Are sins of concupiscence always voluntary to some degree?

[fakename]

Are sins of concupiscence always voluntary to some degree?

That is, is one always at least partly responsible for these?

I think there’s a good chance that they are and we do know that some things are willed no matter what happens (like the love of God in the afterlife).

 

[gelsbern]

All sins are voluntary. There’s no such thing as an involuntary sin. In order for an intrinsically evil action to be considered sinful, the person committing an act must know that it is a sin, and then have the intentionally choose to perform that act is spite of that knowledge.

The sin of concupiscence is no different. However I would say that the real sin starts when you realize you are having those thoughts and don’t stop them. Attraction is natural but when we find our thoughts go past simple attraction, then we step into the danger zone.

 

[Corki]

Concupiscence is not a sin or a category of sins. It is the residue of our fallen nature that makes sin attractive and tempting.

 

[LilyM]

All sins are voluntary. There’s no such thing as an involuntary sin. In order for an intrinsically evil action to be considered sinful, the person committing an act must know that it is a sin, and then have the intentionally choose to perform that act is spite of that knowledge.

The sin of concupiscence is no different. However I would say that the real sin starts when you realize you are having those thoughts and don’t stop them. Attraction is natural but when we find our thoughts go past simple attraction, then we step into the danger zone.

Full knowledge and consent are required elements of mortal sin, yes. But I’d imagine one can be culpable for lesser things too - sinful acts committed negligently or recklessly rather than deliberately.

Recklessness or negligence are sufficient to be punished for some actions under secular law, why not under moral law?

 

[fakename]

Let me ask this though to clear up this question.

Is it inevitable that we are at least partly responsible for some sins in the same way that we are inevitably drawn to love God in the beatific vision?

If not then what is the character of the necessity of our will viz. concupiscible objects of sin?

Is there a necessary voluntariness to our concupiscible thoughts such that we are always responsible at least partly for all of our thoughts of desire, urge, and love?

I think there is a good argument for the negative assertion because we believe that some people can experience both temptations (and temptations are concupiscible feelings) and be sinless.

Thoughts and especially answers are welcome.

 

[tonyrey]

Are sins of concupiscence always voluntary to some degree?

That is, is one always at least partly responsible for these?

I think there’s a good chance that they are and we do know that some things are willed no matter what happens (like the love of God in the afterlife).

Love for God in heaven is necessarily and essentially different from any experience in this world because we are in the immediate presence of God.

Many things are willed by God in this world but our free will is not affected because we don’t always know what is willed by God and we do know that often we are not fully responsible for what we do. In fact it is impossible to be sure how far our sins or even our virtuous actions are voluntary. Only God knows…

 

[fakename]

Love for God in heaven is necessarily and essentially different from any experience in this world because we are in the immediate presence of God.

Many things are willed by God in this world but our free will is not affected because we don’t always know what is willed by God and we do know that often we are not fully responsible for what we do. In fact it is impossible to be sure how far our sins or even our virtuous actions are voluntary. Only God knows…

But Aquinas said this:

Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.

newadvent.org/summa/2006.htm#article7

I was just wondering to what extent he was right.

 

[gelsbern]

Full knowledge and consent are required elements of mortal sin, yes. But I’d imagine one can be culpable for lesser things too - sinful acts committed negligently or recklessly rather than deliberately.

Recklessness or negligence are sufficient to be punished for some actions under secular law, why not under moral law?

Involuntary sin is a protestant notion.

I think I will just refer you to a post on this forum

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=59554

 

[davidv]

Are sins of concupiscence always voluntary to some degree?

That is, is one always at least partly responsible for these?

I think there’s a good chance that they are and we do know that some things are willed no matter what happens (like the love of God in the afterlife).

What are the “sins of concupiscence?”

 

[fakename]

What are the “sins of concupiscence?”

Any sin that involves something pleasing to the will as opposed to sins that involve something painful. The latter are sins caused by fear (cowardice) while the former are sins caused by some good (sex, knowledge, etc.).

 

[davidv]

Any sin that involves something pleasing to the will as opposed to sins that involve something painful. The latter are sins caused by fear (cowardice) while the former are sins caused by some good (sex, knowledge, etc.).

Thanks. I think this means you are misusing “concupiscence” in your OP.

All sins are voluntary.

I have never heard of a sin caused by fear. do you have an example?

My understanding is that the causes of sin can be grouped in four categories; wealth, power, pleasure and prestige.

 

[tonyrey]

But Aquinas said this:

Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.

newadvent.org/summa/2006.htm#article7

I was just wondering to what extent he was right.

Much as I respect Aquinas (and that is very much) he would be the first to agree he wasn’t infallible.

Concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence but it doesn’t compel the will to succumb to the desire. Otherwise the will wouldn’t be free!

 

[Qoeleth]

But Aquinas said this:

Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.

newadvent.org/summa/2006.htm#article7

I was just wondering to what extent he was right.

Aquinas’ is using the term ‘voluntary’ in the sense of ‘pertaining to the will’ (voluntas). Now, since concupiscence does pertain to the will, it is, in that sense ‘voluntary.’ However, it is not ‘voluntary’ in the more contemporary sense that we have a choice about it.

