It can be argued that those who are working to supply arms are combatants, and should be subject to the same rules as combatants. I am speaking here of non-combatants, such as for one example, children of the age of 3 or 4 years old, and as well, there are many other examples.
Actually, in the case of dropping the A Bomb on Japan, it was completely unnecessary as well as immoral, because according to General Dwight D. Eisenhower:“In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.”
One of the consequences of having all one’s books in one house, and one’s computer in another house, is a lag time, in doing stuff like this. Another consequence is an occasional use of a wrong term, which maybe no one noticed. Hasten the day when the books and computer are rejoined under one roof.
Frank among others) addresses this quote in DOWNFALL, in a lengthy note on p.332. Other conventional historians of the period make similar observations (Maddux, below).
Eisenhower made the statement above in two places, in 1948 (CRUSADE IN EUROPE) and 1963 (MANDATE FOR CHANGE). This quote is from 1948, the 1963 account was more detailed and more colorful. A couple of points:
Stimson kept detailed diaries that include a complete record of all discussions, of any nature, which he had on the bombs. This exchange is not mentioned. and it is not independent evidence of an opinion as stated prior to the use of the weapons, but after the war. And, in the 1948, but not the 1963 account, Eisenhower added “My views were merely personal and immediate reactions, they were not based on any analysis of the subject”.
Eisenhower had no particular insight into the Pacific theater, nor should he have. As far as is known, he had no access to Pacific Theater Magic or Ultra, either trafiic or summary. Nor should he have. Ina 12 July 1945 letter he wrote that he had not the slightest idea what would happen in the Pacific, nor was there any reason he should. He was the ETO commander. MacArthur or Nimitz had similarly no insight into the European Theater.
Nimitz’s opinion, postwar, is compared to Nimitz’s opinion, during the war, (as well as much more detailed consideration of Eisenhower’s words, and the improbablility of the circumstances being accurately recalled) in HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY:THE MYTHS OF THE REVISIONISTS, ed. by Robert James Maddux, in the first article (also written by Maddux). Nimitz, when briefed on the bomb, and that it would be most likely available in August, replied “That sounds fine, but this is only February. Can’t we get one sooner?”. And Nimitz was in favor of dropping the 3rd bomb, on Tokyo, if necessary. Citations and sources are found in HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY, p. 19. Eisenhower’s words are discussed on pp. 16-19.
Moral opposition to the use of the bombs, to the use of any bombs, to the use of any deadly force, for any or some reasons, are things of one sort. Facts of history are things of another sort. Generally, I only try to keep the facts straight. And generally I just recommend the books. Line by line refutations are tedious.
GKC
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