Brain, Mind & Neuroscience

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On the other hand, it’s often a good idea to be wary of answers that seem overly complex and ponderous, since they may actually be avoiding the crux of the question, dressing up a lack of knowledge in swathes of obscurantist verbiage.QUOTE]

LOL. Sorry, but I got a kick out of your “fancy talk.” 😃
 
On the other hand, I don’t think this requires a separate awareness of the “thereness” of things, apart from our mental concepts of them - other entities are either within our field of perception or they are not. If our senses evolved to perceive things that might affect our immediate survival, the assumption of “thereness” must be automatic, in order to elicit the appropriate reaction.

Just throwing these ideas out there, really - I don’t know that there isn’t a separate human faculty that homes in on existence as separate to any other feature…
The interplay of “presence” and “absence” is involved in language. Take naming for instance. To be able to name something, we have to be able to “appreciate” it whether it is "present’ or “absent”. Or more exactly, to appreciate this “something”, e.g., a tree, as remaining the same whether it is “present” or “absent” - it remains “there” in the world even I am not present to perceive it.

Another way of saying this - that something can be somewhere else is part of the meaning of its presence (to me).

Equally interesting - the object “available” through naming by me is the very same object that is “available” through naming by you. When we name, we do not name some internal phantasm or mental representative - no, we name the object that is out there in the world - this is what possible “referring” - I can talk to you about the oak tree outside my house because you and I can “share” the same tree.

This is what science, i.e., “objective” knowledge, possible.
 
… this is what possible “referring” …

… This is what science, i.e., “objective” knowledge, possible.
Typos:

… this is what **makes **possible “referring” …

… This is what **makes **science, i.e., “objective” knowledge, possible …
 
I don’t see any reason to think that the physical sciences are a reliable means to understand the mind.
  1. Do you understand the mind well enough to know what tools are required to understand it?
I understand the mind well enough to know that it is more than the sum of fMRI imaging.
There is a reason why Mr. Harris got his rear-end handed to him by William Lane Craig, and it’s the same reason Dawkins refuses to debate him: they make claims that overstep the bounds of their profession and go into Craig’s, and when they step into his arena, he eats them alive.
  1. i am certain there is some element of subjectivity mixed up somewhere in those cold harsh observations.
No, I’m actually being quite objective about it. I have been a lifelong skeptic and credulity is a sin in my eyes. My observations are based on these facts:

In the Harris vs. Craig debate
  • Craig consistently defended his arguments
  • Craig’s arguments never resorted to appeals to emotion
  • Craig consistently refuted Harris’ objections
  • Harris rambled profusely
  • Most of Harris’ talk was purely emotional, i.e. “What kind of God would do that?” “Christianity is bad!”
  • Harris failed to address Craig’s contentions
  • I could go on.
However, I’ll assume you won’t take me at my word for it and give you a review from an unbiased (e.g. non-Christian) source. Here’s what a rather irreverent philosophy blogger had to say about it:
A Google search of the debate reveals how much a bro’s predispositions influence his opinions on the outcome - several athiest blogs seem convinced that Harris crushed WLC, and Christian apologists are already bragging about their debate superstar chalking up another one.
Here’s the deal: WLC wrecked Harris’ ****.
Let me qualify that: I’m a trained debater, and from the perspective of a trained debater, this was a ****ing bloodbath. WLC has a strict flow, he stuck to the proposition at hand (He constantly affirmed that objective morality must be based in God and can’t exist without Him) and he easily and consistently dismissed arguments of Harris’ that didn’t matter to that proposition.
So when Harris trotted out the problem of evil and the problem of the unevangelized, WLC shrugged those off and went about laying waste to Harris’ case like a machine. Yeah, if I’m a judge at a debate tournament, and these two get up and say exactly what was said last night, I’m signing a ballot for WLC and giving high speaks all around. I had never heard of WLC before, so I thought that Sam Harris was going to have no problem, but holy ****.
As for Dawkins, he has given the lie to his excuses numerous times over the years. For every reason he’s given for not debating Craig, he’s debated someone who matches the profile.
 
The interplay of “presence” and “absence” is involved in language. Take naming for instance. To be able to name something, we have to be able to “appreciate” it whether it is "present’ or “absent”. Or more exactly, to appreciate this “something”, e.g., a tree, as remaining the same whether it is “present” or “absent” - it remains “there” in the world even I am not present to perceive it.

