Biological Design Argument?

  • Thread starter Thread starter bennierja
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
The Real is a mental construct that has no existence in the external world.
Actually, you are making an unwarranted conclusion. Even if the Real is a mental construct you cannot know that there is no corresponding existent in the “external” world and therefore cannot conclude definitively that there is no corresponding existent in the external world.

Colour is a mental construct, as is sound, but you cannot conclude that there is no colour or sound in the external world just because your mind is capable of producing or possibly reproducing those qualities. The colour or sound your mind constructs may, in fact, correspond to real qualities of colour or sound in the external world. You have no warrant for concluding they do not exist externally.

Now you might argue that not all subjects perceive the same colour or sound, but that does not entail that therefore no one’s perception of colour or sound can possibly correlate precisely with the colour or sound that exists in the external world. Some minds may, in fact, be better attuned to external colours or sounds. That some err with regard to perception does not entail that all necessarily do. The problem is that proof of accuracy cannot be established with certainty. Again, though, that does not mean we need to assume that all subjects are necessarily errant.

If I choose to trust my own perception does not even mean I have to prove to you that my perception is correct. I feel no compulsion to do so. In fact, that you feel compelled to disbelieve your perceptions is your personal decision, but, logically speaking, your belief that perceptions might be wrong and that is the reason you have to disbelieve all your perceptions does not amount to an argument against the veracity of the perceptions of others nor of mine (especially those that I personally find compelling), in particular.
 
For those interested, this week’s New Scientist (no 2917, 18th May 2013) has a special feature on consciousness.

TonyRey might want to dose up on beta blockers before reading it, but it is an interesting and very accessible discussion of various modern views on the subject. 😉
If you can’t summarise its conclusion I shall continue on my merry way! Abstruseness is always a sign of weakness. 🙂
 
S
*
Your faith in neuroscience is self-destructive! If all our thoughts and conclusions are caused by neural events - which lack insight and understanding - they are as fallible and deceptive as instincts which are notoriously unreliable and have led to the downfall and destruction of countless persons and animals. Neuroscience presupposes
Extremism is a sign of fanaticism!

Neuroscience still presupposes the power of reason - unless the brain happens to be magically aware of what it is doing…
 
So you believe reason doesn’t distinguish us from other forms of life?
So you don’t believe reason distinguishes us from other forms of life?
What makes you think that?
My eyes. I can see the computer in front of me.

I fail to “see” how your eyes are sufficient…
You referred to the question “How did the universe originate?” and specified two answers. Which do you favour?
Which of the two definitions of “universe” are we discussing? Context is very important. In the context of base ten, we have 1 + 1 = 2. In the context of base two we have 1 + 1 = 10. The correct answer depends on the context.

What is the context of the universe in your opinion?
 
Immediately I should note that evidence does not need to be quantitative, so your argument completely falls apart without that false assumption.

I’ll also point out that while you derided my “perception” of what faith is, you then proceeded to describe faith in almost the exact same terms I did.
So go ahead and demonstrate instances where evidence is not quantitative. It is fine to make a claim, but a claim is not an argument. My argument doesn’t fall apart until you bring to the table evidence that is other than quantitative, i.e., not measurable in some way.

My point concerning faith is that you are setting up the false dichotomy of evidence vs faith, when evidence has nothing to do with faith properly understood. An individual’s faith does not directly relate to evidence because evidence has to do only with physical reality whereas faith relates to metaphysical reality. There is not an inverse relationship between faith and evidence as you seem to be claiming there is because the kind of evidence you seem to regard as the only substantive kind is physical evidence, but that presumes physical reality is the only substantive reality. What evidence do you have for that conclusion without begging the question by allowing only physical evidence?

I strictly demand physical evidence to substantiate claims about physical reality. My faith does not relate to physical events. I have no need for faith regarding these because, for the most part physical evidence is readily available. That does not stop me from seeing the necessity of having faith where I must make choices that relate to non-physical realities such as those related to moral decisions, spiritual existence and choices related to subjective personal relationships. My choice to love others around me and care for them does not depend upon physical evidence, but on personal determination based upon my understanding of the reality of human persons for which there is no physical evidence.
 
