Authority on Married Sex

[JimG]

The thing is, Humanae Vitae was right. The evils that Paul VI predicted have come to pass.

Catholic doctrine on contraception was universal Christian doctrine up until 1930, when the Anglican Church first authorized artificial birth control among married couples for serious reasons.

Serious reasons indeed. That 1930 Lambeth conference opened the floodgates.

Humanae Vitae has kept the faith.
Read it.

 

[Bookcat]

The thing is, Humanae Vitae was right. The evils that Paul VI predicted have come to pass.

Catholic doctrine on contraception was universal Christian doctrine up until 1930, when the Anglican Church first authorized artificial birth control among married couples for serious reasons.

Serious reasons indeed. That 1930 Lambeth conference opened the floodgates.

Humanae Vitae has kept the faith.
Read it.

Amen.

 

[FiberZilla]

I will third this statement. I don’t think Ron has any business on this forum, and is doing more damage then good to all married couples, or those seeking marriage. I suspect this is the reason for the posts in the first place.

I would strongly suggest the forum admin take a look at this thread, and take administrative action against this type of behavior.

Ron’s intentions are no doubt well meaning. Unfortunately there are good married people who have done everything right in an effort to love God who are emotionally tormented after having an orgasm, or are so riddled with religious anxiety because of Ron’s writings (he is a published writer) that they cannot enjoy sex at all, or they have given it up completely.

This bizaare obsession with minute details of marriage bed is not unique to Ron. Many religious people of good intent have a fixation in this area because of the mystery that surrounds our sexuality. However these views are extremely unhealthy and should be debated in the open not silenced.

It would be my hope that anyone who is suffering anxiety due to this type of religious sexual oppression turn from this way of thinking and free themselves to partake in the incredible joy of the marriage bed as God intended.

 

[Bookcat]

Rach,

For instance this portion seems suggestive: What do we make of a husband taking into account the wife’s slower reactions for hedonistic reasons? Here is what I mean: if we presume that the Archbishop is saying that a husband ought to help his wife reach climax after intercourse is completed, and he ought to do so for altruistic reasons – what is the explanation of the husband who does so for hedonistic reasons?

VC

He is meaning here I think that a husband is not to take advantage of the wifes slower reactions in order just to seek the max pleasure for himself…you know…hedonism. Disordered seeking of selfish pleasure…

It is not talking about what we were…

 

[Verbum_Caro]

He is meaning here I think that a husband is not to take advantage of the wifes slower reactions in order just to seek the max pleasure for himself…you know…hedonism. Disordered seeking of selfish pleasure…

It is not talking about what we were…

Right, that seems a possible reading, and what I was getting at. The only way I can think of that a husband could seek pleasure for himself in the context of taking advantage of a wife’s slower reaction would be by delaying his own climax in order to prolong his own pleasure. In contrast, altruistically taking into account the wife’s slower reactions would mean delaying his own climax in order for her to reach climax at same time or before himself.

This reading then precludes the husband causing the wife to climax after the completion of intercourse. The reason this is a possible reading is because it is difficult to see how a husband would take hedonistic self-seeking pleasure in helping his wife climax after his own climax.

I think it’s a nuanced point. Read the above paragraph over once or twice to see what I am getting at.

Again – I’m just pointing this out as one possible reading, and I neither urge or discourage it. Rather, I am attempting to show that if one were to read it this way, one could hold that a husband can’t help his wife climax after his own climax, and not be accused of contradicting JPII in Love and Responsibility.

VC

 

[Rach620]

Right, that seems a possible reading, and what I was getting at. The only way I can think of that a husband could seek pleasure for himself in the context of taking advantage of a wife’s slower reaction would be by delaying his own climax in order to prolong his own pleasure. In contrast, altruistically taking into account the wife’s slower reactions would mean delaying his own climax in order for her to reach climax at same time or before himself.

I don’t think we need to read into such minute detail, nor can we. A husband cannot be self-seeking in the marital act at all…He should always be seeking after the good of his wife, for her benefit. If he takes advantage of his understanding of his wife’s body and sexual excitement for his own pleasure (for one example, in the man who feels pleasure when his wife is no where near climax), he is acting hedonistically. If he recognizes the unitive good, for the marriage, of each spouse’s experience of sexual climax, and acts based upon that within the one marital act, he is acting altruistically.

I just do not understand where the “same time or before himself” comes in. It seems like a rather arbitrary timeline, and is not at all mentioned by JP2, who instead speaks of “harmony” and “simultaneous” climax as of great good for the couple.