Another way of saying this - that something can be somewhere else is part of the meaning of its presence (to me).

Equally interesting - the object “available” through naming by me is the very same object that is “available” through naming by you. When we name, we do not name some internal phantasm or mental representative - no, we name the object that is out there in the world - this is what possible “referring” - I can talk to you about the oak tree outside my house because you and I can “share” the same tree.

This is what science, i.e., “objective” knowledge, possible.
 
Whoops - didn’t mean to duplicate my previous posting … was trying to elaborate on it … .

What I was trying to get at is what Piaget calls “constancy of object” - the ball that rolls out of sight is the same ball which was previously perceived.

The sense of this “constancy”, however, requires “appreciating” the ball “as present” and the ball “as absent”.

It is this “constancy of object” that makes possible “naming” and “referring”.
 
The interplay of “presence” and “absence” is involved in language. Take naming for instance. To be able to name something, we have to be able to “appreciate” it whether it is "present’ or “absent”. Or more exactly, to appreciate this “something”, e.g., a tree, as remaining the same whether it is “present” or “absent” - it remains “there” in the world even I am not present to perceive it.

Another way of saying this - that something can be somewhere else is part of the meaning of its presence (to me).

Equally interesting - the object “available” through naming by me is the very same object that is “available” through naming by you. When we name, we do not name some internal phantasm or mental representative - no, we name the object that is out there in the world - this is what possible “referring” - I can talk to you about the oak tree outside my house because you and I can “share” the same tree.

This is what science, i.e., “objective” knowledge, possible.
So our concept of the ‘thereness’ of other things is intimately tied to the notion of an objective reality, one that is there to be perceived rather than one we create subjectively inside our own heads. Perhaps it is the case that our ability to consider our selves - our conscious awareness - as persisting in time is tied to our tendency to perceive that other entities seem to do the same; essentially, we conceptualise ourselves as objects. So which of these came first?

And what are we to make of the solipsist’s claim that nothing outside of our mental impressions can be claimed as certainly existing? It is after all not certain that our referents actually do persist in time and space, though it seems to us that they do. There is no contradiction inherent in the proposition that the sock I found at the bottom of a basket today is not, in fact, the self-same sock that I lost when I did the laundry last weekend, even though it appears to match its pair partner. Ockham’s razor would seem to suggest that the simplest explanation is that it is indeed the same sock (not that the sock fairy stole it and replaced it with an exact replica, for example), but since I had no perception of the sock between losing it and apparently finding it again, I can only suppose this to be the case (never mind that it serves no practical purpose to suppose otherwise - since when did philosphy weigh itself down with practical considerations? 😉 )

So the question remains as to whether the persistence of objects in time and space is something we create with our mental impressions, or something about objective reality that we apprehend. It should be obvious from the general tenor of my posts that I believe it is the latter, but that is primarily because I see no value or usefulness in supposing the former - not because I have certain knowledge either way.
 
If the mind is not a separate entity from the brain all our activity is determined by physical events and we are biological computers without free will and without responsibility for our thoughts, words or deeds…
No responses!

That hypothesis is also self-refuting because it undermines the trustworthiness of the process by which that hypothesis was established. :doh2:
How could a blind lump of tissue in the skull acquire the power of insight into the nature of reality - and itself into the bargain?
 
No responses!

That hypothesis is also self-refuting because it undermines the trustworthiness of the process by which that hypothesis was established. :doh2:
How could a blind lump of tissue in the skull acquire the power of insight into the nature of reality - and itself into the bargain?
Perhaps because it lacks the motivation to distort our perceptions to fit with preconceived or pre-programmed notions?
 
So our concept of the ‘thereness’ of other things is intimately tied to the notion of an objective reality, one that is there to be perceived rather than one we create subjectively inside our own heads.
Modern philosophy has been plagued with this question. Once your epistemology “dictates” that we are aware only of our private sensations, or internal phantasms, or mental representatives, you’re stuck inside your solipsistic “dungeon”.

But this is a false “imprisonment”.

We are always and already “out there” in the world at large.

If this were not “certain”, naming would be impossible because we would not be talking about the same object. Each of us would be locked inside the circle of his or her own private ideas, and we wouldn’t be able to “share” the same objects.

