Aristotelian substance theory and transubstantiation

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Substance theory says that any object can be broken up into two components: the material and the immaterial. The material is obviously the Accidents: the color, shape, feel, etc of an object.

Matter is not an accident of a material substance. It is of the very essence of the substance. If you were to define the nature of man, would you define him solely by his soul or his soul and body?
The immaterial is obviously the Substance: that what the object is, its essence or form or similarly defined words (not exact, mind you, but they are close enough IMO).
 
O.K. guys, you have tried your best. You should have become convinced by now that Muze is not going to be persuaded. No matter what you say he will continue to say you are wrong. He is Protestant after all and apparantly of a doctrinaire persuasion.

All you have to do is hold firmly to what the Church teaches. Remember that the Holy Spirit has guaranteed the Church can not err in matters of Faith and Morals. The Church is guided by Tradition, of which the Scriptures is a part, but only a part. And the final authority of this Tradition is the Magisterium of the Church.

In the doctrine of Christ’s Real Presence the Church has used the terms " substantially, " " substance, " " species, " and " transubstantiation. " It seems clear that the Church is borrowing these terms from philosophy, perhaps the philosophy of St. Thomas. But it is even more clear that it is using these terms in its own way to express the reality of Chris’s Presence and how we are to regard it and how we are to understand how this comes about.

And what this means is given in the Catechisl of the Catholic Church as follows :

1374 The mode of Christ’s presence under the Eucharistic species is unique. It raises the Eucharist above all the sacraments as "the perfection of the spiritual life and the end to which all the sacraments tend."199 In the most blessed sacrament of the Eucharist "the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ and, therefore, the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained."200 "This presence is called ‘real’ - by which is not intended to exclude the other types of presence as if they could not be ‘real’ too, but because it is presence in the fullest sense: that is to say, it is a substantial presence by which Christ, God and man, makes himself wholly and entirely present."201

1375 It is by the conversion of the bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood that Christ becomes present in this sacrament. the Church Fathers strongly affirmed the faith of the Church in the efficacy of the Word of Christ and of the action of the Holy Spirit to bring about this conversion. Thus St. John Chrysostom declares:

It is not man that causes the things offered to become the Body and Blood of Christ, but he who was crucified for us, Christ himself. the priest, in the role of Christ, pronounces these words, but their power and grace are God’s. This is my body, he says. This word transforms the things offered.202

and St. Ambrose says about this conversion:

Be convinced that this is not what nature has formed, but what the blessing has consecrated. the power of the blessing prevails over that of nature, because by the blessing nature itself is changed… Could not Christ’s word, which can make from nothing what did not exist, change existing things into what they were not before? It is no less a feat to give things their original nature than to change their nature.203

1376 The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation."204

1377 The Eucharistic presence of Christ begins at the moment of the consecration and endures as long as the Eucharistic species subsist. Christ is present whole and entire in each of the species and whole and entire in each of their parts, in such a way that the breaking of the bread does not divide Christ.205

There really is no point in going any futher than that. You do not have to Prove anything to Muze, he will not accept anything you say. So let it go. Besides, you are making mistakes here and there - which I really don’t feel inclined to unpack at this point. I will only say that St. Thomas would agree that the word :" substance " is validly applied to the " Whole Christ " just as it would to the " whole Socrates. " And it is clear that the act of " Transubstantiation " is very similar to what St. Thomas would call a substantial change - but of a very special kind. First we are talking about bread and wine being totally changed into the Entire Physical Human Nature of Christ and the Divine Nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. That makes this substantial change very different and unique - outside the normal definitions of philosophy.

And secondly, the species ( material accidents ) of the bread and wine remain, but they remain without a subject or substance in which to inhere. And this too makes for a substantial change that does not fit into the definition of a substantial change in St. Thomas.

And it is always these " accidents " with which science deals, but science would call them substances. And under normal circumstances, say before the consecration, we would agree. But after the consecration we know through Faith that bread and wine are no longer there but only their accidents ( philosophical accidents). Science would still disagree. Well, let it. Science does not recognize miracles.

And this is about all we can say.

LInus2nd
 
Sorry, I forgot the intro to the previous paragraph, which sets up my quote:

(The compatiblist view reduces substance theory to merely an explanatory role. For Trent, this means that nothing remains of substance that is actionable or able to be converted.)

