Atomic Bomb In WWII

[JimG]

I’d also add to this well thought out string of posts that monday morning quarterbacking is not appropriate here. the historical revisionists do not try to stand in the boots of the military planners in the world of August 1945.

would the US have foregone the use of the A bomb if the planners had perfect insight into the effectiveness of the conventional (firebombing) campaign which might well have ended the war prior to DOWNFALL?. maybe, but then this discussion would have been all about the ethics of the practice of mixing high explosives and firebombs to level and burn out cities.

I suspect we’d be hearing about the same argument.

I also suspect that had Truman not used the bombs, and the war had dragged on with tens of thousands of casualties, we would now be hearing arguments about why he did not end the war sooner, when he had the means.

But that argument would have been nothing compared to the outrage of Americans in the late '40’s who would have discovered after the end of the war that Truman held back a weapon that could have saved thousands by ending the war sooner.

Still, the “what if’s” are only speculation.

 

[cardas]

Re Caesar 517

There were more than 2 choices available to President Truman.

1. Don’t bomb, continue the blockade. Japan must import to survive.
   2.Don’t bomb. Negotiate a peace settlement. Our policy of ‘unconditional surrender’ left the emperor at risk, which was unaceptable to the Japanese people. We conceded this point anyway after we bombed.

 

[Wirraway]

Re Caesar 517

There were more than 2 choices available to President Truman.

1. Don’t bomb, continue the blockade. Japan must import to survive.
   2.Don’t bomb. Negotiate a peace settlement. Our policy of ‘unconditional surrender’ left the emperor at risk, which was unaceptable to the Japanese people. We conceded this point anyway after we bombed.

“don’t bomb” meaning, suspend conventional bombing or not use nukes?

 

[GKC]

Re Caesar 517

There were more than 2 choices available to President Truman.

1. Don’t bomb, continue the blockade. Japan must import to survive.
   2.Don’t bomb. Negotiate a peace settlement. Our policy of ‘unconditional surrender’ left the emperor at risk, which was unaceptable to the Japanese people. We conceded this point anyway after we bombed.

Whether we should have been more clear about just what our attitude toward the Emperor was is open to discussion. Certainly we gave out some hints, as in Truman’s V-E Day speech, 8 May. And certainly the Japanse (the end-the-war faction, anyway, such as Prime Minister Togo Shenori, and Baron Hiranuma Kiichciro, president of the Privy Council), also realized that we were not insisting on unconditional surrender, when they read the Potsdam Declaration which stated “These are our terms”. A surrender, with terms, is not an unconditional surrender. We imposed such on Germany.

And however long the war lasted, the deaths continued, outside the Home Islands.

A good read on the issue of unconditional surrender can be found in chap. 3 of Newman’s TRUMAN AND THE HIROSHIMA CULT.

GKC

 

[Wirraway]

Whether we should have been more clear about just what our attitude toward the Emperor was is open to discussion. Certainly we gave out some hints, as in Truman’s V-E Day speech, 8 May. And certainly the Japanse (the end-the-war faction, anyway, such as Prime Minister Togo Shenori, and Baron Hiranuma Kiichciro, president of the Privy Council), also realized that we were not insisting on unconditional surrender, when they read the Potsdam Declaration which stated “These are our terms”. A surrender, with terms, is not an unconditional surrender. We imposed such on Germany.

And however long the war lasted, the deaths continued, outside the Home Islands.

A good read on the issue of unconditional surrender can be found in chap. 3 of Newman’s TRUMAN AND THE HIROSHIMA CULT.

GKC

the german surrender was without terms primarily because the civil government simply ceased to exist. but it is unimaginable that the allies would have offered terms. in japan, there were a lot of demands that were simply not negotiable at all, and even the preservation of the (no longer son of heaven) emperor was to the allies’ advantage. again, its hard to imagine what kind of terms the other allies would accept other than no terms at all.

 

[GKC]

the german surrender was without terms primarily because the civil government simply ceased to exist. but it is unimaginable that the allies would have offered terms. in japan, there were a lot of demands that were simply not negotiable at all, and even the preservation of the (no longer son of heaven) emperor was to the allies’ advantage. again, its hard to imagine what kind of terms the other allies would accept other than no terms at all.

Concur. Germany being not only the moral leper it was, but the exemplar of what a negotiated armistice can do, as in WWI. We were not, as Pershing said in 1923, going to do all that over again.

