not moral beings. they do not have the capacity to reason about how to maximize well-being. there is evidence that chimpanzees and perhaps some other animals have rudimentary “moral” instincts in showing a concern for the well-being of others, but they obviously cannot reason about whether or not their instincts ought to be trusted while we can.)

rocinante

I appreciate your mentioning reason here. That got left out of your original explanation, but I think you agree that reason is one of the necessary conditions for morality.

 

[Rocinante]

Okay, so moral concerns are human concerns (true) about (you say…) what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of human beings (and perhaps other beings too). Now it’s true that we have the capacity for such considerations and we humans (sometimes) do make such considerations (not very often though) - but how do you get from this fact to morality (to the claim that morality has been explained)? What does ‘morality’ mean? Maybe it’s time for a definition. Without one it’s not really possible to understand what you’re claiming here.

morality is right conduct. it is what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of creatures capable of experiencing happiness and misery. hasn’t that already been made clear?

Without God it seems questionable whether there really is such a ‘thing’ as what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of human beings (and perhaps other beings too)

i don’t see how a supernatural intelligence could be relevant here unless we think of this being as one more of those capable of experiencing happiness an suffering for whose well-being we ought to be concerned.

(or perhaps some other more accurate characterization of the basic demand that morality places upon us).

i hope you will specify what you think that is (though i gather that you have determined that avoiding revealing the position you are defending is helpful to you in your discussions).

i can’t imagine what you could think we ought to be concerned about in the name of morality if not conscious experience of creatures capable of experiencing well-being and misery. i don’t think that something that has no actual or potential way of affecting changes in states of consciousness of anyone or anything could possibly concern anyone. but again, i hope you’ll specify what this alternative source of moral values you apparently have in mind is.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Curious Hobbit

• " Is walking on your hands immoral because they were not made for walking?" or “is using your nose to rest your glasses on immoral because your nose was not meant for that?”*

Not really. One aspect of the natural law that tends to get lost in discussions of this sort is the fact that human intelligence is also part of the natural law. God made us to use our intelligence and our imagination in creative, useful, and beautiful ways. Walking on your hands is not immoral because it is a form of entertainment, delight, and laughter, especially for the benefit of others. But if you walked on your hands in the belief that it is natural to walk on your hands, this would not so much be immoral as a sign that you have lost your wits. The same applies to resting your glasses on your nose. You were not born that way in your natural state, but God gave you the intelligence to wear glasses because they enhance your vision. If you believed that wearing glasses was something you should do because it’s part of the natural law to wear glasses (whether you need them or not) again this would be a sign that you have lost your wits.

Here is Aquinas at length on the natural law.

newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm

As he says in Article 2:

Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, “which nature has taught to all animals” [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

 

[Betterave]

morality is right conduct. it is what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of creatures capable of experiencing happiness and misery. hasn’t that already been made clear?

So morality is “right conduct, i.e., what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of creatures capable of experiencing happiness and misery”? That certainly doesn’t sound right to me, but if that’s what you want to claim, then how do you explain morality? Could you try to answer that question again? Do you still want to claim that given that people sometimes consider the fact that it might be possible to maximize the well-being of sentient creatures, therefore they ought to do so, i.e., therefore morality exists?

i don’t see how a supernatural intelligence could be relevant here unless we think of this being as one more of those capable of experiencing happiness an suffering for whose well-being we ought to be concerned.

I guess it never occurred to you that a supernatural intelligence might be a being in relation to which we are profoundly dependent, for everything, but including our actual development of a capacity for happiness (and for redemption of our suffering).

i hope you will specify what you think that is (though i gather that you have determined that avoiding revealing the position you are defending is helpful to you in your discussions).

You say A, so I say B, is not actually a normative model for dialogue - not even a particularly good one, I’d say. Are suggesting that it is? You say A, so I ask you about A, is actually a better model, imho. Does that make you uncomfortable?

To answer your question here, one problem is your notion of ‘maximization,’ which is a utilitarian notion derived from economics. I don’t see how it can be fundamental to morality as such.

i can’t imagine what you could think we ought to be concerned about in the name of morality if not conscious experience of creatures capable of experiencing well-being and misery. i don’t think that something that has no actual or potential way of affecting changes in states of consciousness of anyone or anything could possibly concern anyone. but again, i hope you’ll specify what this alternative source of moral values you apparently have in mind is.