Not sure about all of it. Aristotle was not an atomist, so any claims he makes about the physical world would be very suspect indeed, and substance theory does make claims as to how the substance influences the physical (via the substantial form). And does so in a way that is incompatible with modern science.
I have found some time this morning to start on the link you provided. The Stanford Encyclopedia one.

Just some general observations so far. The author, I think, is referring to the issue you bring up in his overview. He defines two senses of the common usage for substance. The second one he defines and further subdivides:
Substances are a particular kind of basic entity, and some philosophical theories acknowledge them and others do not. On this use, Hume’s impressions and ideas are not substances, even though they are the building blocks of—what constitutes ‘being’ for—his world. According to this usage, it is a live issue whether the fundamental entities are:

  1. *]substances or
    *]something else, such as events, or properties located at space-times.

  1. I think the first definition is the one that the author states is the incompatibilist view. Here is the quote I want to look at and make some observations about:
    There are two interpretations of what Aristotle meant by this, one of which seems compatible with modern science and the other not.

    1. *]You seem to have take this quote to be a definitive ruling on the subject, but in the intro, the author specifically states that discussion of substance is still a :live issue" in the philosophical world.
      *]In the intro you provided in your second post, the author himself leaves the door open for further analysis and debate when he uses the terms I bolded “which seems”
      *]This article does not seem to address Thomas’ concept of substance. In fact, Thomas is not mentioned at all in the article.

      So the first thing we have to assume is that the church teaching in Trent can in no may be reconciled with the second definition (**which seems to be compatible ** with science). And I see no definitive ruling on whether the second definition of substance really is incompatible with science. And finally, this whole discussion might be a moot point if Thomas’ definition is substantially 😉 different than Aquinas’ definition.

      Do you think these are fair observations?

      God bless,
      Ut
 
And I see no definitive ruling on whether the second definition of substance really is incompatible with science.
typo: And I see no definitive ruling on whether the first definition of substance really is incompatible with science.
 
I have found some time this morning to start on the link you provided. The Stanford Encyclopedia one.

Just some general observations so far. The author, I think, is referring to the issue you bring up in his overview. He defines two senses of the common usage for substance. The second one he defines and further subdivides:

I think the first definition is the one that the author states is the incompatibilist view. Here is the quote I want to look at and make some observations about:


  1. *]You seem to have take this quote to be a definitive ruling on the subject, but in the intro, the author specifically states that discussion of substance is still a :live issue" in the philosophical world.
    *]In the intro you provided in your second post, the author himself leaves the door open for further analysis and debate when he uses the terms I bolded “which seems”
    *]This article does not seem to address Thomas’ concept of substance. In fact, Thomas is not mentioned at all in the article.

  1. No disagreement, here. There is obviously some discussion here. My impression was that it was between these two options.

    And there is some assumption that St. Thomas adopted the fundamentals of Aristotelian substance theory. I didn’t get a lot of disagreement as to that.
    So the first thing we have to assume is that the church teaching in Trent can in no may be reconciled with the second definition (**which seems to be compatible ** with science). And I see no definitive ruling on whether the second (first) definition of substance really is incompatible with science. And finally, this whole discussion might be a moot point if Thomas’ definition is substantially 😉 different than Aquinas’ definition.
    Do you think these are fair observations?
    God bless,
    Ut
    Yes. In fact, the first appears to be compatible with science, but the way that the substantial form is interpreted reduces it to an explanatory role, which seem quite incompatible with Aquinas and Trent, as it does not permit a substance that is actionable in that it can undergo conversion. Thus, Trent and Aquinas need to embrace something like the incompatible (second) interpretation.
 
I have found some time this morning to start on the link you provided. The Stanford Encyclopedia one.
You don’t seem to get it. It doesn’t matter one whit what the Stanford Encyclopedia says about " substance, " nor how ideologues interpret this in an attempt to smear the teachings of the Church. The O.P. will never agree with you, he is determined not to.

All that is improtant is to hold firmly to what the Church teaches. Remember that the Holy Spirit has guaranteed the Church can not err in matters of Faith and Morals. The Church is guided by Tradition, of which the Scriptures is a part, but only a part. And the final authority of this Tradition is the Magisterium of the Church.

In the doctrine of Christ’s Real Presence the Church has used the terms " substantially, " " substance, " " species, " and " transubstantiation. " It seems clear that the Church is borrowing these terms from philosophy, perhaps the philosophy of St. Thomas. But it is even more clear that it is using these terms in its own way to express the reality of Chris’s Presence and how we are to regard it and how we are to understand how this comes about.