Extremism is a sign of fanaticism!

Neuroscience still presupposes the power of reason - unless the brain happens to be magically aware of what it is doing…
There’s nothing magical about the brain. Your argument is like arguing that sight can’t be caused by eyes, because you wouldn’t be able to study eyes without presupposing that your eyes can see. And also saying that if sight was caused only by the biological factors in your eyes, then you wouldn’t be able to say that human sight is perfect. Which of course it isn’t.

Do you similarly suppose that there must be some supernatural element causing people to see?
 
So go ahead and demonstrate instances where evidence is not quantitative. It is fine to make a claim, but a claim is not an argument. My argument doesn’t fall apart until you bring to the table evidence that is other than quantitative, i.e., not measurable in some way.

My point concerning faith is that you are setting up the false dichotomy of evidence vs faith, when evidence has nothing to do with faith properly understood. An individual’s faith does not directly relate to evidence because evidence has to do only with physical reality whereas faith relates to metaphysical reality. There is not an inverse relationship between faith and evidence as you seem to be claiming there is because the kind of evidence you seem to regard as the only substantive kind is physical evidence, but that presumes physical reality is the only substantive reality. What evidence do you have for that conclusion without begging the question by allowing only physical evidence?

I strictly demand physical evidence to substantiate claims about physical reality. My faith does not relate to physical events. I have no need for faith regarding these because, for the most part physical evidence is readily available. That does not stop me from seeing the necessity of having faith where I must make choices that relate to non-physical realities such as those related to moral decisions, spiritual existence and choices related to subjective personal relationships. My choice to love others around me and care for them does not depend upon physical evidence, but on personal determination based upon my understanding of the reality of human persons for which there is no physical evidence.
First, I would say that my definition of “physical” is more broad than yours.

Also, your definition of qualitative and quantitative isn’t one I’ve heard. Quantitative evidence is that which deals with quantities, qualitative data is that which deals with non-numeric qualities. The color of apples or ethnic identification are both examples of qualitative data.
 
There’s nothing magical about the brain. Your argument is like arguing that sight can’t be caused by eyes, because you wouldn’t be able to study eyes without presupposing that your eyes can see. And also saying that if sight was caused only by the biological factors in your eyes, then you wouldn’t be able to say that human sight is perfect. Which of course it isn’t.

Do you similarly suppose that there must be some supernatural element causing people to see?
The processes by which the eyes and brain perceive light does not explain how subjective awareness of light is possible. Blind sightedness demonstrates that the neural system can process the light spectrum without making it subjectively available to consciousness. The question of the interface between neural processes and consciousness remains unexplained. Subjective experience of sight is not caused by eyes. The experience might be enabled by or have as an aspect, visual perception, but it is possible to have normally functioning eyes without consciously experiencing sight.
 
The processes by which the eyes and brain perceive light does not explain how subjective awareness of light is possible. Blind sightedness demonstrates that the neural system can process the light spectrum without making it subjectively available to consciousness. The question of the interface between neural processes and consciousness remains unexplained. Subjective experience of sight is not caused by eyes. The experience might be enabled by or have as an aspect, visual perception, but it is possible to have normally functioning eyes without consciously experiencing sight.
But is it possible to experience sight without functioning eyes?
 
First, I would say that my definition of “physical” is more broad than yours.
Physical would mean any reality that is material in substance and locatable in time-space. I am not sure how your definition could be broader
Also, your definition of qualitative and quantitative isn’t one I’ve heard. Quantitative evidence is that which deals with quantities, qualitative data is that which deals with non-numeric qualities. The color of apples or ethnic identification are both examples of qualitative data.
The colour of apples is quantifiable in a variety of ways (CMYK, Pantone, RGB), identification with ethnicity is likewise numerically determinable by counting heads

Beauty, truth or goodness are not quantifiable and hence are strictly qualitative. The beauty of an entity or event, the truth of a proposition, the goodness of an act are not determined by measurement and therefore are not evidentiary in nature.