This reading then precludes the husband causing the wife to climax after the completion of intercourse. The reason this is a possible reading is because it is difficult to see how a husband would take hedonistic self-seeking pleasure in helping his wife climax after his own climax.

I’m sorry, I don’t really understand what you are getting at, and I have reread it. It looks to be coming from a very restricted reading of the passage. By “completion of intercourse” you really mean “completion of male climax”. As I said earlier, JP2 contextualizes this necessary event in marital relations within the larger, continuous, SINGLE act of marital relations. The marital act does not just revolve around male climax, but for the unitive good of the spouses SHOULD involve both male and female climax, and “as far as possible” these should occur simultaneously–because it is good for the spouses and their marriage.

Within the ONE marital act, “before” or “after” male climax really isn’t an enormously important category, at least not from my reading of JP2. Where do you see that it is?

 

[Rach620]

I will third this statement. I don’t think Ron has any business on this forum, and is doing more damage then good to all married couples, or those seeking marriage. I suspect this is the reason for the posts in the first place.

I would strongly suggest the forum admin take a look at this thread, and take administrative action against this type of behavior.

I could not agree more. There are a good number of points of Catholic theology cited on Ron Conte’s own website where he is at odds with orthodox Catholic teaching. He continuously promotes his heterodox understandings of Catholic teaching here on CAF, and we cannot know how many readers have been affected by the spread of his confusion.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I’m sorry, I don’t really understand what you are getting at, and I have reread it.

Rachel,

Take my comments in the very limited way in which they are offered. Earlier in the thread a comment was made that a certain poster was accusing JPII of heresy because the poster believes that it is impermissible for a husband to help a wife climax after intercourse is completed. The reasoning was that JPII said it was permissible in Love and Responsibility, the poster called the concept heresy, therefore the poster implicitly and indirectly accused JPII of heresy.

But, even though I’ve seen this concept attributed to JPII before, I’ve never seen a quote offered which directly states it. If it’s the passage we are speaking about, it seems to be an inference about the passage. It might be a possible inference, even a plausible inference. But I think (as I’ve attempted to show) there is an alternative reading. If it can be read alternatively, and another quote can’t be found, I’m not sure it accurate to say quote “JPII taught that a husband may. . . etc.”

Any help?
VC

 

[Bookcat]

If he takes advantage of his understanding of his wife’s body and sexual excitement for his own pleasure (for one example, in the man who feels pleasure when his wife is no where near climax), he is acting hedonistically.

I would not say that "the man who feels pleasure when his wife is no where near climax…is acting hedonistically.

 

[Rach620]

Rachel,

Take my comments in the very limited way in which they are offered. Earlier in the thread a comment was made that a certain poster was accusing JPII of heresy because the poster believes that it is impermissible for a husband to help a wife climax after intercourse is completed. The reasoning was that JPII said it was permissible in Love and Responsibility, the poster called the concept heresy, therefore the poster implicitly and indirectly accused JPII of heresy.

But, even though I’ve seen this concept attributed to JPII before, I’ve never seen a quote offered which directly states it.

I take pgs 270-278 of L&R as sufficiently direct.

At any rate, the poster in question believes that any genital contact besides that which leads immediately to intercourse is “objectively gravely disordered”–including foreplay. JP2 clearly states the contrary. While not directly calling JP2 heretical for what he taught in the theology of the body, the poster has been attacking the content of the TOB and thereby impugning its teacher.

The issue here is not solely restricted to the female climax question. We can keep debating that, if you’d like. but I think it’s fairly clear that JP2 did nothing to forbid it, and in his encouraging married couples re: the good of BOTH husband’s and wife’s climaxing in the marriage act (“as far as possible simultaneously”) it is quite easy for husbands and wives to infer how that ought to be accomplished in the marriage bed.

AGAIN, JP2 does not draw a bright line after male climax in the theology of the body. To point at female climax within the marital act yet outside the event of male climax as morally wrong or disordered seems to me to come out of a view of the body and of marital relations that views them as essentially sinful. We need to be careful about our attitude here.

The view of the marital embrace that it involves platonic kissing, hugging and intercourse is rather shallow, laughable, and at the root of it–Gnostic. Thankfully the Church teaches no such thing.

 

[Rach620]

I would not say that "the man who feels pleasure when his wife is no where near climax…is acting hedonistically.

Perhaps I wasn’t being clear enough. The man who willfully climaxes long before his wife is ‘ready’ because he feels more pleasure when his wife is no where near climax is acting hedonistically. He has sought maximum pleasure for himself without regard to her pleasure (much less comfort).

