Being, Good, and Evil

[Portofino]

I said I did not know the nuances of the translation. I don’t know Latin. I did not say that I don’t know what “desirable” means.

Aquinas’s and Aristotle’s metaphysical views are pretty well-known, even by people who disagree with them. What I’ve argued is fairly consistent with them - that “desirable” refers to a closer instantiation of what a thing is supposed to be. This is a “lighter” claim than noting that the good is the fulfillment of final causes, which requires a defense of the doctrine of final causes which I’ve chosen not to get into here. Since people can misapprehend the good, this definition is meant to account for what they mean when they call something good.

Where do you draw the line between bad as imperfection (the privation of a good, which ill-health would be), and bad as an imperfection plus an instance of immorality?

Some examples:

----an individual drinks too much at a festive occasion and the body rejects the alcohol, because the individual’s body has become in-toxic-ated. The body, in self-defense mode, vomits the alcoholic beverage as if it were a poison. Does this clearly imply that drunkness is not only bad, but immoral?

—an individual is obese, incurring the bad of the privation of health. Was it immoral to eat fatty or unhealthy foods?

–an individual engages in non-procreative sex; there are no harmful health consequences, thus no instance of badness as a privation of the goodness of health, per se (there is a privation of procreation but, then again, there is a privation of pro-creation via abstinence, as well).

–an individual takes his first drag on a cigarette and coughs violently. In fact, he feels as if he wants to vomit. His body seems to be telling him, “I do not want this! I was designed to breathe clean, fresh air, not tar and smoke!” Is his activity not only bad, but immoral, because he engages in a behavior that fails to promote the good of his body, that being his health?

I imagine that, in a virtue ethics or Christian virtue ethics contexts, all of these behaviors are vices. To call all of them immoral would probably give pause, to some, but I could imagine a Christian saying that “yes, all of these behaviors are immoral.”

A thought that fascinates me just occurred to me, though — “good behavior” and “bad behavior”, within the context of natural law/final ends/intrinsic goodness is largely viewed as an either/or proposition. How does one distinguish between degrees of goodness versus badness, morality versus immorality, naturalness versus unnaturalness. To take a germane example, is the individual who engages in non-procreative sex (a mortal sin, per the Catholics) engaged in a worser form of vice or immorality than the individual – and let’s say he does not suffer from alcoholism – who drinks until he vomits, or drinks until he loses consciousness?

Can rational argument alone get you to the conclusion that one is morally worse than the other?

A second, follow-up question — what could one say to someone who, though agreeing with Feser about “intentionality” in nature and final causes, or goodness as what things are “supposed to be like”, nonetheless says, “but what will the consequences be, if I simply do what I have a will to do, whether it is deemed ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’? Why should I do the natural thing?”

The individual who drinks until he’s drunk may be engaging in a behavior that is injurious to the good of his body, yet such an individual may never become an alcoholic, and will be left with nothing but “good times”, in terms of whatever pleasure his state of intoxication procured him. He would, as if were, have engaged in immoderateness…with due moderation. Further, I assume that the level of immorality in his behavior – given that he’s disobeyed the natural end of his body, which is not to ingest anything harmful to it – does not approach that of an ax-murderer, in the eyes of someone like Feser (though why not? Again, how does reason alone tell you the degrees of offense against the ways of nature?

Or let’s say a woman kisses another woman, in amorous desire. This is against nature, says Feser. To how severe a degree? To as severe a degree as sucking in tar and smoke, or chewing tobacco? To as severe a degree as drinking until one vomits, or loses consciousness? To a lesser degree, perhaps?

And if the consequences of an allegedly unnatural behavior are not deemed harmful (physically or emotionally), on what grounds would you impel someone to not engage in them? For example, in the case of our two women, what harmful consequences could be articulated? If they are both virgins – excuse the frankness – we not talking about harmful consequences to the health of their bodies. Emotionally, all they may experience is the joy of intimacy. Lack of procreation, perhaps? A priest or a monk could rival them, in that absence of achieving the good of procreation. Would not the harmful consequences of, say, a monogamous lesbian relationship not be of a lesser severity than sucking in smoke or tar, or ingesting alcohol?

These are the concrete applications of these theories, where the rubber hits the road; the pragmatic consequences of subscribing to these ideas, and they interest me.

Does Feser have it all figured out? If so, has he claimed to have done so through rational reflection alone – assessing comparative degrees of unnaturalness, badness, or immorality, for example, and where to draw the line between each of these – or are his own assessments informed by his Catholic faith?

