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LRThunder
Guest
True, but as I keep saying you and I, as well as the Church, has the benefit of hindsight. Truman and our military didn’t.
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Caesar517
Guest
Even after the first atomic bomb, they wouldn’t surrender. They certainly wouldn’t have gone peacefully.
I think it was necessary to eliminate them as soon as possible. They were conquering parts of mainland Asia, and could have used their home island to launch bombing attacks. We had to stop them. We did it the least costly way possible. How could that have been wrong? It was certainly a just war, we had to stop them at all costs. They were trying to take over the world.
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miguel
Guest
I hear what you’re saying as to hindsight. But I wouldn’t say they had no idea what the atom bomb could do. And ultimately, they had to justify their decision to use it to God.
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LRThunder
Guest
Or they could have had to justify their decision to invade which would’ve killed many more people.
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miguel
Guest
I don’t argue with any of this. The means used to stop them. That’s what’s in question.
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Caesar517
Guest
The means used to stop them saved more lives than the alternative. How could that have been wrong?
How can it be more right to send humans to their death storming heavily defended beaches when the enemy knows you’re coming? It would have been worse than storming the beaches of Normandy (in this case we had no other choice).
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DaveBj
Guest
I researched this back in the '80s when I was doing my MA in Soviet Studies. Stalin had promised at Yalta that he would go to war against Japan a certain number of days (I think it was 90) after Germany surrendered. The USSR’s attack on Japan came in strict accordance with the scheduling that he had promised. The timing of the Hiroshima bomb was a coincidence. An attack of that magnitude could not have been done like, “Oh, look, the capitalists dropped a super-weapon on Japan–let’s attack now!” Too much planning and preparation required.
On the subject of the morality of using the Bomb, I have argued that Truman’s decision was made in the light of the best information he had at the time. Recent reading in the WWII magazines that I subscribe to (I read three of them) have made me not so sure of my position. For one thing, he may have not made the decision at all, but simply rubber-stamped a decision already made by the military leadership inherited from FDR.
And it was not a merciful death. True, tens of thousands were vaporized instantly, but tens of thousands more died in agony from burns and/or radiation poisoning. Would to God that it could have been used on a purely military target, if at all.
DaveBj
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pnewton
Guest
This link is not what was asked. It is twenty years later. I believe the original question is to get the Church’s position at the time of attack.
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miguel
Guest
The good that might come from an evil act doesn’t justify the evil act. It was wrong because it was an act that resulted in the indiscriminate killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians.
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Caesar517
Guest
What I’m saying is that a land invasion would have resulted in the death of even more civilians. How could a land invasion have been the better course of action?
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pnewton
Guest
Yes, but that is the question being asked. Calling it evil just begs the question and does not solve anything. If it was objectivly evil, then it could not be used, even if a million had to die to avoid it’s use, as might well have happened.
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miguel
Guest
If you read item 80 in the link, there are references to papal statements at the time.
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pnewton
Guest
No, we could not have, should not have and would have done nothing but pass on another war to the next generation. There is a reason why unconditional surrender is the only option that should be given to an aggressive foe who is willing to commit any atrocity against you. I think we sometimes forget what Imperial Japan was like.
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miguel
Guest
I believe CCC 2314, which I quoted, makes this exact point.
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miguel
Guest
I think it said after the attack. It didn’t say at the time. But your distinction is a good one. Sometimes events occur that are so horrible that they aren’t foreseen until they happen. But does that get the decision maker off the hook? It might mitigate the decision somewhat. Only God really knows.
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pnewton
Guest
Again, that is a later document which was not around in 1945. Also, section 80 does not mention anything to do with this thread and the footnotes do not include any references earlier that 1963 for that section.
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miguel
Guest
That’s fine. So are you saying that therefore the indiscriminate mass killing of civilians in war was OK?
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Wolseley
Guest
A group of quotes and my replies from another board:
Well, this topic has been argued into the ground (it seems to come around like clockwork every August on the anniversary of the bombings—although nobody seems to do much crying on the anniversaries of September 1st, 1939 or December 7th, 1941—everybody knows it’s only the nasty old mean Americans who should be flogged for eternity); and my arguments will convince no one who has already decided which stance they already prefer, but nevertheless, I’ll throw in my 2 cents worth here anyway.
All military estimates at the time placed the American casualty lists at a million or more, not counting the number of Japanese casualties, which could be expected to be two to three times more.
That places the total in the range of three to four million, as opposed to 300,000. Would it have been more moral to go with conventional warfare instead of using the bombs?
Is it more moral to kill 100 people with a rifle, or 20,000 people with rocks and slingshots? Does the choice of weapon make a difference?
As for the debate about “civilian targets vs. military targets”, see below.