“Same” here is crucial. Without “constancy of object”, to return to Piaget’s phrase, we would live in total chaos.

To be able to say that the house I’m sitting in is the very same house that I was in a few moments ago is a proof of sanity. It’s not a similar house; it is the very same house.

And this is what I meant by the “thereness” of things.

Without this sense of “thereness”, everyday life, logic and science would be impossible.

Wittgenstein: how would I know that the beetle in your black box is the same as the beetle in my black box?
 
If the mind is not a separate entity from the brain all our activity is determined by physical events and we are biological computers without free will and without responsibility for our thoughts, words or deeds…
Why would you say that a “biological computer” necessarily lacks free will or responsibility?
 
Modern philosophy has been plagued with this question. Once your epistemology “dictates” that we are aware only of our private sensations, or internal phantasms, or mental representatives, you’re stuck inside your solipsistic “dungeon”.

But this is a false “imprisonment”.

We are always and already “out there” in the world at large.

If this were not “certain”, naming would be impossible because we would not be talking about the same object. Each of us would be locked inside the circle of his or her own private ideas, and we wouldn’t be able to “share” the same objects.

“Same” here is crucial. Without “constancy of object”, to return to Piaget’s phrase, we would live in total chaos.

To be able to say that the house I’m sitting in is the very same house that I was in a few moments ago is a proof of sanity. It’s not a similar house; it is the very same house.

And this is what I meant by the “thereness” of things.

Without this sense of “thereness”, everyday life, logic and science would be impossible.

Wittgenstein: how would I know that the beetle in your black box is the same as the beetle in my black box?
It is often the case that pragmatism cuts through a great deal of philosophical speculation - to ask, “What difference will it make if this belief is true?” is a way of clarifying what we think about a given conundrum. What difference would it make to me, to my experience of the world, if solipsism were true? My answer would be that if I do indeed create the reality I experience, there are times when I would definitely have created it differently to how it turned out - like the occasion on which I broke my arm falling off the back of a van, or when my dog died from cancer. If I had creative control over my experience, these and probably many other things as well would not have happened.

Of course science and technology and pretty much all of our interactions with the world are based on the assumption that it does indeed exist objectively, independently of our perception - and the most parsimonious explanation for why this assumption works for us is that it happens to be true.
 
Do your hold your computer responsible for its operations?
Perhaps, if Ray Kurtzweil is correct, computers will hold us humans responsible for our actions.

i rather suspect that in the decades to come, AI will so dramatically change our existences that our prodigy will view us, our customs and ways, and, even our philosophies in much the same way as we see the behavior of chimps in a zoo. It will be a brave new world.
 
Perhaps, if Ray Kurtzweil is correct, computers will hold us humans responsible for our actions.

i rather suspect that in the decades to come, AI will so dramatically change our existences that our prodigy will view us, our customs and ways, and, even our philosophies in much the same way as we see the behavior of chimps in a zoo. It will be a brave new world.
Funny you should say that. I quoted Huxley in another thread earlier. I’ll do it again, except given the scenario you describe, it would be altered to, “Oh, brave new world with no people in it!”

I agree with you. I think if science continues unchecked our own technology will destroy us. But, hey, that’s progress!
 
Perhaps, if Ray Kurtzweil is correct, computers will hold us humans responsible for our actions.
Yeah, that’s kind of the problem with the whole worshiping a “higher authority” thing.
i rather suspect that in the decades to come, AI will so dramatically change our existences that our prodigy will view us, our customs and ways, and, even our philosophies in much the same way as we see the behavior of chimps in a zoo. It will be a brave new world.
Kurzweil said that the worst opponent of the Singularity was fanatical Humanism. I find that idea interesting.
 
Yeah, that’s kind of the problem with the whole worshiping a “higher authority” thing.
The problem with rejecting the “higher authority” thing is that one is left worshipping one’s own moral authority!
Kurzweil said that the worst opponent of the Singularity was fanatical Humanism. I find that idea interesting.
Yet he favours fanatical AI…
 
The problem with rejecting the “higher authority” thing is that one is left worshipping one’s own moral authority!
The only problem here is that in order to embrace any supposed “higher” moral authority, one has to trust one’s own moral intuition to determine if such an authority is actually worth embracing.
 
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