Argument from Atrocities

[Gorgias]

I thought it was pretty clear what I was talking about, but here I revised it so maybe this should help you out;

An atrocity is any such action by an arbitrary free moral agent A such that, if an arbitrary moral agent B were aware of the intentions of A, B would be morally obligated to stop the actions and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

OK, but you’ve still got a couple of problems.

First, your definition of “atrocity” covers everything from witnessing one kid pulling a girl’s ponytails to Auschwitz. I think you’re thinking more the latter than the former, but your definition doesn’t attempt to distinguish between the two; I think it should. (And I think that it makes a difference, once it does distinguish.)

Second, “atrocity” has an intense emotional connotation that you’re not identifying at all. What does “atrocity” mean? If it’s not a description of some qualitative judgment of evil (which is what my first point gets at), is it some other judgment? What makes an “atrocity” an “atrocity”? Is it objective? Do two identical events always merit description of “atrocity”, or is there some judgment that makes one atrocious and the other simply immoral?

And no it’s only if you have a moral obligation to interfere. If you have a moral obligation to interfere with any action, then that act is an atrocity.

From what does that moral obligation proceed? If there’s an objective moral obligation, then what objective moral standard is it relying upon? Is it based on some objective fact? A shared worldview? Unless we know from whence the obligation proceeds, how can we discuss the implications of the obligation?

For instance: i see a deer dart in front of cars in the highway. Do I have a moral obligation to try and save it? Do I have an obligation to put myself at risk for this purpose? What if it’s not a deer, but an adult? A child? A bus filled with children? My child? Does it matter, for the sake of your argument, whether the oncoming traffic is trying to avoid or trying to hit the pedestrians? How does the obligation present itself, and on what basis?

I think it’s very obvious I’m speaking about objective morality. My definition does not say anything about whether the moral agent thinks it’s obligated, but whether it is obligated.

If the free moral agent doesn’t believe itself to be obligated, then how do we judge the morality of its inactivity, then?

Freedom to act sounds most like it. And if we are speaking about the freedom to act then no, there are no actions for which thwarting would not defile the freedom.

Really? We’re positing an unlimited right to act, regardless of the action and the effects of the action?

I suppose free will by your understanding is irrelevant, then. God could thwart all evil and not defile anyone’s free will, but merely their freedom to act.

Are you asserting that there’s no difference between “will” and “action”?

 

[tonyrey]

If preventing atrocities is a lesser evil than depriving one of free will, wouldn’t God be morally obligated to see to it that the lesser of the two obtain?
Also as I’ve defined atrocities (1) is a tautology, and (3) follows from (2) and (1), so if you’re going to reject (3) you’d have to reject (2) first.

1. Depriving persons of free will is a greater evil than preventing atrocities.
2. Therefore atrocities should be permitted because atrocities are inevitable when an immense number of persons have free will.

Thanks! I’m happy to see this forum is fairly active. I’m hoping to get some good discourse.

This forum is very active and very stimulating - with more than 2,000 posts in 5 weeks on the Evidence for Design thread alone!

 

[Relinquish]

1. Depriving persons of free will is a greater evil than preventing atrocities.
2. Therefore atrocities should be permitted because atrocities are inevitable when an immense number of persons have free will.

(2) is false (by the definition of an atrocity) so if this argument is valid that would imply (1) is also false.

This forum is very active and very stimulating - with more than 2,000 posts in 5 weeks on the Evidence for Design thread alone!

yeah that’s good

 

[tonyrey]

1. Depriving persons of free will is a greater evil than preventing atrocities.
2. Therefore atrocities should be permitted because atrocities are inevitable when an immense number of persons have free will.

Why?

 

[Relinquish]

Why?

Because by the definition of an atrocity, if something ought to be permitted then it’s not an atrocity

 

[tonyrey]

Because by the definition of an atrocity, if something ought to be permitted then it’s not an atrocity

Then it becomes a question not of kind but degree because it amounts to a choice between different atrocities! Life is not always a choice between good and evil but very often the lesser of two evils…

 

[Qoeleth]

Hey here’s an argument from the problem of evil, I’m interested to see how people will respond to it, and what objections might be brought against it.

