But you wont find intellect in the brain

[ronnie_bonigli]

I often see threads on religion forums on other sites along the lines of “You won’t find consciousness in the brain”, I really do, and they almost always break down into two camps, the Cartisian dualists and the reductive materialists. One camp thinks mind is independent of the brain and the other than it is solely a product of the brain.

But instead, the reality is it’s not a question of whether you will “find consciousness in the brain” (all conscious experience might very well be soley a product of the brain, though I’m not sure), the question is whether you will “find intellect in the brain”.

With regard to certain sensory conscious experiences, the action of the brain is possibly both a necessary and a wholey sufficient condition for their occurrence. But when it comes to the intellectual activity of the mind, the power of the mind that involves both ***understanding ***and judgment, specifically the mind’s understanding of abstract concepts and propositions, and the mind’s rational judgments on the truth of those propositions, then an immaterial element in the intellect must be postulated in order to provide an adequate explanation of the mind’s acts conceptual understanding and rational judgments of truth. The brain may be necessary intertwined in these acts of the intellect, but it is not a wholey sufficient condition for their occurrence.

One such argument for an immaterial element in intellect rests on two propositions and the conclusion that follows. The first premise points out that the concepts in which we understand what the different classes or kinds of things are consist of meanings that are universal. And the second premise points out that nothing that exists materially is actually universal. Anything that is constructed of matter exists as an individual singular thing. The conclusion follows that our universal concepts cannot be embodied in matter. If our concepts were merely acts of the brain, they would exist in matter, and would not have the necessary universality that allow us to think of the universal objects so very different from the individual things that are objects of senses. The power of conceptual thought has all the signs of being an immaterial power, and not one the acts of a material bodily organ like the brain.

And of course this matches exactly with the Catholic description of man. That man is a profound union of matter and a spiritual soul with the faculties of intellect and will. And that this union is so profound that the two become one being, man could be considered spiritualized matter, rather than a “ghost in a machine” or a soul driving a body. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, for example, teaches that: “The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the ‘form’ of the body … spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.”

 

[GEddie]

I often see threads on religion forums on other sites along the lines of “You won’t find consciousness in the brain”, I really do, and they almost always break down into two camps, the Cartisian dualists and the reductive materialists. One camp thinks mind is independent of the brain and the other than it is solely a product of the brain.

But instead, the reality is it’s not a question of whether you will “find consciousness in the brain” (all conscious experience might very well be soley a product of the brain, though I’m not sure), the question is whether you will “find intellect in the brain”.

With regard to certain sensory conscious experiences, the action of the brain is possibly both a necessary and a wholey sufficient condition for their occurrence. But when it comes to the intellectual activity of the mind, the power of the mind that involves both ***understanding ***and judgment, specifically the mind’s understanding of abstract concepts and propositions, and the mind’s rational judgments on the truth of those propositions, then an immaterial element in the intellect must be postulated in order to provide an adequate explanation of the mind’s acts conceptual understanding and rational judgments of truth. The brain may be necessary intertwined in these acts of the intellect, but it is not a wholey sufficient condition for their occurrence.

One such argument for an immaterial element in intellect rests on two propositions and the conclusion that follows. The first premise points out that the concepts in which we understand what the different classes or kinds of things are consist of meanings that are universal. And the second premise points out that nothing that exists materially is actually universal. Anything that is constructed of matter exists as an individual singular thing. The conclusion follows that our universal concepts cannot be embodied in matter. If our concepts were merely acts of the brain, they would exist in matter, and would not have the necessary universality that allow us to think of the universal objects so very different from the individual things that are objects of senses. The power of conceptual thought has all the signs of being an immaterial power, and not one the acts of a material bodily organ like the brain.

And of course this matches exactly with the Catholic description of man. That man is a profound union of matter and a spiritual soul with the faculties of intellect and will. And that this union is so profound that the two become one being, man could be considered spiritualized matter, rather than a “ghost in a machine” or a soul driving a body. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, for example, teaches that: “The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the ‘form’ of the body … spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.”

You couldn’t do abstract thinking if your brain weren’t keeping you conscious. See how much philosophy is done by persons under general anesthetic. Nor could you do it if you hadn’t already filled your mind by sensory means, enabling you to perform abstract operations. See how much abstract philosophy is done by neonates.

If all the “immaterial mind” can do is abstract philosophy, then it is almost or wholly unused in most of human life.

ICXC NIKA.

 

[JimG]

I don’t recall which Catholic philosopher it was who said, “nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses.”

