Science uses various models. To a physicist we may be elementary particles, to a chemist molecules, to a biologist an organism, to a medic a person and to a social scientist part of a group. It wouldn’t make much sense to try to understand laughing in terms of quarks or photon entanglement in terms of botany.
Right. Levels of description and layers of abstraction as the basis for context and meaning. This is a tired loop here, though, it’s been pointed out over and over. The only way to resolve the discussion dynamics here is to understand that unless there is something more, something
beyond emergence and levels of description and complex systems, something supernatural or mystical, it’s
ipso facto inadequate, for many.
Grains of dirt can’t hold up a roof but a whole bunch cooked into bricks and cemented together can. In the same way, we are composed of particles but are more than that. It’s about organization. A computer chip isn’t just some silicon, and we are a whole lot more complicated than a bunch of chips.
Yep. Another pair of good examples.
Consciousness is a hard nut to crack but there’s no reason in principle to think that it can’t be explained. If and when it is, it will need new models and none of them will, by definition, appeal to the supernatural -
Supernatural : (of something’s cause or existence) not able to be explained by the laws of science; forces or events that cannot be explained by science – Cambridge
Here I think you’ve (inadvertantly skipped over the crucial fulcrum of the debate) – what would,
in principle stand as an explanation for conscious on materialist terms. If you review the discourse here on this over the last year or so, it’s clear that you do NOT have any consensus on the idea that “there’s no reason in principle to think it can’t be explained”. Tonyrey is clearly against a materialist rendering, no matter
how thorough, because,
in principle for him (her? don’t know!) a materialist explanation is a fundamentally inadequate non-explanation. No amount of richness in the model for meaning, semantics, emotion, aspiration, self-awareness, etc. will suffice, simply because it’s material in its vocabulary.
It’s easy to test, just by raising the question: what would an “adequate explanation” of consciousness in material terms look like?
Even for me, a thoroughgoing materialist, it’s not clear what that would like like. If we came up with “breakthrough” models that were astonishingly precise and accurate in their predictions, and which provided rich explanatory models that demonstrated how various neural structures integrated to facilitate not just perceptual awareness, but meta-representational concepts of self and self-considering-self, there’d still be a whole lot more to know, and to investigate. Science is never satisfied in that sense, and so no theory is adequate, finally.
I raise that because even I suspect this is an example of the “heap” problem, where there is no particular grain of sand that makes a “non-heap” a “heap” of sand, but only depths of knowledge and robust models that are broadly convincing – most people would say “yeah, that’s a heap of sand”. And for those who are simply defiant in the face of such prospects, even that will never be enough; there must be some supernatural/mystical element, or its an existential psychology crisis, and life has no meaning, etc.
If consciousness is explained there will no doubt be many threads here pointing out failings of the model, but currently it’s still an open question. Philosophers haven’t had much luck trying to explain it (or even agreeing on an exact definition

) so why not let scientists have a go and see if they come up with anything?
Philosophy, to the extent it is useful at all, is effective in a negative sense. C.S. Lewis had a good line that said we need to engage philosophy because good philosophy was needed to combat and discredit bad philosophy – negation as the value proposition, there. There’s no reason to expect philosophy will provide explanations or “figure it out” – philosophy has no metric for what does or does not stand as an explanation in the first place. It can (and should) cast doubt, but that’s all – it doesn’t build, but only negates (and that’s valuable).
Science has a positive model (once one grants negatable philosophy – ‘reality is real and somewhat intelligible’) that can distinguish between explanation and non-explanation, and even better, works in a cumulative fashion.
The real question is, as science “comes up with something”, what of it? It’s not at all clear that that will matter here, at all, and in fact, the more science does deepen and develop naturalistic models of cognition, the more dogmatic the rejection
must be, here. The supernatural dimension to the mind is a hill Catholics are willing to die on, and must, according to their doctrines, no matter what kinds of performance physical models achieve.
And it’s not hard to defend that hill it’s crucial. The “immaterial” part of the picture is unfalsifiable, so no matter how good the naturalist account is, one can always say, “No there must be more”. Especially if the whole meaning of one’s life depends on that being the case.
-TS