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

An example might be rape, for if you know of someone’s intentions to rape another you might consider it your moral duty to see to it that those intentions never actualize.

(1) Where one is aware of an intended atrocity and capable of seeing to it that the atrocity does not obtain, one is morally obligated to do so. (definition of atrocities)
(2) God is aware of all intended atrocities and is capable of seeing to it that the atrocities do not obtain.
(3) God is morally obligated to ensure that atrocities do not obtain. (follows from 3)
(4) Atrocities obtain.
(5) God fails in moral obligation (follows from 5 and 6)

Note: In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

You are using as an unstated premise the God is ABLE to prevent atrocities. But He is not, at least in the sense assumed here- Jesus (i.e. God) has no power, except the power of Love. And God has no hand to work in this world, except through OUR hands, as Therese of Avila says.

God sincerely wants to stop atrocities, and Jesus and the Blessed Virgin Mary weep at every human suffering, but the only power He has to do so are through OUR efforts.

 

[Gorgias]

You are using as an unstated premise the God is ABLE to prevent atrocities. But He is not, at least in the sense assumed here- Jesus (i.e. God) has no power, except the power of Love. And God has no hand to work in this world, except through OUR hands, as Therese of Avila says.

God sincerely wants to stop atrocities, and Jesus and the Blessed Virgin Mary weep at every human suffering, but the only power He has to do so are through OUR efforts.

uch: No, that’s not what Catholicism states. Your ideas are more like the deist notion of a “clockmaker” deity, who sets the world in motion and then fails/refuses/is uninterested in participating in it; rather, this deity initiates the world and just watches it from afar.

If that were the case – that is, if “God has no hand to work in this world”, strictly speaking – then the notion that God was made incarnate and walked among us is impossible.

 

[sw85]

Hey here’s an argument from the problem of evil, I’m interested to see how people will respond to it, and what objections might be brought against it.

Definition: An atrocity is any such action preformed by a free moral agent that, if you were able to, you would be morally obligated to ensure the intended actions did not obtain and effectively defile the freedom of the agent attempting to act.

An example might be rape, for if you know of someone’s intentions to rape another you might consider it your moral duty to see to it that those intentions never actualize.

(1) Where one is aware of an intended atrocity and capable of seeing to it that the atrocity does not obtain, one is morally obligated to do so. (definition of atrocities)
(2) God is aware of all intended atrocities and is capable of seeing to it that the atrocities do not obtain.
(3) God is morally obligated to ensure that atrocities do not obtain. (follows from 3)
(4) Atrocities obtain.
(5) God fails in moral obligation (follows from 5 and 6)

Note: In objection to the argument I would expect a denial of one of the premises, or a demonstration that the structure of the argument is invalid. I don’t want to be a Nazi about it, but I find the people very often give objections which are pretty unclear as to how exactly they are supposed to defeat the argument.

It fails at point one. Man’s moral obligations arise from his nature, in which God does not participate. Indeed man’s “goodness” is good only by reference to God. Hence God is not subject to any moral law but is the maker of it.

In other words, as many philosophers have demonstrated, God is not a moral agent, i.e., an agent subject to moral law.

Like any problem of evil, it fails because it misapprehends the nature of good and evil. God is not good for evidential reasons but necessary metaphysical ones – because goodness and being are convertible and because God is necessarily pure being, therefore pure goodness. So to defeat the problem of evil it is only necessary to demonstrate that there is at least one hypothetical reason why God might tolerate evil; it is not even necessary to demonstrate that that is the correct reason.

 

[Qoeleth]

uch: No, that’s not what Catholicism states. Your ideas are more like the deist notion of a “clockmaker” deity, who sets the world in motion and then fails/refuses/is uninterested in participating in it; rather, this deity initiates the world and just watches it from afar.

