Are there absolute moral axioms?

[Oreoracle]

In what parallel universe of yours was there no torture at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Were Hiroshima and Nagasaki the moral equivalent of Pearl Harbor?

We’re not talking about equivalences or justifications. We’re talking about definitions. Torture is torture whether or not it is justified.

So what role are you playing, the dutiful anti-Catholic?

Can you please please please stop the sarcasm?

I’m not being sarcastic. I know that you genuinely think you’re taking a courageous stand and that perhaps God will reward you for being so steadfast.

If your morality says that torture is always wrong, and then you say later that torture can be justified, you’ve contradicted yourself. Period. No ifs, ands, or buts. Your rule-based morality doesn’t appear to work any better than consequentialism. In fact, it seems to have at least as many difficulties as utilitarianism has. The mature thing would be to admit that your morality is really no better than utilitarianism, or at least that both have their faults.

 

[Tomdstone]

Are you suggesting that you aren’t willing to recognize waterboarding as torture unless your church tells you it is?

I know you’re playing the role of dutiful Catholic, but please think without any bias for a moment. They hold you down and gag you with wet cloth to simulate drowning. In what universe is that not torture? How much do you have to twist definitions before you can call that anything other than torture?

I would say that waterboarding is definitely torture, just as the use of the rack in the Inquisition was torture.

 

[Tomdstone]

If your morality says that torture is always wrong, and then you say later that torture can be justified, you’ve contradicted yourself.

I believe that Pope Innocent IV approved the use of torture (under certain conditions) to extract confessions and that the Inquisition used the rack. However, today the teaching of the Catholic Church is that torture is wrong. I am not sure if this is a contradiction or an indication that customs have changed?

 

[inocente]

By the way, is it your view that waterboarding should be considered immoral, or that it is the view of the Catholic Church that waterboarding is forbidden?

Is there a specific reference to waterboarding by the Catholic bishops as torture and therefore forbidden?

‘Then he will say to those at his left hand, “You that are accursed, depart from me into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you waterboarded me…"’

See this Catholic Answers article by Michelle Arnold.

Finding get-out clauses in the small print is accepted in legal matters but not in morals. For instance big corporations may legally find ways to pay little tax, but they are acting immorally in paying less than their fair share. If torture is immoral then torture is immoral, period. As Michelle quotes, Gaudium et Spes says “these things and others of their like are infamies indeed”.

You’ll also see that Gaudium et Spes does not differentiate between the evils of conventional firebombing and nuclear devices.

 

[Nihilist]

None of these quotes apply to the case of terrorism. They refer very specifically to the traditional prisoner who is in no position to give information that may prevent a calamity. When the CCC was published, the question of torturing a terrorist for information that could save lives was not even an issue as you can see from the language of the passage you cited. Nowhere does that passage indicate that torture to obtain information in order to prevent a calamity is forbidden.

Moreover, there are different kinds of torture that needn’t result in permanent injury, such as waterboarding. Is that the kind of torture you had in mind? That in no way constitutes wounding a prisoner by the application of a knife or beating him to a pulp. Again, such prisoners are not prisoners in the traditional sense, but are prisoners of war. A just war allows for extraordinary means on the battlefield, so long as they do not exceed the offense against the victim (the victims of 9/ll, for example).

There are no exceptions! Torture is absolutely prohibited.

Only the most degraded form of utilitarianism wouyld ever consider torture as being acceptable.

One thousand 9/11’s would never, ever justify a single case of deliberate, calculated cold-blooded torture.

Being tortured is a worse offense against a human being than killing them. That is why capital punishment is more tolerable to civilized society than torture.

I assume, given the view that you expressed, in direct opposition to the clear teaching of the Magisterium, that you no longer identify as Catholic…

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Being tortured is a worse offense against a human being than killing them. That is why capital punishment is more tolerable to civilized society than torture.

Being executed is better than being water-boarded? :bigyikes: Whew! I’ve never heard that one. How would you extract the information from a terrorist (to prevent a calamity) by killing him?

Why is capital punishment not torture when the prisoner is psychologically tortured by his increasing fear of the execution?

You have a lot of 'splainin to do!

By the way, did you know that killing in a just war is approved by the Church?

So by your logic, instead of wounding our enemies and causing them (and their surviving families) to be tortured by their pain, we should just kill them all because that’s better than to inflict pain?

 

[Charlemagne_III]

By the way, I never said that the torture of water-boarding is not evil. I’ve argued consistently that it is the lesser of two evils when there is no other way to prevent the greater calamity of another 9/11.

So far as I know, the CCC does not address the dilemma of having to choose between a greater and a lesser evil. Though I guess you could say it does when it allows for a just war as the lesser evil to being oppressed by the greater evil of being conquered.