We do not determine the beauty of a sunset or piece of art by calculation. We can calculate colour as a precise mixture of values (CMYK, RGB, etc.) or with reference to the light spectrum. We could even measure sound in terms of loudness, tempo or pitch, but to determine whether a Mozart concerto or Michelangelo work are truly beautiful is not determined by that kind of “physical” evidence.

If you want to insist that only physical (and hence quantifiable) reality is the only one worth considering, go ahead. I am not convinced that it is. I side with Shakespeare on this:
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. Hamlet; Act 1, Scene V
 
But is it possible to experience sight without functioning eyes?
I can visualize or imagine a scene without seeing it with my eyes. Simply because, as biological creatures we normally use eyes to see the world does not logically entail that eyes are the only means by which light can be perceived. Furthermore, light is a medium by which colour is transmitted physically, but that does not even mean colour is necessarily limited to being carried by light waves. Colour is a qualia of consciousness. We would have to assume consciousness to be physical in origin to conclude that colour could only be perceived via physical mediation.
 
The being has to change in order to move from non-creator to creator. If it has changed then there must be a difference between before and after. Hence the before and after are not the same being, but different beings. When you were born you could not type on a computer. Now you can. You are different – you have changed.
Can we prove that God does not change when he creates? No. But to be absolutely truthful we cannot prove anything about God to everyone. This is particularly trure of those, like yourself, who are committed to a definite philosophy or belief system already or to those who lack the facility of understanding. We do maintain that he can be known, that his basic nature can be known, and that he is a personal God. We futher maintain that His existence and nature can be known with absolute certainty by Divine Revelation as taught and handed on by the Church.

This revelation teaches that God does not change - no matter the arguments raised contrary to this. Perhaps no satisfactory answer can be found through human reason, yet Faith tells us there is no change in God.

Professor James Anderson, professor of philosophy at the Reformed Theological Seminary of Charolette, N.C. offered this solution: “…An alternative solution is to deny that God can experience intrinsic change while recognizing that God appears to change from the temporal standpoint of his creatures (compare how the landscape appears to move when you’re travelling in a train). In addition, we can make a distinction between divine causes and divine effects. God’s actions take effect in time (and space) but God acts from timeless eternity. So at one time (t1) Abraham is not in covenant with God, while at a subsequent time (t2) Abraham is in covenant with God. Did God intrinsically change? Not from his eternal standpoint. It’s timelessly true that God is not-related-by-covenant with respect to Abraham-at-t1 but related-by-covenant with respect to Abraham-at-t2. Abraham is the one conditioned by time, not God. But from Abraham’s standpoint it makes perfect sense to say, “God entered into a covenant with me…”
thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/tgc/2011/08/02/you-asked-did-god-change-at-the-incarnation/

This seems to point the way to a reasonable explanation. In the end, however, the position taken by Christians is at least as reasonable as that taken by Buddahists, etc.

Linus2nd
 
But is it possible to experience sight without functioning eyes?
in order for human beings to function as physical beings in the physical world they require the necessary anatomy and physiology

you cannot feel, smell, taste or hear colour - in a similar manner, you cannot understand meaning, love, beauty by studying the human brain: all you will get is information biochemical processes
 
*Extremism is a sign of fanaticism!
Sight is not **caused **by the eyes nor is the power of sight created by the eyes.

Neuroscience continues to be created by the power of reason.
Do you similarly suppose that there must be some supernatural element causing people to see?
Since nature does not account for itself I believe there is a SuperPower far greater than nature - or anything or anyone in the entire universe.
 
The sort of “objective meaning” you’re looking for doesn’t exist, and wouldn’t exist even if there was a supernatural element to us. Essentially all you’re doing is propping up your subjective purpose (pleasing God, worshipping God, etc.) and calling it objective.
No, I’m expressing my subjective opinion, formed through a process of deduction, that there is an objective purpose to the universe and human life. My desire to please God follows from that belief. You have it exactly backwards.

