Being!

[levinas12]

I agree that it means something to us for ourselves to not exist, even if we can’t grasp (perhaps with good reason) what it could be like to not exist - part of what makes it scary, I guess.

But you make a good point in that for us to know whether or not a particular entity exists, we need some understanding of what it would mean for that entity not to exist. I’ve tried to articulate a similar point in the threads dealing with ‘intelligent design’ - essentially, how would we know the difference between a world that was designed and one that was not designed? What would it mean for an intelligent designer not to exist and how would we know?

By the same token, my own impression is that by defining God as ‘pure existence’, believers are trying to work around this very point - to claim, effectively, that the existence of God is proven by the mere fact of existence on the part of apparently extant entities. But the question then becomes - what if the “ground of existence”, if there is anything that could be called such, is not the personal God of Classical Theism? How would the world be different were it not so, and how would we know? I admit this is a question of some weight for nonbelievers also, but the difference is that we acknowledge the apparent fact of existence, without extrapolating from this the existence of an ultimate, transcendent being that essentially provides ‘being’ for all other entities. Frankly, any such entity seems surplus to requirements…

It’s curious how often God and intelligent design pop up in “ontological” threads. Not that this is a bad thing. In fact, I think God and intelligent design are nice philosophical topics (both pro and con). It’s just that they might divert the discussion .

We should first ask ourselves why we are even concerned about the meaning of “to be”. What’s the point? Why does it matter?

The question of “being” has nothing to do with getting better consumer goods.

So why are we interested in this question?

Again, I think it stems from our anxiety about “not being there” (Heidegger).

But this anxiety is not just about own mortality. When we have loved someone, we cannot bring ourselves to accept their “absolute” absence.

That’s why the “immateriality” of the soul is such a hot topic on these threads - it ensures against total loss.

You may ask about evidence here. Well, I don’t have any hard evidence - I haven’t seen the dead. But how can those we love simply disappear forever - this the heart, if not the mind, cannot accept.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Good point - although I get the impression that for the most part, concepts of the theistic god as being an infinite, simple entity don’t take these qualities to their logical conclusion, certainly not if this means supposing said god to be limited in any way. Then again, most arguments that acknowledge the apparent imperfection of the universe - perhaps as an ‘unavoidable’ consequence of its complexity - assert (in a very hesitant, veiled manner) that the theistic god is limited.

Yes, these are some of the " popular " objections. But they ignore or treat as invalid the proofs for God’s existence as demonstrated by the Five Ways of St. Thomas and his proofs of God’s Simplicity, Perfection, Goodness, Limitlessness, the immediate presence of His Being to everything that exists - moving them, sustaining them, directing them, His Unchangeableness, His Eternity, His Oneness ( S.T. Part 1, Ques 2-11). In the same way they ignore the Names of God ( Your last sentence ), His Knowledge, His Will and Power ( S.T. Ques 12-26). Also ignored is His ever present interaction with His creation ( Ques 44-119). Edward Feser has found that the popularizers of the current craze of non-belief have not bothered to even read ST. Thomas, let alone study him. They simply parrot criticisms of popular critics of the past going back to the Age of Enlightment and the Reformation. ( excellent source material )

Also dismissed as devoid of meaning and validity is the historic Revelation of God from Moses through Jesus, generally dismissed as some sort of fairy tail. This Revelation does indeed prove as true most of whatl Thomas taught. In other words God is exactly Who He said He was, I Am Who Am. The Perfect Intellectual, Act of Existence, the Cause of All that is, all who are beings by participation ( i. e. caused by He Who Simply Exists).

Do we understand how he can create and cause without being changed, do we understand how he can create a universe of mutltiple beings and still be One and Simple? No, not really, we just know that it HAS to be that way and futher that is how He has Revealed Himself. It is all bound up with the Hiddeness of His Being, the Mystery of His Inner Life.

And what is the alternative - chaos and meaninglessness. And if God does not exist where are the complaints lodged against Him going to be now directed? The imperfections of the universe will still exist, evil will still exist. And the poor and suffering will deprived of any consolations at all. The Christian explanation of pain, suffering, evil may not be very satisfying on level but try explaining it to a grieving husband or wife if God does not exist.