That having been said, Hiroshima’s primary value as a military target consisted of the fact that it was the Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army; the entire army was engaged in calisthenics on a parade field in the city center on August 6th when the bomb exploded almost directly overhead. The entire army was vaporized, the equivalent of the entire United States Marine Corps vanishing in a split second. It was also a transport hub and an industrial production area.
Nagasaki’s primary value as a military target consisted of the fact that 90% of the city’s labor force worked in a huge complex of manufacturing plants owned by the Mitsubishi company, making torpedoes for the Japanese Navy and small arms for the Japanese Army; all the plants in the city were operating at full production on August 9th when the second bomb exploded.
And even if both cities had not been major military targets, one must bear in mind the dissemination of Japanese war production: virtually every home in Japan was a miniature factory, producing parts for war material. As Curtis LeMay, commander of the 21st Bomber Command, said later, “No point in slaughtering civilians for the mere sake of slaughter…it was their system of dispersed industry. All you had to do was visit one of those targets after we’d roasted it, and see the multitude of tiny houses, with a drill press sticking up through the wreckage of every home. The entire population got into the act and worked to make those munitions of war…men, women, and children. We knew we were going to kill a lot of women and kids…had to be done.”
As for the Catholic aspect, Hiroshima was primarily a Shinto and Buddhist community. Nagasaki was the center of Japanese Catholicism, true, but Nagasaki wasn’t even supposed to be bombed that day—Kokura was. When the aircraft arrived over the target, however, Korkura was clouded over and the bombadier couldn’t get a sighting on the aiming point. The B-29 carrying the bomb was having a problem with its reserve fuel pump, and the crew couldn’t get any spare fuel transferred to the engines. As a result, they didn’t have enough gas to make it all the way back to their base on Tinian.
Carrying the bomb back was out of the question because nobody had ever tried to land to B-29 with more than five tons of atomic bomb aboard, and the crew was not anxious to try. However, ditching the bomb was also out of the question, because of direct orders from Washington forbidding them to do so. As a result, the only other alternative was choosing a secondary target. Nagasaki was chosen primarily because it was directly in line on the way to Okinawa, which was the only American base close enough for the aircraft to reach with the amount of fuel it had left, and because the aircraft was so low on fuel it was the only target close enough to hit with one pass—they couldn’t just keep flying around up there forever. So, as a cruel turn of circumstance, Nagasaki was hit instead of Kokura, which was the primary target choice.
As I say, I realize these arguments won’t change your mind, but I place them out there for everyone to read and consider.
By the way, I’m not a rabid militarist, either. But I did have a father who was in the Army in World War II, and who was awaiting orders to be readied for the invasion of Japan. If my dad had waded ashore on November 1, 1945 (The projected invasion of Kyushu), or March 1, 1946 (the projected invasion of Honshu) there’s a very good chance I might not have been here writing this. Nobody can know that, of course, but I thank God my father made it home from the war to my mother and my sisters, and that I was born 15 years later.
Well, this topic has been argued into the ground (it seems to come around like clockwork every August on the anniversary of the bombings—although nobody seems to do much crying on the anniversaries of September 1st, 1939 or December 7th, 1941—everybody knows it’s only the nasty old mean Americans who should be flogged for eternity); and my arguments will convince no one who has already decided which stance they already prefer, but nevertheless, I’ll throw in my 2 cents worth here anyway.
The combined immediate combat deaths of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were approximately 200,000; add to that another 100,000 deaths over the next 60 years in long-term effects, and you still have 300,000.
All military estimates at the time placed the American casualty lists at a million or more, not counting the number of Japanese casualties, which could be expected to be two to three times more.
That places the total in the range of three to four million, as opposed to 300,000. Would it have been more moral to go with conventional warfare instead of using the bombs?
Is it more moral to kill 100 people with a rifle, or 20,000 people with rocks and slingshots? Does the choice of weapon make a difference?
As for the debate about “civilian targets vs. military targets”, see below.
I agree that the use of incendiary bombs to destroy Dresden was questionable, especially since the resulting firestorm engulfed the residential sections of the city, which had little to do with military or industrial targets (again, as opposed to the Japanese targets; see below). 200 German factories were damaged, which hampered the flow of German war production, but in my own humble opinion, that could have been done more effectively with HE and rendered the same result with much less collateral damage.
None of the three targets we’re discussing here were “random”, nor were they attacked strictly for terror purposes. Dresden was targeted in order to hinder the city’s rail system from moving upwards of half a million German troops into the eastern section of Germany to engage advancing Soviet forces. That, at least, was the stated objective. As for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see below.
Considering the fact that the plants which produced the components and research for the atomic bomb hadn’t even been built when 1943 began, that a good deal of the research and development hadn’t even been accomplished yet, that nobody had any idea, even in early 1944, whether what they were producing would work or not, and that the general consensus was that we were racing against the Germans to produce the bomb before they did (and that if we did produce one before they did, it would be used against Germany) the idea that Hiroshima was specifically targeted long before 1943 is questionable, at best.
