Calling Thomistic Philosophers: Induction and a posteriori demonstration

[Blue_Horizon]

I’m not sure what you think your chicken is supposed to be demonstrating, but from an Aristotelian/Thomist point of view, all it shows is that the chickens had a mistaken belief about why they were being called by the farmer’s wife. In Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy (in fact, all philosophy until the Enlightenment) there is a distinction between a right opinion and a wrong opinion (Socrates is at pains to draw this distinction out in Plato’s dialogues, such as Meno). The chickens simply had a wrong opinion, but not knowledge.

William’s Chicken is a commonly used example of the lack of certainty that inductive demonstration (Enlightenment understanding) provides.

(1) I chicken, have always been fed by the farmer’s wife every morning at sunrise by the wrong back door.
(2) It is now sunrise and the farmer’s wife has just opened the backdoor.
(3) Therefore I am going to be fed.

The chickens had certain knowledge that a cause was at play (they were not mistaken over its existence) re the wife emerging with grain at sunrise every morning for the last 364 days.

However the chickens were mistaken as to the nature of the cause. They thought it was to be fed and cared for. In fact it was to be fattened for Christmas dinner.

So induction seems to provides certain knowledge as to the existence of a cause.
But only probable knowledge (i.e. no knowledge at all by Aquinas’s defintion but just wrong opinion?) as to its inherent nature.

I think “wrong opinion” does not do justice to the helpful “practical knowledge” the chickens used for 364 days!

 

[Blue_Horizon]

In responses above when I said “nature/essence of a cause” I was speaking colloquially.
Of course what I really mean is “some sort of definition of the cause” (similar to that found in an apriori demonstration).

 

[CrossofChrist]

SE I think you need to tease this out.
Isn’t it simply an unexplained assertion on your part to say Aquinas’s theories are grounded in “philosophy (metaphysics)” while Newton’s are grounded in “Science.”

If Aquinas asserts that his demonstration starts with “a posteriori” demonstrations (some here equate this with induction) then Aquinas is surely starting from truths he thinks are manifested/derived from sensible local motion?

If you opine it isn’t just from sensible “local motion” then it must be some other form of sensible “motion.” Can you provide an example if its not local motion?

The attached article may (or may not) assist as it better describes the difficulties I see.

I believe Aquinas meant the change from potency to act (IOW the actualization of the potency (aka changeable)) when he was talking about “motion”, rather than a change in place or position.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Blue Horizon:
**…If Aquinas asserts that his demonstration starts with “a posteriori” demonstrations (some here equate this with induction) then Aquinas is surely starting from truths he thinks are manifested/derived from sensible local motion?

If Aquinas’s aposteriori example of local motion (the motion of the planets)=“effect” fails to uphold the said cause/principle that he induces … then it seems we need a new sensible/concrete example (effect) of “motion” that will do so.
The potency/act principle (“cause”) you refer to is not really such an example/effect.

The problem is that the horse may have already bolted. We need many successful effects (examples) to provide aposteriori insight into the nature of a cause/principle. However when it comes to aposteriori demonstrations (which are apparantly inductive also) we only need one unsuccessful example to tell us that we have misunderstood the nature of the principle/cause we seek. As William’s Chicken shows.

Because Aquinas’s example/effect of local motion has in fact denied the nature of the cause he seeks to establish how can other examples (of other sorts of motion) now redeem the situation?

If aposteriori and inductive demonstrations are basically the same (as others assert) this approach seems to go nowhere.

On the other hand if aposteriori demonstration is something different from the understanding of inductive demonstration defined above by AuditVocemMeam (post #2) and also William’s Chicken then maybe there is another solution to this difficulty?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

There is no need to “tease” anything, particularly if you continue to insist that Newton and Aquinas mean the same thing when they use the term “motion.”

SE I am not insisting anything, I am seeking understanding and consistency.
If you believe the “solution” is that Newton and Aquinas’s definitions of “motion” intersect rather than overlap 1:1 then that is the sort of “teasing out” I am indeed looking for if you wish to assist.

I think it is established thus far that:
(a) The example of the aposteriori effect that Aquinas had in mind when “proving” his intermediate principle of motion in the First Way was the “local motion” of the celestial bodies.
(b) For Aquinas “motion” can be exemplified in effects other than local motion.
(c) A concrete example of (b) hasn’t yet been established in this thread.
(d) Aquinas’s example in (a) does not appear to uphold the intermediate cause/principle he believed it exemplified in the way he argued it did.
(e) If the Third Way’s “local motion” example is indeed an inductive demonstration then its failure means no other example (even from other sort’s of motion) can salvage the failure. Either all “motion” effects/examples (whether local or not) stand or … the principle to be proved fails.