The problem as I see it, at least, seems to lie in the belief that complexity can only come from complexity - but complexity that is (erroneously, in my view) deemed ‘simple’ just because it is identified as the ‘first cause’ or the ‘source’ of all subsequent phenomena. The way theistic believers try to get around this is by separating ‘existence itself’ from ‘that which exists’, which I don’t think can properly be done. Even if it is claimed that ‘God’ created everything from ‘nothing’, that means ‘nothing’, in the sense of a state of nonexistence never actually obtained in the first place - unless one equates God with nothing.

I responded to the first sentence above. The last sentence ignores the argument and definite provided by Thomas and it ignores common sense understanding of what is meant. God exists eternally by definition and by his own Revelation. To bring the universe into being from a state of no existing matter or material does not mean that God would be non- existent. God is Spirit, not matter. He exists Eternally. The absence of a material universe does not mean He does not or did not exist. Nor does the issuing forth of a material universe cause a change in Him. This is a figment of the imagination of God’s critics who claim they can’t understand how this could be possible, therefore He does not exist.

It is always amazing to see very limited and weak intellects ( I’m not being critical, we are all rather dumb and ignorant when you get right down to cases and very conceited to boot - incuding myself). Stuffing the reality of God into their simple and ofter illogical and erroneous categories and saying " how grand we all are. "

 

[Linusthe2nd]

If I may say so, there seems no logical contradiction to say that extant entities - living or otherwise - simply exist, without any requirement to ‘participate’ in any act of being. They - we - may exist as particular, defined entities, but in order to do so, existence itself must be a given. I doubt I’m explaining this adequately, but what I mean to say, really, is that it strikes me as unnecessary to cite ‘existence’ as some kind of separate quality exhibited by extant things/beings. You can’t exist as anything unless you exist in the first place - and by the very fact of existence, one must exist as something.

To put it another way, what we have in common with every other extant entity is existence - but that is just as it is. Why any need to extrapolate from this that existence itself is provided by some external being - moreover, a being who is inexplicably described as “pure existence”?

Did you read the links I gave? At any rate Thomas was not " extrapolating. " He had very sound reasons for his conclusions. And by the way the Greeks, primarily Plato and Aristotle came near the mark. Their error was that they stopped at material being, being composed of matter and form. Thomas, a man of deep faith and holiness took Revelation at its word. God revealed Himself as " I Am …tell them I Am sends you ( God speaking to Moses)…"

Knowing this and haveing studied the writings of the Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle, and their Arab and Jewish commentators he set about to correct their errors.
Here is a bit from De Potentia lll, V that will help explain his reasoning.

First, if in a number of things we find something that is common to all, we must conclude that this something was the effect of some one cause: for it is not possible that to each one by reason of itself this common something belong, since each one by itself is different from the others: and diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Seeing then that being is found to be common to all things, which are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of necessity that they must come into being not by themselves, but by the action of some cause. Seemingly this is Plato’s argument, since he required every multitude to be preceded by unity not only as regards number but also in reality. The second argument is that whenever something is found to be in several things by participation in various degrees, it must be derived by those in which it exists imperfectly from that one in which it exists most perfectly: because where there are positive degrees of a thing so that we ascribe it to this one more and to that one less, this is in reference to one thing to which they approach, one nearer than another: for if each one were of itself competent to have it, there would be no reason why one should have it more than another. Thus fire, which is the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in all things hot. Now there is one being most perfect and most true: which follows from the fact that there is a mover altogether immovable and absolutely perfect, as philosophers have proved. Consequently all other less perfect beings must needs derive being therefrom. This is the argument of the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, I).

