Argument from Atrocities

[Relinquish]

Hey here’s an argument from the problem of evil, I’m interested to see how people will respond to it, and what objections might be brought against it.

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

An example might be rape, for if you know of someone’s intentions to rape another you might consider it your moral duty to see to it that those intentions never actualize.

(1) Where one is aware of an intended atrocity and capable of seeing to it that the atrocity does not obtain, one is morally obligated to do so. (definition of atrocities)
(2) God is aware of all intended atrocities and is capable of seeing to it that the atrocities do not obtain.
(3) God is morally obligated to ensure that atrocities do not obtain. (follows from 3)
(4) Atrocities obtain.
(5) God fails in moral obligation (follows from 5 and 6)

Note: In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

 

[tonyrey]

Hey here’s an argument from the problem of evil, I’m interested to see how people will respond to it, and what objections might be brought against it.

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

An example might be rape, for if you know of someone’s intentions to rape another you might consider it your moral duty to see to it that those intentions never actualize.

(1) Where one is aware of an intended atrocity and capable of seeing to it that the atrocity does not obtain, one is morally obligated to do so. (definition of atrocities)
(2) God is aware of all intended atrocities and is capable of seeing to it that the atrocities do not obtain.
(3) God is morally obligated to ensure that atrocities do not obtain. (follows from 3)
(4) Atrocities obtain.
(5) God fails in moral obligation (follows from 5 and 6)

Note: In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

#3 is false because preventing atrocities is a lesser evil than depriving persons of their free will thereby rendering them incapable of love and self-determination.

Welcome to the forum!

 

[Eric_Hyom]

Hello Relinquish;

Welcome to the forum, I hope you enjoy your stay here.

We are on this Earth for just a short time, and God can put right any atrocities that I commit on this Earth. If I kill a hundred people, God can raise them from the dead, and give them eternal life.

The greatest way we should relate to all people in all situations, is to live by the greatest commandments, these commandments give us the freedom to do good or evil.

 

[Perplexity]

Hey here’s an argument from the problem of evil, I’m interested to see how people will respond to it, and what objections might be brought against it.

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

An example might be rape, for if you know of someone’s intentions to rape another you might consider it your moral duty to see to it that those intentions never actualize.

(1) Where one is aware of an intended atrocity and capable of seeing to it that the atrocity does not obtain, one is morally obligated to do so. (definition of atrocities)
(2) God is aware of all intended atrocities and is capable of seeing to it that the atrocities do not obtain.
(3) God is morally obligated to ensure that atrocities do not obtain. (follows from 3)
(4) Atrocities obtain.
(5) God fails in moral obligation (follows from 5 and 6)

Note: In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

I don’t understand the argument form, especially as (3) is said to follow from itself and (5) is said to follow from (5)-(6) when there is no (6) . The argument as it stands is certainly invalid; but, that really is a trivial point since you can validify (yes I just made that up) the argument in a sec.

I think a few objections can come from either the divine command theorists, or from the moral error-theorists. The divine command theorist would deny that God is under moral obligations and the moral error-theorist would say there are no moral obligations. I’d be happy to defend the latter.

 

[Mark1124]

Hey here’s an argument from the problem of evil, I’m interested to see how people will respond to it, and what objections might be brought against it.

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

An example might be rape, for if you know of someone’s intentions to rape another you might consider it your moral duty to see to it that those intentions never actualize.

(1) Where one is aware of an intended atrocity and capable of seeing to it that the atrocity does not obtain, one is morally obligated to do so. (definition of atrocities)
(2) God is aware of all intended atrocities and is capable of seeing to it that the atrocities do not obtain.
(3) God is morally obligated to ensure that atrocities do not obtain. (follows from 3)
(4) Atrocities obtain.
(5) God fails in moral obligation (follows from 5 and 6)

Note: In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

Your definition of atrocity seems to be saying that an atrocity is something that you must stop at absolutely any cost if you are able to. If that is what you mean by ‘atrocity’, then I would have to disagree with premise 4. Take your example of rape: suppose that a man is about to rape a woman and the only way you can prevent it is for you to rape the woman yourself. Clearly in that case you do not have moral obligation to prevent that rape. Since your obligation to prevent rape is conditional not only on your ability to do so but also on your ability to do so without yourself committing a significant moral wrong, by definition rape is not an atrocity.

 

[Mark1124]

I think a few objections can come from either the divine command theorists, or from the moral error-theorists. The divine command theorist would deny that God is under moral obligations and the moral error-theorist would say there are no moral obligations. I’d be happy to defend the latter.

I’m not familiar with the term ‘moral error-theorist’, could you please explain?

 

[Perplexity]

I’m not familiar with the term ‘moral error-theorist’, could you please explain?