I think you’ve quite missed the point. It is not that we should be concerned about something other than conscious experience of sentient and especially intelligent creatures. It’s that saying that is far too general, it doesn’t address the specific question of morality. Obviously not all discussions about conscious experience are discussions about morality, right?

(Remember my analogy about ‘explaining’ the disappearance of frogs? Try to keep this point in mind: If I want to know about the letter ‘P’ and you tell me it’s part of the alphabet, that’s not very helpful, especially if I already know that; of course it’s part of the alphabet, but what makes a ‘P’ to be a ‘P’ rather than, say, a ‘B’? Do you understand?)

 

[Betterave]

Some helpful reading: plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

“although not widely discussed, what morality is taken to refer to has great significance for moral theories.”

 

[Rocinante]

So morality is “right conduct, i.e., what we ought to do so as to maximize the well-being of creatures capable of experiencing happiness and misery”? That certainly doesn’t sound right to me, but if that’s what you want to claim, then how do you explain morality? Could you try to answer that question again? Do you still want to claim that given that people sometimes consider the fact that it might be possible to maximize the well-being of sentient creatures, therefore they ought to do so, i.e., therefore morality exists?

i don’t understand how you could doubt that morality exists given that morality is about how we can maximize well-being. such a denial is to deny that there is any difference between the greatest possible fulfillment and the worst possible misery. can someone sincerely doubt that? sure you can put those doubting words into language, but i don’t think it is possible to actually hold such doubts.

also, if someone takes this extreme skeptical position and says that the worst possible misery for everyone in existence isn’t something that necessarily ought to be avoided, then i think we are entirely justified in being skeptical about whether this person has any idea what “ought” means.

I guess it never occurred to you that a supernatural intelligence might be a being in relation to which we are profoundly dependent, for everything, but including our actual development of a capacity for happiness (and for redemption of our suffering).

i understand that people believe in such beings, but if such a god is benevolent and omniscient, then what god wants is what is good for us. so learning about what is good and bad for us and what god wants are the same thing. therefore, we don’t have to worry about what god wants as some separate concern to what is good for us. it is irrelevant to inquiring into moral truth.

You say A, so I say B, is not actually a normative model for dialogue - not even a particularly good one, I’d say. Are suggesting that it is? You say A, so I ask you about A, is actually a better model, imho.

i suppose it depends on what you are looking for from dialogue. my hope is always to try to reach consensus on the correct ideas which benefits from a candid exchange of positions and justifications. but if your aim is rather to make someone else look bad so that whatever your position is appears to win by default, then i suppose you are pursuing the proper strategy in playing hide the ball so your opponent (this is how you apparently view your conversation partners) never knows where you are coming from.

To answer your question here, one problem is your notion of ‘maximization,’ which is a utilitarian notion derived from economics. I don’t see how it can be fundamental to morality as such.

this is not an answer to my question. i had hoped that you would reveal your alternative notion of morality–what you referred to as “some other more accurate characterization of the basic demand that morality places upon us.” i can’t see how we could hope to come to any consensus on the matter if you are unwilling to tell me what that is.

I think you’ve quite missed the point. It is not that we should be concerned about something other than conscious experience of sentient and especially intelligent creatures. It’s that saying that is far too general, it doesn’t address the specific question of morality. Obviously not all discussions about conscious experience are discussions about morality, right?

note that you chide me for missing the point while you never bothered to say what your point is. you never specified what concerns about conscious experience are moral concerns and which ones are not. you simply insinuate that i am missing something, but bever want to say what that something is. that way, i suppose, you no matter what i say you can keep saying, nope, that’s not it either. can you see how this can get very tedious for your interlocutors?

(Remember my analogy about ‘explaining’ the disappearance of frogs? Try to keep this point in mind: If I want to know about the letter ‘P’ and you tell me it’s part of the alphabet, that’s not very helpful, especially if I already know that; of course it’s part of the alphabet, but what makes a ‘P’ to be a ‘P’ rather than, say, a ‘B’? Do you understand?)

all i can keep telling you is that it would help a lot if you were up front about what you “already know” so i don’t have to guess. you keep getting frustrated when i tell you things you later claim to know or assume you know things that you later decide you want to play the skeptic about. it would be so much easier if you stopped playing games and made your position clear.

rocinante

 

[Betterave]

i don’t understand how you could doubt that morality exists given that morality is about how we can maximize well-being. such a denial is to deny that there is any difference between the greatest possible fulfillment and the worst possible misery. can someone sincerely doubt that? sure you can put those doubting words into language, but i don’t think it is possible to actually hold such doubts.