The third argument is based on the principle that whatsoever is through another is to be reduced to that which is of itself. Wherefore if there were a per se heat, it would be the cause of all hot things, that have heat by way of participation. Now there is a being that is its own being: and this follows from the fact that there must needs be a being that is pure act and wherein there is no composition. Hence from that one being all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation, must needs proceed. This is the argument of Avicenna (in Metaph. viii, 6; ix, 8). Thus reason proves and faith holds that all things are created by God, END QUOTE

dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#3:7

You cannot excape " existence, " the act of " to be. " It is what is innermost and most fundamental to every " thing " that exists. Take a horse in the pasture for example. You notice the horse for sure but you say to yourself ( consciously or unconsciously ) it " exists, " it " is." You are also aware from your wide experience that there are many such horses, many more or less identical beings which " exist, " which " are. " They are all compsed of a certain " nature, " a " horseness. " And each of these natures " exist " in a particular " matter. " But unless there was an " act of existence " underlying each particular manifestation of " horseness, " there would be no horse to be seen !

Now since each of these horses has an act of " to be, " no one of them can be the cause of the " act of to be." No one of them could have caused the actual " act " by which they are or they would be the cause of their on existence which is impossible.

Throughout the range of existing things we encounter the same truth. Every material being has an act of " to be " which makes it a being, a thing, a particular nature which exists.
But it is obvious that none of them are perfect in being, each of their acts of " to be " are limited in some way, there is a range of less and more perfect. Therefore their existence must be caused by some Perfect Being, some perfect Act of Existence with the power to cause the existence of all limited or less perfect beings. And this we call God.

 

[billcu1]

I am interested in Aquinas (and any other philosopher) that talks about Being. The idea that God is that whose essence is Being, fascinates me. However, I am weak when it comes to medieval philosophy ( I am not being derogatory, I have great respect for medieval philosophy and believe it has much to offer) and would be grateful for an explanation of topics such as hacceity.

So your interested in ontology. Well there’s many ontologists. So you are looking at the supreme being and not other beings that might exist such as man?

 

[billcu1]

Kant showed that existence is not a predicate (property). Something without properties is undefinable ( similarly God is ineffable ). Let “X” represent something undefinable. If I say,"X exists " have I said anything meaningful?
I want to be clear about this. I am not saying that if God is Being (existence) itself, the proposition that God exists is meaningless. I am saying that in the context of the correspondence theory of truth ( which has many problems,for example if the correspondence theory of truth is true then it must correspond to something, another correspondence theory of truth…infinite regress) it is meaningless. One must approach God from outside signifiers and signifieds. In other words faith is not about finding similarities between our concepts and God’s reality.

No properties sounds like God at rest. Now he is pure act. Before creation was and there was the “dark sea” did he have potential natures of any kind? But then some say self came from being and being has no beginning and no end as opposed to “In the beginning…”

 

[levinas12]

Not sure I understand the last long paragraph. What Thomas is driving at is that a being is a " that which exists, " God, an angel, a man, a dog, a tree, etc. A " that which exists " exercises an " act of to be, " or you could also say an " act of existence. " It is because a thing is or has an act of " to be " that the " thing " or " being " is a " this " or a " that " and can be " here " or " there. " So a being’s act of to be, its act of existence makes it a " being, " a " something " that exists.

“Being” has traditionally been understood to be “presence”. But “presence” is a mode of “time”.

And we are only aware of “time” because we know that we are going to die. Otherwise, the question of “time” would never occur to us.

And so, without a sense of “time”, we would not have a sense of “presence”; and, without that, we would not have a sense of what “being” means.

So, if we weren’t aware of our own mortality, we would be incapable of “ontology”.

All of this assumes that philosophy grows out of our everyday life. We would not be asking philosophical questions unless we were first concerned about ourselves.

So the question about “being” arises out of anxiety over a very personal “question” - what’s the point of our own existence given the inevitability of death?

Notice that this question is the source of both philosophy and religion.

 

[Shike]

I’m tending towards the notion that what we call ‘essence’ is a very human-sized perception of commonality between certain extant beings

Then you are not alone but have found good company in the nominalist camp. It’s self-defeating but still a popular choice. Do you know much about nominalism?

I don’t know how tightly bound the idea of ‘essence’ is with the concept of Platonic ‘ideal forms’, but again I think the latter is still a product of our tendency to classify things according to shared characteristics.

