Atheous

[tonyrey]

Can’t an instance of suffering “just happen”, or merely be, or be sufficiently explained without reference to a good, without presupposing any unresolved (i.e., ought-/yet-to-be-resolved) issue or puzzle attached to it, somehow crying out for further explanation? If not, are you sure the reason isn’t ultimately tied to anything pertinent, perhaps crucial, to whether or not theism is true?

Excellent questions!

The element of chance within the framework of Design is the cause of many deaths, disasters, diseases and deformities. It is absurd to expect harmful coincidences never to occur in an immensely complex system in which there are an immense number of sentient beings pursuing different goals…

 

[tonyrey]

Ok guys, this argument will not work. I didn’t see this at first but realized it last night. The entire argument banks on theism not entailing inscrutable suffering. If that’s the case, then the entire argument goes through smoothly. However, I realized, the theist can construct arguments much like my own to show that theism does entail inscrutable suffering. The result is that inscrutable suffering is no more probable on atheism than on theism, and therefore it’s certainly not evidence for atheism. etc. Here’s the example I thought of last night:

1. If theism is true, then suffering occurs.
2. If suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if theism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

Check the truth-conditions yourself, the theist and atheist must accept the above as sound.

By the ramsey test, (3) translates as: P(Inscrutable suffering | Theism)=1.0. And with that, my argument goes up in flames

Progress!

Congratulations! Not everyone would have the courage to admit they were mistaken.

 

[In_Spiration]

Perplexity:

The interesting thing is you’ll calculate a posterior differently depending on where you start. Should we begin with your argument, or mine? If we start with yours, we’ll be theists, if mine, we’ll be atheists. And so forth. Some have concluded from the problem of discerning where one should begin, that there’s no way to know who is ultimately right: we’ve merely calculated probabilities differently because we’ve taken different starting points. Just thought I’d mention that.

This is indeed one of my fundamental suspicions about this sort of argumentation, as you may have already noticed from my questioning of the feasibility of Bayesian reasoning re: this particular matter, from both subjective and objective perspectives. I might not have articulated it very clearly. Anyway, I recently found this blog post to be pretty helpful. It consists of some combox discussion that grapples with points highly significant for our topic, that could perhaps be behind my doubts, and that I would probably want to stand by. The following captures its basic reasoning.
Maverick Philosopher:

Let us assume that our concept of God is the concept of a being that has a certain modal property, the property of being such that, if existent, then necessarily existent, and if nonexistent, then necessarily nonexistent. Call this the Anselmian conception of deity. It follows that God exists, if true, is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. Simply put, the proposition in question is either necessary or impossible, and thus necessarily noncontingent.

. . . [H]ow can such a noncontingent proposition have its probability either raised or lowered by any empirical consideration? In particular, how can considerations about the kinds and amounts of natural and moral evil in the world lower the probability of God exists? If true, then necessarily true; if false, then necessarily false. . . [E]vidential considerations are simply irrelevant to the probability of noncontingent propositions.

(This post is also not too bad.)

Perplexity:

As to the argument itself:

1. If atheism is true, then there is at least one contingent fact.
2. If there is at least one contingent fact, then at least one contingent being exists.
3. Therefore, if atheism is true, then at least one contingent being exists.

First, I’d say (c) is almost infinitely more probable, given theism, in contrast to its probability on an assumption of atheism, if we’re excluding all other background knowledge (which, for the record, I think is a futile and patently ridiculous contrary-to-fact thought-experiment). Second, I’ll note that the preceding argument elicited my fond recollection of yet another contribution to philosophy of religion from Dr. Vallicella. (“It is possible that facts exist; if it is possible that facts exist, then God exists; therefore, God exists.”) Third, this makes me wonder a lot about what mere “possible truth (value)” could ultimately imply, and what its nature essentially is. Fourth… [To be completely honest, there is no fourth, as I really only had the initial three. Sorry.]

I realized, the theist can construct arguments much like my own to show that theism does entail inscrutable suffering. The result is that inscrutable suffering is no more probable on atheism than on theism, and therefore it’s certainly not evidence for atheism. etc. . .