Rocinante,
You’re very combative and impatient. Please try to understand, rather than just engaging in rash polemics. You take as a given, still, that morality is about how we can maximize well-being. But I’ve already told you that ‘maximization’ seems problematic for me as an essential moral concept (anyone who has studied a bit of moral philosophy should know that it’s problematic, even when it is accepted as a centrally important heuristic).

Now take your claim that to deny that morality exists implies the denial of a difference between “the greatest possible fulfillment and the worst possible misery”: that doesn’t make sense. Why couldn’t there be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery? (On the other hand, “greatest possible fulfillment” and “worst possible misery” seem not to be expressions that have real referents.)

also, if someone takes this extreme skeptical position and says that the worst possible misery for everyone in existence isn’t something that necessarily ought to be avoided, then i think we are entirely justified in being skeptical about whether this person has any idea what “ought” means.

You’re missing the point again. I am not a skeptic. The point here is to examine the grounds (and thus the specific nature) of morality, not to question its existence altogether. Do you for some reason not recognize the need for this? You seem awfully reluctant to “go there” - why?

i understand that people believe in such beings, but if such a god is benevolent and omniscient, then what god wants is what is good for us. so learning about what is good and bad for us and what god wants are the same thing. therefore, we don’t have to worry about what god wants as some separate concern to what is good for us. it is irrelevant to inquiring into moral truth.

Well that’s partly true: what God wants and what is good for us are indeed not separate concerns. But it certainly does not follow that what God wants is irrelevant to inquiring into moral truth.

i suppose it depends on what you are looking for from dialogue. my hope is always to try to reach consensus on the correct ideas which benefits from a candid exchange of positions and justifications. but if your aim is rather to make someone else look bad so that whatever your position is appears to win by default, then i suppose you are pursuing the proper strategy in playing hide the ball so your opponent (this is how you apparently view your conversation partners) never knows where you are coming from.

Listen: you can`t reach consensus on a given position until you have understood that position. Reaching consensus on position A means first of all that we understand position A. It doesn’t require that we understand position B, and introducing position B instead of discussing position A is often going to just be a red herring which will make reaching consensus more difficult. Make sense? So why do you want to insist that I introduce position B? Why not try to understand, to get consensus on, position A first?

this is not an answer to my question. i had hoped that you would reveal your alternative notion of morality–what you referred to as “some other more accurate characterization of the basic demand that morality places upon us.” i can’t see how we could hope to come to any consensus on the matter if you are unwilling to tell me what that is.

Can you see, based on my explanation above, that this doesn`t make any sense?

note that you chide me for missing the point while you never bothered to say what your point is. you never specified what concerns about conscious experience are moral concerns and which ones are not. you simply insinuate that i am missing something, but bever want to say what that something is. that way, i suppose, you no matter what i say you can keep saying, nope, that’s not it either. can you see how this can get very tedious for your interlocutors?

LOL! I didn`t “chide” you - I just pointed out that you missed the point. That’s just what you do when in the course of a conversation someone misses the point!

As for your claim that it doesn’t matter what you say, I can just keep saying, “nope, that’s not it either,” I hope you can re-think this and realize how silly that is. You seem to be chiding me for disagreeing with you (that’s silly) and completely mischaracterizing the nature of my criticisms (that’s silly too). Can you see how such silliness is not only tedious for your interlocutors, but intellectually dishonest and destructive of intelligent dialogue?

all i can keep telling you is that it would help a lot if you were up front about what you “already know” so i don’t have to guess. you keep getting frustrated when i tell you things you later claim to know or assume you know things that you later decide you want to play the skeptic about. it would be so much easier if you stopped playing games and made your position clear.

You don’t have to already know the answer (i.e., have some pat formula ready) to be able to intelligently examine some question. Are you interested in doing that, or not? If you are, please stay focussed on the issue, instead of complaining about my wanting to examine the issue.