And what this means is given in the Catechisl of the Catholic Church as follows :

1374 The mode of Christ’s presence under the Eucharistic species is unique. It raises the Eucharist above all the sacraments as "the perfection of the spiritual life and the end to which all the sacraments tend."199 In the most blessed sacrament of the Eucharist "the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ and, therefore, the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained."200 "This presence is called ‘real’ - by which is not intended to exclude the other types of presence as if they could not be ‘real’ too, but because it is presence in the fullest sense: that is to say, it is a substantial presence by which Christ, God and man, makes himself wholly and entirely present."201

1375 It is by the conversion of the bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood that Christ becomes present in this sacrament. the Church Fathers strongly affirmed the faith of the Church in the efficacy of the Word of Christ and of the action of the Holy Spirit to bring about this conversion. Thus St. John Chrysostom declares:

It is not man that causes the things offered to become the Body and Blood of Christ, but he who was crucified for us, Christ himself. the priest, in the role of Christ, pronounces these words, but their power and grace are God’s. This is my body, he says. This word transforms the things offered.202

and St. Ambrose says about this conversion:

Be convinced that this is not what nature has formed, but what the blessing has consecrated. the power of the blessing prevails over that of nature, because by the blessing nature itself is changed… Could not Christ’s word, which can make from nothing what did not exist, change existing things into what they were not before? It is no less a feat to give things their original nature than to change their nature.203

1376 The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation."204

1377 The Eucharistic presence of Christ begins at the moment of the consecration and endures as long as the Eucharistic species subsist. Christ is present whole and entire in each of the species and whole and entire in each of their parts, in such a way that the breaking of the bread does not divide Christ.205

There really is no point in going any futher than that. You do not have to Prove anything to Muze, he will not accept anything you say. So let it go. Besides, you are making mistakes here and there - which I really don’t feel inclined to unpack at this point. I will only say that St. Thomas would agree that the word :" substance " is validly applied to the " Whole Christ " just as it would to the " whole Socrates. " And it is clear that the act of " Transubstantiation " is very similar to what St. Thomas would call a substantial change - but of a very special kind. First we are talking about bread and wine being totally changed into the Entire Physical Human Nature of Christ and the Divine Nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. That makes this substantial change very different and unique - outside the normal definitions of philosophy.

And secondly, the species ( material accidents ) of the bread and wine remain, but they remain without a subject or substance in which to inhere. And this too makes for a substantial change that does not fit into the definition of a substantial change in St. Thomas.

And it is always these " accidents " with which science deals, but science would call them substances. And under normal circumstances, say before the consecration, we would agree. But after the consecration we know through Faith that bread and wine are no longer there but only their accidents ( philosophical accidents). Science would still disagree. Well, let it. Science does not recognize miracles.

And this is about all we can say.

LInus2nd

 
You don’t seem to get it. It doesn’t matter one whit what the Stanford Encyclopedia says about " substance, " nor how ideologues interpret this in an attempt to smear the teachings of the Church. The O.P. will never agree with you, he is determined not to.
I believe Muze has built his case around some of the discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia article. I’m not sure, but I don’t think many people have taken a detailed look at the article. I wanted to take a look for myself. Expand on what is presented there, and see if it lines up with what Muze is claiming.
All that is improtant is to hold firmly to what the Church teaches. Remember that the Holy Spirit has guaranteed the Church can not err in matters of Faith and Morals. The Church is guided by Tradition, of which the Scriptures is a part, but only a part. And the final authority of this Tradition is the Magisterium of the Church.
Understood and I 100% agree.
In the doctrine of Christ’s Real Presence the Church has used the terms " substantially, " " substance, " " species, " and " transubstantiation. " It seems clear that the Church is borrowing these terms from philosophy, perhaps the philosophy of St. Thomas. But it is even more clear that it is using these terms in its own way to express the reality of Chris’s Presence and how we are to regard it and how we are to understand how this comes about.
Agreed. In my discussions with Muze about the article, we have already defined a generic sense in which the term substance is used and another two more specific ways. Those options would have been available to the council fathers, plus a lot more besides. And also, the way they introduce this discussion in session 13 seems to add to this idea of appropriating the language, but not using it in the same way.