1. If theism is true, then suffering occurs.
2. If suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if theism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

If only I had come up with this… Do you see what you’ve just done here? Now my pride and my faith are in clearer, more bitter opposition than they were at the time of my first post. Which in fact, rather tragically, manages to lend the syllogism that much more truth.*

Finally, thanks for making me think. I enjoyed this thread, mostly due to your impartial style of analysis and evident concern for nothing besides what the logical analysis dictates. It serves as a reassurance to would-be interlocutors that you’re committed to the truth, or at least to what you’ve reasonably deemed its most reliable means of approach. In turn, we didn’t really have to deal with the inevitable extra costs involved with mutual distrust – which always result from the slightest justified suspicions about deception or ulterior motivation. It’s quite refreshing.

*Only kidding, of course. I hope. Probably.

 

[In_Spiration]

Oh, and another thing I forgot to mention: I’ve been reluctant to concede the justification of material implication from the start. Actually, ever since I first learned about it in my introductory class for Symbolic Logic. Plus, in case you’re further interested, I found some food for thought on exactly that subject at Alexander Pruss’s [Catholic] blog last week.

 

[Perplexity]

Thanks for the replies In Spiration! Just want to let you know I may be a little delayed in a reply here: I want to check out those links, chew on your points, and get some material I think could help as well. Thanks again :^]

 

[Al_Moritz]

Ok guys, this argument will not work. I didn’t see this at first but realized it last night. The entire argument banks on theism not entailing inscrutable suffering. If that’s the case, then the entire argument goes through smoothly. However, I realized, the theist can construct arguments much like my own to show that theism does entail inscrutable suffering. The result is that inscrutable suffering is no more probable on atheism than on theism, and therefore it’s certainly not evidence for atheism. etc. Here’s the example I thought of last night:

1. If theism is true, then suffering occurs.
2. If suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if theism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

Check the truth-conditions yourself, the theist and atheist must accept the above as sound.

By the ramsey test, (3) translates as: P(Inscrutable suffering | Theism)=1.0. And with that, my argument goes up in flames

Progress!

Congratulations on being able to see flaws in your arguments and on being able to change your mind. Not many people can. I did change my mind a few times too, such as with an origin of life by natural causes, which previously I found impossible but now highly probable, see my article on the evolution website Talkorigins.org:

talkorigins.org/faqs/abioprob/originoflife.html

So what are other, in your view more valid, arguments against the existence of God that you can come up with?

 

[JDaniel]

Excellent questions!

The element of chance within the framework of Design is the cause of many deaths, disasters, diseases and deformities. It is absurd to expect harmful coincidences never to occur in an immensely complex system in which there are an immense number of sentient beings pursuing different goals…

Tony:

Nevertheless, God controls and is the cause of all that exists. “(1) God controls all events, whether good or bad, (2) God does everything with supreme wisdom”. (Essay by Father Jean Baptiste Saint-Jure, called, Trustful Surrender to Divine Providence, p1) Even what we consider “chance” occurrences are guided by God’s Supreme Wisdom. What is inscrutable to man is obviously not so to God.

It’s interesting that whenever someone speaks of “suffering,” it is almost always someone else’s suffering. I wonder why?

God bless,
jd

 

[Charlemagne_II]

There is no possible proof that God does not exist. No respectable philosopher in the history of the world has been able to prove this. While many have declared God to be dead, none have ever proven there was never any God in the first place. Such proof would require an observation, and it is not possible to search everywhere and find there is no God.

But the atheist thinks there is no God because he has failed (or refused) to look for God in the place where he is most likely to be found … not in the head, but in the heart.

 

[Al_Moritz]

But the atheist thinks there is no God because he has failed (or refused) to look for God in the place where he is most likely to be found … not in the head, but in the heart.

But the two quotes by Plato and Heisenberg below your posts appear to appeal to the head – not that there is anything wrong with that.