He meant that man, as a composite of body and soul, receives information from the outside world through the senses. That sensory information is necessary, and it is material. It is organized and integrated in the brain. The intellect, which is not material, continuously abstracts from the integrated data, abstract concepts, which allows for abstract thinking.

 

[grannymh]

And of course this matches exactly with the Catholic description of man. That man is a profound union of matter and a spiritual soul with the faculties of intellect and will. And that this union is so profound that the two become one being, man could be considered spiritualized matter, rather than a “ghost in a machine” or a soul driving a body. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, for example, teaches that: “The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the ‘form’ of the body … spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.”

I am very glad to see that you focused on the Catholic description of human nature. Too often, people erroneously believe that Cartesian dualism is the Catholic position.

Blessings,
granny

The human person is worthy of profound respect from the moment of conception.

 

[JohnDamian]

I don’t recall which Catholic philosopher it was who said, “nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses.”

He meant that man, as a composite of body and soul, receives information from the outside world through the senses. That sensory information is necessary, and it is material. It is organized and integrated in the brain. The intellect, which is not material, continuously abstracts from the integrated data, abstract concepts, which allows for abstract thinking.

That quote is Aquinas…

However, that phrase denies the priority of the will and eers on the side of determinism; for the will is first and prior to intellection; with perception posterior to even these; then it cannot be said that in the intellection nothing is without sense images; as that denies the principle of the priority of the will; which in turn consequently determines that the will (as it must be if not prior or intrinsic; posterior) that in such an absurd positation that the intellection as guided by sense objects is prior to the will; and consequently it’s determinant, or at least that the object formation is higher than the will (which is absurd). The will is both logically and temporally prior to the intellection, and is united temporarily to it; whilst not so united logically.

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

You couldn’t do abstract thinking if your brain weren’t keeping you conscious. See how much philosophy is done by persons under general anesthetic. Nor could you do it if you hadn’t already filled your mind by sensory means, enabling you to perform abstract operations. See how much abstract philosophy is done by neonates.

If all the “immaterial mind” can do is abstract philosophy, then it is almost or wholly unused in most of human life.

ICXC NIKA.

I wasn’t talking about just doing “abstract philosophy”, I was saying that the intellect’s power involves both the understanding of universal concepts and the power to make judgments of truth. Understanding universal concepts sure isn’t just abstract philosophy, you do it all the time. Let me just quote the great Frank Sheed from his classic Theology and Sanity;

A very crude example must suffice here instead of the longer discussion the question will find in a book of philosophy. A man, having a spiritual soul, can be aware not only of this or that dog, but of the general notion of dog which is expressed in all the dogs that have been or will be or could be. When he remarks that the dog is a useful animal, he is employing—and employing with the ease of an entirely natural operation—a universal concept. He is not thinking of any individual dog of a particular shape and size and colour; he is abstracting that essence of dog which is common to all the numberless combinations of size and shape and colour in which dogs are found. He can do this precisely because his soul is a spirit. His body, which is material, cannot make any sort of contact, enter into any sort of relation, with that universal dog. His eyes can see only individual dogs, each dog with its own shape and size and colour. That is what we mean by saying that matter is limited in its contacts to the individual and concrete.

If we examine all that we can of the animal’s awareness of things, there is nothing to suggest that this awareness ever goes beyond the individual and concrete to make any sort of abstraction of essence, that it ever goes beyond the sight and the taste and the smell to what the thing profoundly is. As someone has observed, if one met a pig capable of knowing that it was a pig it might be safer to baptize it, on the ground that it must have a spiritual soul to be able to arrive at the general idea pig and apply it to itself as one realization of that general idea. As I say, none of the animal activities that we call knowing seem to go beyond awareness of the individual and concrete, that is to say none of them seem to go beyond the material order, for that is the material order. Nothing that the animal’s psyche does takes us so obviously out of the range of matter that we are forced to postulate a spiritual principle. The animal’s soul does nothing that leads us to feel that some higher than material principle must be in operation. Therefore there is no reason to believe that it is not a material soul, “immersed” in the matter of the animal’s body, and ending with it.

Neither by permanence in being, nor by rational knowledge and love, do even the highest material beings, those that have life, transcend the sphere of matter. The gulf between matter and spirit remains. But if it is a real gulf, it is a bridged gulf, too, bridged at one point—man.

 

[grannymh]

As the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Second Edition says: “Of all visible creatures only man is ‘able to know and love his Creator’.” This is because in his own human nature, Adam unites the spiritual and material worlds. (CCC 355-368)

The intellect and the brain, one rational and one corporeal, are intimately united in their operations not as two natures but rather their unique union forms the single nature of the human being.