 

[polytropos]

Some examples:

----an individual drinks too much at a festive occasion and the body rejects the alcohol, because the individual’s body has become in-toxic-ated. The body, in self-defense mode, vomits the alcoholic beverage as if it were a poison. Does this clearly imply that drunkness is not only bad, but immoral?

—an individual is obese, incurring the bad of the privation of health. Was it immoral to eat fatty or unhealthy foods?

–an individual engages in non-procreative sex; there are no harmful health consequences, thus no instance of badness as a privation of the goodness of health, per se (there is a privation of procreation but, then again, there is a privation of pro-creation via abstinence, as well).

–an individual takes his first drag on a cigarette and coughs violently. In fact, he feels as if he wants to vomit. His body seems to be telling him, “I do not want this! I was designed to breathe clean, fresh air, not tar and smoke!” Is his activity not only bad, but immoral, because he engages in a behavior that fails to promote the good of his body, that being his health?

I imagine that, in a virtue ethics or Christian virtue ethics contexts, all of these behaviors are vices. To call all of them immoral would probably give pause, to some, but I could imagine a Christian saying that “yes, all of these behaviors are immoral.”

I would say that these are vices, generally speaking. Part of the reason is the damaging of the body, but it might be a stretch so say that that is even the main reason.

A large part of the disorders of immoderate drinking, gluttony, or (one might say) smoking is that they distort man’s rational nature, ie. by drinking a lot, one loses the ability to reason in the same way that one loses reason by lusting for food, or by adultery, or by becoming addicted to cigarettes. Health and physical well-being are pretty far from the only final causes one should be worried about. The physical damage done is less a problem than the disorder of the will (hence, why intention is important in Catholic morality).

I’d also note that there is a difference between a privation of procreation in sex and a privation of procreation in someone’s life as a whole. The natural law theorist does not hold that your purpose as a whole human being is to procreate, and so anyone who does not procreate is sinning. What the natural law theorist is holding is that the final end of sex and intimacy is procreation (which is why it must be heterosexual, and why it must occur within marriage). It is problematic when an act does not fulfill its final cause. If procreation were the final end of man in himself, then I think abstinent clergy etc. would be problematic. But man is meant to be celibate, ie. sex should only occur when it is aligned toward procreation.

To take a germane example, is the individual who engages in non-procreative sex (a mortal sin, per the Catholics) engaged in a worser form of vice or immorality than the individual – and let’s say he does not suffer from alcoholism – who drinks until he vomits, or drinks until he loses consciousness?

Can rational argument alone get you to the conclusion that one is morally worse than the other?

I do not think one can quantify that badness of an act. Even from the standpoint of moral theology, we would not claim that one person’s sin is worse than another. Sometimes an individual can evaluate his own culpability, but otherwise only God knows.

Since you are saying that the person doing the drinking does not suffer from alcoholism, you seem to be suggesting that we consider the case as though “all other things are equal,” but that is rather difficult to do. There could always be mitigating circumstances on either side - surely, whether you’re an alcoholic or not, your rationality decreases as you go and you may be more “susceptible” to having “just one more.” In that case, you become less culpable as your ability to reason disappears, but more culpable for putting yourself in such a situation in the first place. Those engaging in non-procreative sex may be fully convinced that it is harmless. It may be - in fact it is likely - that at some times, binge drinking is morally worse than non-procreative sex, and vice versa. What is known is that both acts are objectively bad, and one should not engage in either.

A second, follow-up question — what could one say to someone who, though agreeing with Feser about “intentionality” in nature and final causes, or goodness as what things are “supposed to be like”, nonetheless says, “but what will the consequences be, if I simply do what I have a will to do, whether it is deemed ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’? Why should I do the natural thing?”

I think I’ve addressed this already. Without revelation, we might lack some information about the afterlife, but we still would know that the human soul is immaterial and eternal, and that the end of the intellect and will is to be ordered towards truth. Actively opposing one’s true end would distort the will, the part of us which we know to be eternal.

Does Feser have it all figured out? If so, has he claimed to have done so through rational reflection alone – assessing comparative degrees of unnaturalness, badness, or immorality, for example, and where to draw the line between each of these – or are his own assessments informed by his Catholic faith?

Some readers of The Last Superstition have actually accused Feser of referring too little to revelation, Church authority, etc. I believe he has always been socially conservative, also, even during the ~decade he was an atheist.

