Aristotle vs. Aquinas on Contraries

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At the end of Aristotle’s Categories, he discusses the various ways in which things may be opposed to one another. He says they may be opposed in four ways: either as relatives, as contraries, as privation and possession, or as affirmation and negation.

My question is, do all things that seem to exist as contraries actually exist merely as privation and possession? I’m wondering, because Aristotle gives the example of good and evil as existing as contraries; but Aquinas and Company held that the latter is a privation of the former, and that evil is not a thing, as in something actual, at all.
 
It seems they might be interchanged in other ways as well. To be to the left is an opposition being to the right in terms of relation, but it is also a privation of “rightness.”

One simply has to be careful of equivocating. Can you post the text here so we can discuss it? I’m lazy tonight.
 
e_c said:
It seems they might be interchanged in other ways as well. To be to the left is an opposition being to the right in terms of relation, but it is also a privation of “rightness.”

One simply has to be careful of equivocating. Can you post the text here so we can discuss it? I’m lazy tonight.
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Sure thing.

All quotes are from the J. L. Ackrill translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. I, pp. 3-24.
Things are said to be opposed to one another in four ways: as relatives or as contraries or as privation and possession or as affirmation and negation.

Now, I don’t think you can say that “to be to the left” is “a privation of rightness,” because Aristotle says: Being deprived and possessing are not privation and possession. For sight is a possession and blindness a privation, but having sight is not sight nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is a particular privation but being blind is being deprived, not a privation. Moreover, if blindness were the same as being blind both would be predicated of the same thing. But though a man is called blind a man is certainly not called blindness.

Rather, being-to-the-right and being-to-the-left are opposed in the same manner as affirmation and negation, even though neither is actually a statement; nevertheless, they are opposed in the same way as “he is to the left”—“he is to the right.” This is what Aristotle says about this:
For an affirmation is an affirmative statement and a negation a negative statement, whereas none of the things underlying an affirmation or negation is a statement. These [the things underlying them] are, however, said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and negation are; for in these cases, too, the manner of opposition is the same. For in the way an affirmation is opposed to a negation, for example ‘he is sitting’—‘he is not sitting’, so are opposed also the actual things underlying each, his sitting—his not sitting.

All the same, the concepts of left and right are weird to deal with, because what is to-the-left from one perspective can be to-the-right from another perspective, so to-the-left or to-the-right is not definite as to where, whereas something like toward-the-city is. It seems absurd to say that any opposition as relative, such as indefinite quantities like more vs. less, or farther vs. closer, could ever admit also of opposition as possession and privation: “more is a privation of less” or “less is a privation of more” seem really strange to say, and furthermore, you can’t pick out which is the privation and which is the possession because neither is either of those two by nature. We can say that darkness is a privation of light, but not that light is a privation of darkness, because privation necessarily means nonexistence. The concept of “nonexistence of darkness” is not just redundant, but absurd.

But let’s get off of this. Back to the idea of evil and good as being contraries, Aristotle explains:
What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad; this is clear by induction from cases—health and sickness, justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, and so on with the rest. But what is contrary to a bad thing is sometimes good but sometimes bad. For excess is contrary to deficiency, which is bad, and is itself bad; yet moderation as well is contrary to both, and it is good.

Then, when speaking of opposition as privation and possession, he says:Nor are cases of privation and possession opposed as contraries, as is clear from the following. With contraries between which there is nothing intermediate it is necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to the things they naturally occur in or are predicated of. …] But where there is something intermediate it is never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything: it is not necessary for everything to be white or black that is capable of receiving them, or hot or cold, since something intermediate between these may perfectly well be present. Moreover, there was something intermediate in just those cases where it was not necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them—except for things to which the one belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow; and in these cases it is necessary for definitely one or the other to belong, and not as chance has it. …]

But neither of these accounts is true of privation and possession. For it is not necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to a thing capable of receiving them, since if it is not yet natural for something to have sight it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that these would not be contraries of the sort that have nothing intermediate between them. Nor, however, of the sort that do have something between them. For it is necessary at some time for one or the other of them to belong to everything capable of receiving them. For when once it is natural for something to have sight then it will be said either to be blind or to have sight—not definitely one or the other of these but as chance has it, since it is not necessary either for it to be blind or for it to have sight, but as chance has it. But with contraries which have something intermediate between them we said it was never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything, but to certain things, and to them definitely the one. Hence it is clear that things opposed as privation and possession are not opposed in either of the ways contraries are.