The fact is that the immaterial, immortal, eternal, spiritual soul enables us to know (intellect) and love (will) and thus we are able to share in God’s own life. This is why it is said that we are created in the image of God.

Blessings,
granny

The quest for knowledge is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[hatsoff]

The first premise points out that the concepts in which we understand what the different classes or kinds of things are consist of meanings that are universal.

A materialist would likely have serious issues with that premise. He might point out, for instance, that concepts exist only insofar as we biological machines act them out, or perhaps have a hidden propensity to act them out should our environment allow. So, whatever you mean by “universal,” it must be compatible with that kind of account, or else they will reject the premise.

 

[JimG]

That quote is Aquinas…

However, that phrase denies the priority of the will and eers on the side of determinism; for the will is first and prior to intellection; with perception posterior to even these; then it cannot be said that in the intellection nothing is without sense images; as that denies the principle of the priority of the will; which in turn consequently determines that the will (as it must be if not prior or intrinsic; posterior) that in such an absurd positation that the intellection as guided by sense objects is prior to the will; and consequently it’s determinant, or at least that the object formation is higher than the will (which is absurd). The will is both logically and temporally prior to the intellection, and is united temporarily to it; whilst not so united logically.

Thanks for identifying the quote. I don’t think Aquinas, or traditional Catholic philosophy, is deterministic. The will acts on what is presented to it by the intellect. The intellect forms ideas from what is presented by the senses. Abstract concept, which humans are continuously forming via the intellect, occur as the end result of sense perception.

That is characteristic of human intellection. It seems that only non-material beings, such as angels, have intellect and will which are independent of sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.

 

[GEddie]

the reality is it’s not a question of whether you will “find consciousness in the brain” (all conscious experience might very well be soley a product of the brain, though I’m not sure)

What is there to be not sure about? Consciousness ends quite neatly if the brain is deprived of functioning, whether by drugs, or by a chokehold, or by an old-fashioned clout on the head. Seems like the brain is a necessary condition for consciousness.

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

What is there to be not sure about? Consciousness ends quite neatly if the brain is deprived of functioning, whether by drugs, or by a chokehold, or by an old-fashioned clout on the head. Seems like the brain is a necessary condition for consciousness.

Well, David Chalmers’ arguments for qualia and a nonmaterial element in consciousness has a lot respect in even materialist philosophical circles. It’s Chalmers’ “Hard Part” of the question of consciousness, not to mention Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room argument, which also has serious adherents. But I don’t hang my hat on conscious experience being non-material, I just subscribe to the traditional Catholic view of a spiritual soul with the faculties of Intellect and Will in a profound union with the matter of the body.

 

[RobNY]

A materialist would likely have serious issues with that premise. He might point out, for instance, that concepts exist only insofar as we biological machines act them out, or perhaps have a hidden propensity to act them out should our environment allow. So, whatever you mean by “universal,” it must be compatible with that kind of account, or else they will reject the premise.

The problem with the behaviorist account (ideas are propensities for action) is, naturally, that it is eliminativist about the meaning of ideas.

While I understand why the materialist would want to hold to such an account dogmatically, I really have little sympathy for him. It is only necessary to eliminate meaning if one is a materialist who cannot allow such things to enter his philosophy. But since I don’t have that prior philosophical commitment, I am quite happy merely to reject behaviorism.

What is there to be not sure about? Consciousness ends quite neatly if the brain is deprived of functioning, whether by drugs, or by a chokehold, or by an old-fashioned clout on the head. Seems like the brain is a necessary condition for consciousness.

It would be fallacious to infer that the brain is a sufficient condition of conscious merely because we know that it is a necessary condition.

ronnie–

I think you’re right about your method. Consciousness may be a red herring. Besides, the entire animal kingdom shares consciousness. Intellect is a much more important mark.

-Rob

 

[hatsoff]

The problem with the behaviorist account (ideas are propensities for action) is, naturally, that it is eliminativist about the meaning of ideas.

While I understand why the materialist would want to hold to such an account dogmatically, I really have little sympathy for him. It is only necessary to eliminate meaning if one is a materialist who cannot allow such things to enter his philosophy. But since I don’t have that prior philosophical commitment, I am quite happy merely to reject behaviorism.

Actually I had functionalism in mind, though the two are very similar. I’m not sure why you’d think either requires us to dispense with the meaning of a particular idea. After all, such meaning is simply another concept, and so falls back into the domain of functionalism (or behaviorism, if you like).