I also believe he has a forthcoming article on natural law, so perhaps we’ll soon see.

 

[Portofino]

I would say that these are vices, generally speaking. Part of the reason is the damaging of the body, but it might be a stretch so say that that is even the main reason.

This is interesting. I think you do a better job of maintaining neutrality than does Feser. His thoughts on tobacco consumption seem to be unduly permissive, by the standards of the proper use of one’s body. The portions I find inconsistently permissive are highlighted in bold. This is from his blog, so he is thinking off the cuff, as it were.

“…smoking cigarettes and cigars and drinking in moderation are not at all problematic. Other practices are (other than the legal aspect) problematic to the extent that they do not fit the alcohol and tobacco model. But the problem in the other cases is not the substance itself, but rather the extent to which it has a greater inherent tendency to deprive one of the use of reason. (Of course someone who is seriously impairing his health by smoking tobacco will have other moral reasons to stop, but that is a separate issue. I think the risk would have to be pretty clear in an individual case[SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy” – addiction, as well]** though, for it to be immoral, and in general I am opposed both to anti-tobacco hysteria and to rigorism on these sorts of questions**.)

I’d also note that there is a difference between a privation of procreation in sex and a privation of procreation in someone’s life as a whole.

Yes; I’ve considered that is their viewpoint. It seems to lose the forest for the trees, in my opinion, insofar as the trees (one’s reproductive organs) are part of the whole human organism. I personally would reason, “your body went through puberty because it is ordered towards procreation. As an adult who has undergone puberty, it is natural and right for you to fulfill that towards which your adult body is ordered.” At the very least, I would count the state of an individual who has married as “more good” – in the amoral sense of having actualized his body’s natural potential for procreation – than an individual who remained celibate for life. From a Christian standpoint, the viewpoint is usually reversed.

I not think one can quantify that badness of an act. Even from the standpoint of moral theology, we would not claim that one person’s sin is worse than another.

That’s saying a great deal. I don’t think Feser would be satisfied with that admission – that’s my gut feeling, at least. I base that on the fact that smoking tobacco, or–I assume–eating hot fudge sundaes when you’ve led a sedentary lifestyle and are overweight or obese, does not seem to “stick in his craw” in the way that the social promotion of the same sex lifestyle does, even though the former are arguably more ubiquitous. If he were asked about this, I think he would try to demonstrate all of the harms that occur as a result of this lifestyle-- “pernicious” probably would not be too strong a word for how he would describe it–but these harms probably would be less empirical in nature(not physical harm or harm to one’s health but moral harm, spiritual harm, which is harder to establish).

revelation, we might lack some information about the afterlife, but we still would know that the human soul is immaterial and eternal, and that the end of the intellect and will is to be ordered towards truth.

Again, I wonder if Feser would be satisfied with this. I’d like to see him “take on” the question of whether “in accord with nature” versus “contrary to nature” is very much an either/or proposition (thus, same-sex contact between two consenting adults is no more or less against that which one’s body is ordered than feeding oneself empty calories or food that is high in saturated fat and cholesterol; or breathing in smoke for the sake of pleasure and gratification; or ingesting a toxic substance such as 100 proof vodka).

And the other curiosity I have is, indeed, how Feser would persuade people who are willing to settle for an imperfect instantiation of health, longevity, willpower, or discipline – by eating that chocolate cake(and, at best, exercising to work it off); by lighting up that cigarette(and, at best, quitting cold turkey once one reaches the age of thirty); by drinking a few shots of that vodka, even as their eyes water and they cough violently(and, at best, following it up with a full glass of water and abstinence from drink for the next two weeks); or, in a similar vein, those who not feel any particular moral indignation over someone like Ellen Degeneres’ relationship with her spouse(choosing, instead, to focus on whatever love and commitment, or “positivity”, exists there). In other words, how would he respond to those who have a higher tolerance for imperfection than Feser claims we ought to have, as rational beings, and those who accept not only that imperfection is a fact of life, but is a part of the pleasure of life, as well.

also believe he has a forthcoming article on natural law, so perhaps we’ll soon see.

I’d like to read it. You probably won’t accept this, but I think you do a better job of assumed neutrality than he does. Through hearsay, at least, I’ve read that he’s slammed same sex marriage pretty hard in his book The Last Superstition, betraying the fact that this is an issue that, emotionally, gets him hot under the collar. His blog seems to bear this out, that this is a form of irrationality that he finds particularly damaging and pernicious (whereas others, to the contrary, have more of a personal bugaboo towards compulsive overeaters, or against fast food chains and purveyors of oversized sodas).