Sure,

“An error theory, then, may be characterized as the position that holds that a discourse typically is used in an assertoric manner, but those assertions by and large fail to state truths.” - Joyce, Richard. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004. p. 9. (Joyce is a leading moral error-theorist)

So a moral error-theorist says that moral discourse fails to state truths. Generally this is because moral oughts are said to be incoherent notions.

 

[Gorgias]

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain

who’s the “you” here? another “free moral agent”? is there any context for this observer? (e.g., does the observer have any claim on the free choice of the “free moral agent”? does it matter whether the observer has any responsibility for the agent, or if the observer may be imputed complicity in the agent’s actions, in general?)

and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

I’m not sure what you’re getting at, here. if one thwarts another’s actions, have they “defiled their freedom”? If so, then there’s no such thing as freedom – each choice any “free moral agent” makes impinges on another’s “freedom”! You’re gonna need to pin down your definition of freedom, first, before you proceed here…!

I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

I think that you need to be a bit more clear in your definitions before you proceed to your argument … at which point the bases for objections might be more clear…!

 

[Relinquish]

#3 is false because preventing atrocities is a lesser evil than depriving persons of their free will thereby rendering them incapable of love and self-determination.

If preventing atrocities is a lesser evil than depriving one of free will, wouldn’t God be morally obligated to see to it that the lesser of the two obtain?
Also as I’ve defined atrocities (1) is a tautology, and (3) follows from (2) and (1), so if you’re going to reject (3) you’d have to reject (2) first.

Welcome to the forum!

Thanks! I’m happy to see this forum is fairly active. I’m hoping to get some good discourse.

 

[Relinquish]

I don’t understand the argument form, especially as (3) is said to follow from itself and (5) is said to follow from (5)-(6) when there is no (6) . The argument as it stands is certainly invalid; but, that really is a trivial point since you can validify (yes I just made that up) the argument in a sec.

Ahh I had it longer before, but I cut out premises cause I figured it should be as simple as possible. I just realized that I had forgotten to change the justification too, sorry!

I think a few objections can come from either the divine command theorists, or from the moral error-theorists. The divine command theorist would deny that God is under moral obligations and the moral error-theorist would say there are no moral obligations. I’d be happy to defend the latter.

Oh please do. Btw are you Perplexity from CARM?

 

[Relinquish]

Your definition of atrocity seems to be saying that an atrocity is something that you must stop at absolutely any cost if you are able to. If that is what you mean by ‘atrocity’, then I would have to disagree with premise 4. Take your example of rape: suppose that a man is about to rape a woman and the only way you can prevent it is for you to rape the woman yourself. Clearly in that case you do not have moral obligation to prevent that rape. Since your obligation to prevent rape is conditional not only on your ability to do so but also on your ability to do so without yourself committing a significant moral wrong, by definition rape is not an atrocity.

Yes an atrocity is an intended action you’d be obligated to interfere with. And I agree that this very extreme case you speak of is not an obvious atrocity as it’s not very clear what ones moral obligations would be, to let it continue or do it yourself assuming those are your only two options.

Rape in general, though, would still be an atrocity as in general you are not restricted to those two options. In fact I’d say it’s very rare that our will is so restricted

Furthermore God has options, being omnipotent, he could never be the hypothetical person in your rape scenario.

 

[Relinquish]

who’s the “you” here? another “free moral agent”? is there any context for this observer? (e.g., does the observer have any claim on the free choice of the “free moral agent”? does it matter whether the observer has any responsibility for the agent, or if the observer may be imputed complicity in the agent’s actions, in general?)

Yes it’s any arbitrary moral agent. I’m not entirely sure what you’re asking, but I don’t think any context is necessary. No one does not need to have any responsibility for the victim or the aggressor to get involved in their conflict.

I’m not sure what you’re getting at, here. if one thwarts another’s actions, have they “defiled their freedom”? If so, then there’s no such thing as freedom – each choice any “free moral agent” makes impinges on another’s “freedom”! You’re gonna need to pin down your definition of freedom, first, before you proceed here…!

Well if you stop someone from doing something they want against their will, have you not defiled their freedom? And merely effecting another persons choice isn’t taking away their free will, but intentionally ensuring that they cannot choose as they want to seems as if it would be. And I cannot define free will, I suppose I mean what ever the theist means when they use it in a free will theodicy.

I think that you need to be a bit more clear in your definitions before you proceed to your argument … at which point the bases for objections might be more clear…!

Well I cannot define free will, maybe you could give your understanding of the term and we could work with that?

 

[Credo_in_Deum]

The problem with atheism is the lack of faith results in the lack of understanding when it comes to the will of God. Atheists see this life as the best there is and because they do not believe in an immortal soul they cannot see how the suffering or death of someone could actaully be for their benefit.