And you are wrong that objective meaning would not exist even if there were a “supernatural element” (for our purposes, I’ll interpret this as God) to our existence. As God, assuming he exists, ontologically supersedes and, in fact, both creates and sustains all else, his intentions for those things are objectively real insomuch as they cannot be negated, eliminated or overruled by anything else. The terms he sets (or, rather, the terms that are set by his nature) are irrevocable. Even the consequences of our refusal of those terms are set in stone.
Believe it or not, your definition of faith is not the most popular one used by Christians. Most Christians, at least in my experience, hold that faith is persisting in belief despite a lack of evidence.
Have you taken a survey on this? Have these Christians actually expressed that idea directly to you? Regardless, I base my definition on the understanding of the Church, not on individual Christians. Faith is belief in a person’s integrity and trustworthiness. There is no lack of evidence for God’s activity in the world.
To be subjective is not to be unreal. Pain and happiness are both subjective, and yet I think you would not find those things any less real. In fact, one could argue that they are more real and important than most things held to be “objective”.
Pain and happiness are both subjective sensations which correspond directly to material realities. They are not abstractions like meaning. Meaning is not something that can be experienced in the way an emotion or stimulus can, though emotions may accompany a sense of meaning. They are, however, two separate things. To reiterate, emotions and physical sensations are experiences which correspond to physiological realities whereas meaning is an abstraction that corresponds only to an intellect. The valuations of an intellect which places import on things that are invariably bound for destruction are logically absurd.

This whole idea of basing importance and purpose on personal whims is, for that reason, a dangerous business. What makes one man’s meaning more important or valid than another’s? If feelings are to be the basis of these things, whose feelings do we follow? If one man feels his meaning in life is to kill other people, are you prepared to say he’s objectively wrong in so doing? If so, how do you justify that charge? If the majority of people want slavery to be reinstated, do we assent? If not, on what grounds do we object? Are we to base our ideas of purpose and meaning on a utilitarian notion of progress or efficiency? Well, that’s been tried before and the results were, needless to say, a bit more than nasty.
Reread Ecclesiastes and Sartre. Both are widely misunderstood. I like Ecclesiastes because it deals with existentialism, and it makes good points about what’s important in life. But it misses something very important.
I don’t think it’s me, but you rather, who needs to reread Ecclesiastes. The overarching theme of the book is the futility of man without God. It concludes that the ONLY thing that’s truly important is the question of God. As far as earthly life goes, Ecclesiastes covers all ground. It’s not Ecclesiastes that misses something important, it’s Sartre.

And I’ve read Sartre enough. I don’t misunderstand him, I simply disagree.
 
Again, I’m not looking for an “objective purpose” imposed by the universe. Existence precedes essence, whether or not a God exists.
Ah, the existentialist mantra! This itself is nothing more than an inversion of essentialism. This is a proposal which may or may not be true, depending on whether Sartre is correct about the nature of reality. I obviously believe he is wrong.

And if you’re not looking for objective purpose, you’re looking for diversions. Call it what you like–“subjective purpose”, “personal meaning” “self-determination”–it amounts to a willed ignorance of one’s futility.