 

[Christopher68]

Perhaps I wasn’t being clear enough. The man who willfully climaxes long before his wife is ‘ready’ because he feels more pleasure when his wife is no where near climax is acting hedonistically. He has sought maximum pleasure for himself without regard to her pleasure (much less comfort).

That does not sound like the hallmark of a loving relationship. I am always more interested in my wife having pleasure than in myself having pleasure.

 

[Squanto]

I think Bookcat is onto something here. HV states every marriage act must be procreative and unitive. “Marriage act” or “marital act” is broad and includes subsets of acts. The organs must be erect, moist, etc. (w/o getting too graphic). Stimulating the organs so that they may be prepared for the act is a necessary part of the act. Stimulating them outside a completed sex act would be improper.

But Ron Conte will object that the same act can’t be evil in one circumstance and good in another. Actually, they are not the same act. And you must look to context to determine the acts and the term “moral act” may include a subset of acts. And the same act may be evil in one circumstance and good in another.

For instance, if you commit thievery, you might case your neighbor’s house, enter it when you know no one is home, go into the bedroom, take the jewelry, and then leave the house. Thievery was not one act, but a series of acts. It’s a continuum. You would confess “stealing the jewelry” but not confess each and every particular act, b/c they are included in the thievery.

Suppose you go on your neighbor’s property when he told you not to. You’ve committed trespass. Now, suppose that he told you not to come on his property, but you see him face down, and think he’s hurt. You did the same act - going on his property w/o his permission, but you do it to assist or help someone in need. The same act is good, in one circumstance, and bad in another.

Lying is (mostly) bad, but lying to the Nazi’s to preserve the life of the Jews you are hiding is not bad. Lying to Chinese soldiers that you don’t know your ex-wife’s whereabouts (when you do) b/c they are going to forcibly abort her baby is not bad.

Even taking a neighbor’s apple off his property when it won’t threaten or hurt him in any way, so that you can feed your hungry family, is not thievery. That same act may be thievery if you are taking the apple for no good reason.

To recap, murder, thievery, and other sins are sins which capture a whole entire bunch of acts. The “sin” is attributed to the continuum of all these acts.

And an act that is bad, may be good, in different contexts. So, masturbation and contraception are always prohibited. But partially stimulating sexual organs to engage in an act of licit sex is neither masturbatory nor contraceptive.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Squanto,

Without speaking to the rest of your post –

Would you be willing to withdraw your example about lying? It might cause your argument problems, because of the way lying (an intrinsically evil act) is defined. In your example the object of lying obtains. The good reasons for lying, the good effect one seeks (to save lives) can’t change the moral object. If the object is bad then the good end sought or the good foreseen consequences can’t reform it – the end doesn’t justify the means.

In other words in your example of lying you aren’t talking about conditions that change lying into something else. You are talking about lying itself being excused because of some additional intent or some foreseen good effect. That’s not going to work.

VC

 

[Bookcat]

I think Bookcat is onto something here. HV states every marriage act must be procreative and unitive. “Marriage act” or “marital act” is broad and includes subsets of acts. The organs must be erect, moist, etc. (w/o getting too graphic). Stimulating the organs so that they may be prepared for the act is a necessary part of the act. Stimulating them outside a completed sex act would be improper.

But Ron Conte will object that the same act can’t be evil in one circumstance and good in another. Actually, they are not the same act. And you must look to context to determine the acts and the term “moral act” may include a subset of acts. And the same act may be evil in one circumstance and good in another.

For instance, if you commit thievery, you might case your neighbor’s house, enter it when you know no one is home, go into the bedroom, take the jewelry, and then leave the house. Thievery was not one act, but a series of acts. It’s a continuum. You would confess “stealing the jewelry” but not confess each and every particular act, b/c they are included in the thievery.

Suppose you go on your neighbor’s property when he told you not to. You’ve committed trespass. Now, suppose that he told you not to come on his property, but you see him face down, and think he’s hurt. You did the same act - going on his property w/o his permission, but you do it to assist or help someone in need. The same act is good, in one circumstance, and bad in another.

Lying is (mostly) bad, but lying to the Nazi’s to preserve the life of the Jews you are hiding is not bad. Lying to Chinese soldiers that you don’t know your ex-wife’s whereabouts (when you do) b/c they are going to forcibly abort her baby is not bad.

Even taking a neighbor’s apple off his property when it won’t threaten or hurt him in any way, so that you can feed your hungry family, is not thievery. That same act may be thievery if you are taking the apple for no good reason.

To recap, murder, thievery, and other sins are sins which capture a whole entire bunch of acts. The “sin” is attributed to the continuum of all these acts.