 

[Rocinante]

You’re very combative and impatient. Please try to understand, rather than just engaging in rash polemics. You take as a given, still, that morality is about how we can maximize well-being. But I’ve already told you that ‘maximization’ seems problematic for me as an essential moral concept (anyone who has studied a bit of moral philosophy should know that it’s problematic, even when it is accepted as a centrally important heuristic).

i don’t know why you think it is problematic, only that you think so.

as usual.

Now take your claim that to deny that morality exists implies the denial of a difference between “the greatest possible fulfillment and the worst possible misery”: that doesn’t make sense. Why couldn’t there be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery?

because i’ve defined “moral beings” as beings capable of reasoning about morality, about what practices, intentions, attitudes, etc lead to increased well-being and which ones lead to increased misery.

(On the other hand, “greatest possible fulfillment” and “worst possible misery” seem not to be expressions that have real referents.)

all you need to do is consider that most of us are in a position such that it is possible to be more fulfilled or more miserable.

You’re missing the point again. I am not a skeptic. The point here is to examine the grounds (and thus the specific nature) of morality, not to question its existence altogether. Do you for some reason not recognize the need for this? You seem awfully reluctant to “go there” - why?

where is it that you think i am reluctant to go?

i had originally assumed that the existence of morality was not in question, but obviously you were questioning the existence of morality when you said “…therefore they ought to do so, i.e., therefore morality exists?” that is why i bothered to answer for the existence of morality. believe me, i wish i hadn’t bothered.

Well that’s partly true: what God wants and what is good for us are indeed not separate concerns. But it certainly does not follow that what God wants is irrelevant to inquiring into moral truth.

it is irrelevant since the there is no way to directly inquire about what god wants in such a way that there is any hope of getting consensus with other inquirers. however, we can hope to get consensus when we inquire into what is good and bad for people.

Listen: you can`t reach consensus on a given position until you have understood that position. Reaching consensus on position A means first of all that we understand position A. It doesn’t require that we understand position B, and introducing position B instead of discussing position A is often going to just be a red herring which will make reaching consensus more difficult. Make sense? So why do you want to insist that I introduce position B? Why not try to understand, to get consensus on, position A first?

is that what you’ve been trying to do? simply* understand* my position??? of course not. you’ve been critiquing my position.

i have no problem with criticism, but one can’t criticize position A but from the perspective of some other position B. can you? (unless you claim to have some omniscient or perspective-less perspective on the matter.)

without knowing what position B is, i have no hope of fully understanding your criticism. make sense?

LOL! I didn`t “chide” you - I just pointed out that you missed the point. That’s just what you do when in the course of a conversation someone misses the point!

not what everyone does. some people recognize that if someone doesn’t get their point that perhaps they didn’t make their point very well to begin with.

you have in fact made a point of refusing to say what your point is, so i find it very strange for you to chide me for missing your point.

As for your claim that it doesn’t matter what you say, I can just keep saying, “nope, that’s not it either,” I hope you can re-think this and realize how silly that is. You seem to be chiding me for disagreeing with you (that’s silly) and completely mischaracterizing the nature of my criticisms (that’s silly too). Can you see how such silliness is not only tedious for your interlocutors, but intellectually dishonest and destructive of intelligent dialogue?

i am not chiding you for disagreeing with me. i’m fine with disagreement. that’s why i come here. the problem is that all i know is that you are disagreeing with me. i have no way of understanding what your disagreement is like and how to respond since you refuse to say what your position is in spite of the fact that i’ve asked you numerous times.

 

[Betterave]

i am not chiding you for disagreeing with me. i’m fine with disagreement. that’s why i come here. the problem is that all i know is that you are disagreeing with me. i have no way of understanding what your disagreement is like and how to respond since you refuse to say what your position is in spite of the fact that i’ve asked you numerous times.

This kind of irrelevant stuff is distracting, I’d like to dispense with it. Can you point out one instance (or more if you’d like) where you asked me what my position is and I refused to respond? Thanks.

 

[Rocinante]

This kind of irrelevant stuff is distracting, I’d like to dispense with it. Can you point out one instance (or more if you’d like) where you asked me what my position is and I refused to respond? Thanks.

“i had hoped that you would reveal your alternative notion of morality–what you referred to as “some other more accurate characterization of the basic demand that morality places upon us.” i can’t see how we could hope to come to any consensus on the matter if you are unwilling to tell me what that is.”

 

[Betterave]

“i had hoped that you would reveal your alternative notion of morality–what you referred to as “some other more accurate characterization of the basic demand that morality places upon us.” i can’t see how we could hope to come to any consensus on the matter if you are unwilling to tell me what that is.”