But, beyond all that, I find it odd that you would choose, given your arguments thus far, to side with Sartre. The same Sartre who said:
The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain kind of secular ethics which would like to abolish God with the least possible expense. About 1880, some French teachers tried to set up a secular ethics which went something like this: God is a useless and costly hypothesis; we are discarding it; but, meanwhile, in order for there to be an ethics, a society, a civilization, it is essential that certain values be taken seriously and they be considered as having an a priori existence. It must be obligatory, a priori, to be honest, not to lie, not to beat your wife, to have children, etc., etc. So we’re going to try a little device which will make it possible to show that values exist all the same, inscribed in a heaven of ideas, though otherwise God does not exist. In other words–and this, I believe, is the tendency of everything call reformism in France–nothing will be changed if God does not exist. We shall find ourselves with the same norms of honesty, progress, and humanism, and we shall have made a God an outdated hypothesis which will peacefully die off by itself.
The existentialist, on the contrary, thinks it very distressing that God does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappears along with Him; there can no longer be an a priori Good, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. Nowhere is it written that the Good exists, that we must be honest, that we must not lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where there are only men. Dostoievsky [sic] said, “If God didn’t exist, everything would be possible.” That is the very starting point of existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible if God does not exist, and as a result man is forlorn, because neither within him nor without does he find anything to cling to. He can’t start making excuses for himself.
If existence really does precede essence, there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom. On the other hand, if God does not exist, we find no values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct. So, in the bright realm of values, we have no excuse behind us, nor justification before us. We are alone, with no excuses.
That is the idea I shall try to convey when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.
The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never agree that a sweeping passion is a ravaging torrent which fatally leads a man to certain acts and is therefor an excuse. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion.
The existentialist does not think that man is going to help himself by finding in the world some omen by which to orient himself. Because he thinks that man will interpret the omen to suit himself. Therefore, he thinks that man, with no support and no aid, is condemned every moment to invent man.
I think Peter Kreeft has done a fine job of pointing out the errors in Sartre’s thinking:
*He called his philosophy “existentialism” because of the thesis that “existence precedes essence.” What this means concretely is that “man is nothing else than what he makes of himself.” Since there is no God to design man, man has no blueprint, no essence. His essence or nature comes not from God as Creator but from his own free choice.
There’s profound insight here, though it is immediately subverted. The insight is the fact that man by his free choices determines who he will be. God indeed creates what all men are. But the individual fashions his own unique individuality. God makes our what but we make our who. God gives us the dignity of being present at our own creation, or co-creation; He associates us with Himself in the task of co-creating our selves. He creates only the objective raw material, through heredity and environment. I shape it into the final form of myself through my free choices.
Unfortunately, Sartre contends that this disproves God, for if there were a God, man would be reduced to a mere artifact of God, and thus would not be free. He constantly argues that human freedom and dignity require atheism. His attitude is like that of a cowboy in a Western, saying to God as to an enemy cowboy: “This town ain’t big enough for both you and me. One of us has to leave.”
Thus Sartre’s legitimate concern with human freedom and his insight into how it makes persons fundamentally different from mere things lead him to atheism because (1) he confuses freedom with independence, and because (2) the only God he can conceive of is one who would take away human freedom rather than creating and maintaining it—a sort of cosmic fascist. Furthermore, (3) Sartre makes the adolescent mistake of equating freedom with rebellion. He says freedom is only “the freedom to say no.” *
(cont…)
 
(…cont)
But this is not the only freedom. There’s also the freedom to say yes. Sartre thinks we compromise our freedom when we say yes, when we choose to affirm the values we’ve been taught by our parents, our society, or our Church. So what Sartre means by freedom is very close to what the beatniks of the 50s and the hippies of the 60s called “doing your own thing,” and what the Me generation of the `70s called “looking out for No. 1.”
Another concept Sartre takes seriously but misuses is the idea of responsibility. He thinks that belief in God would necessarily compromise human responsibility, for we would then blame God rather than ourselves for what we are. But that’s simply not so. My heavenly Father, like my earthly father, is not responsible for my choices or the character I shape by means of those choices; I am. And the fact of my responsibility no more disproves the existence of my heavenly Father than it disproves the existence of my earthly father.
Sartre has a keen awareness of evil and human perversity. He says, “We have learned to take Evil seriously…Evil is not an appearance…Knowing its causes does not dispel it. Evil cannot be redeemed.”
Yet he also says that since there is no God and since we therefore create our own values and laws, there really is no evil: “To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil.” So Sartre gives both too much reality to evil (“Evil cannot be redeemed”) and too little (“We can never choose evil”).
Sartre’s atheism does not merely say that God doesn’t exist, but that God is impossible. He at least pays some homage to the biblical notion of God as “I Am” by calling it the most self-contradictory idea ever imagined, “the impossible synthesis” of being-for-itself (subjective personality, the “I”) with being-in-itself (objective eternal perfection, the “Am”).
God means the perfect person, and this is for Sartre a contradiction of terms. Perfect things or ideas, like Justice or Truth, are possible; and imperfect persons, like Zeus or Apollo, are possible. But the perfect person is impossible. Zeus is possible but not real. God is unique among gods: not only unreal but impossible.
Since God is impossible and since God is love, love is impossible. The most shocking thing in Sartre is probably his denial of the possibility of genuine, altruistic love. In place of God, most atheists substitute human love as the thing they believe in. But Sartre argues that this is impossible. Why?
Because if there is no God, each individual is God. But there can be only one God, one absolute. Thus, all interpersonal relationships are fundamentally relationships of rivalry. Here, Sartre echoes Machiavelli. Each of us necessarily plays God to others; each of us, as the author of the play of his own life, necessarily reduces others to characters in his drama.
There is a little word which ordinary people think denotes something real and which lovers think denotes something magical. Sartre thinks it denotes something impossible and illusory. It is the word “we.” There can be no “we-subject,” no community, no self-forgetful love if each of us is always trying to be God, the one single unique I-subject.
Sartre’s most famous play, “No Exit,” puts three dead people in a room and watches them make hell for each other simply by playing God to each other—not in the sense of exerting external power over each other but simply by knowing each other as objects. The shocking lesson of the play is that “hell is other people.”
It takes a profound mind to say something as profoundly false as that. In truth, hell is precisely the absence of other people, human and divine. Hell is total loneliness. Heaven is other people, because heaven is where God is, and God is Trinity. God is love, God is “other persons.”*
 