Platonic Forms leads to skepticism or a world of unreal things (positions no doubt Plato wanted to avoid). There is some good to the theory and it seems like it has been properly critiqued by Aristotle and others. Aristotelian Hylemorphism saves face with common experience while Platonic Forms do not AND it has the added benefit of following necessarily from considerations of the possibility of change.

The idea that there is a category of things called ‘trees’ (by us) flows into the notion that there is somewhere, somehow, the ‘perfect’ form of a tree from which all other trees derive their essence. But to suppose that essence precedes existence, then, is surely getting it backwards. And it invites all kinds of awkward questions, not the least of which from our perspective is, do we manifest the essence of humans or the essence of apes, since biologically speaking, humans are apes?

Your first point sounds like something an Aristotelian would accept. Your second point concerns the unity of things and the multiplicity of essences within a thing and sounds like a problem a Scotist would have. The kind of philosophical classification an Aristotelian would talk about is not that of a modern day biologist. The philosopher would classify based upon kinds of capacities found in a thing’s nature, while a biologist would often classify with regards to mating. Further, essence for Aristotelians is something that encompasses all of the intelligible principles in a thing and therefore is solitary. Substantial and accidental forms are probably what you are hinting at and they can always be found in a hierarchical relation–so unity is preserved.

Yet there are multiple - and some would say, mutually exclusive - characteristics ascribed to the God of Classical Theism

These are common objections that can be answered. If you bring specific arguments I could probably critique them for you.

But if God could go from being an entity with the potential to create to an entity that did and does create, that is a change, surely.

We cannot imagine such an act without change. But what you are probably thinking of is on the macro level and does not address specifically the precise principles of change that make up the definition that Scholastics use when they say God cannot change. In other words, you are talking past the people who say God cannot change.

…that is, in relation to the problem of evil, there is no logical contradiction inherent in suggesting that God could have made a universe that was kinder to sentient beings than the one that manifestly does exist…unless his abilities are more limited than they are usually claimed to be!

Omnipotence does not lend support to the problem of evil. Sure, God could always create a better world as there is no such thing as the perfectest of finite worlds–indeed, how many coconut trees do you need to have the perfect number on a tropical island? So someone wishes to have a world without sin–then no free-will. Someone wishes to have a world without natural disasters–then no techtonic plates and the conditions necessary to life in the first place… ect. ect (though I hesitate to include natural disasters in the problem of evil). It all comes down to this: people usually can’t see the importance of suffering, especially when they are in the throws of it. Does that mean suffering is meaningless? It most definitely does not provide a philosophical argument against the existence of God.

Perhaps not, but this is the result of hindsight. Perhaps the ground of possibility really is something profoundly simple - limited in itself, in that it may have only one or two possibilities for how it might behave.

While what you bring up is very interesting from an evolutionary point of view it is pretty much besides the point when you bring Aquinas’ arguments to the fore. It’s not metaphysics you’re bringing up because what kind of existence do rules have? Answer that and you may be led to further questions, the kind that interact with Aquinas’ arguments.

I have book recommendations if you are interested…

 

[Sair]

Do you know much about nominalism?

Beyond the name, not really.

The kind of philosophical classification an Aristotelian would talk about is not that of a modern day biologist. The philosopher would classify based upon kinds of capacities found in a thing’s nature, while a biologist would often classify with regards to mating.

Here I question the value of the philosophical notion of ‘essence’ as distinct from actual existence. It seems to me the very idea of an ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ some entity possesses tends to the belief in premeditated design, a set of qualities built in to an entity, rather than a set of qualities that entity manifests through its particular existence. It doesn’t seem, to me, useful to pursue, in philosophy, a study of - largely speculative and prescriptive - qualities which certain entities are supposed to possess (or ought to pursue) because they have the ‘nature’ of some category of beings; all this in apparent disconnection from biological classification, which takes into account not just genetic relationship and mating ability, but bodily structure and behavioural tendency - all of which are mutable. Anything that distinguishes humans from apes biologically is a legitimate distinguishing feature, as far as it goes - this distinction doesn’t justify, in my view, the supposition that ‘human nature’ is so radically different from ‘ape nature’ as to occupy a separate and rarefied metaphysical category.

These are common objections that can be answered. If you bring specific arguments I could probably critique them for you.

