Argument for God from Complexity

[cor]

no, i’m not - i’m asuming that the set of elapsed moments is equal to aleph-null (aleph-null itself isn’t the “infinitieth” member of that set - i was simply being (apparently too) colloquial). if you are trying to get from one end of the set to another by successive addition, then you must work through each member of the set, which entails having to work through the gap between aleph-null and its successive constitutent numbers. which cannot be done.

The cardinality of aleph-null is equal to the cardinality of the set I specified. That doesn’t mean that the set {0, 1, 2, 3…,…, aleph-null} will have all the same properties as the set {…,-2,-1, 0}. The former set has both a first member and a last member; the latter has a last member but not a first member. And you mentioned as a problem that the last member doesn’t have an immediate predecessor. But the latter set has a last member which does have an immediate predecessor, avoiding the problem you raised while still retaining an aleph-null cardinality.

this is false, i’m afraid: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gifis at an infinite remove from 0; if it wasn’t, then the set would not be infinite, as you claim it to be. in fact, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gifis at an infinite remove from every member of the set (which entails another problem with trying to realize an actual infinite).

aleph-null is not a member of the set I specified.

look, by stipulating that every member of an infinite set can be at a finite remove from 0, you are assuming what you are trying to prove: namely tht the addition of a number of finite numbers can be result in aleph-null…

I asserted that it was so with respect to the set I specified because I thought it would be obvious. The set {…-2, -1, 0} includes only natural numbers equal to or less than 0. All these numbers are in finite predecession from 0. If you disagree, name one that isn’t! One can prove it is so through transfinite induction.

look, even if you’re not familiar with transfinite math, isn’t the impossibility of something like that just obvious?

I am familiar with transfinite math.

i mean, remember, it’s not like we’re talking about an actual infinite being given all at once, but rather the formation of one by increment; it’s only the latter that runs into problems.

You are assuming that an infinite past has to be formed increment by increment. I think God, outside of time as we know it, can create an infinite past “all at once” as you say.

 

[cor]

Right. God is not an object.

What do you mean when you say that God is not an “object”? How are you understanding the term “object” there? Contemporary philosophers (I’m not sure if this squares with Catholic thought) generally refer to God as an “object” as a concrete object as opposed to an abstract object.

God is not “made of” anything. That’s exactly the point. To be “made of” something is to have existence from outside oneself–to be a composite of form and matter (I’ll leave to one side Aquinas’s somewhat dubious notion that angels are pure form but are composites of essence and existence).

So you think angels have matter? Interesting (I’m inclined to agree with you)

From the contingency of the physical things we know, we deduce the existence of an immaterial reality which we cannot know directly in our current state, though we can have indirect experiental knowledge of it (perhaps, as the Orthodox claim, including its “uncreated energies”).

Edwin

But what makes us think that all physical things must be contingent. There seem to be things other than God which are non-contingent. For example, the truth that 1+1=2. Apparently those who subscribe to traditional divine simplicity say that these things are identical with God (his thoughts are identical with his nature)

Maybe the canvas of space-time is a non-contingent thing.

 

[cor]

I’m not sure this qualifies as an example, but it’s worth looking at. Cellular automata shows us how very complex structures can be generated from very simple instructions and iteration. These structures have both order and complexity.

Stephen Wolfram is the leader in the field, and his book is A New Kind of Science. Although Wolfram is one of those guys who earned a PhD from Cal Tech at 19 his book is easily understood by non-scientists.

I would say that those simple “instructions and iteration” have an inner harmony which is at least as great, despite its simplicity, as the complex structures that can arise from them. I don’t see complicatedness as being necessarily greater than non-complicatedness. I would also say that the complexity is hidden within the apparent simplicity of the rules. One could also prove all kinds of theorems about the rules, revealing their hidden complexity. Another example of this would be the natural numbers. They seem simple, but there is no limit to the number of theorems that can be proved about them. A whole mathematical field (number theory) is devoted to them.

Thanks for the post. I find artificial life to be fascinating. I’ll maybe check out that book.

 

[cor]

Raindrops creating rainbows.

In this case the rainbow is caused by both the raindrops and the sun. I wouldn’t say that a rainbow is greater than the sun so this example doesn’t work.

Planets forming out of random dust.