Here is a link to an online version, but it is a different translation.
 
Tannhauser_1509 said:
At the end of Aristotle’s Categories, he discusses the various ways in which things may be opposed to one another. He says they may be opposed in four ways: either as relatives, as contraries, as privation and possession, or as affirmation and negation.

My question is, do all things that seem to exist as contraries actually exist merely as privation and possession? I’m wondering, because Aristotle gives the example of good and evil as existing as contraries; but Aquinas and Company held that the latter is a privation of the former, and that evil is not a thing, as in something actual, at all.
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If I remember rightly (I’d have to go back and check, but I don’t have time at the moment), “contraries” here can be taken in a broad sense and in a strict sense. In a strict sense, two “contraries” are simply two alternatives that are roughly equivalent—the way you can have chocolate or vanilla ice cream. They are “contraries” because they exclude one another. Yes, you can have “checkerboard” ice cream with both flavors, or you can make a third flavor that is a mixture of both, but generally the portion that is truly “vanilla” cannot be “chocolate” at the same time.

In a broader sense, however, Aquinas sometimes includes possession and privation as kinds of contraries, and yes, that would include good and evil in all its manifestations.
 
lmelahn said:
If I remember rightly (I’d have to go back and check, but I don’t have time at the moment), “contraries” here can be taken in a broad sense and in a strict sense. In a strict sense, two “contraries” are simply two alternatives that are roughly equivalent—the way you can have chocolate or vanilla ice cream. They are “contraries” because they exclude one another. Yes, you can have “checkerboard” ice cream with both flavors, or you can make a third flavor that is a mixture of both, but generally the portion that is truly “vanilla” cannot be “chocolate” at the same time.

In a broader sense, however, Aquinas sometimes includes possession and privation as kinds of contraries, and yes, that would include good and evil in all its manifestations.
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So “contrary” here expresses mutual exclusivity, in the broad sense? Then why is “privation and possession” not a sub-category, then, under “contraries”? Why does Aristotle make them two distinct categories of ways things may be opposed?
 
Tannhauser_1509 said:
At the end of Aristotle’s Categories, he discusses the various ways in which things may be opposed to one another. He says they may be opposed in four ways: either as relatives, as contraries, as privation and possession, or as affirmation and negation.

My question is, do all things that seem to exist as contraries actually exist merely as privation and possession? I’m wondering, because Aristotle gives the example of good and evil as existing as contraries; but Aquinas and Company held that the latter is a privation of the former, and that evil is not a thing, as in something actual, at all.
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Contraries, unlike contradictions, can exist at the same time. Contraries are not mutually exclusive but may co-exist with their opposites.

The privation of good (evil) co-exists with the good as contraries.
 
o_mlly said:
Contraries, unlike contradictions, can exist at the same time. Contraries are not mutually exclusive but may co-exist with their opposites.

The privation of good (evil) co-exists with the good as contraries.
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I am reasonably certain that what Aristotle and Aquinas called “contraries” cannot exist at the same time in the same subject. Sort of like what I said about vanilla and chocolate ice cream: parts can be vanilla and parts chocolate, but not both at once (in which case we would probably consider it a third flavor).

That would make sense, because in Aristotelian logic, the “contrary” of an enunciation (in which the quality of a universal enunciation is changed) can never be simultaneously true with the original enunciation. E.g., “All chickens have feathers” and “No chicken has feathers” cannot be both simultaneously true (although they could both be false).

Note that good never co-exists with evil in the same respect. I can’t have both the virtue of chastity and the vice of lust, for instance.