Colour is a mental construct, as is sound, but you cannot conclude that there is no colour or sound in the external world
There is certainly no colour, since colour is an artefact of the way the receptors in our eyes are structured and wired into our nervous system. Different frequencies of photons appear to be real, but colour as such is definitely internal to us. There are ‘colours’ that we cannot see in the ultra violet and infra red, that other animals can sense.
If I choose to trust my own perception does not even mean I have to prove to you that my perception is correct. I feel no compulsion to do so.
Can you smell as well as a dog? You need to be aware that your perceptions are imperfect. If you assume that your perceptions are perfect then you will make errors. Our perceptions give us a reasonable good approximation of reality. It is a mistake to forget that they only provide an approximation.
In fact, that you feel compelled to disbelieve your perceptions
I do not disbelieve them; I am aware that they start as an approximation and have various internally generated mental overlays added to them. One of the purposes of Buddhist meditation is to learn to recognise those mental overlays and to be aware of them and their effects. For example, “Dog”, is an internally generated mental overlay whereas the various examples of ‘dog’ are a real external entities. Like all reification, “Dog”, is not external, as it appears to be, but internal to ourselves.

rossum
 
So you don’t believe reason distinguishes us from other forms of life?
There are many things that distinguish us from other forms of life. Number of legs distinguishes us from centipedes. Acuity of vision distinguishes us from eagles.
What is the context of the universe in your opinion?
Not the context of the universe, but the context of the discussion. Since this thread is about biological design, then for this thread we can talk about the material universe that started at the Big Bang.

rossum
 
Professor James Anderson, professor of philosophy at the Reformed Theological Seminary of Charolette, N.C. offered this solution: “…An alternative solution is to deny that God can experience intrinsic change while recognizing that God appears to change from the temporal standpoint of his creatures (compare how the landscape appears to move when you’re travelling in a train). …”
This solution fails because it splits God into two parts, intrinsic non-change coupled with extrinsic change. If there is only one God, then at least one of those parts cannot be God. You either retain the unchanging non-creator as God or you have the changing creator as God.

The difficulty of reconciling change with non-change is an old one. The multitude of emanations in the Kaballah is just one example of an early attempt at a solution.
Did God intrinsically change?
You are reifying again. If there are intrinsic and extrinsic parts of God, then we can split God into two parts with opposed properties, the intrinsic part and the extrinsic part. Each part can then be analysed separately. Any attempt at establishing an intrinsic/substantial/real part as opposed to an extrinsic/accidental/reflection part will come up against the same problem.

rossum
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top