Here was my response:
Can you see, based on my explanation above [below, now], that this doesn`t make any sense?:

Listen: you can`t reach consensus on a given position until you have understood that position. Reaching consensus on position A means first of all that we understand position A. It doesn’t require that we understand position B, and introducing position B instead of discussing position A is often going to just be a red herring which will make reaching consensus more difficult. Make sense? So why do you want to insist that I introduce position B? Why not try to understand, to get consensus on, position A first?

So do you have some alternate model to propose of how consensus-building works? Why do you think my model doesn’t work? It seems to be based on the claim that: if not A, then B and if not B, then A. I.e., it is not possible to critique A unless we are replacing it with B, and if we are not replacing it with B, then A cannot be subjected to critique. That doesn’t make sense to me. Does it to you?

If there are problems internal to A, those should be addressed. If A is internally OK, but B is too and is better than A for other reasons, only then does it become relevant/necessary to bring up B in order to criticize A. Make sense?

**

 

[Betterave]

i don’t know why you think it is problematic, only that you think so.

as usual.

But, as usual, you choose to treat this position as a given, regardless of my expressed concerns about it. Does that strike you as an intelligent way to pursue mutual understanding?

Why couldn’t there be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery?

because i’ve defined “moral beings” as beings capable of reasoning about morality, about what practices, intentions, attitudes, etc lead to increased well-being and which ones lead to increased misery.

Please examine this argument. It does not follow:
Premise: i’ve defined “moral beings” as beings capable of reasoning about morality, about what practices, intentions, attitudes, etc lead to increased well-being and which ones lead to increased misery…
Conclusion: …so there could not be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery.

That does not follow - non sequitur. Can you see that?

all you need to do is consider that most of us are in a position such that it is possible to be more fulfilled or more miserable.

Again, *it does not follow *that we are therefore in a position to consider our “greatest possible fulfillment” or “worst possible misery” - can you see that??

where is it that you think i am reluctant to go?

You seem reluctant to just answer objections against your position, instead of trying to change the subject to a discussion of my position.

i had originally assumed that the existence of morality was not in question, but obviously you were questioning the existence of morality when you said “…therefore they ought to do so, i.e., therefore morality exists?” that is why i bothered to answer for the existence of morality. believe me, i wish i hadn’t bothered.

No, your “obviously…” here does not follow. Trying to establish the grounds for the existence of morality does NOT entail doubting the existence of morality.

it is irrelevant since the there is no way to directly inquire about what god wants in such a way that there is any hope of getting consensus with other inquirers.

Why do you think that?

however, we can hope to get consensus when we inquire into what is good and bad for people.

Why do you think that?

is that what you’ve been trying to do? simply* understand* my position??? of course not. you’ve been critiquing my position.

False dichotomy.

i have no problem with criticism, but one can’t criticize position A but from the perspective of some other position B. can you? (unless you claim to have some omniscient or perspective-less perspective on the matter.)

That is true in a sense, but only in the sense that by default position B will emerge from the critique of position A.

without knowing what position B is, i have no hope of fully understanding your criticism. make sense?

Yes, that makes sense, but position B will emerge in the course of the critique. You don’t need to know it up front. That would just distract us from discussing the intrinsic merits of position A, wouldn’t it?

not what everyone does. some people recognize that if someone doesn’t get their point that perhaps they didn’t make their point very well to begin with.

That may be, but so what? I would still need to point out that you didn’t get my point, even if your failing to get it was because of my poor way of trying to make it.

you have in fact made a point of refusing to say what your point is, so i find it very strange for you to chide me for missing your point.

No, that’s simply not true.

i am not chiding you for disagreeing with me. i’m fine with disagreement. that’s why i come here. the problem is that all i know is that you are disagreeing with me. i have no way of understanding what your disagreement is like and how to respond since you refuse to say what your position is in spite of the fact that i’ve asked you numerous times.

On this: Nuff said.

 

[Rocinante]

But, as usual, you choose to treat this position as a given, regardless of my expressed concerns about it. Does that strike you as an intelligent way to pursue mutual understanding?

all you’ve said is that you have concerns. you haven’t said why it is a problem.