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

ronnie–

I think you’re right about your method. Consciousness may be a red herring. Besides, the entire animal kingdom shares consciousness. Intellect is a much more important mark.

Thanks

And exactly right, consciousness may be a red herring. Though I’m not certain. But a nonmaterial element in the intellect, that’s a much better argument. Ironically, the person who has recently and inadvertently made a powerful argument for the ability of human minds to “understand” and make “judgements” of truth in a way that is non-computational and non-mechanical is Roger Penrose, the mathematical physicist on a prestige level with Stephen Hawking, as well as ironically a materialist and religious agnostic. In Roger’s books The Emperor’s New Mind and Shadows of the Mind he makes the case that the fact that human minds get use Godel’s Theorem to find the undecidable propostion in any formal system shows that the human mind does not act like a formal system, i.e. a computer, and any type of mechanical system. I’ve read The Emperor’s New Mind twice and I still have trouble explaining the argument (it’s pretty advanced), but Catholic physicist Stephen Barr does a nice job of it in his review of Penrose’s Shadows of the Mind. Here’s the link to Barr’s article, (it was originally published in First Things) I highly recommend it;

leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9511/articles/revessay.html

 

[inocente]

Penrose gives a formal proof for something we knew instinctively, that the brain is not a computer. Think of someone you love unconditionally (God?) and then try to express that love in words. Your brain never does a dictionary look-up as a computer would, and at some point you have to admit that words alone can never express the depth of your love.

This is a big problem for any philosopher who wants to take a reductionist approach. A necessary first step is to define the thing (consciousness, intellect, mind, will, soul, etc.) that is to be explained. The difficulty is that the thing doesn’t work that way, it defies formal definition. Uniquely, this defiance applies both to the thing being studied and to the thing doing the studying.

E.g., if I can’t explain unconditional love rationally then does it fit with the OP’s understanding and judgment? Another example, the Spanglish phrase guau sus amigos (guau means woof and is pronounced wow, as in bow wow, so the phrase means “wow your friends”, or the interestingly pedantic “woof your friends”). It takes a lot of imagination and creativity to be that playful.

ronnie – thanks for the Barr article, it’s very interesting. I tend to agree with his summary, that perhaps scientific approaches with more humble goals may tiptoe towards an explanation. Here’s an old favorite:
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=real-outof-body-experiences

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

Penrose gives a formal proof for something we knew instinctively, that the brain is not a computer. Think of someone you love unconditionally (God?) and then try to express that love in words. Your brain never does a dictionary look-up as a computer would, and at some point you have to admit that words alone can never express the depth of your love.

I never thought of that before, but yeah, it would be hard to imagine a computer feeling love. Just imagine John Searle’s Chinese Room for understanding “love” instead of understanding Chinese

 

[RobNY]

I never thought of that before, but yeah, it would be hard to imagine a computer feeling love. Just imagine John Searle’s Chinese Room for understanding “love” instead of understanding Chinese

Love can be taken as a passion or as a virtue.

The problem here is that we risk confusing having the passions (which are proper to animated bodies) with having an intellect. A computer certainly cannot have passions, but that doesn’t mean that we’ve proven that it can’t have an intellect. Immaterial intellects, after all-- the angels-- do not suffer the passions.

If one takes love as an act of the will, i.e., the act of an agent, then perhaps one has hit on a crucial difference between the human being and the computer. The computer, much like the abacus, remains an instrument and not an agent.

-Rob

 

[Black_Rose]

What about intellect in the genes? It is supposedly a highly heritable trait.

 

[RobNY]

What about intellect in the genes? It is supposedly a highly heritable trait.

I’d have to accuse you of the genetic fallacy.

-Rob

 

[Moonstruck888]

Here’s a question for you all.

If the human intelligence is not contingent on the brain, then why did God see fit to place the miracle of the human soul into these decaying biological dung heaps that we all inhabit from cradle to grave?

Why not put the miracle of human thought into a desk, or a motor car, or a painting, or a computer?

I’ll tell you what my thoughts on this are.

The human intelligence is in human bodies because that is the only place it can be. Desks, cars, paintings and computers can’t multiply. A painting needs a painter. A car needs an engineer, a desk needs a carpenter and a computer needs a programmer. Human beings are created spontaneously from other human beings and ultimately other lifeforms that were also created spontaneously.

We are stuck in fragile disease prone bilogical bodies that last for a blink of an eye with no gurantee even then because they need no design and we have no design. We have no design because we have no designer. Intelligence isn’t a miracle. It’s a survival trait that has been selected from a myriad of possibilities and enhanced as millions of years have passed, simply because it is so advantageous.