GKC

 

[miguel]

…As for my own opinion, I agree with Gen Eisenhower with regard to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

You provided a very interesting quote from Eisenhower. It doesn’t help those who argue that the atom bomb was morally preferable to the only other option of a full-scale invasion. When both sides have a lot to lose by continuing a war, negotiations are an obvious option. Eisenhower’s words sure lend credence to that.

 

[GKC]

You provided a very interesting quote from Eisenhower. It doesn’t help those who argue that the atom bomb was morally preferable to the only other option of a full-scale invasion. When both sides have a lot to lose by continuing a war, negotiations are an obvious option. Eisenhower’s words sure lend credence to that.

As I noted in my post # 672 above, it is most unlikely that Eisenhower’s words, either here or in the later memoir he repeated them in, are historically accurate, or particularly pertinent, if they had been. Again, I suggest contextual reading, in some depth, in this case, pp. 16-19 of chap. one of HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVISIONISM, ed. (and chap 1 written by) James Maddox. As Eisenhower said even earlier, in a letter to his wife, he knew nothing of the particular circumstances in Japan at that time. And no reason he should; it was not his theater.

GKC .

 

[miguel]

As I noted in my post # 672 above, it is most unlikely that Eisenhower’s words, either here or in the later memoir he repeated them in, are historically accurate, or particularly pertinent, if they had been. Again, I suggest contextual reading, in some depth, in this case, pp. 16-19 of chap. one of HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVISIONISM, ed. (and chap 1 written by) James Maddox. As Eisenhower said even earlier, in a letter to his wife, he knew nothing of the particular circumstances in Japan at that time. And no reason he should; it was not his theater.

GKC .

I have no reason to doubt the words in his memoir. But whether they’re historically accurate or not, they certainly reflect his later thinking at least. And if Eisenhower was anything, he was a diplomat. This makes his words at least as pertinent as any opinions expressed on this thread 60 years later.

 

[GKC]

I have no reason to doubt the words in his memoir. But whether they’re historically accurate or not, they certainly reflect his later thinking at least. And if Eisenhower was anything, he was a diplomat. This makes his words at least as pertinent as any opinions expressed on this thread 60 years later.

No, they represent one man’s opinion, expressed, and perhaps inaccurately expressed It is unlikely he said any such thing to Stimson, in the circumstances he reports), after the fact.

The issue was what actions would result in the fewest casulaties, and end the war, at the time, not what Eisenhower said he thought of it. The persons making the decision were those with both the responsibillity and the information best suited to make the decision. Eisenhower had neither, as he said in his letter to his wife.

To make a meaningful decision on the history today requires information, too. As I often recommend, in-depth reading in the historical field helps. Frank’s DOWNFALL is the best overall account, Newman’s TRUMAN AND THE HIROSHIMA CULT and Maddox’s HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MTHS OF REVISIONISM are excellent sources to deal with the sort of things one finds by googling. And if you want a book to support your contention, try Alperovitz’ THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOMIC BOMB (Maddox’s and Newman’s books deal nicely with that bit of revisionism).

GKC

 

[miguel]

No, they represent one man’s opinion, expressed, and perhaps inaccurately expressed…

One man who was also one of our nation’s most important leaders during WWII. The implication that he lied in his memoirs is a bit much, but not absolutely incredible since we all know politicians lie. But you don’t know that for sure.

…It is unlikely he said any such thing to Stimson, in the circumstances he reports, after the fact.

You already said that. Yet the statement is in his memoirs. Do you think this reveals anything about his thinking after the fact and not too long after the fact? I do.

The issue was what actions would result in the fewest casulaties and end the war,…

Negotiations might have resulted in even fewer casualties than Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

 

[GKC]

One man who was also one of our nation’s most important leaders during WWII. The implication that he lied in his memoirs is a bit much, but not absolutely incredible since we all know politicians lie. But you don’t know that for sure.
You already said that. Yet the statement is in his memoirs. Do you think this reveals anything about his thinking after the fact and not too long after the fact? I do.
Negotiations might have resulted in even fewer casualties than Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

As I said, this is one of those subjects that some historical knowledge assists in understanding. In fact, I’m still looking for a case in which the opposite is true.

I’ve been in this lengthy thread a long time. And addressed such points as these before, in detail. I won’t do it again, but, as you wll note, I did list some reading material, for education.

