B
belorg
Guest
I am not talking about Cambridge change. As I have said before, Cambridge change is the change in a relation due to the other partner(s) in the relation changing. That’s why I start with a world in which there are no partners.well, if you want to engage in an exegesis of the writings of aquinas, then cool: show me how aquinas’ understanding of god’s immutability excludes the possibility of cambridge change.
I think Edward Feser brings up Cambridge change to counter the argument that if God cannot change, he nevertheless “becomes” a creator. That is not my argument.
So, I do not see any need to delve into Aquinas for the time being. But, according to Aquinas, God 's essence is his existence and God is ultimately simple. Since He has no parts, we cannot say that only an insignificant part of Him changes
My principle concern is to investigate whether an immutable being can be the basis of chnagung reality.if your principle concern is to show an inconsistency in the thought of aquinas, then let’s start with the thought of the man himself.
That’s why the argument you presented doesn’t work. (2) is a non-sequitur.a relational change is only one kind of incidental (red: non-substantial) change.
I’ll try to dig up some of his writings.maybe i’m not - it will depend on the outcome of our discussion about thomas’ writings on divine immutability.
Here is one
Thomas of Aquino Summa Theologica:
I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable.
First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 7) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved.
Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.