thecounciloftrent.com/ch13.htm
CHAPTER I.
On the real presence of our Lord Jesus Christ in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist.
In the first place, the holy Synod teaches, and openly and simply professes, that, in the august sacrament of the holy Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the species of those sensible things. For neither are these things mutually repugnant,-that our Saviour Himself always sitteth at the right hand of the Father in heaven, according to the natural mode of existing, and that, nevertheless, He be, in many other places, sacramentally present to us in his own substance, **by a manner of existing, which, though we can scarcely express it in words, yet can we, by the understanding illuminated by faith, conceive, and we ought most firmly to believe, to be possible unto God: **for thus all our forefathers, as many as were in the true Church of Christ, who have treated of this most holy Sacrament, have most openly professed, that our Redeemer instituted this so admirable a sacrament at the last supper, when, after the blessing of the bread and wine, He testified, in express and clear words, that He gave them His own very Body, and His own Blood; words which,-recorded by the holy Evangelists, and afterwards repeated by Saint Paul, whereas they carry with them that proper and most manifest meaning in which they were understood by the Fathers,-it is indeed a crime the most unworthy that they should be wrested, by certain contentions and wicked men, to fictitious and imaginary tropes, whereby the verity of the flesh and blood of Christ is denied, contrary to the universal sense of the Church, which, as the pillar and ground of truth, has detested, as satanical, these inventions devised by impious men; she recognising, with a mind ever grateful and unforgetting, this most excellent benefit of Christ.
Even if you reject substance theory, the truth that the church is trying to convey here is the real presence. A truth that “…we can scarcely express it in words”. The bread and wine are no longer there (except in their appearance (species).

Continued
 
I believe Muze has built his case around some of the discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia article. I’m not sure, but I don’t think many people have taken a detailed look at the article. I wanted to take a look for myself. Expand on what is presented there, and see if it lines up with what Muze is claiming.

Understood and I 100% agree.

Agreed. In my discussions with Muze about the article, we have already defined a generic sense in which the term substance is used and another two more specific ways. Those options would have been available to the council fathers, plus a lot more besides. And also, the way they introduce this discussion in session 13 seems to add to this idea of appropriating the language, but not using it in the same way.

thecounciloftrent.com/ch13.htm

Even if you reject substance theory, the truth that the church is trying to convey here is the real presence. A truth that “…we can scarcely express it in words”. The bread and wine are no longer there (except in their appearance (species).

Continued
Yes, the council states the matter more clearly than the CCC. Linus2nd
 
And what this means is given in the Catechisl of the Catholic Church as follows :
1374 The mode of Christ’s presence under the Eucharistic species is unique. It raises the Eucharist above all the sacraments as "the perfection of the spiritual life and the end to which all the sacraments tend."199 In the most blessed sacrament of the Eucharist "the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ and, therefore, the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained."200 "This presence is called ‘real’ - by which is not intended to exclude the other types of presence as if they could not be ‘real’ too, but because it is presence in the fullest sense: that is to say, it is a substantial presence by which Christ, God and man, makes himself wholly and entirely present."201
1375 It is by the conversion of the bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood that Christ becomes present in this sacrament. the Church Fathers strongly affirmed the faith of the Church in the efficacy of the Word of Christ and of the action of the Holy Spirit to bring about this conversion. Thus St. John Chrysostom declares:
It is not man that causes the things offered to become the Body and Blood of Christ, but he who was crucified for us, Christ himself. the priest, in the role of Christ, pronounces these words, but their power and grace are God’s. This is my body, he says. This word transforms the things offered.202
and St. Ambrose says about this conversion:
Be convinced that this is not what nature has formed, but what the blessing has consecrated. the power of the blessing prevails over that of nature, because by the blessing nature itself is changed… Could not Christ’s word, which can make from nothing what did not exist, change existing things into what they were not before? It is no less a feat to give things their original nature than to change their nature.203
1376 The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation."204
1377 The Eucharistic presence of Christ begins at the moment of the consecration and endures as long as the Eucharistic species subsist. Christ is present whole and entire in each of the species and whole and entire in each of their parts, in such a way that the breaking of the bread does not divide Christ.205
Good quote. I understand and affirm this in faith.
There really is no point in going any futher than that. You do not have to Prove anything to Muze, he will not accept anything you say. So let it go.
Well, I don’t think Muze is asking us to prove an article of faith. I think he is using a perceived contradiction in substance theory with science to attack Trent’s explanation of this article of faith. His goal is simple. Discredit substance theory and you discredit the church’s explanation of Transubstantiation.