They are very common objections, which I have seen argued both ways and will not take up extra time rehashing here; suffice to say that whilst they may be answerable individually, to varying degrees of satisfaction, taken together they provide a significant grounding for doubt as to whether the God of Classical Theism is a tenable concept.

We cannot imagine such an act without change. What you are probably thinking of is on the macro level and does not address specifically the precise principles of change that make up the definition that Scholastics use when they say God cannot change.

So in order to get around the notion that action produces change, Scholastics simply redefine ‘change’? That is the same kind of accusation levelled at the likes of Lawrence Krauss and other cosmologists who have supposedly redefined ‘nothing’ to come up with a physical explanation for the origin of the universe. The justification is that the philosopher’s ‘nothing’, a state of nonexistence, never did - probably never could - obtain; I suppose there could be an explanation of how God can change in such that he remains exactly the same - perhaps God does not himself change, but only changes in his relationship to other entities? I don’t know…

Omnipotence does not lend support to the problem of evil. God could create a better world as there is no such thing as the perfectest of finite worlds. So someone wishes to have a world without sin–then no free-will. Someone wishes to have a world without natural disasters–then no techtonic plates and the conditions necessary to life in the first place… It all comes down to this: people usually can’t see the importance of suffering, especially when they are in the throws of it. Does that mean suffering is meaningless?

I’d hesitate to cite ‘perfection’ in any argument regarding the problem of evil - most people who pursue this argument have no expectation of perfection. That is left to those who define God as perfect! The argument runs that an omnipotent and genuinely benevolent God could have made the world behave in such a way as to manifest far less suffering on the part of sentient beings; and being omnipotent, could have done so such that it preserves free will (if that is really the all-important consideration it is claimed to be in the front-running counterargument to the philosophical problem of evil) and maintains the natural development of the universe. Even if there had been a dozen fewer serial killers in the past century or so, the world would have been better from the point of view of the experience of sentient beings. Is it logically contradictory for an omnipotent, benevolent God to have brought this about? As for the significance of suffering itself, it can certainly be said suffering makes us stronger, better able to cope with life’s trials, and more compassionate - it does all these things, but none would be as necessary in a world with less suffering.

While what you bring up is very interesting from an evolutionary point of view it is pretty much besides the point when you bring Aquinas’ arguments to the fore. It’s not metaphysics you’re bringing up because what kind of existence do rules have?

Any discussion of ‘rules’ always raises the semantic problem of how ‘rules’ are defined in context. Physical laws are descriptive, not prescriptive - they are observations of the way matter and energy characteristically behave. To tie this to the notion of limits and simplicity, very simple entities behave always in certain ways because they haven’t the capacity or complexity to behave in other ways - their options are limited by virtue of their very simplicity. I could accept an argument that applied the same notion of simplicity to God - that he was limited to certain actions - but any being described as omnipotent, who has practically limitless options, could not be simple in this way. How radically different a definition could ‘simplicity’ take before it ceases to be anything like simplicity?

 

[GEddie]

ON being

So when someone shuffles off the mortal coil, do they become an OFF being??

 

[belorg]

I suppose there could be an explanation of how God can change in such that he remains exactly the same - perhaps God does not himself change, but only changes in his relationship to other entities? I don’t know…

No, Sair, there cannot be an explanation of how God can change in such a way that he remains exactly the same. Remaining exactly the same is not changing, so that would be a contradiction.
Some theists hold to the position that since God is infinite and infinity minus one is still infinity, God remains infinite even after ‘losing’ something. But that does not mean that God is still the same. If we take all natural numbers, then this set is infinite. If we remove “3” from the set, the set is still infinite, but it is not the same set. It may contain an equal number of elemants, but there is one particular elemant that is not there.
Moreover, when scholastics say that God cannot change, they mean that God cannot chnage in any way. That is partially because of the fact that God is ultimately simple and has no “parts” to disappear or to become something else.

 

[Shike]

Beyond the name, not really.

Without knowing more of your position, it sums up what you said quite nicely. Putting a name to it will help you find what others have said on the topic so you can utilize the history of thought and not be a victim of said history.