 

[davidv]

By the way, I never said that the torture of water-boarding is not evil. I’ve argued consistently that it is the lesser of two evils when there is no other way to prevent the greater calamity of another 9/11.

So far as I know, the CCC does not address the dilemma of having to choose between a greater and a lesser evil. Though I guess you could say it does when it allows for a just war as the lesser evil to being oppressed by the greater evil of being conquered.

How is this thinking, '“lesser evil”, consistent with the Catholic moral principal that the end does not jusify the means?

 

[Aloysium]

Some random thoughts:

The judgement of torturers is in the hands of God. There is justice beyond human ethics, morality and power.

As to moral axioms, I see nothing complicated about the ten commandments, which in fact were distilled into two expressions of love - for God and each other.
These sorts of questions seem to imply a search for loop-holes.

But, going along with this, I have to say I don’t get Utilitarianism.
In what way does the good of, let’s say ten billion outweigh that of one person.
Seriously, suffering and happiness are not additive. Although we share, giving love and comfort to one another when bad things happen, we ultimately suffer individually in ourselves. In the case of Jesus taking on the suffering and sin of each person to redeem humanity, it is a different matter. However, where it would be equal, one’s pain would be no different from that of the other ten billion individuals, each of whom would suffer to the same extent.
One may sacrifice oneself for others, but as a moral code, to me it sounds like a excuse for the use of power in situations that cause harm. Ten billion vs one, fully justified.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

How is this thinking, '“lesser evil”, consistent with the Catholic moral principal that the end does not jusify the means?

As I think I said earlier in this thread, the obligation to choose the “lesser evil situation” is outside the normative range of moral choices. It is rare, but real nonetheless. But when we talk about the ends not justifying the means, we cannot possibly be talking about the lesser evil situation. We are talking rather about the normative desire for something and not letting anything stop us from getting it. There is no obligation, however, to make such a choice of letting the ends justify the means, whereas in the lesser evil situation you have to make a choice, either of which is evil. Even not making a choice is a choice, because one of the two evils is going to occur anyway. Shouldn’t it be the lesser evil if we can choose it?

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Some random thoughts:

The judgement of torturers is in the hands of God. There is justice beyond human ethics, morality and power.

As to moral axioms, I see nothing complicated about the ten commandments, which in fact were distilled into two expressions of love - for God and each other.
These sorts of questions seem to imply a search for loop-holes.

But, going along with this, I have to say I don’t get Utilitarianism.
In what way does the good of, let’s say ten billion outweigh that of one person.
Seriously, suffering and happiness are not additive. Although we share, giving love and comfort to one another when bad things happen, we ultimately suffer individually in ourselves. In the case of Jesus taking on the suffering and sin of each person to redeem humanity, it is a different matter. However, where it would be equal, one’s pain would be no different from that of the other ten billion individuals, each of whom would suffer to the same extent.
One may sacrifice oneself for others, but as a moral code, to me it sounds like a excuse for the use of power in situations that cause harm. Ten billion vs one, fully justified.

 

[Tomdstone]

Even not making a choice is a choice, because one of the two evils is going to occur anyway. Shouldn’t it be the lesser evil if we can choose it?

This is not clear in the examples which were cited. In not making a choice, perhaps there would be an evil which occurs, but it is not guaranteed because the future is never 100% predictable with certainty. By not making a choice, you are not choosing evil, but simply leaving it up to fate to decide. You are trusting to place things in the Hand of God and believing that “what will be, will be - the future is not ours to see.” Why is it wrong to pray and trust in God’s protection and to refuse to make a choice for evil? Faith and hope are two of the greatest Christian virtues which we are taught to cultivate as followers of Christ, even in the greatest of adversities. Actually, disbelief in the protection of God and despair can be serious sins.

 

[Oreoracle]

However, today the teaching of the Catholic Church is that torture is wrong. I am not sure if this is a contradiction or an indication that customs have changed?

I have no problem with the Church adjusting its morality. I do have a problem with it claiming infallibility, changing its stance, and then claiming infallibility all over again.

I would respect the Church if it presented itself like “We are a man-made institution that is just trying to grapple with the same moral issues that everyone else is. We make mistakes as they do, but our members help us progress with each generation, as with any group.”

So far as I know, the CCC does not address the dilemma of having to choose between a greater and a lesser evil. Though I guess you could say it does when it allows for a just war as the lesser evil to being oppressed by the greater evil of being conquered.

The stipulation that we choose the lesser evil seems arbitrary in a deontological morality though. Deontologists give you a set of morals that they claim to be absolute, but then they add in the fine print “Oh yeah, and if any of these rules contradict each other in a certain situation, these rules take priority over those rules.”

