Aristotle: in what sense are passions and actions real?

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How are actions and passions real and really distinguished from another?

By action we mean the POV of something from which motion is expressed and passion, the POV of something to which, motion is received.
 
There are three words which tend to be used in this kind of discussion–passions, emotions and feelings.

They also have technical meanings.

My passions emote feelings.

My passions are passive.

My passions need an active agent.

The active agent can be external to me.

The active agent can be internal.

The external active agent can be other people or the rest of the surrounding world.

The internal active agent can be my mind, will, memory and things of this nature.

There is a difference between a person acting on my emotions by being kind to me or mean to me. The actions of another person are active, and my passions are passive.

I could write more, but if I am accurate one gets the concept of the realities.
 
Are there times when passions or actions are “logical”
(in the mind only) and not real?

For instance, throwing a ball and catching it are action and passion respectively. But in reality they are the same thing ( a motion), so is this an instance of only mental passions/actions?
 
I think I might have misunderstood the first post.

I am sorry about that.

I will get back to this, if I come up with an idea to address your ideas.

I am not saying I will be able to give an answer, but only address your ideas.
 
fakename said:
How are actions and passions real and really distinguished from another?

By action we mean the POV of something from which motion is expressed and passion, the POV of something to which, motion is received.
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We sometimes have a tendency to only think of substances as really existing, but of course one of Aristotle’s most fundamental points is that there are categories of being (he names 10). Action is the 9th Category and Passion is the 10th. Just because Action and Passion are relationally opposed, doesn’t mean that they are not real. Indeed, the 4th category of being is Relation. Relations are real (but not real “things” because “things” denotes substance).

You ask if some actions can be simply logical and not real, I would point out that the question is invalid. Whatever is logical is in fact real. It might not be a substance, but it clears exists somehow, if it didn’t, you wouldn’t be able to talk about it. Even a phantasm in a person’s mind (which doesn’t correspond to any existing substance) is still a “real” phantasm. Real and existing are sort of synonymous terms in this context. Thus, if something only exists in potency and not in act, that thing could be considered “not real” at least not until it is actualized.
 
A better question: are passions/actions founded on something real necessarily?

Is the passion of receiving a blow necessarily connected with the physical connection between fist and chin?
 
When Aristotle defined the 10 Categories, he first made a broader classification between substance and accident. Substance was then named as the first Category, and the other 9 Categories were classified as Accidents. Any accident, whether quality, quantity, relation, action, or passion, only exists insofar as it inheres in a substance. For example, you might have a tall tree. Tallness, is a real quality/quantity, but it cannot exist outside of the tree. You do not walk down the street and see “tallness” walking by.

Least we think that because of this, only substances are real and accidents are not, we must also realize that substances don’t often exist without accidents, this is always true of material substances. Just as you cannot see tallness walking down the street, you cannot see a dog walking down the street that did not have some quality of color, for without color, nothing would be visible at all. Substance and accidents are related in a way to what Modern Philosophers (and I use that term in all of its negative connotation) call noumenal and phenomenal realities. Indeed many modern scientists argued that only the perceptible accidents were real, and that since we could not directly perceive substances, they must not be real.

Anyway, passions and actions are really real, but they also must inhere as accidents of some substance, i.e. some substance acts, or some substance receives.
 
Katholish

Please forgive this question, what is the Thomistic teaching on the nature of the being of math? You could send it to me on another thread or here, thanks!

I think I can say that better: What kind of being does math have?
 
Math is essentially is own category of being, it is Aristotle’s 2nd Category in fact, called “Quantity”.

In a strict definition, we would define math as the science of quantity (science just being a term that means “an organized body of knowledge” about some thing). When you think about the number “7” we know that “7” is not a substance. It does not have independent existance, but rather always exists as a property (or accident) of some other thing. Like, the NBA player is 7ft tall, or “I have 7 dollars”.

If your question had more to do with “what kind of being is knowledge” then my answer would be different and significantly more complicated as it involves the potency of an intellect.
 
Thanks!

I posted on the immaterial soul before I saw your post here.

You are a saint, and I want to thank you for your help!!!
 
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