My goal is to look through the Stanford article to see if this is really possible. I have already raised a few general observations about the article where I have expressed my thoughts about this.
Besides, you are making mistakes here and there - which I really don’t feel inclined to unpack at this point.
I am ready and willing to learn about my mistakes - I make no claims at being an expert here. I’m sorry you don’t have the time to unpack these mistakes though. I would appreciate your (name removed by moderator)ut.

But perhaps my goal is not so much to present myself as an expert in Aquinas or Aristotle, but to take a close look at what Muze is claiming, look at his evidence (the only thing I have seen so far is the Stanford article) and then move on.

At the same time, if I can deepen my understanding of Aristotle and Aquinas’ philosophy, I will be happy.
I will only say that St. Thomas would agree that the word :" substance " is validly applied to the " Whole Christ " just as it would to the " whole Socrates. " And it is clear that the act of " Transubstantiation " is very similar to what St. Thomas would call a substantial change - but of a very special kind. First we are talking about bread and wine being totally changed into the Entire Physical Human Nature of Christ and the Divine Nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. That makes this substantial change very different and unique - outside the normal definitions of philosophy.
Agreed. You know,what is interesting, is that you can explain this information in ways that don’t use these philosophical words of substance and species. I mean, what the church was after was a doctrine that believers could, with the church, “…openly and simply professes…” Perhaps the philosophy of substance and species was the best way to achieve this in the time of Trent, but not the best way today. Perhaps what we really need here is a translation into modern language that everyone today can “…openly and simply professes”.

Continued
 
And secondly, the species ( material accidents ) of the bread and wine remain, but they remain without a subject or substance in which to inhere. And this too makes for a substantial change that does not fit into the definition of a substantial change in St. Thomas.
And it is always these " accidents " with which science deals, but science would call them substances. And under normal circumstances, say before the consecration, we would agree. But after the consecration we know through Faith that bread and wine are no longer there but only their accidents ( philosophical accidents). Science would still disagree. Well, let it. Science does not recognize miracles.
Right. So lets say that a substance is only a group of properties (accidents). I would suspect that this doctrine would still hold up. We are basically saying that the properties that make up the bread and wine no longer reflect the reality of what the bread and the wine are after consecration. Muze would object here that if we collapse substance into properties in this way, there is nothing to transustantiate. But I don’t think this is a necessary conclusion. If the properties are the substance, then what the church is claiming here is that, in this one case, there is a divergence between what the properties reveal about the thing and about what that thing actually is after consecration.

Would you agree LInus? Or are we necessarily bound to a realist interpretation of what Aristotle and Aquinas meant by substance, where substance would be some kind of substrata?
And this is about all we can say.
Oh I think there is so much more we can say here. But maybe it would be like Saint Augustine’s vision of the boy trying to empty the sea into a sea shell. 🙂

God bless,
Ut
 
Right. So lets say that a substance is only a group of properties (accidents). I would suspect that this doctrine would still hold up. We are basically saying that the properties that make up the bread and wine no longer reflect the reality of what the bread and the wine are after consecration. Muze would object here that if we collapse substance into properties in this way, there is nothing to transustantiate. But I don’t think this is a necessary conclusion. If the properties are the substance, then what the church is claiming here is that, in this one case, there is a divergence between what the properties reveal about the thing and about what that thing actually is after consecration.

Would you agree LInus? Or are we necessarily bound to a realist interpretation of what Aristotle and Aquinas meant by substance, where substance would be some kind of substrata?

Oh I think there is so much more we can say here. But maybe it would be like Saint Augustine’s vision of the boy trying to empty the sea into a sea shell. 🙂

God bless,
Ut
If you reread what you quoted from the Council, you will notice that even the Council said it could hardly find words to express the wonderful Miracle of change that takes place. One gets the feeling that the Council realized that perhaps the term " substance " did not express exactly what had to be said. But it was intent only in that they get across the reality of what takes place, even if the language fell short. So I don’t think it is wise to force the meaning of the word " substance, " as used by the Council, into the definitions of that term as used by any philosopher. But rather it used the term as the only one available that came anywhere close to what it meant to say.