The million dollar question is how one decides which morals take precedence over others. There would need to be a more fundamental moral in place to help us decide which moral is “better” to adhere to than another in a particular case. This moral will inevitably be from a consequentialist morality because it has to be something that accounts for why we should care about consequences. This is something that, by definition, a deontological morality lacks.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

This is not clear in the examples which were cited. In not making a choice, perhaps there would be an evil which occurs, but it is not guaranteed because the future is never 100% predictable with certainty. By not making a choice, you are not choosing evil, but simply leaving it up to fate to decide. You are trusting to place things in the Hand of God and believing that “what will be, will be - the future is not ours to see.” Why is it wrong to pray and trust in God’s protection and to refuse to make a choice for evil? Faith and hope are two of the greatest Christian virtues which we are taught to cultivate as followers of Christ, even in the greatest of adversities. Actually, disbelief in the protection of God and despair can be serious sins.

I like to believe I can choose and pray at the same time.

In the case of Sophie’s choice, I believe that would be the only thing to do: choose and pray that the butcher will change his mind and kill neither child.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

The stipulation that we choose the lesser evil seems arbitrary in a deontological morality though. Deontologists give you a set of morals that they claim to be absolute, but then they add in the fine print “Oh yeah, and if any of these rules contradict each other in a certain situation, these rules take priority over those rules.”

The million dollar question is how one decides which morals take precedence over others. There would need to be a more fundamental moral in place to help us decide which moral is “better” to adhere to than another in a particular case.

Yes, that is the way of the world. Different rules are required for different situations, and sometimes the rules seem to bump into each other. I just don’t think they really do bump into each other until or unless you get to the point where you are so rigid that they are going to have to bump into each other.

In the case of Sophie’s Choice one choice given to the mother might be: “Choose which son you would prefer to die.” In that case, the mother can legitimately refuse to take any part in the matter, since the butcher has promised to kill one of the sons. She would have honored the most fundamental axiom of all: Do good and avoid evil. She would be blameless in the outcome and all the blame would fall on the butcher.

But in the case of having to choose between two necessary evils, the death of both sons or the death of one only, again, when Sophie chooses which son is to die, she is saving the other’s son’s life. How is this violating the principle of do no evil? Or how does this violate the principle that the end does not justify the mean? Which moral axioms are bumping up against each other? It seems clear to me that while choosing the lesser necessary evil may be quite a disagreeable business, it is nonetheless business that has to be done.

You have to shovel manure to keep a stable clean so the horses won’t die. The shoveling is the lesser evil.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

The million dollar question is how one decides which morals take precedence over others.

You’ve raised this point of “who” and “how” several times.

As to who, everyone has to decide for himself.

As to how, most often by the voice of conscience which God has planted in all of us, Catholic and atheist alike. In cloudier cases, for the Catholic by consultation with the teachings of the Church, upon which he can rely with considerable confidence; for the atheist by the common sense of mankind or by mightily straining himself to reason it through.

 

[Oreoracle]

You puzzle me sometimes, Charlemagne. In the first half of this discussion, you criticized utilitarianism harshly. You pointed out extreme situations in which the courses of action it advised disagree with our moral intuitions. I conceded that it didn’t always work out the way we wanted, but I asserted that deontological morality would do no better.

During the second half of the discussion, I point out simple scenarios in which deontological morality fails to match our intuitions. You proposed choosing the lesser of two evils as a solution, but I pointed out that this really requires a moral that transcends the others–a sort of “meta-moral” that lets us decide which moral is more important when two conflict. This meta-moral would have to be able to take consequences into account. Since consequentialism is, by definition, the only position that can do this, it appears that consequentialism wins this bout.

Your response to this is to use one’s conscience when we encounter difficult situations in which rules conflict. In effect, this makes one’s conscience the arbiter of morality. And let’s face it, following one’s conscience amounts to doing what one feels is right. But this invites a question: If the rules feel right in easy situations, and I’m allowed to do what I feel is right in the difficult situations, why not simply make one’s morality “Do whatever you feel is right?”

So the conscience isn’t your salvation. Using recourse to one’s conscience as a justification for an action is the death of morality. I don’t need a moral code to tell me how I feel, after all.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

During the second half of the discussion, I point out simple scenarios in which deontological morality fails to match our intuitions. You proposed choosing the lesser of two evils as a solution, but I pointed out that this really requires a moral that transcends the others–a sort of “meta-moral” that lets us decide which moral is more important when two conflict. This meta-moral would have to be able to take consequences into account. Since consequentialism is, by definition, the only position that can do this, it appears that consequentialism wins this bout.