As far as right and left, for Aristotle and Aquinas, these are both relations, and as with the vast majority of relations, they exist in pairs: the right in reference to the left, and the left in reference to the right. They are not found in the very same subject, so they are not contraries.
 
lmelahn said:
I am reasonably certain that what Aristotle and Aquinas called “contraries” cannot exist at the same time in the same subject. Sort of like what I said about vanilla and chocolate ice cream: parts can be vanilla and parts chocolate, but not both at once (in which case we would probably consider it a third flavor).

That would make sense, because in Aristotelian logic, the “contrary” of an enunciation (in which the quality of a universal enunciation is changed) can never be simultaneously true with the original enunciation. E.g., “All chickens have feathers” and “No chicken has feathers” cannot be both simultaneously true (although they could both be false).

Note that good never co-exists with evil in the same respect. I can’t have both the virtue of chastity and the vice of lust, for instance.

As far as right and left, for Aristotle and Aquinas, these are both relations, and as with the vast majority of relations, they exist in pairs: the right in reference to the left, and the left in reference to the right. They are not found in the very same subject, so they are not contraries.
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Yes, I was mistaken. Thank you for the explanation.
  • Two propositions are contradictory iff they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false.
  • Code: 
    Two propositions are contraries iff they cannot both be true but can both be false.
  • Code: 
    Two propositions are subcontraries iff they cannot both be false but can both be true.
  • Code: 
    A proposition is a subaltern of another iff it must be true if its superaltern is true, and the superaltern must be false if the subaltern is false.
 
o_mlly said:
Yes, I was mistaken. Thank you for the explanation.
  • Two propositions are contradictory iff they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false.
  • Code: 
    Two propositions are contraries iff they cannot both be true but can both be false.
  • Code: 
    Two propositions are subcontraries iff they cannot both be false but can both be true.
  • Code: 
    A proposition is a subaltern of another iff it must be true if its superaltern is true, and the superaltern must be false if the subaltern is false.
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Well, I think you allude more to what Aristotle deals with in De Interpretatione—wherein he discusses the nature of conflicting propositions—rather than to what is said about categories of opposition in general as discussed in the Categories.
 
I’ve been wondering if ugliness is real or just in the eye of the beholder. Can we say that a picture is ugly? After all, unlike sin, it exists. It has individuality
 
thinkandmull said:
I’ve been wondering if ugliness is real or just in the eye of the beholder. Can we say that a picture is ugly? After all, unlike sin, it exists. It has individuality
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I would say that ugliness, as such, is just the privation of beauty. The picture exists, but its ugliness really something missing in it.
 
I don’t see how two homosexuals having sex could be seen as a mere privation
 
Or a picture at least of man having sex with man. I think the devil sustains these pictures and men’s bodies during these acts. God is too perfect to do it Himself. We have to be careful not to impute ANYTHING bad to God
 
thinkandmull said:
Or a picture at least of man having sex with man. I think the devil sustains these pictures and men’s bodies during these acts. God is too perfect to do it Himself. We have to be careful not to impute ANYTHING bad to God
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Thats not correct. God sustains the activity in being insofar as he sustains all activity in being. The devil has nothing to do with it other than perhaps being the cause of the temptation.
 
So God is imperfect just enough to sustain homosexual acts? Doubt it
 
IWantGod said:
Thats not correct. God sustains the activity in being insofar as he sustains all activity in being. The devil has nothing to do with it other than perhaps being the cause of the temptation.
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Do you know where Aquinas discusses this interplay of our free choices and God’s sustainment of their effects?
 
I don’t think it can be disproven that God can grant the devil the power to sustain a body as it masturbates. The act contradicts its natural form, so God can have nothing to do with it by His power.
 
thinkandmull said:
I don’t think it can be disproven that God can grant the devil the power to sustain a body as it masturbates. The act contradicts its natural form, so God can have nothing to do with it by His power.
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Creatures and their activity have no existence without the continuous sustaining power of God. God is always sustaining their being and therefore their activity in existence regardless of what they are doing.

If i stab someone in the eye it is my choice, but God is actualizing that event, he is giving existence to it.
 
thinkandmull said:
I don’t think it can be disproven that God can grant the devil the power to sustain a body as it masturbates. The act contradicts its natural form, so God can have nothing to do with it by His power.
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I’ve never heard of that.
 
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