[bibledrb]matthew 10:28[/bibledrb]

Until you open your heart to God’s grace you will never be able to truly see the wonders of His works.
[bibledrb]Psalm 134:16-17[/bibledrb]

 

[Perplexity]

Ahh I had it longer before, but I cut out premises cause I figured it should be as simple as possible. I just realized that I had forgotten to change the justification too, sorry!

No worries

Oh please do. Btw are you Perplexity from CARM?

Alrighty. Yep, are you Lance by any chance?

1. If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless of whether he cares to, regardless of whether φing satisfies any of his desires or furthers his interests.
2. If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φing.
3. Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φing regardless of whether φing serves his desires or furthers his interests.
4. But there is no sense to be made of such reasons.
5. Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation.

Since (3) and (5) are derivations, I need only defend (1)-(2) and (4).

(1) seems self-evident, it’s just a part of what we mean by ‘morally ought’.

(2) seems likewise clear, imagine telling a sadist “You ought to not torture”, him replying “why?” and you saying “just 'cause.”

I think (4) falls neatly out of reflection on (3). It basically means S has reason to do x even if she has no reason to do x. What does that even mean?

 

[Relinquish]

No worries

Alrighty. Yep, are you Lance by any chance?

1. If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless of whether he cares to, regardless of whether φing satisfies any of his desires or furthers his interests.
2. If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φing.
3. Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φing regardless of whether φing serves his desires or furthers his interests.
4. But there is no sense to be made of such reasons.
5. Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation.

Since (3) and (5) are derivations, I need only defend (1)-(2) and (4).

(1) seems self-evident, it’s just a part of what we mean by ‘morally ought’.

(2) seems likewise clear, imagine telling a sadist “You ought to not torture”, him replying “why?” and you saying “just 'cause.”

I think (4) falls neatly out of reflection on (3). It basically means S has reason to do x even if she has no reason to do x. What does that even mean?

Yes I am Lance! I thought I’d try out a different forum as CARM’s getting kind of lame.

I’m not sure I like (2). If you mean that x would be aware of having reasons to φ, then that’s just impossible as you’re going to be able to ask “why?” to any claim someone makes until they have to respond with “I don’t know.” It seems to be implying that one must know how one knows, which would throw us into global skepticism.
But if this is saying that there is a reason, we might not know about it, but it’s out there; then one can have a reason for doing something that they’re not aware of and then (4) doesn’t so obviously follow from (3).

 

[Relinquish]

In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

Should have read the OP.

 

[Perplexity]

Yes I am Lance! I thought I’d try out a different forum as CARM’s getting kind of lame.

Ah, kewl haha yeah, I know what you mean. This place is interesting since it has a distinctly Catholic flavour to it; but, it doesn’t have folks like johnson

I’m not sure I like (2). If you mean that x would be aware of having reasons to φ, then that’s just impossible as you’re going to be able to ask “why?” to any claim someone makes until they have to respond with “I don’t know.” It seems to be implying that one must know how one knows, which would throw us into global skepticism.
But if this is saying that there is a reason, we might not know about it, but it’s out there; then one can have a reason for doing something that they’re not aware of and then (4) doesn’t so obviously follow from (3).

The bolded statement is the one relevant to my understanding of ‘reasons’. I’m not sure I understand why (4) wouldn’t so obviously follow from (3), if (2) “is saying that there is a reason, we might not know about it, but it’s out there.”

The problem is that regardless of what those reasons ‘out there’ are, they won’t in any way serve our desires or further our interests. I don’t understand how they’re then supposed to be “reasons.” Every understanding of ‘reasons’ I’m aware of involve in some way the serving of our desires or furthering of our interests.

It’s like saying X is a means to Y, but X won’t serve desires for Y or further interests in Y.

 

[Relinquish]

Ah, kewl haha yeah, I know what you mean. This place is interesting since it has a distinctly Catholic flavour to it; but, it doesn’t have folks like johnson

The bolded statement is the one relevant to my understanding of ‘reasons’. I’m not sure I understand why (4) wouldn’t so obviously follow from (3), if (2) “is saying that there is a reason, we might not know about it, but it’s out there.”

The problem is that regardless of what those reasons ‘out there’ are, they won’t in any way serve our desires or further our interests. I don’t understand how they’re then supposed to be “reasons.” Every understanding of ‘reasons’ I’m aware of involve in some way the serving of our desires or furthering of our interests.

It’s like saying X is a means to Y, but X won’t serve desires for Y or further interests in Y.

Okay, I think I see your point.

 

[Gorgias]

Relinquish,

Well, in general, I think that you’ve left a lot undefined, and that just leads to a discussion that’s all heat and no light.

First off, the definition of “atrocity” probably needs work, and definitely needs that “you” statement refined. By your definition, then when I see a child attempting to hit another child, then I’m in the business of stopping an “atrocity” (since I’m thwarting the action of a free moral agent in the commission of free act). I’m pretty sure that’s not what you’re trying to say.

