F
feltmeanings23
Guest
I don’t think God exists. The argument from evil seems compelling once one realizes that libertarian free will is undesirable and/or incoherent.
God does not have libertarian free will* and yet His existence is morally significant. Why would humans need to have free will to have moral significance? One might say that God has free will in that nothing external to Him forces Him to do good. However, logical entailment is a stronger (or at least as strong) relationship than causation. God can’t control the fact that He exists; His existence logically entails He never does wrong; so He is not morally praiseworthy. Why would external causation take away praiseworthiness and not logical entailment, when both are out of the person’s control?
So either God does not have free will or He has compatibilist “free will.” (Hereafter in quotes.) “Free will” is compatible with determinism, so God could have set up our desires/inclinations so that we never desire to sin, and there would never be suffering. After all, choices (whether free or “free”) are based on unchosen desires. If it’s okay for God to have “free will” but be unable to sin, why wouldn’t it be the case for us? And many theists already believe there is no libertarian free will* in Heaven, where there is no possibility of sin.
In addition to the undesirability of libertarian free will, it also seems like an incoherent idea. One does what one desires** – and you can’t choose what you desire, lest that ‘choice’ be baseless or based on what one desires to desire. This leads to a regress, for that second-order desire (if not determinate/fixed) would be random or based on a third-order desire, ad infinitum. If one suggests that one can choose between opposing desires, without some higher-order desire or motivating principle, it is ultimately random which desire you act on. It’s not like you any control over what desire took priority, for that would lead to a regress again. You’re just witnessing yourself do something, and then you’re somehow held accountable for it. (In my opinion, the randomness of free will is a death blow to free will theisms.)
I know this won’t apply to open theists, but for Catholics and Orthodox: doesn’t your Church infallibly teach that God knows the future? If God knows that I am going to Heaven or Hell (let’s say Hell), and God is never wrong, then I haven’t a shot at Heaven, for it’s impossible to change what God already knows. At this point, one may say “knowing X doesn’t cause X to happen,” to which I would agree, but that misses the point. I’m not saying God’s foreknowledge makes things happen, but that it entails things happen. What God foreknows cannot fail to be the case – if it cannot fail to be the case, then it must happen by necessity***. I can’t change a proposition that’s already true or false – and it’s already true that I’ll be damned.
God does not have libertarian free will* and yet His existence is morally significant. Why would humans need to have free will to have moral significance? One might say that God has free will in that nothing external to Him forces Him to do good. However, logical entailment is a stronger (or at least as strong) relationship than causation. God can’t control the fact that He exists; His existence logically entails He never does wrong; so He is not morally praiseworthy. Why would external causation take away praiseworthiness and not logical entailment, when both are out of the person’s control?
So either God does not have free will or He has compatibilist “free will.” (Hereafter in quotes.) “Free will” is compatible with determinism, so God could have set up our desires/inclinations so that we never desire to sin, and there would never be suffering. After all, choices (whether free or “free”) are based on unchosen desires. If it’s okay for God to have “free will” but be unable to sin, why wouldn’t it be the case for us? And many theists already believe there is no libertarian free will* in Heaven, where there is no possibility of sin.
In addition to the undesirability of libertarian free will, it also seems like an incoherent idea. One does what one desires** – and you can’t choose what you desire, lest that ‘choice’ be baseless or based on what one desires to desire. This leads to a regress, for that second-order desire (if not determinate/fixed) would be random or based on a third-order desire, ad infinitum. If one suggests that one can choose between opposing desires, without some higher-order desire or motivating principle, it is ultimately random which desire you act on. It’s not like you any control over what desire took priority, for that would lead to a regress again. You’re just witnessing yourself do something, and then you’re somehow held accountable for it. (In my opinion, the randomness of free will is a death blow to free will theisms.)
I know this won’t apply to open theists, but for Catholics and Orthodox: doesn’t your Church infallibly teach that God knows the future? If God knows that I am going to Heaven or Hell (let’s say Hell), and God is never wrong, then I haven’t a shot at Heaven, for it’s impossible to change what God already knows. At this point, one may say “knowing X doesn’t cause X to happen,” to which I would agree, but that misses the point. I’m not saying God’s foreknowledge makes things happen, but that it entails things happen. What God foreknows cannot fail to be the case – if it cannot fail to be the case, then it must happen by necessity***. I can’t change a proposition that’s already true or false – and it’s already true that I’ll be damned.