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GKC
Guest
The original estimated ratio of us to them, on Kyushu, based on best intelligence around Jun 45 was a 3-1 superiority in our favor, about what is minimum for a successful opposed landing. By late July, ULTRA intercepts showed the actual ratio was to be around 1 to 1, a recipe for disaster. See Drea’s MACARTHUR’S ULTRA.And, the United States had broken some of the Japanese codes and we knew from reading their radio communications that the Japanese military had figured out which beaches we would be landing on, and had heavily reinforced their defending forces. So, that instead of our landings being merely difficult, our landings would be heavily opposed.
So far, we’re still hearing that using the atomic bomb would be immoral. So we’re hearing what we should not do (or have done). But we’re not hearing what the United States should do / have done.
We’re waiting.
GKC