Aristotelian substance theory and transubstantiation

[Eleve]

Thus, substance is simply a way to make language for particular forms.

Explanation is not “simply a way to make language for particular forms.” That my coffee was hot when I got in the shower and lukewarm when I got out is explained by the laws of thermodynamics. These are facts about the physical world, not “language for particular forms.”

The whole point of the anti-reductionist view is that the difference between saying, say, “Worms reproduce asexually” and “Molecules with such-and-such a structure behave in such-and-such a way under such-and-such circumstances” is not just linguistic. According to the anti-reductionist, you can’t take the language we use about, say, animals, replace it with the language of the underlying physics, and preserve all the information in the underlying truth-claims. If you reduce those claims to physics, the anti-reductionist says you are eliminating facts, not just language. If you think, on the other hand, that the language of the special sciences is just a shorthand for the language of fundamental physics, then you are a reductionist. You are part of the “few, if any” who retain that view.

 

[Muze]

You have missed the point: science cannot prove or disprove the non-physical, so why should science be able to say anything about substance theory?

Because what substance theory claims to explain, modern science has fully displaced.

 

[Eleve]

Yes, as they appear to deal with Real Presence outside of the physical universe.

Again, you are saying that it is compatible with modern science to claim that something “outside of the physical universe” can be mysteriously “consubstantiated” with something in the physical universe?

Let’s be clear: you can try all you want to say that your views are “spiritual” or magical or whatever in order to avoid having your own claims about physics applied to your pet theology. But if you believe in the Real Presence, somehow you need to believe in Presence. You can’t just say that the body and blood are “out there” in some abstruse spiritual sense. For if the doctrine of the Real Presence means anything, it means that Christ is present in the Eucharist in a way that he is not present in my cellphone or my breakfast toast. That means making a claim about physical objects - the hosts - to distinguish them from other physical objects that are not so consecrated. So let’s quit pretending that Catholics are the only ones making a claim about the physical world.

 

[Muze]

Again, you are saying that it is compatible with modern science to claim that something “outside of the physical universe” can be mysteriously “consubstantiated” with something in the physical universe?

Yes. Just as the human being is both spiritual and physical.

Let’s be clear: you can try all you want to say that your views are “spiritual” or magical or whatever in order to avoid having your own claims about physics applied to your pet theology. But if you believe in the Real Presence, somehow you need to believe in Presence. You can’t just say that the body and blood are “out there” in some abstruse spiritual sense.

Who said anything about ‘abstract’ or ‘magical’? You appear to be losing your objectivity, here, as these are tactics used by atheists. Next you’ll be asking me about a magical fairy being in the sky.

For if the doctrine of the Real Presence means anything, it means that Christ is present in the Eucharist in a way that he is not present in my cellphone or my breakfast toast. That means making a claim about physical objects - the hosts - to distinguish them from other physical objects that are not so consecrated. So let’s quit pretending that Catholics are the only ones making a claim about the physical world.

You can misrepresent what I’ve said all you want. It doesn’t matter.

I am comfortable with mystery in this matter as the EO are, I am comfortable with consubstantiation, as well.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Because what substance theory claims to explain, modern science has fully displaced.

Except substance is a metaphysical claim about the nature of being, not about the objects properties. Science can only explain the properties, not the nature of being.

 

[Muze]

Except substance is a metaphysical claim about the nature of being, not about the objects properties. Science can only explain the properties, not the nature of being.

Aristotle did not believe that the behaviour of complex entities followed from the laws that govern their parts or their matter. (Gotthelf 1987, Robinson 1983) By contrast, the behaviour of the matter is influenced by what it is the matter of. The nature of the matter places restrictions on what the enmattered thing can do—an animal can only be made from living tissue, not of stone or fire—but exactly how that matter behaves depends on the substantial form present in it. The substantial form plays, therefore, an essential role, not merely in certain kinds of scientific explanation, but by **being a fundamental efficient cause in its own right. **

ibid

Thus, what Aristotle placed into metaphysics in substance theory is actually not part of metaphysics, but part of the physical world, as shown by modern science. This is why this view is INCOMPATIBLE with modern science.

 

[Eleve]

Muze, you haven’t responded at all. Is it not true of the physical object involved in the Eucharist that it has the Real Presence, and that my cell phone does not? If not, what does the Real Presence amount to? If so, how can you say that you say that the Real Presence is “outside the physical universe”?

 

[Muze]

Muze, you haven’t responded at all. Is it not true of the physical object involved in the Eucharist that it has the Real Presence, and that my cell phone does not? If not, what does the Real Presence amount to? If so, how can you say that you say that the Real Presence is “outside the physical universe”?

TBH, there would need to be significant work to figure out the RCC’s actual position on the Eucharist to spell this out.

The EO appeals to mystery. Consubstantiation does as well, to an extent, and I’m comfortable with not necessarily fully explaining that.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Thus, what Aristotle placed into metaphysics in substance theory is actually not part of metaphysics, but part of the physical world, as shown by modern science. This is why this view is INCOMPATIBLE with modern science.

Nothing in your quote says that substance is physical. Please reread my quote in Post 179 as to why science fails to deny the non-physical concept of substance.

 

[Eleve]

TBH, there would need to be significant work to figure out the RCC’s actual position on the Eucharist to spell this out.

The EO appeals to mystery. Consubstantiation does as well, to an extent, and I’m comfortable with not necessarily fully explaining that.

It doesn’t make a lick of a difference. Science, by your own account, doesn’t say that physical objects are made up of fundamental particles plus unexplainable mysteries. It says they’re made up of fundamental particles.

