Books on Aquinas's Natural Law?

[Curious_Hobbit]

In an excerpt I read from one of Edward Feser’s books he basically argued that since humans have a will and an intellect, we can understand what is “good” for us and will it to be. Being = good, and therefore fullness of being is rightly called good. A “good” triangle is a 3 sided polygon without any curved sides or open corners. Humans have certain ends attached to us by nature (hunger, freedom, procreation, survival, etc.) and the proper natural attainment of these ends are “good” in the same sense that a perfect, ideal triangle is good. Since we as humans have an intellect to decipher the natural teleological purposes of human action according to right reason and we have a will to choose whether or not to do “good”, we can know what is moral by reflecting on the metaphysical nature of humans.

David Oderberg argues that proponents of the fact/value distinction sacrifice a more complete conception of reality by denying the ethical realist to draw an Ought from an is. If “facts” are defined as only that which is empirically verifiable and quantifiable, then they are assuming that there are no facts beyond that which we can observe and experience. Oderberg proposes to define “facts” as -true propositions-.

For instance there are many true or false propositions that aren’t necessarily observable aspects of reality like, If Alan had bet on horse number five, he would have won’; ‘One day the universe will come to an end’; Mountain climbing is a dangerous sport’; Brian is a peculiar sort of chap’; The joke Alan told me is very funny’, etc.

Since there are facts that are either true or false, but aren’t observable in the sense that the statement “the sky is blue” is, the fact/value distinction assumes a definition of “facts” that can’t count for all of reality and excludes the position of the ethical realist as well. Here’s the Oderberg excerpt I drew from if anyone’s interested,

payingattentiontothesky.com/2011/02/04/the-fact-value-distinction-by-david-oderberg/

 

[Curious_Hobbit]

I think I’ll probably look into both schools of thought. I only understand them at a very surface level and perhaps I should read them both to get a greater understanding and appreciation.

 

[adolphuscusins]

David Oderberg argues that proponents of the fact/value distinction sacrifice a more complete conception of reality by denying the ethical realist to draw an Ought from an is. If “facts” are defined as only that which is empirically verifiable and quantifiable, then they are assuming that there are no facts beyond that which we can observe and experience. Oderberg proposes to define “facts” as -true propositions-.

For instance there are many true or false propositions that aren’t necessarily observable aspects of reality like, If Alan had bet on horse number five, he would have won’; ‘One day the universe will come to an end’; Mountain climbing is a dangerous sport’; Brian is a peculiar sort of chap’; The joke Alan told me is very funny’, etc.

Since there are facts that are either true or false, but aren’t observable in the sense that the statement “the sky is blue” is, the fact/value distinction assumes a definition of “facts” that can’t count for all of reality and excludes the position of the ethical realist as well. Here’s the Oderberg excerpt I drew from if anyone’s interested,

payingattentiontothesky.com/2011/02/04/the-fact-value-distinction-by-david-oderberg/

Unfortunately, there is not a clear demarcation of where the is/ought issue stops and fact/value discussion begins. The problem here is in deducing an ought where you have only previously stated “is”/factual statements in the premises. This is what Grisez, Finnis, etc. maintain you do when you base your natural law prescriptions on metaphysical anthropology. Your comment seems to conflate the fact/value dichotomy with the is/ought problem and import the criticism of one into your discussion of the other. The issue we have been discussing is really strictly concerned with the is/ought problem: making an illicit inference from factual propositions.

 

[dmar198]

Unfortunately, there is not a clear demarcation of where the is/ought issue stops and fact/value discussion begins. The problem here is in deducing an ought where you have only previously stated “is”/factual statements in the premises. This is what Grisez, Finnis, etc. maintain you do when you base your natural law prescriptions on metaphysical anthropology. Your comment seems to conflate the fact/value dichotomy with the is/ought problem and import the criticism of one into your discussion of the other. The issue we have been discussing is really strictly concerned with the is/ought problem: making an illicit inference from factual propositions.