My feeling is that Thomas’ use of the term does not fit exactly the meaning the Council meant to express, the same would apply to Aristotle. Perhaps I am wrong and I certainly bow to someone who can express it better than myself. But if you read Thomas on " substance " you will see it is one of the most difficult concepts to get hold of. One feels that even Thomas struggled with the term. It is certainly confusing.

Linus2nd
 
If you reread what you quoted from the Council, you will notice that even the Council said it could hardly find words to express the wonderful Miracle of change that takes place. One gets the feeling that the Council realized that perhaps the term " substance " did not express exactly what had to be said. But it was intent only in that they get across the reality of what takes place, even if the language fell short. So I don’t think it is wise to force the meaning of the word " substance, " as used by the Council, into the definitions of that term as used by any philosopher. But rather it used the term as the only one available that came anywhere close to what it meant to say.

My feeling is that Thomas’ use of the term does not fit exactly the meaning the Council meant to express, the same would apply to Aristotle. Perhaps I am wrong and I certainly bow to someone who can express it better than myself. But if you read Thomas on " substance " you will see it is one of the most difficult concepts to get hold of. One feels that even Thomas struggled with the term. It is certainly confusing.

Linus2nd
I think this is a fair point to make. Thanks Linus2nd,

God bless,
Ut
 
Muze,

Your questions got me reading up on the current state of atomism in science. I decided to look at atomism historically and modernly. Thankfully, the 10 volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006) gave an overview of its development, with some interestng conclusions (explicitly concluding that the Greek debate about the nature of change is just as important now as it was then: it is a “live issue” philosophically). It also provided a nice overview of Aristotelianism in another article. The relevant articles are Atomism and Aristotle, found in Vol. 1.

Firslty, Aristotle did not reject atomism outright. What he insisted on, however, is that the atoms (means “indivisible”) are each of them also capable of changing. Modernly this has been confirmed by science: atoms are capable of changing. See the latter half of the Atomism article if you can, but if not here’s a short piece from wiki about it:

Nuclear transmutation is the conversion of one chemical element or isotope into another. In other words, atoms of one element can be changed into atoms of other element by ‘transmutation’. This occurs either through nuclear reactions (in which an outside particle reacts with a nucleus), or through radioactive decay (where no outside particle is needed).

If I recall, the article also mentioned another more radical kind of change too.

Aristotle, then, was well ahead of his time; notwithstanding atomism and even a concept of atomism closer to our more maleable modern and scientific one, Aristotle did not abandon his Substance Theory. I think the reason for this is because something’s physical make-up or construction cannot be absolutely identified with that individual thing - least of all from an atomic viewpoint, as when a car or robot undergoes many part changes over the course of its ‘life’, such that we can’t even be sure the majority of parts, considered either by overall weight or volume or their essential importance, are from the original vehicle. Indeed, identifying things with certain (individual) atoms would be even more absurd than its various whole parts (e.g., its frame): animals especially are constantly acquiring matter (atoms), manipulating (changing) it and discarding it. Notwithstanding, a man remains the same person he was when he was a boy even if, materially speaking, he is radically -almost completely- different, especially considered from his early days in his mother’s womb, where those original cell types are not even present in him anymore ; and the car or robot remains a car or a robot even if it is difficult to identify it as the original invidual car or robot over time and many various part replacements.

Source: amazon.com/Encyclopedia-Of-Philosophy-Volume-Set/dp/0028657802
 
Muze,

Your questions got me reading up on the current state of atomism in science. I decided to look at atomism historically and modernly. Thankfully, the 10 volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006) gave an overview of its development, with some interestng conclusions (explicitly concluding that the Greek debate about the nature of change is just as important now as it was then: it is a “live issue” philosophically). It also provided a nice overview of Aristotelianism in another article. The relevant articles are Atomism and Aristotle, found in Vol. 1.

Firslty, Aristotle did not reject atomism outright. What he insisted on, however, is that the atoms (means “indivisible”) are each of them also capable of changing. Modernly this has been confirmed by science: atoms are capable of changing.’/quote]

LOL… These are not the terms that Aristotle used, nor is this what he was referring to.
See the latter half of the Atomism
 
1AugustSon7;10897417:
Muze,

Your questions got me reading up on the current state of atomism in science. I decided to look at atomism historically and modernly. Thankfully, the 10 volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2006) gave an overview of its development, with some interestng conclusions (explicitly concluding that the Greek debate about the nature of change is just as important now as it was then: it is a “live issue” philosophically). It also provided a nice overview of Aristotelianism in another article. The relevant articles are Atomism and Aristotle, found in Vol. 1.