The random dust is what Aristotelian philosophy calls the “material cause” out of which the planets form, but it’s not the “efficient cause” which is what we today usually mean by cause (other kinds of cause include “final” and “formal”).

In your example here, the planets are forming due to the application of the laws of physics with the random dust. I think the laws of physics have a beauty that is not less than the planets that you mention. So this example also doesn’t work for me.

Snowflakes. Mamals forming out of lesser animals.

Snowflakes also involve the laws of physics which have a beauty not less than them.

Your last example I’ll have to think about. My initial thoughts are that causative processes that are involved in mammals arising out of lesser animals are not lesser than the mammals viewed as mere biochemical machines. If however, mammals are viewed as in some way sentient, in some way capable of feeling, then that would not be the case. But evolution doesn’t predict or provide a mechanism for the emergence of sentience (a species of zombies is just as fit for survival as one that has the same behavior but with sentient feeling). So I would say that the sentience of animals and man must arise out of some other kind of causation, that is, apart from evolution.

 

[Nullasalus]

ll have to think about. My initial thoughts are that causative processes that are involved in mammals arising out of lesser animals are not lesser than the mammals viewed as mere biochemical machines. If however, mammals are viewed as in some way sentient, in some way capable of feeling, then that would not be the case. But evolution doesn’t predict or provide a mechanism for the emergence of sentience (a species of zombies is just as fit for survival as one that has the same behavior but with sentient feeling). So I would say that the sentience of animals and man must arise out of some other kind of causation, that is, apart from evolution.

I’d believe the same, at a glance (not nearly the philosophically experienced person many here are.) Sentience/consciousness is the only trick there; otherwise I’d be hard pressed to see how the non-mammal → mammal means the arrival of the greater out of the lesser.

(As a side note: If the lesser were to arise out of the greater, it has some interesting ramifications for some atheist arguments. One of Dawkins’ main claims is that the universe is so complex that arising out of something prior must be more complex than it. But if something more complex can arise out of something less complex…)

 

[cpayne]

One of Dawkins’ main claims is that the universe is so complex that arising out of something prior must be more complex than it. But if something more complex can arise out of something less complex…)

As Aquinas argues: that the composite / complex arises out of the simple.

Again, as a previous poster noted, this doesn’t necessarily mean the “lesser” producing the “greater.”

 

[john_doran]

The cardinality of aleph-null is equal to the cardinality of the set I specified. That doesn’t mean that the set {0, 1, 2, 3…,…, aleph-null} will have all the same properties as the set {…,-2,-1, 0}. The former set has both a first member and a last member; the latter has a last member but not a first member. And you mentioned as a problem that the last member doesn’t have an immediate predecessor. But the latter set has a last member which does have an immediate predecessor, avoiding the problem you raised while still retaining an aleph-null cardinality.

i’m not sure how much further we’re going to get with this, 'cos we seem to be talking past each other, but i’ll say at least this much:

if your notation of the set has the same cardinality as http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif, then i have no idea how you can avoid the conclusion that it must be expressed as {http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif,.…,-2,-1,0}…

but this is all math, and what matters is ontology: how an actual infinite composed by increment must occur in the real world.

cor:

aleph-null is not a member of the set I specified.

so you say. personally, i don’t see how you can avoid its inclusion if your set has the same cardinality as the first infinite set; any set whose cardinal number is http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gifhas the problem that its immediate predecessor/successor cannot be traversed by additive succession.

cor:

I asserted that it was so with respect to the set I specified because I thought it would be obvious. The set {…-2, -1, 0} includes only natural numbers equal to or less than 0. All these numbers are in finite predecession from 0. If you disagree, name one that isn’t! One can prove it is so through transfinite induction.

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif.

cor:

You are assuming that an infinite past has to be formed increment by increment. I think God, outside of time as we know it, can create an infinite past “all at once” as you say.

and here we get down to it.

an infinite past does have to be formed by increment; though god might be able to create a universe with the ***appearance ***of age, he can’t create an actual past - i.e. time that has both elapsed and not elapsed.

though perhaps this means you see the real problem with the identification of your set with the temporal series of moments as it actually occurs in the world: though it is possible notionally go backwards in time by stripping away moments that have already elapsed, this has got nothing to whatever to do with the actual progress of time, which is incrementally additive. which means, further, that if the number of past moments is infinite, then it is always infinite - no matter how far one goes back (10 years, 10 million years, 10^1000 years), an infinite number of prior moments have already elapsed. which means that, as you say, the only way to get an infinite past is to have it given, all at once. but not even god can do that, because, by my lights, it is logically impossible (because contradictory).

of course, the traditional, atemporally eternal god, can create a world that has temporal moments elapsing in successive addition that he can*** see*** all at once; but that does not mean that the moments he sees all at once have actually*** occurred*** all at once; they haven’t - they still occur one-after-another.