No, I don’t know that for sure but I know the historical reasons why it is unlikely to be true. Posted them before, I did, somewhere. Gave the reference above. And it is not pertinent to the discussion what Eisenhower thought. Leahy said he was against it, after the fact, too. The point is that the decision was made on what was known at the time, not what Eisenhower said he thought, afterwards.

To find out what was known at the time, read the books above. Frank, most particularly.

GKC

 

[miguel]

…And it is not pertinent to the discussion what Eisenhower thought. Leahy said he was against it, after the fact, too.

There is some plausibility in what you say, if only because it isn’t inconceivable that some politicians would later want to distance themselves from the consequences of certain decisions made during war. But again, what does that say? And to say these statements aren’t pertinent to a discussion about the morality of these decisions? I don’t get that at all.

 

[GKC]

There is some plausibility in what you say, if only because it isn’t inconceivable that some politicians would later want to distance themselves from the consequences of certain decisions made during war. But again, what does that say? And to say these statements aren’t pertinent to a discussion about the morality of these decisions? I don’t get that at all.

You misunderstand, which is understandable. It’s a very long thread and It has a lot of my posts scattered in it. But my posts are not directly on the issue of the morality of the decision (though sometimes they try to force a recognition of what the implications of that morality would have been, in the world). I say throughout that one should affirm, if one is RC, what the RCC teaches on the matter, though certainly I have an opinion on it. It’s only when the discussion drifts from what the RCC teaching is to what I called the “And anyway …” discussions, that I post, to give the historical background, and correct the revisionism so rampant. If one says “the RCC teaching is X”, I have no problem. But if it then goes on to say, “And anyway, the Japanese were about to surrender, and the bombs were dropped to influence the Russians, and the decision was racist, and the deaths exceeded the costs of an invasion, etc”, then I post history, to correct historical error.

GKC

 

[miguel]

You misunderstand, which is understandable. It’s a very long thread and It has a lot of my posts scattered in it. But my posts are not directly on the issue of the morality of the decision (though sometimes they try to force a recognition of what the implications of that morality would have been, in the world). I say throughout that one should affirm, if one is RC, what the RCC teaches on the matter, though certainly I have an opinion on it. It’s only when the discussion drifts from what the RCC teaching is to what I called the “And anyway …” discussions, that I post, to give the historical background, and correct the revisionism so rampant. If one says “the RCC teaching is X”, I have no problem. But if it then goes on to say, “And anyway, the Japanese were about to surrender, and the bombs were dropped to influence the Russians, and the decision was racist, and the deaths exceeded the costs of an invasion, etc”, then I post history, to correct historical error.

GKC

It is crucial to this discussion to understand as clearly as possible the historical context for the decisions that were made. But even if we were right there with the decision makers and knew exactly the historical context that they knew, it still comes down to the moral judgement of the decision makers. And that is the point of this thread…to discuss the morality of the decision.

 

[GKC]

It is crucial to this discussion to understand as clearly as possible the historical context for the decisions that were made. But even if we were right there with the decision makers and knew exactly the historical context that they knew, it still comes down to the moral judgement of the decision makers. And that is the point of this thread…to discuss the morality of the decision.

And go to it. But if you indulge in history, you are subject to historical correction. It’s a historical subject I’ve studied for 8-9 years.

GKC

 

[miguel]

And go to it. But if you indulge in history, you are subject to historical correction. It’s a historical subject I’ve studied for 8-9 years.

GKC

Correct me then.

 

[Wolseley]

It would sure be interesting to see how this thread would read if the Germans and the Japanese had won the war.

Wonder if they’d be beating themselves up, here 60 years after the fact, for “killing innocent enemy women and children”?

 

[GKC]

Correct me then.

I have, re: Eisenhower. If you step across the line on any other facts I’m aware of, I’ll have at it again.

But the best thing I can do, is recommend that you, or anyone else interested in this or other points of history, find the pertinent literature and read. I’ve suggested a few titles above, I can triple the list, easily.

GKC

 

[GKC]

It would sure be interesting to see how this thread would read if the Germans and the Japanese had won the war.

Wonder if they’d be beating themselves up, here 60 years after the fact, for “killing innocent enemy women and children”?

Maybe so. But the theme of the OP was related to how the RCC viewed the use of bombs; a valid question, though not one I’m interested in. Not a relevant consideration to wonder how the Axis would have viewed it, if they had won, it seems to me.

GKC