That having been said, Hiroshima’s primary value as a military target consisted of the fact that it was the Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army; the entire army was engaged in calisthenics on a parade field in the city center on August 6th when the bomb exploded almost directly overhead. The entire army was vaporized, the equivalent of the entire United States Marine Corps vanishing in a split second. It was also a transport hub and an industrial production area.
Nagasaki’s primary value as a military target consisted of the fact that 90% of the city’s labor force worked in a huge complex of manufacturing plants owned by the Mitsubishi company, making torpedoes for the Japanese Navy and small arms for the Japanese Army; all the plants in the city were operating at full production on August 9th when the second bomb exploded.
And even if both cities had not been major military targets, one must bear in mind the dissemination of Japanese war production: virtually every home in Japan was a miniature factory, producing parts for war material. As Curtis LeMay, commander of the 21st Bomber Command, said later, “No point in slaughtering civilians for the mere sake of slaughter…it was their system of dispersed industry. All you had to do was visit one of those targets after we’d roasted it, and see the multitude of tiny houses, with a drill press sticking up through the wreckage of every home. The entire population got into the act and worked to make those munitions of war…men, women, and children. We knew we were going to kill a lot of women and kids…had to be done.”
As for the Catholic aspect, Hiroshima was primarily a Shinto and Buddhist community. Nagasaki was the center of Japanese Catholicism, true, but Nagasaki wasn’t even supposed to be bombed that day—Kokura was. When the aircraft arrived over the target, however, Korkura was clouded over and the bombadier couldn’t get a sighting on the aiming point. The B-29 carrying the bomb was having a problem with its reserve fuel pump, and the crew couldn’t get any spare fuel transferred to the engines. As a result, they didn’t have enough gas to make it all the way back to their base on Tinian.
Carrying the bomb back was out of the question because nobody had ever tried to land to B-29 with more than five tons of atomic bomb aboard, and the crew was not anxious to try. However, ditching the bomb was also out of the question, because of direct orders from Washington forbidding them to do so. As a result, the only other alternative was choosing a secondary target. Nagasaki was chosen primarily because it was directly in line on the way to Okinawa, which was the only American base close enough for the aircraft to reach with the amount of fuel it had left, and because the aircraft was so low on fuel it was the only target close enough to hit with one pass—they couldn’t just keep flying around up there forever. So, as a cruel turn of circumstance, Nagasaki was hit instead of Kokura, which was the primary target choice.
The United States isn’t squeaky clean, and everybody knows this. Andersonville was a war crime. Wounded Knee was a war crime. My Lai was a war crime. The reasoning behind the Mexican and Spanish-American Wars was a trumped-up bunch of balderdash, in both cases. But Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in my personal estimation, were not war crimes.
The historical reality is that Japanese resistance during the US conquests of places like Peleliu, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa indicated that millions upon millions of American and Japanese lives were going to be lost before the Pacific war ended, which conservative estimates placed as happening some time in early 1948, and liberal estimates placed as possibly late as 1955. The bombs, for all their negatives, did help tip the scales to ending the war sooner, thus saving millions of lives.
In 1945, there was no such concept as “nuclear war”, and to apply such a term to Hiroshima and Nagasaki is both disingenuous and inaccurate. The United States had a total of three very small weapons in its stockpile in 1945: one was exploded in New Mexico, and the other two over Japan. The idea of “nuclear warfare” came much later, when both the United States and the Soviet Union had large stockpiles of much more powerful weapons. It also has to be borne in mind that nobody really knew very much about atomic weapons effects in 1945; these things were brand-new, and since we were in a total war, any new weapon that could be used to our advantage was going to be used. If we had known about radiation effects in more detail in 1945, would it have deterred us from using them? Possibly. But at the time, such effects were unknown, so it’s more or less a moot point.
As I say, I realize these arguments won’t change your mind, but I place them out there for everyone to read and consider.
By the way, I’m not a rabid militarist, either. But I did have a father who was in the Army in World War II, and who was awaiting orders to be readied for the invasion of Japan. If my dad had waded ashore on November 1, 1945 (The projected invasion of Kyushu), or March 1, 1946 (the projected invasion of Honshu) there’s a very good chance I might not have been here writing this. Nobody can know that, of course, but I thank God my father made it home from the war to my mother and my sisters, and that I was born 15 years later.
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Caesar517
Guest
Very nicely said Wolseley.
That is the only conclusion I have been able to come to. I can’t understand why someone would say that we shouldn’t have used the atomic bombs.
That is the only conclusion I have been able to come to. I can’t understand why someone would say that we shouldn’t have used the atomic bombs.
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miguel
Guest
Thank you for your post. There are moral limits to warfare. And I accept CCC 2314.
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