 

[Contarini]

What do you mean when you say that God is not an “object”? How are you understanding the term “object” there? Contemporary philosophers (I’m not sure if this squares with Catholic thought) generally refer to God as an “object” as a concrete object as opposed to an abstract object.

They probably do. As I said elsewhere, my colleague in the philosophy department thinks that God might in some sense be localized somewhere in the universe.

I did not have a very precise definition of object in mind. But here are a few things:

1. God is not physical
2. God acts but is not acted upon
3. God cannot be “comprehended”–i.e., we cannot form mental concepts of Him that are adequate and complete

So you think angels have matter? Interesting (I’m inclined to agree with you)

I’m inclined to, because it seems to me that Aquinas’s denial of this got him into all sorts of problems. But this may be heretical.

But what makes us think that all physical things must be contingent. There seem to be things other than God which are non-contingent. For example, the truth that 1+1=2. Apparently those who subscribe to traditional divine simplicity say that these things are identical with God (his thoughts are identical with his nature)

And thus you answered your own question!

Edwin

 

[freesoulhope]

I’m inclined to, because it seems to me that Aquinas’s denial of this got him into all sorts of problems. But this may be heretical.

I think that angels may have a material counterpart to them, but only so far as they are not bound by material laws. We see angels in the bible taking material form, not just illusionary forms, but real physical forms; take Lot for instance, he invited angels in to his house. These angels were as real as you or me; in fact they may as well have been human. On the other hand they may only be temporary forms that turn back to mindless atoms

I think that “some” angels have been granted material forms that they can change at will. What do you think?

 

[cor]

if your notation of the set has the same cardinality as http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif, then i have no idea how you can avoid the conclusion that it must be expressed as {http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif,.…,-2,-1,0}…

Because the set {aleph-null ,…,…-2, -1, 0} and the set {…-2, -1, 0} even though they don’t have exactly the same members (the former includes aleph-null as a member and the latter doesn’t) can still be placed in one-to-one correspondence with each other. For example, like so:

aleph-null <-> 0
0 <-> -1
-1 <-> -2
-2 <-> -3
… …

Each member of the former set (represented in the first column) can be “mapped” to each member of the latter set (represented in the second column) and vice versa – thus satisfying the definition for having the same cardinality. Two sets have the same cardinality if and only if their respective members can be placed into one-to-one correspondence with each other.

though perhaps this means you see the real problem with the identification of your set with the temporal series of moments as it actually occurs in the world: though it is possible notionally go backwards in time by stripping away moments that have already elapsed, this has got nothing to whatever to do with the actual progress of time, which is incrementally additive. which means, further, that if the number of past moments is infinite, then it is always infinite - no matter how far one goes back (10 years, 10 million years, 10^1000 years), an infinite number of prior moments have already elapsed. which means that, as you say, the only way to get an infinite past is to have it given, all at once. but not even god can do that, because, by my lights, it is logically impossible (because contradictory).

You are envisioning time as some kind of objective reality/substance where each moment of time has to have been formed from each preceding moment of time – and so if there’s an infinite past, the process of formation would be too long to have elapsed – but wait! who says it would have been too long to have elapsed? Since there’s an infinite amount of time available in the infinite past for the process of formation to have elapsed there doesn’t seem to be any problem. One can’t count out all the natural numbers in a finite amount of time. But in an infinite amount of time, one could (for every natural number there would be a moment in time in which it was counted).

of course, the traditional, atemporally eternal god, can create a world that has temporal moments elapsing in successive addition that he can*** see*** all at once; but that does not mean that the moments he sees all at once have actually*** occurred*** all at once; they haven’t - they still occur one-after-another.

Look at it this way. In a world with an infinite past, the moments in time are arranged one after the other and everyone who is born into the world as it so happens out of necessity is born into a world with an infinite history.

