Argument from evil and why free will doesn't work

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feltmeanings23

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I don’t think God exists. The argument from evil seems compelling once one realizes that libertarian free will is undesirable and/or incoherent.

God does not have libertarian free will* and yet His existence is morally significant. Why would humans need to have free will to have moral significance? One might say that God has free will in that nothing external to Him forces Him to do good. However, logical entailment is a stronger (or at least as strong) relationship than causation. God can’t control the fact that He exists; His existence logically entails He never does wrong; so He is not morally praiseworthy. Why would external causation take away praiseworthiness and not logical entailment, when both are out of the person’s control?

So either God does not have free will or He has compatibilist “free will.” (Hereafter in quotes.) “Free will” is compatible with determinism, so God could have set up our desires/inclinations so that we never desire to sin, and there would never be suffering. After all, choices (whether free or “free”) are based on unchosen desires. If it’s okay for God to have “free will” but be unable to sin, why wouldn’t it be the case for us? And many theists already believe there is no libertarian free will* in Heaven, where there is no possibility of sin.

In addition to the undesirability of libertarian free will, it also seems like an incoherent idea. One does what one desires** – and you can’t choose what you desire, lest that ‘choice’ be baseless or based on what one desires to desire. This leads to a regress, for that second-order desire (if not determinate/fixed) would be random or based on a third-order desire, ad infinitum. If one suggests that one can choose between opposing desires, without some higher-order desire or motivating principle, it is ultimately random which desire you act on. It’s not like you any control over what desire took priority, for that would lead to a regress again. You’re just witnessing yourself do something, and then you’re somehow held accountable for it. (In my opinion, the randomness of free will is a death blow to free will theisms.)

I know this won’t apply to open theists, but for Catholics and Orthodox: doesn’t your Church infallibly teach that God knows the future? If God knows that I am going to Heaven or Hell (let’s say Hell), and God is never wrong, then I haven’t a shot at Heaven, for it’s impossible to change what God already knows. At this point, one may say “knowing X doesn’t cause X to happen,” to which I would agree, but that misses the point. I’m not saying God’s foreknowledge makes things happen, but that it entails things happen. What God foreknows cannot fail to be the case – if it cannot fail to be the case, then it must happen by necessity***. I can’t change a proposition that’s already true or false – and it’s already true that I’ll be damned.
 
*Or at least, no LFW with respect to evil.
**Even when you voluntarily do something painful (e.g. go to work, resist temptation), it’s because there is a desire for a perceived benefit (or to avoid perceived harm/punishment) in the future.
***Whether causally or non-causally.
****(If anyone is troubled by disbelief in God while my profile says Hindu, realize that there are atheistic strands of Hinduism, and that Brahman is not quite the same as God.)
 
Tag for later, though the topic will no doubt get to 100+ posts before I can respond.
 
I’m not looking for that many posts, but I suppose I can’t stop the inevitable.
 
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feltmeanings23:
I don’t think God exists.
Have you never read Aquninas’ five ways to prove that God exists?
I did read Edward Feser’s Five Proofs. One’s of God’s attributes is moral perfection, and I think Feser failed at that. And I don’t think Aquinas’ arguments counteract the logical argument from evil.
 
The argument from evil has the fallacy in supposing that God does not allow free will. It is evident that He does, by the very fact that we make our own choices- he just already knows what choices we will make. For example, you can know that it will rain- however you are not making it rain or controlling it.
 
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One’s of God’s attributes is moral perfection
In fact, it is basically the opposite. Morality is defined by God’s will. That which God wills is moral; that which God doesn’t will is not moral.
 
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feltmeanings23:
One’s of God’s attributes is moral perfection
No it isn’t.
I don’t mean in the univocal sense, or the same way humans are. Nevertheless, God is morally good in some sense, as Edward Feser acknowledges:
Since moral goodness concerns the will, it follows that God is morally good, and perfectly so. But His moral goodness is not like ours, since it does not involve fulfilling obligations, acquiring virtues, or the like. [Edward Feser: God, obligation, and the Euthyphro dilemma]
 
Re: OP
I honestly see nothing in the OP that shows that God’s existence is illogical, and God’s (non)existence seems to be the topic of this thread. If I have missed something, please point it out to me.

I only see arguments regarding the kind of God which exists.
 
I honestly see nothing in the OP that shows that God’s existence is illogical
The argument is that an all-loving God would not want suffering to inflict His loved ones. If you love someone, you want what’s best for them.

A common response is the free will theodicy, which is what the OP tries to refute.
I only see arguments regarding the kind of God which exists.
I’m not trying to prove that an indifferent or evil god does not exist. Just God with a capital G: omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
 
Evil is not something that ‘exists.’ It is not a positive counter-point to good. It is a negative, a lack, a vacuum where good formerly was. That missing slice of pie.

So, to argue from evil is to argue from nothing.
 
I don’t think God exists.
I’m not trying to prove that an indifferent or evil god does not exist. Just God with a capital G: omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
(If anyone is troubled by disbelief in God while my profile says Hindu, realize that there are atheistic strands of Hinduism, and that Brahman is not quite the same as God.)
Would you define “Brahman” as “an indifferent or evil god?”
 
Evil is not something that ‘exists.’
One may rename it the argument from the privation of good, and the problem remains. If evil requires a deficient cause, whence cometh the defect? God surely can’t be the cause of evil, and the OP tries to show that creaturely free will can’t be the cause of evil.
 
I’m not trying to prove that an indifferent or evil god does not exist. Just God with a capital G: omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
People often misconstrue what is meant by saying “God is perfectly good.” What is unsatisfactory about Feser’s explanation?
 
Would you define “Brahman” as “an indifferent or evil god?”
One could say that. I basically just use “Brahman” as a title for the universal consciousness that we all comprise. Bernardo Kastrup has written on the topic of idealism, and that we are different alters of one consciousness. That’s a whole other topic, though.
 
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