 

[tonyrey]

The element of chance within the framework of Design is the cause of many deaths, disasters, diseases and deformities. It is absurd to expect harmful coincidences never to occur in an immensely complex system in which there are an immense number of sentient beings pursuing different goals…

I think “controls” may give the wrong impression, JD. God certainly knows and permits all events but He is not the **direct **cause of all events. Otherwise He would be directly responsible for all evil, whether it is physical or moral! He ensures that the final outcome is good and just - and in the meantime intervenes as often as possible - but we have to pray that His Will be done and play our part in fulfilling that prayer.

It’s interesting that whenever someone speaks of “suffering,” it is almost always someone else’s suffering. I wonder why?

Because our suffering is not more important than anyone else’s!

God bless,

Tony

 

[Perplexity]

This is indeed one of my fundamental suspicions about this sort of argumentation, as you may have already noticed from my questioning of the feasibility of Bayesian reasoning re: this particular matter, from both subjective and objective perspectives. I might not have articulated it very clearly. Anyway, I recently found this blog post to be pretty helpful. It consists of some combox discussion that grapples with points highly significant for our topic, that could perhaps be behind my doubts, and that I would probably want to stand by. The following captures its basic reasoning.

Let us assume that our concept of God is the concept of a being that has a certain modal property, the property of being such that, if existent, then necessarily existent, and if nonexistent, then necessarily nonexistent. Call this the Anselmian conception of deity. It follows that God exists, if true, is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. Simply put, the proposition in question is either necessary or impossible, and thus necessarily noncontingent.

. . . [H]ow can such a noncontingent proposition have its probability either raised or lowered by any empirical consideration? In particular, how can considerations about the kinds and amounts of natural and moral evil in the world lower the probability of God exists? If true, then necessarily true; if false, then necessarily false. . . [E]vidential considerations are simply irrelevant to the probability of noncontingent propositions.

(This post is also not too bad.)

I’ve heard numerous perspectives on this, I’d like to outline my own, particularly because I may or may not be using terms in a quaint sense:

I would distinguish between metaphysical and epistemic modality here (not saying this distinction hasn’t already been drawn, just that more attention to it seems helpful).

I take metaphysical modality to concern whether a thing could be real or actual, or whether a proposition could really be true, or false. Here, ‘real’ and ‘actual’ are intentionally left undefined as it seems we have a fairly well understood prephilosophical notion behind these words. Just in case though, here’s an example:

Could it ever really be the case that I run faster than the speed of light, unaided? No. We can imagine me doing so, but that couldn’t ever actually happen.

Epistemic modality concerns whether, given your beliefs and knowledge, a thing could be real or actual.

For example, some may say the state of affairs consisting in God creating all human persons immediately in hell is a scenario which is able to be real. Others, perhaps in virtue of their understanding of perfect goodness, may disagree.

As you know a proposition is necessarily true if it’s true in all possible worlds and impossible if it’s true in none.

It seems to me that we conceive of possible worlds, but do not imagine them. ‘Conceiving’, here, refers to that intensional cognitive act, the object of which is a particular scenario obtaining in a world, described by complete and compossible propositions. The world is complete in that every proposition or its negation describe the world such that no aspect of the world is left undescribed by a proposition. These proposition are compossible in that the conjunction of all of them is able to be real. Whereas ‘imagining’ refers to that intensional cognitive act, the object of which is a particular scenario which isn’t able to be real.

This is why, for example, we can mentally ‘picture’ impossible scenarios like me running faster than the speed of light without assistance.

Now, I take the relevant probability to be a measure of our confidence that certain propositions bare particular truth-values. Because we may be ignorant of certain things, we can be unsure of the truth-values certain propositions may bare.

So, it makes sense to me that we can be unsure of whether we’re ‘conceiving’ or ‘imagining.’ In so far as we are, it makes sense that we’re unsure of whether a proposition is necessarily true or impossible: we’re ‘picturing’ the relevant scenario, but don’t know if it’s obtaining in a possible world or not. All the probability is doing is numerically representing the ignorance we actually have, or variant degrees of confidence perhaps. Without such numerical representation, our confidence would still exemplify in shades.