 

[polytropos]

This is interesting. I think you do a better job of maintaining neutrality than does Feser. His thoughts on tobacco consumption seem to be unduly permissive, by the standards of the proper use of one’s body.

I don’t disagree with him much on those points. I do not see an issue with moderate drinking or smoking cigars. I tend to view the smoking of cigarettes as deeply irrational, however, since by my observation it is incredibly difficult to be moderate about it. (I have a couple family members who have gone through multiple surgeries for smoking-related cancers, and still smoke when they get the chance. In that respect, I would kind of regard the evil of smoking cigarettes as more of an occasion of evil, since its most pronounced negative effects, both to reason and the body, crop up once you’re addicted.)

However, I think a lot of where Feser and I would differ on those issues chalks more up to our fiscal views than our social views. I am definitely less fiscally conservative than Feser.

Yes; I’ve considered that is their viewpoint. It seems to lose the forest for the trees, in my opinion, insofar as the trees (one’s reproductive organs) are part of the whole human organism. I personally would reason, “your body went through puberty because it is ordered towards procreation. As an adult who has undergone puberty, it is natural and right for you to fulfill that towards which your adult body is ordered.” At the very least, I would count the state of an individual who has married as “more good” – in the amoral sense of having actualized his body’s natural potential for procreation – than an individual who remained celibate for life. From a Christian standpoint, the viewpoint is usually reversed.

I don’t think anyone is committed to holding that a body which has gone through puberty must reproduce. One’s reproductive organs are part of the whole human organism, and as such reproductive ends are not a human’s only ends. Final causes do not entail just that potentials have to be actualized; they entail that they must be actualized under the right circumstances. Marrying and procreating is certainly good. But someone who is unmarried is not obligated to get married or procreated in large part because simply doing so imprudently would be to procreate under improper circumstances.

That’s saying a great deal. I don’t think Feser would be satisfied with that admission – that’s my gut feeling, at least.

Hmm, I don’t think I meant what you think I meant. I am saying that whether a particular action was morally worse than another particular action is never clear - ie. when person A performs action X and person B performs action Y, there is insufficient information to judge who is more morally culpable, even if we know both X and Y are gravely sinful.

My larger hesitation about same-sex marriage would be that (compared to the other sins you’ve mentioned) it is particularly scandalous, and scandal is a sin against truth. Adultery in general is scandalous since you sin with someone, but same-sex marriage advocacy is very scandalous in itself. It is certainly bad and scandalous for a father to be an alcoholic, but in the case of something like same-sex marriage, the falsehood is marketed as a truth. More moderate advocates, I think, will insist that there is no slippery slope, but I am personally exposed to the “forefront” of liberal sexual agendas, which do consist of more radical ideas like the abolition of gender (for instance, in theories which claim the mind has no gender, or that gender is a spectrum, or that gender is entirely socially constructed). Such ideas are, I think, thoroughly false (on a biological, materialistic account, indeed, they could not even begin to make sense), but are entailed by the same ideologies that advocate same-sex marriage.

You probably won’t accept this, but I think you do a better job of assumed neutrality than he does.

As I said, I am less fiscally conservative than him, and I think that probably influences some of his positions more than his being Catholic does.

I would agree with him, to an extent, in that I do not think natural law morality completely precludes consuming alcohol or tobacco products. As I said, I find cigarettes very problematic. But in terms of consuming, what becomes a problem is when it distorts rationality, which is why I would say that moderate alcohol and tobacco consumption (I am thinking cigars here) is not disordered. In the case of alcohol and tobacco, it is the excesses which are disordered, we might say, not the nature of the acts. By contrast, the natures of the acts are what are disordered when it comes to homosexuality.

 

[polytropos]

Through hearsay, at least, I’ve read that he’s slammed same sex marriage pretty hard in his book The Last Superstition, betraying the fact that this is an issue that, emotionally, gets him hot under the collar. His blog seems to bear this out, that this is a form of irrationality that he finds particularly damaging and pernicious (whereas others, to the contrary, have more of a personal bugaboo towards compulsive overeaters, or against fast food chains and purveyors of oversized sodas).

He does slam same-sex marriage hard in The Last Superstition, which puts off a lot of moderate readers, although I think he defends his position pretty well there (and, having looked at a few reviews that were put off by it, few have really responded thoroughly to the justifications he provides for his position, they just attack the position itself).