Anything that distinguishes humans from apes biologically is a legitimate distinguishing feature, as far as it goes - this distinction doesn’t justify, in my view, the supposition that ‘human nature’ is so radically different from ‘ape nature’ as to occupy a separate and rarefied metaphysical category.

I didn’t quote it but essence is much more like the latter than “pre-meditated design”. Also, human nature isn’t a metaphysical category. And human nature in some respects isn’t different at all from “ape nature” insofar as rational animal shares capacities with animal. You are very correct that these philosophical considerations are somewhat disconnected from biology, mostly because they are answering different questions than what biology is asking.

They are very common objections, which I have seen argued both ways and will not take up extra time rehashing here; suffice to say that whilst they may be answerable individually, to varying degrees of satisfaction, taken together they provide a significant grounding for doubt as to whether the God of Classical Theism is a tenable concept.

A string of falsehoods together are just as false as taken individually.

So in order to get around the notion that action produces change, Scholastics simply redefine ‘change’?

Before you go off to the races, do you want to ask if that is indeed what is being done?
First, the statement that “God creates” is using analogical predication. If we are to use univocal predication it must be said that “God doesn’t create nor act” because such terms require the notion of change as they are rigidly tied to the human context (not that analogical predication is entirely separate!). But it is legitimate to say that “God creates” without being tied to any notion of change, and this is because we don’t need to emphasize the receptive principle that change requires–we don’t emphasize it because in God it isn’t there. This allows us to emphasize the effect, what wasn’t there before, while at the same time knowing that God doesn’t change.
My point was not to redefine change, only let you know that Thomists are very precise about it and don’t treat change as a single principle (which if treated that way would lead to all of the problems you are expressing).

Even if there had been a dozen fewer serial killers in the past century or so, the world would have been better from the point of view of the experience of sentient beings.

Like I said, the problem of evil degenerates into the problem of suffering. Also, do you mean to say serial killers have no choice in the matter, in being serial killers?

Is it logically contradictory for an omnipotent, benevolent God to have brought this about?

Good question! Doesn’t seem so, especially in light of the doctrine of omnipotence. Then again, much of the force of the problem of suffering disappears when you question the significance of suffering. Have you meditated on the Cross of Christ?

Any discussion of ‘rules’ always raises the semantic problem of how ‘rules’ are defined in context. Physical laws are descriptive, not prescriptive

You are correct. And metaphysics is about the principles of being, so such an analysis would analyse those entities that you call simple.
Regardless of what term had its origins first, metaphysical simplicity is the lack of multiple principles. Question: are you judging the arguments of the Scholastics based on your definitions of words or theirs? In other words, are you playing their game or your own?

Thanks for your post; I found a lot of good in it.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Then you are not alone but have found good company in the nominalist camp. It’s self-defeating but still a popular choice. Do you know much about nominalism?

Platonic Forms leads to skepticism or a world of unreal things (positions no doubt Plato wanted to avoid). There is some good to the theory and it seems like it has been properly critiqued by Aristotle and others. Aristotelian Hylemorphism saves face with common experience while Platonic Forms do not AND it has the added benefit of following necessarily from considerations of the possibility of change.

Your first point sounds like something an Aristotelian would accept. Your second point concerns the unity of things and the multiplicity of essences within a thing and sounds like a problem a Scotist would have. The kind of philosophical classification an Aristotelian would talk about is not that of a modern day biologist. The philosopher would classify based upon kinds of capacities found in a thing’s nature, while a biologist would often classify with regards to mating. Further, essence for Aristotelians is something that encompasses all of the intelligible principles in a thing and therefore is solitary. Substantial and accidental forms are probably what you are hinting at and they can always be found in a hierarchical relation–so unity is preserved.

These are common objections that can be answered. If you bring specific arguments I could probably critique them for you.

We cannot imagine such an act without change. But what you are probably thinking of is on the macro level and does not address specifically the precise principles of change that make up the definition that Scholastics use when they say God cannot change. In other words, you are talking past the people who say God cannot change.