I hope none of this sounded patronizing, I wouldn’t feel comfortable explaining my position unless I covered the bases lol.

 

[Perplexity]

First, I’d say (c) is almost infinitely more probable, given theism, in contrast to its probability on an assumption of atheism, if we’re excluding all other background knowledge (which, for the record, I think is a futile and patently ridiculous contrary-to-fact thought-experiment). Second, I’ll note that the preceding argument elicited my fond recollection of yet another contribution to philosophy of religion from Dr. Vallicella. (“It is possible that facts exist; if it is possible that facts exist, then God exists; therefore, God exists.”) Third, this makes me wonder a lot about what mere “possible truth (value)” could ultimately imply, and what its nature essentially is. Fourth… [To be completely honest, there is no fourth, as I really only had the initial three. Sorry.]

I don’t think the whole ‘leave nothing in the background knowledge but tautologous propositions’ thing works (even though guys like Swinburne try it). I can’t wrap my head around it lol. Thanks for the link, hadn’t heard of that before. Yeah, I’m with you on your third point, it’s fascinating stuff.

If only I had come up with this… Do you see what you’ve just done here? Now my pride and my faith are in clearer, more bitter opposition than they were at the time of my first post. Which in fact, rather tragically, manages to lend the syllogism that much more truth.*

Finally, thanks for making me think. I enjoyed this thread, mostly due to your impartial style of analysis and evident concern for nothing besides what the logical analysis dictates. It serves as a reassurance to would-be interlocutors that you’re committed to the truth, or at least to what you’ve reasonably deemed its most reliable means of approach. In turn, we didn’t really have to deal with the inevitable extra costs involved with mutual distrust – which always result from the slightest justified suspicions about deception or ulterior motivation. It’s quite refreshing.

Thanks for your contributions, they were witty, funny and insightful. It was actually your counter-argument that made me think of the silver bullet. Can’t believe I missed that lol

 

[Perplexity]

Oh, and another thing I forgot to mention: I’ve been reluctant to concede the justification of material implication from the start. Actually, ever since I first learned about it in my introductory class for Symbolic Logic. Plus, in case you’re further interested, I found some food for thought on exactly that subject at Alexander Pruss’s [Catholic] blog last week.

Thanks for the link. I hadn’t taken that into account, Graham Priest has some good objections as well to material implication in his intro to non-classical logic. Worth pondering for sure. That would actually be quite relieving to me. Those bloody things are too weird a creature for me lol. They don’t seem realistic.

 

[Perplexity]

Congratulations on being able to see flaws in your arguments and on being able to change your mind. Not many people can. I did change my mind a few times too, such as with an origin of life by natural causes, which previously I found impossible but now highly probable, see my article on the evolution website Talkorigins.org:

talkorigins.org/faqs/abioprob/originoflife.html

So what are other, in your view more valid, arguments against the existence of God that you can come up with?

Thanks I’ll definitely check out the link, I think it’s awesome that you’ve posted an article on that site!

Well, most of the arguments that “I’ve” come up with turn out to have been come up with by someone else But, I take the following to be very persuasive reasons for atheism:

Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument

Quentin Smith’s Evil Natural Laws Argument

Arguments from evil borrowing the argument form of Robin Collins’ Fine Tuning piece in the black well companion to natural theology.

 

[Perplexity]

There is no possible proof that God does not exist. No respectable philosopher in the history of the world has been able to prove this. While many have declared God to be dead, none have ever proven there was never any God in the first place. Such proof would require an observation, and it is not possible to search everywhere and find there is no God.

But the atheist thinks there is no God because he has failed (or refused) to look for God in the place where he is most likely to be found … not in the head, but in the heart.

Interestingly, theist philosophers like William Lane Craig disagree with you here.

dictionary.com defines proof as:

1. evidence sufficient to establish a thing as true, or to produce belief in its truth.

Understood as such, of course there can be such proof. All you’d be conceding here is that there may be evidence which is sufficient to elicit belief in atheism.