I think he was also making a point to bring up same-sex marriage in the way he does (he talks about it on the first page of the introduction, as well as later in the book when he addresses natural law morality). He notes that, over the last 10 years, same-sex marriage has gone from something that looked impossible to something that is happening. The book is, of course, a response to New Atheists like Dawkins and Hitchens who make the political implications of New Atheism very clear. Part of their argument is that a liberal position on abortion etc. is obviously entailed by their scientism, and I think Feser is interested in arguing that his metaphysical position, which is more defensible, entails social conservatism. I think it is largely part of the nature of the book (he makes few partisan comments in Philosophy of Mind, Locke, or Aquinas, for instance).

 

[Portofino]

I don’t think anyone is committed to holding that a body which has gone through puberty must reproduce. One’s reproductive organs are part of the whole human organism, and as such reproductive ends are not a human’s only ends. Final causes do not entail just that potentials have to be actualized; they entail that they must be actualized under the right circumstances. Marrying and procreating is certainly good. But someone who is unmarried is not obligated to get married or procreated in large part because simply doing so imprudently would be to procreate under improper circumstances.

It’s a fine distinction. Certainly, never eating, or drinking, would be a great evil insofar as it impedes survival. Never procreating, if all of humanity renounced it, would be a great evil insofar as collective survival of the species would be compromised. It’s not clear to me that the complete absence of an activity is not itself a great evil, only the active misuse of that activity (with the food example, it would be like comparing the anorexic who starves herself – not eating at all – with the bulimic who more actively mis-uses the eating process). Eating and procreating may be different --insofar as one is necessary for individual survival, the other for collective survival–but I certainly see the logic in those orthodox Jewish thinkers who interpret a moral duty to marry and to procreate (says one article, “Judaism declared procreation a religious duty—a positive commandment. Maimonides states, “G‑d has commanded us to be fruitful and multiply with the intention of preserving the human species, and this is what the Torah says: As for you, be fruitful and multiply.’” Maimonides’ use of the term “with the intention” probably means “binding insofar as it contributes to the preservation of the species in accordance with the demands of the law.” Presumably, once one has done one’s share in maintaining the population of the next generation, one may no longer be obligated to fulfill the command. “Be fruitful and multiply” is not only good advice, “a blessing on your head,” it is law for every Jew”).

And then there’s the question whether the distinctions of natural law (unaided by religious teachings, which avail themselves of revelation, in part) can have so fine a point, that they can lead one to articulate with such precision, “you’re not obligated to engage in sexual activity at all but, if you do, you are obligated to be married; if you do, you are obligated to use your sexual organs towards their proper end, in each and every instance, including no withdrawal or use of artificial birth control; and just because you’ve procreated and have children, doesn’t mean you can also enjoy non-procreative sex 'on the side, like the dieter who permits herself the occasional ‘indulgence’ because she’s physically active and in good shape.”

moderate advocates, I think, will insist that there is no slippery slope, but I am personally exposed to the “forefront” of liberal sexual agendas, which do consist of more radical ideas like the abolition of gender (for instance, in theories which claim the mind has no gender, or that gender is a spectrum, or that gender is entirely socially constructed). Such ideas are, I think, thoroughly false (on a biological, materialistic account, indeed, they could not even begin to make sense), but are entailed by the same ideologies that advocate same-sex marriage.

It’s interesting to me, though, how much of gender roles are cultural. I’m thinking, specifically, of the uproar that existed when many men – in the 1960’s – began to wear their hair long. Obviously, men wore long hair in the court of Louis XIV (for example) and in many other contexts, but it seems some conservatives would have gone so far as to say that long hair on men was unnatural for a man. The same could be argued about a male wearing pink panties ( ), or donning a dress and wearing makeup. Intrinsically, there is nothing unnatural about any of this, whether as regards one’s clothing or footwear; whether one wears makeup or no makeup; whether one shaves one’s legs and armpits, or does not. There is nothing intrinsically unnatural about a man wearing a dress and high heels, except in the *de facto *sense that it has become the social custom for only women to dress in this way, and insofar as the typical male who emulates them in this is likely seeking to become female, on some level. I knew of a guy in college – seemingly heterosexual – who not only had long hair, but put a “scrunchy” in it; who studied at Sarah Lawrence college; who won top prize in a feminist essay contest. Would he be in violation of natural law, per Feser? Not necessarily so, I would think; there would have to be, logically, a good deal of breathing room in the space between what is innately natural for the genders and what is a de facto social convention, even by the standards of a natural law theorist. A young women who resists falling in line and who maintains naturally hairy legs is not violating any naturally-ordered femaleness, even though society would view this as markedly unfeminine. That being said, I can only imagine that an elementary school child showing up to school in a dress would cause a scandal, even though this is not in violation of natural law; and a uni-sex bathroom would cause a scandal, as well, even though that too is not intrinsically a violation of natural law (hey, the latter worked pretty well in the television show “Ally MacBeal” ).