Perhaps some point above is mistaken?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

SE I am not insisting anything, I am seeking understanding and consistency.
If you believe the “solution” is that Newton and Aquinas’s definitions of “motion” intersect rather than overlap 1:1 then that is the sort of “teasing out” I am indeed looking for if you wish to assist.

I think it is established thus far that:
(a) The example of the aposteriori effect that Aquinas had in mind when “proving” his intermediate principle of motion in the First Way was the “local motion” of the celestial bodies.
(b) For Aquinas “motion” can be exemplified in effects other than local motion.
(c) A concrete example of (b) hasn’t yet been established in this thread.
(d) Aquinas’s example in (a) does not appear to uphold the intermediate cause/principle he believed it exemplified in the way he argued it did.
(e) If the Third Way’s “local motion” example is indeed an inductive demonstration then its failure means no other example (even from other sort’s of motion) can salvage the failure. Either all “motion” effects/examples (whether local or not) stand or … the principle to be proved fails.

Perhaps some point above is mistaken?

For some reason, you do not seem to understand Thomas. Perhaps you have a " favorite " philosopher of your own, someone more " modern " whose arguments you have adopted. I think you need a different view of Thomas from someone who has actually studied Thomas and taught him as opposed to someone who merely comments on commentators of the modern sort.

As a start I would urge you to read the following article from the Edward Feser Blog:
" So you think you understand the cosmological argument? " at :
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/so-you-think-you-understand.html

Then I would suggest you read " Aquinas " by Edward Feser. "

I think you will see that Thomas does not base his arguments on the " Celestial Movements " of Aristotle and that his arguments are based on the " act - potency " principles which are the metaphysical causes of created being ( effects ), whose external manifestations are visible in the motion/change of visible reality. And are not based strictly on " local motion " but includes " local motion. " And that objections raised by Hume and post Humean philosophers are arguing against a " red herring. "

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

For some reason, you do not seem to understand Thomas. Perhaps you have a " favorite " philosopher of your own, someone more " modern " whose arguments you have adopted. I think you need r view of Thomas from someone who has actually studied Thomas and taught him as opposed to someone who merely comments on commentators of the modern sort.

As a start I would urge you to read the following article from the Edward Feser Blog:
" So you think you understand the cosmological argument? " at :
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/so-you-think-you-understand.html

Then I would suggest you read " Aquinas " by Edward Feser. "

I think you will see that Thomas does not base his arguments on the " Celestial Movements " of Aristotle and that his arguments are based on the " act - potency " principles which are the metaphysical causes of created being ( effects ), whose external manifestations are visible in the motion/change of visible reality. And are not based strictly on " local motion " but includes " local motion. " And that objections raised by Hume and post Humean philosophers are arguing against a " red herring. "

Linus2nd

Thanks Linus. I am not sure why you think I am pushing some modern philosopher in particular simply because I seek clarification on points re Aquinas that naturally arise in the mind of a non medieval thinking person. Yes, I am here to understand Aquinas better, if you are the person you speak of then I am all ears! Unfotunately the link you’ve offered doesnt seem wholly relevent to my main concern here re Aquinass understanding of induction though other contributions have.
I thought my Aquinas commentator was faiirly well respected - he did a 1905 translation of SCG afterall ( Joseph Rickaby SJ ). He was quite certain that the First Way of Aquinas was based on that of Aristotle and the local motion of the planets. He was clear that this example from local motion was problematic. I am not sure of the implications for the First Way as a whole. Anyways, this post is more about the certainty that attaches to Aquinass demonstrations from effects.

What I have realised by this discussion is that demos from effects provide certainty re the existence of a cause but apparantly not re a comprehensive understanding of the character of the cause.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thanks Linus. I am not sure why you think I am pushing some modern philosopher in particular simply because I seek clarification on points re Aquinas that naturally arise in the mind of a non medieval thinking person. Yes, I am here to understand Aquinas better, if you are the person you speak of then I am all ears! Unfotunately the link you’ve offered doesnt seem wholly relevent to my main concern here re Aquinass understanding of induction though other contributions have.
I thought my Aquinas commentator was faiirly well respected - he did a 1905 translation of SCG afterall ( Joseph Rickaby SJ ). He was quite certain that the First Way of Aquinas was based on that of Aristotle and the local motion of the planets. He was clear that this example from local motion was problematic. I am not sure of the implications for the First Way as a whole. Anyways, this post is more about the certainty that attaches to Aquinass demonstrations from effects.