And an act that is bad, may be good, in different contexts. So, masturbation and contraception are always prohibited. But partially stimulating sexual organs to engage in an act of licit sex is neither masturbatory nor contraceptive.

humm…some of what you say would be the case…(I will refer you back to the grisez link regarding what is chaste and when in marriage…so i skip that part of your post here)

subsets of acts…and regarding the jewelry and confession…right on there

Physical acts can be different ‘moral objects’.

Killing an innocent person with a gun is one moral object (we call it murder).
Killing a person of necessity with a gun who is about to kill you is another moral object (self defense)

both are basically the same physical action …but different moral objects.

It is not that the circumstance changes an evil action into a good onto…it is that there are two different moral objects here.

The Church is very clear that the circumstance can never make an intrinsically evil thing into a good. vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm#I

Lying too is an evil…and thus the circumstance can not make it good… but it can make the guilt very very little though a lie is still an evil (and there may be some argument that one has a different object in some of these…but the Church has not said this is the case)…

The taking of the food out of necessity is likewise a different moral object than theft.

See here in the Catechism…see how the definitions are important:

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.190

 

[Bookcat]

PS: I can understand how one can think it is the circumstances per se that change things…so it is understandable for someone to think this. but once one understands that it is really the moral object here that changes. One sees that say murder…is a different thing than self defense. It is not the intention or the circumstances per se that changes things…it is the difference between apples and… well cake.

 

[Rach620]

Squanto,

Excellent post. You very clearly stated the central issues of the debate here…The marital act is indeed a subset of acts, and everything that is permitted of spouses in that context must remain in that context. Very clearly put.

Would you be willing to withdraw your example about lying? It might cause your argument problems, because of the way lying (an intrinsically evil act) is defined. In your example the object of lying obtains. The good reasons for lying, the good effect one seeks (to save lives) can’t change the moral object. If the object is bad then the good end sought or the good foreseen consequences can’t reform it – the end doesn’t justify the means.

In other words in your example of lying you aren’t talking about conditions that change lying into something else. You are talking about lying itself being excused because of some additional intent or some foreseen good effect. That’s not going to work.

There is no issue with the lying example. The CCC is clear that “lying” in some circumstances is permissible, because in certain circumstances there is no such thing as a lie. Lies are wrong because they denigrate the truth; when we know that the person who is demanding the truth of us has no real respect for the truth, or that they wish to use the truth to do evil (as in the example of the Nazis), we do not owe them the truth. There is a whole section in the CCC on our responsibilities with regard to the truth. When we “lie” to protect the good of others from those who would do them harm, we do not commit any sin against the truth.

 

[FiberZilla]

I agree. I believe Ron is micro-analyzing things to a rigid extreme, and is doing a disservice to loving Catholic married couples with these types of posts. In an earlier post, Ron stated that he is single and has never been married. With that in mind - and with all due respect - he seems to have an unnatural preoccupation with activities involving married couples. Perhaps he should focus his scriptural analysis on those areas where he has some real world experience and can actually add to the dialogue.

Brilliant response Christoper. I’ll put it another way. Unmarried (and therefore celibate) individuals, regardless of their literary accomplishments and level of education who profess expertise in area sexual morality within marriage are on par with an orthopedic surgeon trying to troubleshoot transmission problems common to Chevrolets.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

There is no issue with the lying example. The CCC is clear that “lying” in some circumstances is permissible, because in certain circumstances there is no such thing as a lie. Lies are wrong because they denigrate the truth; when we know that the person who is demanding the truth of us has no real respect for the truth, or that they wish to use the truth to do evil (as in the example of the Nazis), we do not owe them the truth.

Could you show us that in the Catechism, Rachel? It is true that the Catechism mentions that one is not bound to reveal the truth to one who does not have a right to know it, but this isn’t to be taken in the sense that one can tell an affirmative lie in those situations. Mental reservation is another issue. But here we seem to be speaking of an affirmative lie. And the example given is an affirmative lie.

There are quite a few threads on this subject, so I’d shy away from rehashing it here in its entirety, but it does illustrate a distinction I think between a context which is secondary to the moral object (and which therefore cannot change a bad object into a good one) and a context which acts as a principal condition for classifying the moral object in the first place.

Thanks,
VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Unmarried (and therefore celibate) individuals (. . .) who profess expertise in area sexual morality within marriage are on par with an orthopedic surgeon trying to troubleshoot transmission problems common to Chevrolets.

Hmmmmm. I’d think it was on par, rather, with an orthopedic surgeon trying to diagnose and heal bone diseases without having bones himself. Oh, wait.

Maybe on par with a orthopedic surgeon trying to diagnose and heal bone diseases without having bone disease himself. Oh, wait.



VC