 

[polytropos]

It’s a fine distinction. Certainly, never eating, or drinking, would be a great evil insofar as it impedes survival. Never procreating, if all of humanity renounced it, would be a great evil insofar as collective survival of the species would be compromised.

This seems more Kantian than Thomistic. It would be bad if everyone decided not to procreate, but that does not make a moral obligation to procreate. Disordered sexual acts are disordered because of what they are as sexual acts which are not directed towards procreation, not because humans are obligated to procreate in general.

It’s interesting to me, though, how much of gender roles are cultural. I’m thinking, specifically, of the uproar that existed when many men – in the 1960’s – began to wear their hair long. Obviously, men wore long hair in the court of Louis XIV (for example) and in many other contexts, but it seems some conservatives would have gone so far as to say that long hair on men was unnatural for a man. The same could be argued about a male wearing pink panties ( ), or donning a dress and wearing makeup. Intrinsically, there is nothing unnatural about any of this, whether as regards one’s clothing or footwear; whether one wears makeup or no makeup; whether one shaves one’s legs and armpits, or does not. There is nothing intrinsically unnatural about a man wearing a dress and high heels, except in the *de facto *sense that it has become the social custom for only women to dress in this way, and insofar as the typical male who emulates them in this is likely seeking to become female, on some level. I knew of a guy in college – seemingly heterosexual – who not only had long hair, but put a “scrunchy” in it; who studied at Sarah Lawrence college; who won top prize in a feminist essay contest. Would he be in violation of natural law, per Feser? Not necessarily so, I would think; there would have to be, logically, a good deal of breathing room in the space between what is innately natural for the genders and what is a de facto social convention, even by the standards of a natural law theorist. A young women who resists falling in line and who maintains naturally hairy legs is not violating any naturally-ordered femaleness, even though society would view this as markedly unfeminine. That being said, I can only imagine that an elementary school child showing up to school in a dress would cause a scandal, even though this is not in violation of natural law; and a uni-sex bathroom would cause a scandal, as well, even though that too is not intrinsically a violation of natural law (hey, the latter worked pretty well in the television show “Ally MacBeal” ).

It would depend. A male actor who wears a dress for a play is not necessarily doing something unnatural. But when something is done with the intention of deviating from one’s gender, it would be unnatural (if a man wears a dress in order to feel more like a woman). So a woman who chooses not to shave her legs for the sake of convenience is not doing anything unnatural. A woman who chooses not to shave her legs in order to be more like a man and break down gender boundaries is doing something unnatural. Certainly specific gender cues are cultural, but the fact that there are gender cues is natural. Sexual dimorphism is an important and natural characteristic of humans; intentional subversion of it (which may manifest itself differently in different cultures) is decidedly unnatural.

 

[Portofino]

This seems more Kantian than Thomistic. It would be bad if everyone decided not to procreate, but that does not make a moral obligation to procreate. Disordered sexual acts are disordered because of what they are as sexual acts which are not directed towards procreation, not because humans are obligated to procreate in general.

This is a particular way of looking at it, though – a subjective viewpoint, ultimately – that not everyone is going to agree about. It eschews pragmatism because it has not offered any harmful practical consequences of engaging in non-procreative sex. One of those practical consequences is that no procreation will take place, but defenders of Thomistic natural law acknowledge that the lack of procreation, in and of itself, is not the problem. It is the fact of engaging in an act that is ordered towards procreation, and subverting the directionality of that act, that is the problem.

Thus there are no practical consequences that the defender of Thomistic natural law has presented, other than the face value fact that “one is engaging in an act ordered towards procreation, and subverting the directionality of that act.” We’re given a principle of the non-violability of the procreation-directedness of the sexual act, without any consequences beyond the violation itself. One either finds that compelling, or one doesn’t. I am more pragmatic in that I don’t care how pregnancy didn’t occur, whether it was: A. one abstained and never engaged in sex to begin with; B. one engaged in intercourse, but it did not result in pregnancy; C. one engaged in non-procreative sexual activity. I don’t care which of the three resulted in non-procreation, if I’m OK with the practical consequence of non-procreation, in general. If I’m ok with that consequence, in general – and, as you’ve pointed out, that consequence is fine, in and of itself, so long as other humans do successfully procreate – then I have no problem with any of these scenarios. Pragmatically speaking, it’s a matter of indifference to me.