I understand the distinction you are making there between God’s creating an infinite future versus creating an infinite past – the former does not have to be actually realized with an actual infinity of time involved whereas the latter does.

BTW, do you think God could have created say an infinite number of cows? (or infinite number of particles or whatever)

 

[predator_CA]

sure. but if i’m saying that god is not
if it helps, let me put it this way: why should anyone believe that god is complex?

Wow, are you kidding me? How could something that you claim to omnipotent and the creator of the universe be simple? And where did this “creator thing” come from anyway?

You don’t know how the universe was created, so you make up the concept of some “god creature.”

All you are doing is moving the mystery one more place away from us explaining it, or simply pondering it even.

I really don’t mean to offend anyone here, but I was raised Catholic, and around the age of 12 I eventually realized that god is an absurd concept. Intelligent Design is even worse.

 

[cpayne]

Wow, are you kidding me? How could something that you claim to omnipotent and the creator of the universe be simple? And where did this “creator thing” come from anyway?

You don’t know how the universe was created, so you make up the concept of some “god creature.”

All you are doing is moving the mystery one more place away from us explaining it, or simply pondering it even.

I really don’t mean to offend anyone here, but I was raised Catholic, and around the age of 12 I eventually realized that god is an absurd concept. Intelligent Design is even worse.

Well, as has been explained several times, “simple” means without composite parts, without extension into space, and without extension into time. Thanks for chipping in, anyway.

 

[Contarini]

Wow, are you kidding me? How could something that you claim to omnipotent and the creator of the universe be simple?

Could you explain what your problem is with this idea? “Are you kidding me” hardly counts as a rational argument, does it?

And where did this “creator thing” come from anyway?

You don’t know how the universe was created, so you make up the concept of some “god creature.”

It’s not just that we don’t know how it was created, but that its existence logically implies the existence of a creator.

All you are doing is moving the mystery one more place away from us explaining it, or simply pondering it even.

That’s not true. You can ponder all you like. God “explains” the universe on a completely different level from science.

I really don’t mean to offend anyone here, but I was raised Catholic, and around the age of 12 I eventually realized that god is an absurd concept. Intelligent Design is even worse.

I think most of us are beyond being offended by juvenile insults with no substance.

If God is such an absurd concept, it shouldn’t be hard for you to explain the absurdity, should it?

Edwin

 

[john_doran]

Because the set {aleph-null ,…,…-2, -1, 0} and the set {…-2, -1, 0} even though they don’t have exactly the same members (the former includes aleph-null as a member and the latter doesn’t) can still be placed in one-to-one correspondence with each other. For example, like so:

aleph-null <-> 0
0 <-> -1
-1 <-> -2
-2 <-> -3
… …

Each member of the former set (represented in the first column) can be “mapped” to each member of the latter set (represented in the second column) and vice versa – thus satisfying the definition for having the same cardinality. Two sets have the same cardinality if and only if their respective members can be placed into one-to-one correspondence with each other.

dude, you’re simply making my point for me…

any set that can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of natural numbers has the same cardinality: namely http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif; just because you don’t actually write http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif in one of the two sets with equivalent cardinality doesn’t mean it’s not there…

cor:

You are envisioning time as some kind of objective reality/substance where each moment of time has to have been formed from each preceding moment of time – and so if there’s an infinite past, the process of formation would be too long to have elapsed – but wait! who says it would have been too long to have elapsed? Since there’s an infinite amount of time available in the infinite past for the process of formation to have elapsed there doesn’t seem to be any problem. One can’t count out all the natural numbers in a finite amount of time. But in an infinite amount of time, one could (for every natural number there would be a moment in time in which it was counted).

i have no idea what you’re trying to say here: you’re simply assuming that an actual infinite can be formed by successive addition.

the mathematical objection to the formation of an actual infinite by means of additive increment has got nothing at all to do with “having enough time” - i’m not sure where you got that from. it has to do with: (a) the more abstract point that you can’t get to http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif if you can’t get to its immediate predecessor (and you can’t); and (b) the practical point that whatever mental gymnastics you can perform on the set of elapsed moments of time, time itself actually passes one moment of time at a time, increasing the set of elapsed moments in the same way - and however many moments you add, you’ll always be able to add one more, thus never getting to http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif.

cor:

Look at it this way. In a world with an infinite past, the moments in time are arranged one after the other and everyone who is born into the world as it so happens out of necessity is born into a world with an infinite history.

sure. and in a world full of square circles, everyone born into that world is born into a world with square circles…

i don’t get it.

cor:

BTW, do you think God could have created say an infinite number of cows? (or infinite number of particles or whatever)

no. actually infinite numbers of physical objects leads to absurd consequences, e.g. Hilbert’s Hotel.