If that were the case – that is, if “God has no hand to work in this world”, strictly speaking – then the notion that God was made incarnate and walked among us is impossible.

Sorry, perhaps I didn’t make my point clearly. God certainly is incarnate, but God (i.e. Jesus) is humble, poor, “a man of sorrows”- He has a kingdom, but it is not of this world. Our God is not a God of strength and control- on the contrary, our God fell three times whilst carrying a piece of wood.

And God is the man who stumbled under the weight of the Cross, nothing more and nothing less. There is no omnipotence (except metaphorically), only Love.

It is a category error to think He should/could stop atrocities.

 

[Gorgias]

And God is the man who stumbled under the weight of the Cross, nothing more and nothing less.

There’s a category error here…! God is also the omnipotent creator of the universe! You’re conflating the Godhead with the man Jesus, if what you’re saying is that the physical limitations of the man Jesus are likewise the limitations of the Triune God!

There is no omnipotence (except metaphorically), only Love.

I guess that Jesus metaphorically healed people, since that would require power over nature? I guess Jesus metaphorically rose from the dead, since that would require power over not only nature, but over the devil?

C’mon … you’re offering very nice devotional platitudes – but don’t try to turn them into doctrinal assertions!

It is a category error to think He should/could stop atrocities.

I look at it Thomistically: God, as primary cause, turns all things for the good; therefore, what appear to be atrocities from our perspective are really, in a way that is mysterious to us in our human limitations, part of His plan of salvation. Could God stop the things that we perceive as atrocities? Of course. Should He, since that would imply that His plan was faulty to begin with? Of course not…!

 

[Qoeleth]

There’s a category error here…! God is also the omnipotent creator of the universe! You’re conflating the Godhead with the man Jesus, if what you’re saying is that the physical limitations of the man Jesus are likewise the limitations of the Triune God!

I guess that Jesus metaphorically healed people, since that would require power over nature? I guess Jesus metaphorically rose from the dead, since that would require power over not only nature, but over the devil?

I look at it Thomistically: God, as primary cause, turns all things for the good; therefore, what appear to be atrocities from our perspective are really, in a way that is mysterious to us in our human limitations, part of His plan of salvation. Could God stop the things that we perceive as atrocities? Of course. Should He, since that would imply that His plan was faulty to begin with? Of course not…!

Yes, all the qualities of Jesus are the qualities of God- mercy, love, compassion, gentleness, suffering. There is ‘metaphoric’ omnipotence in these, in the sense that true love and total mercy ultimately overcome all else.

Do you really believe God would use things like child abuse or torture as part of His plan of salvation? Even if we say that these things only ‘appear’ as atrocities to us (and, if something appears to be an atrocity to those concerned, it IS an atrocity), it is totally incompatible with the way of Jesus.

Are Christians bound to believe in a Thomistic God- can’t we just stick with the words and example of Jesus? I mean, isn’t the whole point of the Incarnation that we DO conflate Jesus, in His humanity, with Divinity?

 

[empther]

Are Christians bound to believe in a Thomistic God- can’t we just stick with the words and example of Jesus?

Sure,
if we could get rid of the Protestants, Moslems,Jews, Hindus, Mormons, atheists, and every other group that tries to find fault with Catholic theology.

But since we can’t do that,
we need Aquinas to explain things that Jesus didn’t mention.

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

#3 is false because preventing atrocities is a lesser evil than depriving persons of their free will thereby rendering them incapable of love and self-determination.

So what you are saying is that we can stop atrocities without denying the free will of those that would commit them, but God cannot. If we controverted their free wills by preventing their atrocities, we would not be morally obligated to act. You are saying that in this respect we are more potent than an omnipotent being.

 

[carlysrose]

War is a more suitable example.

 

[Gorgias]

Do you really believe God would use things like child abuse or torture as part of His plan of salvation?

Yes, I do – but I’m not saying that God is causing them or desiring that they occur; when they happen, though, and in some inscrutable way, God is able to allow them to be used for good.