Of course, I’m speaking as one who doesn’t believe that natural processes are normative or impose moral obligations, to begin with. In some cases, of course, they have consequences, aside from whether or not there is any moral imperative there. If one stops eating, one will die. If human beings en masse stop procreating, the human race will become extinct.

would depend. A male actor who wears a dress for a play is not necessarily doing something unnatural. But when something is done with the intention of deviating from one’s gender, it would be unnatural (if a man wears a dress in order to feel more like a woman).

Again, if no dire consequences are demonstrated as a result of crossing gender boundaries – if the sky does not fall, if human civilization does not collapse, then I have no interest in taking a stand against the behavior. If it can be demonstrated that crossing gender boundaries causes harm to self or others, I might feel differently. But the mere principle of it – based on a very fine-tuned, abstract understanding of what is right and appropriate – is more like adhering to a certain idea of symmetry or perfection, more of an “aesthetic” standard, to me, than a moral or practical one.

specific gender cues are cultural, but the fact that there are gender cues is natural.

This says nothing about whether a society can stray to an *exaggerated * polarization of gender roles. If gender cues are natural, it does not tell us whether a society’s rigid definitions of appropriate gender roles are not the natural equivalent of a body that is morbidly obese – bloated, overblown, grossly exaggerated. To be convinced that society knows best, just because – in principle – some disparity between the sexes is natural, does not tell me how much disparity is appropriate, versus how much similarity.

But even if a man decided he wanted to become a woman – including through surgery – I would have no objection to this, insofar as I cannot demonstrate that the sky will fall or that society will collapse, as a result of this breaching of gender boundaries or this subverting of nature. I have to be shown actual consequences; adherence to a principle is not enough for me – to an idea of something, which I view almost akin to a kind of aesthetic perfectionism, like wanting to maintain the perfect circle and eschew any “ellipticality” (though elliptical might actually be more interesting). There has to be demonstrated harm, in concrete terms, for me to take a stand against it (others, of course, would argue for positive consequences, such as lessing what they claim to be an overblown or exaggerated social polarization of the genders).

 

[polytropos]

Thus there are no practical consequences that the defender of Thomistic natural law has presented, other than the face value fact that “one is engaging in an act ordered towards procreation, and subverting the directionality of that act.” We’re given a principle of the non-violability of the procreation-directedness of the sexual act, without any consequences beyond the violation itself. One either finds that compelling, or one doesn’t.

I’m not arguing that there must be “practical consequences,” besides objective harm to the dignity of man. I am saying why the act is sinful and why one might expect it to disorder the will. If you require the sky to fall to oppose it, then that is up to you. Be complicit with whatever you like.

If one stops eating, one will die. If human beings en masse stop procreating, the human race will become extinct.

This phrasing accentuates the lack of analogy.

But the mere principle of it – based on a very fine-tuned, abstract understanding of what is right and appropriate – is more like adhering to a certain idea of symmetry or perfection, more of an “aesthetic” standard, to me, than a moral or practical one.

As I think I’ve stressed, morality is about striving towards the perfect form of man. It is not about practicality. I think is where we’ll have to agree to disagree, since this topic is not about formal/final causes or even morality.

This says nothing about whether a society can stray to an *exaggerated * polarization of gender roles…To be convinced that society knows best, just because – in principle – some disparity between the sexes is natural, does not tell me how much disparity is appropriate, versus how much similarity.

I’m not claiming that society knows best. The Church (and any natural law theorist) would hold that gender roles are in some sense distorted even as they are being collapsed. It is astonishing to look at ads or watch TV and see how sexualized our culture is. While gender theorists are claiming that there is no biological basis for male and female gender differences, the media presents women as objects of lust. Women claim to want freedom from patriarchy but participate in “slut walks” in which they present their bodies as nothing more than sexual. Our culture is deeply disturbed when it comes to sex. People want it, and they want it to be safe and casual and open. But all of that just leads to contradictory courses of action, because sex is not something casual or unimportant.