But you can derive an ought from an is without making an illogical inference. Once you have defined the good, as the natural “end-goal” of any natural thing, or as “fulness of being,” then you can have “the good” in your premise, and it logically follows that doing the opposite is the definition of bad.

 

[adolphuscusins]

Unfortunately, I will have to disagree with you, and unfortunately, I don’t have time to give a proper response right now.

 

[Joel_PF]

But you can derive an ought from an is without making an illogical inference. Once you have defined the good, as the natural “end-goal” of any natural thing, or as “fulness of being,” then you can have “the good” in your premise, and it logically follows that doing the opposite is the definition of bad.

Of course we can define the good and turn descriptive statements into prescriptive ones. But we do this at a high cost: morality loses its moral force.

Suppose I define good for man as “being rational”. And I go on and say that learning is a rational activity. Therefore, learning is good. That is a perfect argument. But as a moral conclusion it is poor, because it breaks down with a simple question: why should I be rational? Why should I be good?

The only way out of this will be to resort to a “first basic obligation”. In fact, that is the way many people see the first principle of practical reason (“do good, avoid evil”): as a fundamental norm, a first commandment that everyone everywhere ought to follow. And if we accept this first commandment, then all the rest of ethics follows.

But why follow this first commandment? Why not rather do evil and avoid good? No reason can be given. It must be accepted as an absolute. And when you try to define this “good” that is to be done in a more concrete way (eg: “to be good is to be rational, love others, treat everyone equally, etc.”), it becomes increasingly questionable.

Someone can easily accept that man is rational, that this rationality distinguishes him from all other animals and yet not uphold reason as a value. “Why should I be rational? Why should I want to follow and actualize that which distinguishes me from other animals, rather than ignoring or even fighting against it?” “Why should I want to achieve my fullness of being? What if I prefer a partiality of being, or even the negation of being?”

The cost of defining good in objective terms (for instance, as fullness of being, which for man means being rational, which is what distinguishes his being from others) is that you separate the good from man’s actual desires and inclinations, and it thus loses its moral force.

St. Thomas did not go down this path (this is what Grisez and Finnis say, and I agree with them); his explanation was substantially different. The first practical principle is not a fundamental norm; it is a directive principle that is always actually operating in whatever choice you make, even in your evil actions.

He did point out the metaphysical basis of morality, rooted in our nature. But that is not how we learn and know morality (that is, how to live, what goods to pursue); it is by the principles of practical reason, that is to say, the natural (and rational) inclinations that we all have and that we all follow, even when we’re not aware of it.

We do not know happiness from an abstract exposition on the nature of man; we know it by the glimpses of it afforded by our own experience and inclinations.

 

[adolphuscusins]

No need to respond now that there is an excellent answer above my post. I can however point people to another short article online by Prof. Tollefsen, who has worked with George and Grisez. thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/05/3292

This article covers the basic ground that has been a point of contention/discussion in this thread.

 

[dmar198]

Of course we can define the good and turn descriptive statements into prescriptive ones. But we do this at a high cost: morality loses its moral force.

On the contrary, its moral force gains metaphysical roots, and makes it stronger. Saying that natural law is based only in the first principles that “everyone knows,” THAT takes away its moral force. Take stealing – it’s wrong, and “everyone knows” its wrong. Okay, now I ask you, why is it wrong: and you have to say – “Well, it just is, and you know it.” That’s called intuitionism, and it removes the “because” out of the first moral principles – the “because” that imputes forward causality, “real force” if you will, to moral imperatives.

Suppose I define good for man as “being rational”. And I go on and say that learning is a rational activity. Therefore, learning is good. That is a perfect argument. But as a moral conclusion it is poor, because it breaks down with a simple question: why should I be rational? Why should I be good?

“Good” and “bad” correspond directly to “ought” and “ought not.” Asking “Why should I be good?” is the same thing as asking “Why is it good to be good?” And that can be answered with a simple X=X.