Firslty, Aristotle did not reject atomism outright. What he insisted on, however, is that the atoms (means “indivisible”) are each of them also capable of changing. Modernly this has been confirmed by science: atoms are capable of changing.’/quote]

LOL… These are not the terms that Aristotle used, nor is this what he was referring to.

Minor problem, here. The “accidents” change when the atom undergoes this change. In Trent, the appearance of the bread and wine do not change.

No, Muze, it is not a ‘minor problem’ and you are demonstrating the complaint lodged against you by earlier posters. The point is, Muze, that a thing cannot be identified absolutely by it’s singular atomic structure.

At this point it is evident that you want a simplistic, reductionist theory to be true and don’t actually care about the opinions of experts or even the obvious evidence.

The truth is: a subsistent thing (such as you are) cannot be identified absolutely with its so-called “atomic arrangement”. Science says so, experts say so, and you would have it otherwise.

Until you can identifiy yourself with an atom you need to acknowledge the fact that atoms come and go but Muze remains Muze regardless.
 
Interesting quote on Hylemorphic dualism by David Oderberg mentioned in Dr. Feser’s blog.

docs.google.com/file/d/0B7SKlRTfkUieRWJGMzRadUVaXzg/edit

I like his thesis statement on page 72:
Briefly, the central theses to be def’ended are as follows.
(1) All substances, in other words all self-subsisting entities that are the bearers of properties and attributes but are not themselves properties or attributes of anything, are compounds of matter (hyle) and form (nnrphc).
(2) The form is substantial since it actualizes matter and gives the substance its very essence and identity.
(3) The human person, being a substance, is also a compound of matter and substantial form.
(4) Since a person ls defined as an individual substance of a rational nature, the substantial form of the person is the rational nature of the person.
(5) The exercise of rationality, however, is an essentially immaterial operation.
(6) Hence, human nature itself is essentially immaterial.
(7) But since it is immaterial, it does not depend for its existence on being united to matter.
(8) So a person is capable of existing, by means of his rational nature, which is traditionally called the soul, independently of the existence of his body.
(9) Hence, human beings are immortal; but their identity and individuality does require that they be united to a body at some time in their existence
It would seem to indicate that, at least according to Oderberg, the substance of a human being is the form, not the prime matter. And this form is the rational nature of the person.

This seems to coincide with what the article mentions as the incompatibilist position:
The stronger, incompatibilitist interpretation is that Aristotle did not believe that the behaviour of complex entities followed from the laws that govern their parts or their matter. (Gotthelf 1987, Robinson 1983) By contrast, the behaviour of the matter is influenced by what it is the matter of. The nature of the matter places restrictions on what the enmattered thing can do—an animal can only be made from living tissue, not of stone or fire—but exactly how that matter behaves depends on the substantial form present in it. The substantial form plays, therefore, an essential role, not merely in certain kinds of scientific explanation, but by being a fundamental efficient cause in its own right.
But as I have read from Feser’s blog and other sources, this statement can be criticized based on a criticism of the methodology of modern science that excludes anything that cannot be explained empirically. Feser, and others as well, seem to see this rejection of all immaterial substances (such as mind and rationality) as a result of Cartesian dualism and a culture of scientism obsessed with quantitative measurements (in the sense realm) that exclude all other kinds of data.

Anyway, this is really interesting stuff. Regardless of which position is ultimately correct, the subject is certainly rewarding in itself.

God bless,
Ut
 
Another interesting one here explaining the reason why we must consider the rational immaterial soul as the substance of human nature:
Now, if the souls immaterial, it follows that human nature is immaterial,
since the soul of a person is that person’s nature.We can see this by understanding the concept of a hierarchy of capacities. Although some may balk at the idea of such a hierarchy, in fact the idea is easily explained by saying that F-typre capacities are superior to C-type capacities just in case the former entail the latter but not vice versa. It follows that sentience is superior to nutrition because sentient operations require nutritive ones but
not vice versa-we have abundant examples of such. Hence, the nature of an object that has sentience and nutrition as capacities is sentient, and by implication nutritive, but not merely nutritive. In other words, the nature of a thing is defined in terrns of its highest capacities. Human rationality is superior to both human sentience and human nutrition according to the definition given, so human nature is defined in terms of the rational capacity. If the rational capacity is immaterial, however, it follows that human
nature, that is, the substantial form of the human person, is immaterial. (This
does not imply that nutrition, say, is an immaterial process, only that human
nature, being essentially immaterial, contains a power of nutrition that can
exist apart from anv embodiment. But in the absence of the requisite material
conditions-embodiment and objects upon which to act-that power
cannot be exercised.)
 