 

[fakename]

Thanks. I think this means you are misusing “concupiscence” in your OP.

All sins are voluntary.

I have never heard of a sin caused by fear. do you have an example?

My understanding is that the causes of sin can be grouped in four categories; wealth, power, pleasure and prestige.

How am I using the word “concupiscence” wrongly in the OP? I’m just asking if the sins which involve objects that are pleasing to the will are always at least somewhat voluntary?

 

[fakename]

Much as I respect Aquinas (and that is very much) he would be the first to agree he wasn’t infallible.

Concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence but it doesn’t compel the will to succumb to the desire. Otherwise the will wouldn’t be free!

Yeah, that could be a problem but I doubt Aquinas would’ve missed such an obvious logical problem.

So how does one solve the problem? I think the answer is that concupiscence renders an act voluntary in the sense that all attraction is something that makes an act more voluntary than not. We see this in everyday life when people are not considered less responsible for something just because they had an incentive to do it. Indeed, it is by assigning an incentive ( a motive) that one also assigns guilt or innocence in a trial.

The act is involuntary in the sense that we cannot control the nature of the mind and the body so that supposing that we did meet with an incentive, then we could avoid being drawn to it.

That’s the way which Aquinas talks about free will and desire. Therefore the incentive cannot be overpoweringly strong or else freedom would be diminished.

This brings up whole new questions: If Aquinas is right, then it follows that some volition is not voluntary: we cannot help but be drawn to certain things. But at the same time, being drawn to certain things cannot be a temptation since a temptation is not voluntary. Therefore we have to really parse hairs here to figure out when we actually are tempted and when we aren’t, for I think we often confuse temptation with what Aquinas is talking about here and therefore we often confuse our voluntary with our involuntary actions -allowing us to get away with too much.

It also begs the question as to what the nature of volition the beatific vision is? For we are drawn to God irresistibly in heaven and yet this must be voluntary while also being impossible to escape.

 

[fakename]

Aquinas’ is using the term ‘voluntary’ in the sense of ‘pertaining to the will’ (voluntas). Now, since concupiscence does pertain to the will, it is, in that sense ‘voluntary.’ However, it is not ‘voluntary’ in the more contemporary sense that we have a choice about it.

How do you come to this conclusion?

 

[lulu88]

Let me ask this though to clear up this question.

Is it inevitable that we are at least partly responsible for some sins in the same way that we are inevitably drawn to love God in the beatific vision?

If not then what is the character of the necessity of our will viz. concupiscible objects of sin?

Is there a necessary voluntariness to our concupiscible thoughts such that we are always responsible at least partly for all of our thoughts of desire, urge, and love?

I think there is a good argument for the negative assertion because we believe that some people can experience both temptations (and temptations are concupiscible feelings) and be sinless.

Thoughts and especially answers are welcome.

**As Jesus told Saint Faustina, “sometimes we are not in control of some of our thoughts,” We have free will of course its a grace, however temptation is to be resisted at all times, as much as one can resist.

Lulu**

 

[davidv]

How am I using the word “concupiscence” wrongly in the OP?

You used the phrase “sins of concupiscence”. This implied to me that concupisence is a sin. This is directly contradictory of this explanation from the Catechism (emphasis mine):

2515 Etymologically, “concupiscence” can refer to any intense form of human desire. Christian theology has given it a particular meaning: the movement of the sensitive appetite contrary to the operation of the human reason. The apostle St. Paul identifies it with the rebellion of the “flesh” against the "spirit."302 Concupiscence stems from the disobedience of the first sin. It unsettles man’s moral faculties and, without being in itself an offense, inclines man to commit sins.303

I’m just asking if the sins which involve objects that are pleasing to the will are always at least somewhat voluntary?

This is an invalid question as there is no thing called an involuntary sin. By definition all sins are voluntary.

1868 Sin is a personal act

 

[Qoeleth]

How do you come to this conclusion?

“Voluntas”= will, “Voluntarius”= of, or pertaining to, the will. As in “habitus voluntarius”- habit of the will.

I think “voluntarius” is being confused with “imperatus”- as in “actus imperatus”, an act which one chooses to do.

In English, what we call a ‘voluntary act’, is actually an “actus imperatus.” I suppose we use 'voluntary in English more for ‘imperatus’ (choosen, commanded, ‘willed’) than for ‘voluntarius’ (pertaining to the will).

 

[fakename]

You used the phrase “sins of concupiscence”. This implied to me that concupisence is a sin. This is directly contradictory of this explanation from the Catechism (emphasis mine):

This is an invalid question as there is no thing called an involuntary sin. By definition all sins are voluntary.

I see, but I didn’t mean sin of concupiscence in that way. I only meant “a sin that has a concupiscible object as its object”.

And again, there are somethings which are necessarily hateful just as there are somethings which are necessarily voluntary. In all cases this necessity does not take away volition, but rather implies volition; people have a necessary desire for good therefore it is outside of our choice to love good but that doesn’t mean that we are not responsible for liking good.