There is a lot of gender- and sex-related activism on my campus, but there is also a very problematic rape culture. People are not supposed to participate in “victim-blaming,” but people are supposed to make themselves as attractive and available as possible if they want to have sex. My college - a bastion for advocates of liberal sex - puts a bunch of lustful people in a room, gives them alcohol, and then finds it disgusting when rape occurs at frightening frequency. The response is to educate people about the fact that rape is bad. What is not questioned is whether society is taking the wrong attitude towards sex.

As a natural law theorist, I do not base my morality on practical consequences. But to say that the liberal desacralizing of sex does not have negative practical consequences is, I think, misleading and false. To look at a single instance of what natural law theorists would shake their head at and conclude that it’s fine since the sky isn’t falling is to miss the forest for the trees. As an isolated incident, it may not have practical consequences. But what distortion of sexual norms entails is the confusion that the West is seeing with regard to sex overall.

(Sorry for my socially conservative rant.)

 

[Portofino]

is a lot of gender- and sex-related activism on my campus, but there is also a very problematic rape culture. People are not supposed to participate in “victim-blaming,” but people are supposed to make themselves as attractive and available as possible if they want to have sex. My college - a bastion for advocates of liberal sex - puts a bunch of lustful people in a room, gives them alcohol, and then finds it disgusting when rape occurs at frightening frequency. The response is to educate people about the fact that rape is bad. What is not questioned is whether society is taking the wrong attitude towards sex.)

No, no need to apologize I was never into the party culture, in my college days (on a Catholic campus) and found that whole culture to be pretty demoralizing.

But to say that the liberal desacralizing of sex does not have negative practical consequences is, I think, misleading and false.

There I agree. I may not agree that all instances of non-procreative sex are damaging to human dignity or to human flourishing, but certainly such things as rape, promiscuity, abandonment of children, abortion can be demonstrated to cause damage, by reasonable standards. These are more easily compared with the scourge of alcoholism and drug addiction, and can be identified as having damaging ramifications to both physical and psychological well-being. One could view these things as all of a piece – that having non-procreative sex with one’s spouse is a “slippery slope”, or that any same-sex sexual contact is a slippery slope – but I take a more permissive view there, it is true.

I think it’s also true that Catholics who argue for traditional sexual morality know that more pragmatic arguments are persuasive, as when pope Benedict declared that the prospect of gay marriage posed a threat to the “future of civilization.” There’s irony, there, insofar as marriage signifies monogamy and commitment, which is the opposite of the culture of promiscuity that led to the AIDS crisis. And, ironically, many of these same sex couples are very interested in being parents and caring for children.

I think you bring a unique perspective insofar as whatever social upheavals took place between roughly 1960 and 1975 were well before you were born (I was born in '75, by the way). It seems the Baby Boomer generation reacted against what they perceived as the excesses of their elders, and perhaps a growing number of younger individuals today will have the same reaction against the world that the Baby Boomers, in turn, have wrought.

And I certainly don’t mean to stray from the topic at hand, although I think Feser is right in trying to tie arguments from the highest level of abstraction (Thomas’ Five Ways, for example) to some of its most immediate applications (as regards current events and the gay marriage debate).

Feser seems to trace the roots of what’s wrong with the west back to the rejection of Aquinas, Aristotle, and of final causes, by early modern philosophers. It would be interesting to note his understanding of the 60’s. You had Hitchcock’s Psycho in 1960 (the infamous shower scene, the breaking of taboos as regards the portrayal of adultery, of women in undergarments, of bathrooms, of men dressing as women); the Kennedy assassination (and the inadvertant broadcast, on live TV, of the assasination of Lee Harvey Oswald), which was the breaking of a taboo regarding the portrayal of violence as something fit for public consumption; rioting in the inner cities; Vietnam as the first war televised and brought to people’s living rooms (in a way that WW II was not). The disintegration of the Hays Code. Or maybe it was Sigmund Freud’s influence, since he made sex a topic of conversation in polite society, going all the way back to 1900. Incidentally, having viewed Psycho, a disgusted Walt Disney turned down the Hitchcock peoples’ request to shoot on location in Disneyland (Hitchcock b. 1899; Disney b. 1901). I see Psycho (1960) and Network (1975) as two bookends in terms of filmic commentaries on the seismic cultural shifts of this period (Feser is a film buff, it would seem, and I at least agree with him regarding the view-worthiness of 2001: A Space Odyssey, Vertigo, and the The Twilight Zone ).edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/08/metaphysics-of-vertigo.html