The only way out of this will be to resort to a “first basic obligation”. In fact, that is the way many people see the first principle of practical reason (“do good, avoid evil”): as a fundamental norm, a first commandment that everyone everywhere ought to follow. And if we accept this first commandment, then all the rest of ethics follows.

But why follow this first commandment? Why not rather do evil and avoid good?

Because that is not good. It is evil. It imputes guilt, and merits punishment. But I ask you: how does your alternative answer this question? By saying that “everyone knows it’s good to be good”? That’s hardly better.

when you try to define this “good” that is to be done in a more concrete way (eg: “to be good is to be rational, love others, treat everyone equally, etc.”), it becomes increasingly questionable.

The further you get from first principles, the more obscure the train of thought becomes. That is perfectly ordinary, but moral obligations can be explained more clearly when that happens. And those who keep the first principles in mind when moral occasions arise do not have so much difficulty with these types of questions as you seem to suggest.

Someone can easily accept that man is rational, that this rationality distinguishes him from all other animals and yet not uphold reason as a value. “Why should I be rational? Why should I want to follow and actualize that which distinguishes me from other animals, rather than ignoring or even fighting against it?” “Why should I want to achieve my fullness of being? What if I prefer a partiality of being, or even the negation of being?”

Same reason as above: “Why should I be good” is the same thing as asking “Why is it good to be good,” and “why X is good” has already been explained through the “fullness of being” example or the teological example.

The cost of defining good in objective terms (for instance, as fullness of being, which for man means being rational, which is what distinguishes his being from others) is that you separate the good from man’s actual desires and inclinations, and it thus loses its moral force.

You do not separate it from man’s actual desires and inclinations; you show where they are grounded. “You desire this because you ARE this, metaphysically.” You feel you OUGHT to do this because it is GOOD to do this, etc. Your alternative leaves them all the worse off; you separate man’s natural inclinations and desires from anything rooted in objective metaphysical facts, and make it so they are only TOLD to be good, albeit by a strong interior voice.

St. Thomas did not go down this path (this is what Grisez and Finnis say, and I agree with them); his explanation was substantially different. The first practical principle is not a fundamental norm; it is a directive principle that is always actually operating in whatever choice you make, even in your evil actions.

I’m not conversant enough in Thomas to answer that criticism, but it seems to me that many Thomists side with metaphysical-based natural law, and they would disagree that Thomas didn’t teach it. But even if he did not, that wouldn’t stop it from being a superior explanation of morality than the alternative.

He did point out the metaphysical basis of morality, rooted in our nature. But that is not how we learn and know morality (that is, how to live, what goods to pursue); it is by the principles of practical reason, that is to say, the natural (and rational) inclinations that we all have and that we all follow, even when we’re not aware of it.

Those reasons don’t seem to be incompatible. Why can’t we learn morality from intuition at first, and then learn the ground of intuition later?

We do not know happiness from an abstract exposition on the nature of man; we know it by the glimpses of it afforded by our own experience and inclinations.

Agreed, but that doesn’t imply that it (happiness) isn’t BECAUSE of the good nature of man being fulfilled. All the arguments you can put forward about man’s natural intuitive knowledge fit in perfectly with the metaphysical grounding that classical Thomists argue for. So I don’t see why you should oppose it merely because two learned men happen to not see it that way.

God bless!
-Dan Marcum

 

[adolphuscusins]

Hey Dan,

You are oversimplifying and misstating the claims of a theory that you state you have not read. I don’t mean to sound snarky at all, but I think you should pick up some primary source material, read over it, then come back and start a new thread where we can all settle this metaphysical royal rumble. It’s fun reading material. Clearly, you’re interested. Get the library card out, and make it happen.

 

[Joel_PF]

Asking “Why should I be good?” is the same thing as asking “Why is it good to be good?” And that can be answered with a simple X=X. Because that is not good. It is evil. It imputes guilt, and merits punishment.