Are Christians bound to believe in a Thomistic God- can’t we just stick with the words and example of Jesus?

I think I would say that a “Thomistic God” is already compatible with the words and examples of Jesus!

I mean, isn’t the whole point of the Incarnation that we DO conflate Jesus, in His humanity, with Divinity?

Well, not ‘conflate’, as in ‘confuse’ or ‘mix’…!

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

Yes, I do – but I’m not saying that God is causing them or desiring that they occur; when they happen, though, and in some inscrutable way, God is able to allow them to be used for good.

You do, of course, realize that no one (including Jesus) could have been sacrificed for us without evil being done to them. Therefore, if we assume that it was God’s plan to provide a “perfect sacrifice” for humanity, that plan required humans to commit evil acts. God needed evil to accomplish his goal.

It is a tenet of Catholic morality that the ends do not justify the means. We cannot achieve a good end through evil actions. However, you claim that God is able to do this.

 

[Gorgias]

You do, of course, realize that no one (including Jesus) could have been sacrificed for us without evil being done to them. Therefore, if we assume that it was God’s plan to provide a “perfect sacrifice” for humanity, that plan required humans to commit evil acts. God needed evil to accomplish his goal.

You’re mischaracterizing “God’s plan”, and therefore, you’re making it appear to rely on evil in a way that isn’t quite correct. God’s plan wasn’t to “provide a ‘perfect sacrifice’ for humanity”; it was to will the salvation of all, such that, having given life and free will to all humans, they would return God’s love and attain salvation.

Now… this isn’t what happened. Free will was abused in sinful ways. Therefore, in order for God’s plan to come to fruition, Jesus was made incarnate, and redeemed humanity. God didn’t “require humans to commit evil acts” or “need evil to accomplish his goal”; rather, God utilized the human condition in a way that respected free will and still attained to the salvation that God intended in the first place.

It is a tenet of Catholic morality that the ends do not justify the means. We cannot achieve a good end through evil actions.

Correct. As humans, our nature sets in play a morality in which intrinsic evil acts cannot be performed in order to achieve good ends.

Two notes: first, this proceeds from natural law – that is, it proceeds from the nature of creation. Second, notice that the prohibition is against intrinsic evil acts. (For example, it is immoral to kill a human in her mother’s womb. However, it is potentially not immoral to kill an intruder who is threatening to kill someone, if there is no other way to prevent the loss of innocent life.)

However, you claim that God is able to do this.

No. In the first case, the actor is the one performing the evil and hoping to attain to the good. In your statement, you’re implying (whether you meant to or not) that God is doing this same thing. This is not what I’m saying: I’m simply noting that God can take evil acts (of others) and make good come of them. Big difference…

 

[tonyrey]

You do, of course, realize that no one (including Jesus) could have been sacrificed for us without evil being done to them. Therefore, if we assume that it was God’s plan to provide a “perfect sacrifice” for humanity, that plan required humans to commit evil acts. God needed evil to accomplish his goal.

It is a tenet of Catholic morality that the ends do not justify the means. We cannot achieve a good end through evil actions. However, you claim that God is able to do this.

You are overlooking the fact that Jesus chose to sacrifice Himself…

 

[tonyrey]

#3 is false because preventing atrocities is a lesser evil than depriving persons of their free will thereby rendering them incapable of love and self-determination.

[/quote]

		 		 	 	 So what you are saying is that we can stop atrocities without  denying the free will of those that would commit them, but God cannot.

We don’t deny free will; we prevent the decision from being implemented.

If we controverted their free wills by preventing their atrocities, we would not be morally obligated to act.

It is impossible to controverted their free will.

You are saying that in this respect we are more potent than an omnipotent being.So what you are saying is that we can stop atrocities without denying the free will of those that would commit them, but God cannot.

God can but He chooses not to because it would defeat the purpose of giving us free will, i.e. to choose what to believe and how to live.