Please examine this argument. It does not follow:
Premise: i’ve defined “moral beings” as beings capable of reasoning about morality, about what practices, intentions, attitudes, etc lead to increased well-being and which ones lead to increased misery…
Conclusion: …so there could not be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery.

That does not follow - non sequitur. Can you see that?

that is not my argument. there CAN be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery. this is not a sufficient condition. we already agreed that the capacity to reason about what is right is also necessary.

Again, *it does not follow *that we are therefore in a position to consider our “greatest possible fulfillment” or “worst possible misery” - can you see that??

i don’t think i ever said that we know in advance of inquiry into well-being that already completely understand what it is.

consider one aspect of well-being–human physical health. we haven’t settled on any scientific definition of what human health is, but as we study it to try to achieve it we learn about what it is.

No, your “obviously…” here does not follow. Trying to establish the grounds for the existence of morality does NOT entail doubting the existence of morality.

i don’t recognize any problematic lack of grounding for morality that would hinder us in our inquiry into what is moral. what is it that you think we need to know about morality before we can try to learn what is and is not moral?

 

[Betterave]

all you’ve said is that you have concerns. you haven’t said why it is a problem.

The notion of “maximizing well-being” is unintelligible, just as is the notion of “minimizing misery.” These can’t serve as basic guides for morality because they are too abstract and can be interpreted to mean just about anything. Therefore, it seems, they can’t be guides to moral reasoning.

that is not my argument. there CAN be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery. this is not a sufficient condition. we already agreed that the capacity to reason about what is right is also necessary.

How can you say that’s not your argument?:

ME: Why couldn’t there be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery?

YOU: [there couldn’t be amoral beings to whom there pertained a greatest possible fulfillment and a worst possible misery] because i’ve defined “moral beings” as beings capable of reasoning about morality, about what practices, intentions, attitudes, etc lead to increased well-being and which ones lead to increased misery.

Now if you want to claim you were just giving a necessary condition for morality, okay, but that’s not what was being asked for in the context. Please focus on giving sufficient, not just necessary conditions (or at least don’t continue to omit obviously crucial necessary conditions - omitting something from an explanation tends to give the impression that it’s not necessary, don’t you think?).

i don’t think i ever said that we know in advance of inquiry into well-being that already completely understand what it is.

That’s a good point…

consider one aspect of well-being–human physical health. we haven’t settled on any scientific definition of what human health is, but as we study it to try to achieve it we learn about what it is.

…but there is no reason to think that science is responsible for defining what human *health *is, as such, or that science is even interested in what human health is, as such. And certainly the notion of health is not necessarily germane anyway to a discussion of what constitutes moral well-being - sick people can be virtuous, healthy people can be vicious.

i don’t recognize any problematic lack of grounding for morality that would hinder us in our inquiry into what is moral. what is it that you think we need to know about morality before we can try to learn what is and is not moral?

I think we need to know what morality is, for starters! Don’t you? Of course you can’t recognize a *problematic *lack of grounding for morality if you aren’t even willing to discuss, in the first place, the question of what morality is and what we take it to be grounded in (and whether your answers to those questions are adequate/cogent).

 

[Betterave]

B: How do you make pancake batter?
A: take an egg, some milk, some baking powder, maybe a dash of salt and mix it all together.
B: No, that’s not right. You forgot the flour!
A: well obviously you need flour! duh.
B: Okay… So again: how do you make pancake batter?
A: like i said, take an egg, some milk, some baking powder, maybe a dash of salt and mix it all together.
B: You forgot flour again!
A: so what? i was just giving necessary ingredients, not sufficient ones.
B: but…

 

[Rocinante]

B: How do you make pancake batter?
A: take an egg, some milk, some baking powder, maybe a dash of salt and mix it all together.
B: No, that’s not right. You forgot the flour!
A: well obviously you need flour! duh.
B: Okay… So again: how do you make pancake batter?
A: like i said, take an egg, some milk, some baking powder, maybe a dash of salt and mix it all together.
B: You forgot flour again!
A: so what? i was just giving necessary ingredients, not sufficient ones.
B: but…

if B really already knows how to make a cake then it sure seems tedious the way he is making A jump through hoops.

@betterave,

this isn’t what happened. you asked me what morality means, so i told you. then you said “gotcha” and pointed out that i left something out because i didn’t tell you what a moral being is. well that wasn’t the question, but i went ahead then anyway and told you what a moral being is.