 

[cor]

dude, you’re simply making my point for me…

any set that can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of natural numbers has the same cardinality: namely http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif; just because you don’t actually write http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif in one of the two sets with equivalent cardinality doesn’t mean it’s not there…

It has the same cardinality as aleph-null but aleph-null is not a member of the set. I’ve defined the set as only 0 and the negative integers. aleph-null is neither 0 nor a negative integer; therefore, it’s not a member of the set. This philosopher uses the same set I used to make his argument for the logical coherence of an infinite past:

qsmithwmu.com/infinity_and_the_past.htm

*To make this clear, it can be observed that if past events are infinitely numerous, then they form a set that is open on one end and closed on the other (the present event being the closure). They would correspond to the set of negative numbers:

http://www.qsmithwmu.com/infini1.jpg

This set has the cardinal number aleph-zero and the order type of regression, w* Note that no matter which number one takes in this set, there will be a finite number of numbers intermediate between it and 0. Sup pose we take the number -128, then there are -127 numbers between it and 0. Suppose we take a trillion times -128, there still is some finite number between it and zero, and so on for any other number in this set. And yet there is not a finite but an infinite number of negative numbers in this set; before each negative number, there is another negative number.

Accordingly, we can conceive of past events as forming an infinite set of events that have “actually occurred” without being presented with the “insoluble problem” to which Whitrow refers, namely, that if some past events are separated by an infinite number of events from the present event, when in the chain of past events did the events start being separated from the present event by an infinite rather than finite number of inter mediate events?*

He also addresses other arguments against an infinite past. I would peruse his paper if you have the time.

time itself actually passes one moment of time at a time, increasing the set of elapsed moments in the same way - and however many moments you add, you’ll always be able to add one more, thus never getting to http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif.

If an infinite past corresponded to something like {… -2, -1, 0, 1, 2…,…, aleph-null} with aleph-null corresponding to the present then you would never get to aleph-null. But an infinite past doesn’t correspond to that set. For one thing the present moment in time has an immediately preceding moment in time whereas that set does not. I and the philosopher in the link above contends that an infinite past with the present corresponds to {…-2, -1, 0} – that is the set of 0 and the negative integers with 0 corresponding to the present moment in time. And it’s not the case for this set that you will “always be able to add one more” since when you get to -1, addding one more will have you arrive at 0, the present.

no. actually infinite numbers of physical objects leads to absurd consequences, e.g. Hilbert’s Hotel.

We are acquainted in ordinary experience with objects with finite characteristics. So when we examinine the consequences of something like Hilbert’s Hotel existing we may find it to have properties that seem strange to many of us. It doesn’t seem strange to me though. I don’t find it to be absurd at all. If Hilbert’s Hotel is absurd, then the mathematical fact that the cardinality of the natural numbers is equal to the cardinality of the odd numbers must also be counted as absurd – yet, it is a theorem that everyone accepts, even though some in an introductory set theory course may find it counter-intuitive.

 

[john_doran]

It has the same cardinality as aleph-null but aleph-null is not a member of the set. I’ve defined the set as only 0 and the negative integers. aleph-null is neither 0 nor a negative integer; therefore, it’s not a member of the set.

of course it’s not - it’s not a member of “my” set, either; http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif denotes the cardinality of each set. but my objection in no way relies on http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif being a member of any set - http://mathworld.wolfram.com/images/equations/ContinuumHypothesis/inline1.gif has no immediate predecessor or successor, either way.

my including aleph-null in the set was an attempt simply to get you to understand that point: namely that not including the symbol in your notation of the set in no way vitiates the force of my objection.

cor:

This philosopher uses the same set I used to make his argument for the logical coherence of an infinite past:

yeah - quentin smith. i’ve read his stuff before. ironic that an atheist would be used as support for what i believe is a thomist’s position.