The assertion that one moral axiom cancels out another moral axiom is not what I argued.

They do not cancel each other out because they are applied to different situations.

“Thou shalt not kill” applies -to one situation … murder.

“Thou shalt kill to to defend thy life” applies to another situation … self defense.

How are these moral axioms canceling each other out?

Bot axioms deal very much with consequences, so I’m not sure what you mean by Catholicism not advancing a morality based on consequences.

The consequence of the sin of gluttony is obesity and early death.

The consequence of the sin of chronic lying to others is to lose the respect of society.

The consequence of sin is death.

The consequence of virtue is everlasting life.

How is this not consequentialism?

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Your response to this is to use one’s conscience when we encounter difficult situations in which rules conflict. In effect, this makes one’s conscience the arbiter of morality. And let’s face it, following one’s conscience amounts to doing what one feels is right. But this invites a question: If the rules feel right in easy situations, and I’m allowed to do what I feel is right in the difficult situations, why not simply make one’s morality “Do whatever you feel is right?”

So the conscience isn’t your salvation. Using recourse to one’s conscience as a justification for an action is the death of morality. I don’t need a moral code to tell me how I feel, after all.

Doing whatever you feel is right assumes that you know what is right. Ernest Hemingway said that you know an act is good if you feel good after you have done it, and you know an act is bad if you feel bad after you have done it. This is a wrongheaded way to approach morality. All moral or immoral acts should be known to be moral or immoral before we perform them, not later. Oppenheimer, before he directed the creation of the first atomic bomb, should have known before he did that what the consequences might be for the future war calamities of the human race. But to give him credit, he did at least feel bad about master-minding the creation of that Pandora’s Box of possible evils.

I would not reduce morality to a personal preference for certain outcomes over others. That is moral relativism. Using a well informed conscience is the life of morality, not its death. Unfortunately, as you did suggest (I think) feeling without knowledge can be very arbitrary. The conscience can lie to itself, persuade itself that what we are doing wrong is really right. Catholics are as guilty of this as atheists can be. The recourse of the Catholic is to turn to the Church for moral guidance. The Church is two thousand years older than any person living today (that ought to count for something) and has been guided by the Holy Spirit not to lead us astray by teaching false doctrine.

Whom does the atheist consult for moral guidance? Or does he even recognize that anyone has to be consulted, and that all he has to do consult himself?

And if that is all everyone did, consult themselves, wouldn’t that be the death of morality?

 

[Oreoracle]

The assertion that one moral axiom cancels out another moral axiom is not what I argued.

They do not cancel each other out because they are applied to different situations.

I think there’s a misunderstanding here. I’m not saying the morals would cancel out. Let’s use the example of lying to a murderer about the location of your friend. Kant argued convincingly that lying and killing are wrong in most cases, as I’m sure most deontologists are capable of doing. For most people’s sensibilities, these imperatives are what he called “hypothetical”; they apply only in certain situations. So how do we decide when certain rules should be applied?

This wouldn’t be an issue if we had a way of deciding which moral takes precedence over another. As you say, we don’t need morals to cancel out, we just need a way of arranging them in a hierarchy. For example, our hierarchy could give the moral against killing priority over the moral against lying. The problem is that, while deontologists do argue for their rules effectively, they don’t do it in such a way that the importance of the rules relative to each other is obvious. For example, both lying and killing are wrong by the Categorical Imperative. The Imperative doesn’t say “Lying is wrong unless it’s done to prevent murder.” That would be a consequentialist ethic, not a deontological one. Likewise, deontology gives us no way to gauge how bad lying is compared to how bad killing is.

In order to decide which is worse, killing or lying, you would have to refer to the consequences. Thus consequentialism is inescapable. If you agree with this, then we can move on.

Doing whatever you feel is right assumes that you know what is right.

If we take the position that the conscience is the arbiter of morality, this would never be a problem. Whatever you feel is right would be good by definition, so feeling something is right is tantamount to knowing it.

Compare this to feeling pain. Feeling pain is equivalent to knowing that one is in pain, because to be in pain is just an expression we use to refer to feeling it.

Whom does the atheist consult for moral guidance? Or does he even recognize that anyone has to be consulted, and that all he has to do consult himself?

And if that is all everyone did, consult themselves, wouldn’t that be the death of morality?

All people consult themselves for moral guidance. It is like you said: You cannot avoid making a choice. If you choose the Church as your moral guide, that is a moral decision made by you. You are making a judgment call, just like someone trusting themselves is making a judgment call.

Indeed, trusting yourself is a prerequisite for trusting your decision to trust someone else’s decisions.