Omnipotence does not lend support to the problem of evil. Sure, God could always create a better world as there is no such thing as the perfectest of finite worlds–indeed, how many coconut trees do you need to have the perfect number on a tropical island? So someone wishes to have a world without sin–then no free-will. Someone wishes to have a world without natural disasters–then no techtonic plates and the conditions necessary to life in the first place… ect. ect (though I hesitate to include natural disasters in the problem of evil). It all comes down to this: people usually can’t see the importance of suffering, especially when they are in the throws of it. Does that mean suffering is meaningless? It most definitely does not provide a philosophical argument against the existence of God.

While what you bring up is very interesting from an evolutionary point of view it is pretty much besides the point when you bring Aquinas’ arguments to the fore. It’s not metaphysics you’re bringing up because what kind of existence do rules have? Answer that and you may be led to further questions, the kind that interact with Aquinas’ arguments.

I have book recommendations if you are interested…

I would be interested in your recommendations in Metaphysics. I have three - Cardinal Mercer, Henri Rahner, Charles A. Hart. I have St. Thomas’s works. Wish I knew Latin well enough to read Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

P.S. You are doing well.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I would be interested in your recommendations in Metaphysics. I have three - Cardinal Mercer, Henri Rahner, Charles A. Hart. I have St. Thomas’s works. Wish I knew Latin well enough to read Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

P.S. You are doing well.

I meant Henri Renard.

 

[belorg]

I meant Henri Renard.

You probably also meant cardinal **Mercier **.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You probably also meant cardinal Mercier .

I’m impressed ! But you are right.

 

[Shike]

I would be interested in your recommendations in Metaphysics.

I actually haven’t read your suggestions but probably will someday. Here, it’s been Klubbertanz’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, first hundred pages or so out of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiea – Pegis translation, and a basis in Aristotelian concepts here and there. Gilson’s work on Aquinas has some really good stuff in it.

And the more history of philosophy the better – Copleston all the way… he’s pretty good.

Ecclesiastical Latin is on the docket, started but got sidetracked. Ancient Greek is on the bucket list as well.

Good luck.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I actually haven’t read your suggestions but probably will someday. Here, it’s been Klubbertanz’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, first hundred pages or so out of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiea – Pegis translation, and a basis in Aristotelian concepts here and there. Gilson’s work on Aquinas has some really good stuff in it.

And the more history of philosophy the better – Copleston all the way… he’s pretty good.

Ecclesiastical Latin is on the docket, started but got sidetracked. Ancient Greek is on the bucket list as well.

Good luck.

I have the Philosophy of Human Psychology by Klubertanz. Very good. Also have the Philosophical Psychology by Raymond J Anable and Man’s Knowledge of Reality by Frederick D. Wilhelmsen. Will see if I can get Philosophy of Being by Klubertanz.

Hope you get back to Latin. A little each day, that’s the trick.

 

[wittgenstein]

Where is, and what is the exact quote where Aquinas said that God’s essence =existence?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Where is, and what is the exact quote where Aquinas said that God’s essence =existence?

S.T., Part l, Ques 3, Art. 4.

On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): “In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.” Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways.

First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species–as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man–and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent–as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence.

Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.

Linus

 

[wittgenstein]

“for one thing, it has changed the definition of ‘nothing’ to the point where it is actually an extant something, but unstable”
Sair
“No quantum mechanics textbook I have ever read (and, being a physicist, that number is somewhat large) has suggested that the “definition of nothing” has changed due to its influence–this sounds more like New Age interpretations of quantum physics than actual science. Could you please provide a credible textbook (and not a New Age book) that states this? “
Alberti Devoveo ( post 25)
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=something-from-nothing-vacuum-can-yield-flashes-of-light
tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/the-physics-of-nothing/
nytimes.com/2012/02/21/science/space/cosmologists-try-to-explain-a-universe-springing-from-nothing.html?_r=0
thenational.ae/news/uae-news/science/something-from-nothing-is-a-quantum-possibility
newscientist.com/blogs/nstv/2011/07/how-the-universe-appeared-from-nothing.html
"As Guth has remarked, “It is said that there’s no such thing as a free lunch. But the universe is the ultimate free lunch.”
Stephen Hawking