In all things of Faith and Morals, it is what the Church teaches that we must hang on to. All philosophy, even that of St. Thomas, all Theology, is specualtion to one degree or another. So we must reject any " learned " opinion that is not in accord with Church teaching.

We are getting off topic. But the nature of man is important. Please refer to the following paragraphs in the CCC.

II. “BODY AND SOUL BUT TRULY ONE”

362 The human person, created in the image of God, is a being at once corporeal and spiritual. the biblical account expresses this reality in symbolic language when it affirms that "then the LORD God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being."229 Man, whole and entire, is therefore willed by God.

363 In Sacred Scripture the term “soul” often refers to human life or the entire human person.230 But “soul” also refers to the innermost aspect of man, that which is of greatest value in him,231 that by which he is most especially in God’s image: “soul” signifies the spiritual principle in man.

364 The human body shares in the dignity of “the image of God”: it is a human body precisely because it is animated by a spiritual soul, and it is the whole human person that is intended to become, in the body of Christ, a temple of the Spirit:232

Man, though made of body and soul, is a unity. Through his very bodily condition he sums up in himself the elements of the material world. Through him they are thus brought to their highest perfection and can raise their voice in praise freely given to the Creator. For this reason man may not despise his bodily life. Rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and to hold it in honour since God has created it and will raise it up on the last day 233

365 The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the “form” of the body:234 i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.

366 The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God - it is not “produced” by the parents - and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection.235

367 Sometimes the soul is distinguished from the spirit: St. Paul for instance prays that God may sanctify his people “wholly”, with “spirit and soul and body” kept sound and blameless at the Lord’s coming.236 The Church teaches that this distinction does not introduce a duality into the soul.237 “Spirit” signifies that from creation man is ordered to a supernatural end and that his soul can gratuitously be raised beyond all it deserves to communion with God.238

Linus2nd
 
In all things of Faith and Morals, it is what the Church teaches that we must hang on to. All philosophy, even that of St. Thomas, all Theology, is specualtion to one degree or another. So we must reject any " learned " opinion that is not in accord with Church teaching.

We are getting off topic. But the nature of man is important. Please refer to the following paragraphs in the CCC.

II. “BODY AND SOUL BUT TRULY ONE”

362 The human person, created in the image of God, is a being at once corporeal and spiritual. the biblical account expresses this reality in symbolic language when it affirms that "then the LORD God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being."229 Man, whole and entire, is therefore willed by God.

363 In Sacred Scripture the term “soul” often refers to human life or the entire human person.230 But “soul” also refers to the innermost aspect of man, that which is of greatest value in him,231 that by which he is most especially in God’s image: “soul” signifies the spiritual principle in man.

364 The human body shares in the dignity of “the image of God”: it is a human body precisely because it is animated by a spiritual soul, and it is the whole human person that is intended to become, in the body of Christ, a temple of the Spirit:232

Man, though made of body and soul, is a unity. Through his very bodily condition he sums up in himself the elements of the material world. Through him they are thus brought to their highest perfection and can raise their voice in praise freely given to the Creator. For this reason man may not despise his bodily life. Rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and to hold it in honour since God has created it and will raise it up on the last day 233

365 The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the “form” of the body:234 i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.

366 The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God - it is not “produced” by the parents - and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection.235

367 Sometimes the soul is distinguished from the spirit: St. Paul for instance prays that God may sanctify his people “wholly”, with “spirit and soul and body” kept sound and blameless at the Lord’s coming.236 The Church teaches that this distinction does not introduce a duality into the soul.237 “Spirit” signifies that from creation man is ordered to a supernatural end and that his soul can gratuitously be raised beyond all it deserves to communion with God.238

Linus2nd
Stop shouting Linus. I can hear you very well.

God bless,
Ut
 
Stop shouting Linus. I can hear you very well.

God bless,
Ut
Not shouting. Just wanted to be sure every one saw what I wanted to say because it was important and those actually posting are not the only ones who read these posts.

Linus2nd
 
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