I don’t see how you can appeal to a mysterious extraphysical consubstantiation and at the same time be so sure that physics has ruled out transubstantiation. The Real Presence is mysterious, except unmysterious enough for you to know that, however it works, it doesn’t work through substance theory? Come on.

 

[Eleve]

Thus, what Aristotle placed into metaphysics in substance theory is actually not part of metaphysics, but part of the physical world, as shown by modern science. This is why this view is INCOMPATIBLE with modern science.

That’s one view. The contrasting, “compatibilist” view, as I explained above, is that substances express facts about physical objects which are not reducible to facts about fundamental physics. Is there anything in the Council of Trent that commits the Catholic Church to the incompatibilist position?

 

[Muze]

That’s one view. The contrasting, “compatibilist” view, as I explained above, is that substances express facts about physical objects which are not reducible to facts about fundamental physics. Is there anything in the Council of Trent that commits the Catholic Church to the incompatibilist position?

The compatible view make substance only explanatory:

Even if dogs are wholly physical objects and even if all the atoms in dogs follow very precise laws of physics, nevertheless when doing the biology of dogs one will need concepts not to be found in a physics textbook. This is not for mere shorthand convenience, but because of the kinds of things in which, for example, the biologist or veterinary scientist is interested. There are interpreters of Aristotle who think that this kind of irreducibility** is all that Aristotle means—or needs to mean—by postulating an explanatory role for substantial form.**

Thus, there is nothing to be changed into something else, because the “substance” is only an explanation of this kind of irreducibility. Thus, it is only a concept that our minds think about.

Since “transubstantiation” must actually change something more than just the explanation of what the form is, then the function of substance as effective cause and such from the incompatible view is required.

 

[Muze]

It doesn’t make a lick of a difference. Science, by your own account, doesn’t say that physical objects are made up of fundamental particles plus unexplainable mysteries. It says they’re made up of fundamental particles.

That’s fine. Again, the “how” is a mystery at this point.

I don’t see how you can appeal to a mysterious extraphysical consubstantiation and at the same time be so sure that physics has ruled out transubstantiation. The Real Presence is mysterious, except unmysterious enough for you to know that, however it works, it doesn’t work through substance theory? Come on.

Modern science didn’t refute transubstantiation specifically, but rather substance theory as whole. In a sense, transubstantiation is a collateral victim to the fall of substance theory (at least as Trent uses it). So, more accurately, transubstantiation has failed because it’s underlying ontology has failed.

So, there isn’t anything addressing Real Presence at all, just the RCC’s doctrine of transubstantiation from the ontological side.

 

[Eleve]

Again, you’re misunderstanding the SEP article. We know that Aristotle posits an explanatory role for substances; the question is what it is that substances explain. The compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretation alike say that substances explain something. The incompatibilist says “Substances are composed of physical particles, but those particles behave differently depending on what substance they compose.” She posits an explanatory role for substance: it explains the behavior of the particles. Thus (as I have said already) the claim that substance is explanatory does not mean that it is “only a concept that our minds think about.”

 

[Muze]

Again, you’re misunderstanding the SEP article. We know that Aristotle posits an explanatory role for substances; the question is what it is that substances explain. The compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretation alike say that substances explain something. The incompatibilist says “Substances are composed of physical particles, but those particles behave differently depending on what substance they compose.”

Which is what is necessary for Trent. There must be something that is part of “substance” to change.

She posits an explanatory role for substance: it explains the behavior of the particles. Thus (as I have said already) the claim that substance is explanatory does not mean that it is “only a concept that our minds think about.”

If it is only explanatory, then it is purely a concept of the mind. That’s the compatible view. It removes any external element of substance which might be an effectual cause or source, and that’s what makes it compatible, but that also removes what might be changed in transubstantiation.

Which, IMHO, makes sense, but I’m not sure that’s what Aristotle meant, and it certainly doesn’t work for Trent.

 

[davidv]

That’s fine. Again, the “how” is a mystery at this point.

Modern science didn’t refute transubstantiation specifically, but rather substance theory as whole. In a sense, transubstantiation is a collateral victim to the fall of substance theory (at least as Trent uses it). So, more accurately, transubstantiation has failed because it’s underlying ontology has failed.

So, there isn’t anything addressing Real Presence at all, just the RCC’s doctrine of transubstantiation from the ontological side.

The Catechism declares this to be an erroneous position.

1376 The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation."206

 

[Eleve]

Where does Trent say that physical particles behave differently when conjoined with different substantial forms? Again, what commits Trent to the incompatibilist interpretation?

 

[Muze]

Where does Trent say that physical particles behave differently when conjoined with different substantial forms? Again, what commits Trent to the incompatibilist interpretation?

sigh

CHAPTER IV.
On Transubstantiation.

And because that Christ, our Redeemer, declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, therefore has it ever been a firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that, by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a ***conversion ***is made of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His blood; which ***conversion ***is, by the holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called Transubstantiation.

Unless you’re going to say that transubstantiation only “converts” the explanation of bread, you’re going to need something external to the mind to undergo this conversion. That’s only in the incompatiblet view.

 

[davidv]

sigh

Unless you’re going to say that transubstantiation only “converts” the explanation of bread, you’re going to need something external to the mind to undergo this conversion. That’s only in the incompatiblet view.

Transubstantiation does not do anything, it is a description of what happened. It makes no claim as to how it happens.

 

[Muze]

Transubstantiation does not do anything, it is a description of what happened. It makes no claim as to how it happens.

But it does make a claim that a conversion happens to the substance of the bread and wine. That means that the substance of the bread and wine must be actionable.