anyway, there’s lots of philosophers who make the same or similar argument as smith (norman kemp smith, c.d. broad, swinburne); i find none of them the least bit compelling.

cor:

If an infinite past corresponded to something like {… -2, -1, 0, 1, 2…,…, aleph-null} with aleph-null corresponding to the present then you would never get to aleph-null. But an infinite past doesn’t correspond to that set. For one thing the present moment in time has an immediately preceding moment in time whereas that set does not. I and the philosopher in the link above contends that an infinite past with the present corresponds to {…-2, -1, 0} – that is the set of 0 and the negative integers with 0 corresponding to the present moment in time. And it’s not the case for this set that you will “always be able to add one more” since when you get to -1, addding one more will have you arrive at 0, the present.

we’re going round and round again on this, methinks…

i don’t want to belabour the mathematical argument (which you still have not fully appreciated), but that is all this is: math.

it doesn’t matter how you think of the set, or denote the set - what matters is how time actually elapses. and time, as additively incremental, doesn’t work the way you’re describing.

what’s more, when you get to “zero” (the present moment), you do simply add one more moment. and then another. and another. and so on…so i’m not sure what you believe yourself to be establishing with the contrary claim.

cor:

We are acquainted in ordinary experience with objects with finite characteristics. So when we examinine the consequences of something like Hilbert’s Hotel existing we may find it to have properties that seem strange to many of us. It doesn’t seem strange to me though. I don’t find it to be absurd at all.

well, maybe this is an appropriate end to the conversation: i find states of affairs like Hilbert’s hotel and tristram shandy utterly absurd, and any argument entailing them to be reduced to absurdity thereby.

if you think they make sense, then cool, i guess - that leaves us absolutely nowhere to go.

cor:

If Hilbert’s Hotel is absurd, then the mathematical fact that the cardinality of the natural numbers is equal to the cardinality of the odd numbers must also be counted as absurd

i couldn’t disagree more…why should anyone believe this? math, as a formal science, deals with abstract objects with no physical characteristics - why would it seem even remotely plausible to suppose that operations that are possible in the mathematical realm must be equally possible in the corporeal world?

you might as well argue that if it’s absurd to put the number 5 in a cloud chamber for testing by electron bombardment, it must therefore be absurd to place a neutron in a cloud chamber for testing.

i’d love to see your support for this position…

 

[Mersenne]

and that’s a circular argument, like i said before: your premise 1 is the same as your conclusion.

you define “object” as “something made of material”; you then conclude “therefore all objects are made of material”.

that’s not an argument of any kind at all.

I don’t define object that way, that is the definition of material. That is how it IS defined, now how I define it. Saying something is non-material is akin to saying it’s not an object. My premise was not identical to my conclusions, though very very close, which is why I have a hard time understanding why you struggle with this. It’s not a large leap of logic. Look up the definition of material.

 

[Mersenne]

The random dust is what Aristotelian philosophy calls the “material cause” out of which the planets form, but it’s not the “efficient cause” which is what we today usually mean by cause (other kinds of cause include “final” and “formal”).

In your example here, the planets are forming due to the application of the laws of physics with the random dust. I think the laws of physics have a beauty that is not less than the planets that you mention. So this example also doesn’t work for me.

You’re switching definitions. You said my particle example wouldn’t work because it’s “less then” the universe. But isn’t the single unintelligent particle the “material cause” not the “efficient cause”?

 

[Nullasalus]

I don’t define object that way, that is the definition of material. That is how it IS defined, now how I define it. Saying something is non-material is akin to saying it’s not an object. My premise was not identical to my conclusions, though very very close, which is why I have a hard time understanding why you struggle with this. It’s not a large leap of logic. Look up the definition of material.

Incorporeal

1. not corporeal or material; insubstantial.
2. of, pertaining to, or characteristic of nonmaterial beings.

What’s a nonmaterial being in reference to? Really, even if you’re a materialist, you should at least know this.

 

[cor]

You’re switching definitions. You said my particle example wouldn’t work because it’s “less then” the universe. But isn’t the single unintelligent particle the “material cause” not the “efficient cause”?

I was taking you to be presenting it as an efficient cause. Guess I misunderstood you.

I have no problem with a single unintelligent particle being the material cause of the material universe (minus conscious experiences)