Note, if you do not concede this, then you’re claiming theism is non-falsifiable.

*On a side, but related noted, I think for many atheists, their atheism is a properly basic response to suffering and evil.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Al

**But the two quotes by Plato and Heisenberg below your posts appear to appeal to the head – not that there is anything wrong with that. **

The quote from Plato should appeal to the heart rather than to the head. A disease of the soul is an emotional condition of dis-ease with the idea of God. But there is no reason to separate the heart from the head. It is the atheists who, by the disease in their soul, have separated the head from the heart.

What Heisenberg says is essentially equivalent to what Aquinas said upon approaching death. That what he had seen through his intellect was as straw compared to the revelations he experienced in his heart. Any right thinking scientist will have the same experience, as the head of the Genome Project Francis Collins did when, after a misspent youth as an atheist, he found God to be more plausible than not in the science to which he was dedicating himself.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Perplexity

***On a side, but related noted, I think for many atheists, their atheism is a properly basic response to suffering and evil. **

I don’t agree. I was an atheist and I never used that as a reason to be one. It’s a cop-out.

Bottom line … no one can prove there is not a God, so that too is not falsifiable.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

*On a side, but related noted, I think for many atheists, their atheism is a properly basic response to suffering and evil.

Not sure if it is or is not the case for many. I’ve never looked into it. For the cases of myself and one of my relatives I could simplify it as an inability to sustain the belief after we realized why we had believed it.

I’ve got one friend that sustains spiritual beliefs but abandoned her belief in Yahweh. In a period of need the churches she approached did nothing she perceived as helpful and those that did help her were non-believers. We could say that her change in position was a response to suffering that she was experiencing, but we could also say that kindness had a noteworthy role in the shift of her position.

 

[Al_Moritz]

Al

**But the two quotes by Plato and Heisenberg below your posts appear to appeal to the head – not that there is anything wrong with that. **

The quote from Plato should appeal to the heart rather than to the head. A disease of the soul is an emotional condition of dis-ease with the idea of God. But there is no reason to separate the heart from the head. It is the atheists who, by the disease in their soul, have separated the head from the heart.

What Heisenberg says is essentially equivalent to what Aquinas said upon approaching death. That what he had seen through his intellect was as straw compared to the revelations he experienced in his heart. Any right thinking scientist will have the same experience, as the head of the Genome Project Francis Collins did when, after a misspent youth as an atheist, he found God to be more plausible than not in the science to which he was dedicating himself.

Charlemagne,

You have a good point on Plato. Yet your interpretation of the Heisenberg quote is rather idiosyncratic, in my view. It is plausible that Heisenberg referred to the order of the cosmos and of the physical laws governing it, and to the elegance of that order. While this can be interpreted as an experience of the heart, it is an experience by the intellect as well, to at least the same degree if not more.

And no, please don’t tell me that “any right thinking scientist will have the same experience” – I am a scientist too, and I don’t experience it that way. How would you know, are you a scientist?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Al

**And no, please don’t tell me that “any right thinking scientist will have the same experience” – I am a scientist too, and I don’t experience it that way. How would you know, are you a scientist? **

To whom am I speaking at present? The Roman Catholic? The Freethinker? The Skeptic?

No right-thinking scientist will see there is no God at the bottom of the scientific cup.

As Pope Pius XII said:

“True science to an ever-increasing degree discovers God as though God were waiting behind each closed door opened by science.” Pope Pius XII

All Pius XII said is exactly what Heisenberg said, using a different metaphor.

Are you a Catholic or not?

It doesn’t matter whether or not I am a scientist. What matters is that Heisenberg was a scientist, and it was his impression that science leads to God. Many other scientists have had the same experience.

Francis Collins has said pretty much the same. So did Francis Bacon, who labored mightily to promote the new scientific method in England. :

“It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy brings about man’s mind to religion: for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.”

In Bacon’s day the scientist was called a natural philosopher.

But then you have scientists like Richard Dawkins who will never drink to the bottom of the cup because they are too inebriated by science to drink that long and deep.