This is the crucial point.

See how on your account morality has to be upheld at the point of a gun?

Deep down, you have to do the good because the contrary “merits” punishment. Says who? God? Sounds more like a big powerful bully.

The real reason why we have to do some things and not others is because these things lead us to our true happiness. The good is the good because it leads us to our complete fulfillment. Deep down, you don’t “have” to do anything; there is no one with a gun pointed at you. But you will have to live with the consequences of your actions. And since the agent, like everyone else, wants to be happy, he better consider his choices well!

But I ask you: how does your alternative answer this question? By saying that “everyone knows it’s good to be good”? That’s hardly better.

Not at all. In my account the question “why do the good?” never arises, because the first principle “do good, avoid evil” is not something that can be obeyed or disobeyed. It is a principle that directs every single action, even bad ones. Even evil man follow this principle, even though they are very misguided in what will lead them to their true good (which they themselves will be able to see if they stop to ponder on their lives a little bit).

Everyone is always already acting on the “do good, avoid evil” principle. The task of ethics is to show them what the good consists of.

You do not separate it from man’s actual desires and inclinations; you show where they are grounded. “You desire this because you ARE this, metaphysically.”

I don’t deny the truth of the metaphysical grounding of morality. I just deny that it has any relevance to moral science, ethics.

A man may know perfectly well that he is a rational animal. Still, the question remains: why should he want to actualize his reason, instead of, say, destroying it and becoming a beast?

You feel you OUGHT to do this because it is GOOD to do this, etc. Your alternative leaves them all the worse off; you separate man’s natural inclinations and desires from anything rooted in objective metaphysical facts, and make it so they are only TOLD to be good, albeit by a strong interior voice.

Another difference between our accounts here. There is no commanding interior voice in my account; there are the actual desires of the individual.
There is no feeling of an absolute “ought” pressing down on his soul. There is the recognition that some paths will lead him to his perfect fulfillment, and others will turn him away from it.

I’m not conversant enough in Thomas to answer that criticism, but it seems to me that many Thomists side with metaphysical-based natural law, and they would disagree that Thomas didn’t teach it.

You are right here, many do. But their interpretation is excessively colored by nominalistic thought, which is what dominated Christian thinking for centuries (even in those who were trying to interpret St. Thomas faithfully), and then by Kant, who destroyed morality by separating it completely from happiness.

St. Thomas himself was not too clear on the matter, mixing the metaphysical foundation and the ethical arguments starting from the first principles of practical reason (the natural inclinations to the many goods of human life, which is what I am basing ethics on).

I don’t follow Finnis’s interpretation and account of morality because he is a big name or anything like that, but because it seems to me very convincing and strong.

I also don’t think that the best version of morality is necessarily the one that is closest to what St. Thomas truly said. But I do think he said many very good things and that our modern reading of him is often colored by the much inferior philosophical approaches of nominalism and Kant.

Why can’t we learn morality from intuition at first, and then learn the ground of intuition later? Agreed, but that doesn’t imply that it (happiness) isn’t BECAUSE of the good nature of man being fulfilled. All the arguments you can put forward about man’s natural intuitive knowledge fit in perfectly with the metaphysical grounding that classical Thomists argue for.

We are in agreement here. I don’t deny the metaphysical foundation. I just think it is irrelevant to moral knowledge. All moral arguments built on the metaphysical nature of man seem, to me, fallacious, because you can’t derive “ought” from “is”.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Try this one by Jean Porter at amazon.com Look inside the book at the table of contents

amazon.com/Nature-Reason-Thomistic-Theory-Natural/dp/0802849067/ref=sr_1_15?ie=UTF8&qid=1305406145&sr=8-15#reader_0802849067

Charles Rice also has a book on natural law, though I don’t recall whether it emphasizes Aquinas.

Here is Charles Rice giving a ten minute talk on natural law on utube.

youtube.com/results?search_query=natural+law+morality&aq=f