In addition, your definition doesn’t do anything with the notion of morality that’s helpful. For example, mass human slaughter would qualify as “atrocity”, don’t you think? But, by your definition, if an Aztec were the “you” in your definition, he wouldn’t feel the slightest compunction to stop a ritual of human sacrifice. So, at the very least, the notion of objective/subjective morality is missing from your definition.

Once we’ve gotten over that hurdle, there’s a bigger one: from what does this notion of objective morality arise? What are the causes (formal, material) from which this morality takes shape? You’d agree that these questions are critical in the context of the putative dilemma of moral obligation that you’re positing, wouldn’t you?

I think that, once you have definition around these issues (at a minimum), some of your questions disappear and your assertions quit looking so thorny…

Well if you stop someone from doing something they want against their will, have you not defiled their freedom?

Well, again, we’ve got a definition problem. What does freedom mean here? Does it speak to freedom of action? Freedom of choice / free will? If freedom of action, are all actions considered worthy of the mantle of freedom, or are there any that don’t meet the standard? (That is, are there actions which, if thwarted, don’t defile ‘freedom’?) If so, what are these actions, and on what premise do we exclude them from your list of valid free actions?

And merely effecting another persons choice isn’t taking away their free will, but intentionally ensuring that they cannot choose as they want to seems as if it would be.

I think you’re being too cavalier with your terms, here: if you choose to rape someone, your free will is acting unhindered. If, on the other hand, you start attempting to rape someone, and a third party stopped you, that third party would be hindering your action, not your will; your free will would still be unhindered.

Nonetheless, please note that you’ve shifted into a whole 'nother arena: you’ve gone from talking “freedom” to talking “free will”. Is this a discussion of free will, then?

 

[Relinquish]

Relinquish,

Well, in general, I think that you’ve left a lot undefined, and that just leads to a discussion that’s all heat and no light.

First off, the definition of “atrocity” probably needs work, and definitely needs that “you” statement refined. By your definition, then when I see a child attempting to hit another child, then I’m in the business of stopping an “atrocity” (since I’m thwarting the action of a free moral agent in the commission of free act). I’m pretty sure that’s not what you’re trying to say.

I thought it was pretty clear what I was talking about, but here I revised it so maybe this should help you out;

An atrocity is any such action by an arbitrary free moral agent A such that, if an arbitrary moral agent B were aware of the intentions of A, B would be morally obligated to stop the actions and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

Here’s an attempt to put it into logic;
A(x, y): x is able to see to it that y not obtain
M(x, y): x is morally obligated to see to it that y not obtain
E(x): x’s intended actions
∀a ∈ Persons( ∃b ∈ Persons( E(b) is an atrocity ⇔ [A(a, E(b)) → M(a, E(b))]))

And no it’s only if you have a moral obligation to interfere. If you have a moral obligation to interfere with any action, then that act is an atrocity.

In addition, your definition doesn’t do anything with the notion of morality that’s helpful. For example, mass human slaughter would qualify as “atrocity”, don’t you think? But, by your definition, if an Aztec were the “you” in your definition, he wouldn’t feel the slightest compunction to stop a ritual of human sacrifice. So, at the very least, the notion of objective/subjective morality is missing from your definition.

I think it’s very obvious I’m speaking about objective morality. My definition does not say anything about whether the moral agent thinks it’s obligated, but whether it is obligated.

Once we’ve gotten over that hurdle, there’s a bigger one: from what does this notion of objective morality arise? What are the causes (formal, material) from which this morality takes shape? You’d agree that these questions are critical in the context of the putative dilemma of moral obligation that you’re positing, wouldn’t you?

I don’t really know what you’re asking.

Well, again, we’ve got a definition problem. What does freedom mean here? Does it speak to freedom of action? Freedom of choice / free will? If freedom of action, are all actions considered worthy of the mantle of freedom, or are there any that don’t meet the standard? (That is, are there actions which, if thwarted, don’t defile ‘freedom’?) If so, what are these actions, and on what premise do we exclude them from your list of valid free actions?

Freedom to act sounds most like it. And if we are speaking about the freedom to act then no, there are no actions for which thwarting would not defile the freedom.

I think you’re being too cavalier with your terms, here: if you choose to rape someone, your free will is acting unhindered. If, on the other hand, you start attempting to rape someone, and a third party stopped you, that third party would be hindering your action, not your will; your free will would still be unhindered.

Alright, does this matter to the argument though?

Nonetheless, please note that you’ve shifted into a whole 'nother arena: you’ve gone from talking “freedom” to talking “free will”. Is this a discussion of free will, then?

I suppose free will by your understanding is irrelevant, then. God could thwart all evil and not defile anyone’s free will, but merely their freedom to act.