What I have realised by this discussion is that demos from effects provide certainty re the existence of a cause but apparantly not re a comprehensive understanding of the character of the cause.

Not familiar with Rickaby. However, there was a revival of Thomism beginning in the late 1800’s and continuing to this day. And of course there are various explanations of exactly what the Five Ways were all about. That is why I referred you to Feser, his works and his blog. I’m surprised that you didn’t find what you needed in the link. Of course, if you are only interested in a discussion of " a posteriori " and " induction, " then your best resource is our own ( he would smile at that ) Hicetnunc. He is very obliging. He is worth listening to.

As far as Thomas’ use of Aristotle’s Clestial Movements is concerned, I refer you to page 39 of Feser’s " Aquinas " where he cites Rickaby ( how could I have forgotten that ) at p. 67 of his " Scholasticism " ( cf S.T. 1. 32. 1 ). Quoting Rickaby, Feser says, " …As Aquinas says with respect to the Ptolemaic astronomy accepted in his day, ’ the suppositions that those astronomers have invented need not necessarily be true; for perhaps the phenomena of the stars are explicable on some other plan not yet discovered by men…’ "

The Five Ways as discussed in the S.T. do not refer to the " Celestial Movements. " Each begins in some easily observable movement and then moves on to the underlying metaphysical causes ( the act and potency principles of being ) which account for their existence and the fact that they are effects whose cause is God.

It is only in the S.C.G. ( Book 1, ch 13, paras 27-28 ) that Thomas refers to the " spheres."

" 27] Nor is it against this argument that the movers of the lower spheres produce an everlasting motion and yet are said to be moved by accident. For they are said to be moved by accident, not on their own account, but on account of their movable subjects, which follow the motion of the higher sphere.

[28] Now, God is not part of any self-moving mover. In his Metaphysics [XII, 7], therefore, Aristotle goes on from the mover who is a part of the self-moved mover to seek another mover—God—who is absolutely separate. For, since everything moving itself is moved through appetite, the mover who is part of the self-moving being moves because of the appetite of some appetible object. This object is higher, in the order of motion, than the mover desiring it; for the one desiring is in a manner a moved mover, whereas an appetible object is an absolutely unmoved mover. There must, therefore, be an absolutely unmoved separate first mover. This is God. "

And this has nothing to do with the validity of the proof as should be evident. I call it, " covering all conceiveable bases. " He does the same thing in first three of the Five Ways in the S.T.

Nor should you think that motion in Aristotle or in Thomas is limited to local motion. Rather it meant any type of movement or change, even thought. His arguments are valid then for every type of movement imaginable, including local motion.

Now as far as " induction " concerned, Feser discusses this on pg 43 of Aquinas, but you should begin reading at the top of pg 42 to get the full flavor.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Blue Horizon

I should have recommended the book " An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing " by Louis Groarke, which, as you see, deals exactly with this topic.

Linus2nd.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Linus thanks again for those references. Hard to get those books cheaply from New Zealand (Amazon charges more for post than book outside of the US!) unfortunately.

(BTW re the Argument from Motion I was always referring to SCG as my first post mentioned). It is good to know Feser respects Rickaby’s erudition - I have found him to be a most refreshing translator and commentator on Aquinas who well straddles both Aristotle and Newton/Einstein. A rare combination. Thanks for the Rickaby quote from Feser in the ST.

You may be interested in what Rickaby comments (at length) on Aquinas’s Proof from Motion in SCG (from whence comes my post):
I refrain from translating the rest of this lengthy argument, based upon the treacherous foundation of Aristotelian Physics. See Aristotle, Physics, vii, viii Metaphysics, xi, 7. Whoever will derive an argument for the divine existence from the mechanism of the heavens must take his principles from Newton, not from Aristotle. Besides Motion he must take account of Force and Energy, not to say of Cosmic Evolution. He must know not only the motion of impact … but also the motion that is set up by gravitation. Aristotle knew nothing of gravitation; and only half knew the inertia of matter declared by Newton’s first law of motion. He supposed that motion, of its own nature, not only needed starting but also needed continual keeping up by some continually acting cause. He did not know that the question with a moving body is, not what there is to keep it in motion, but what there is to stop it. It would be a mistake to represent the Aristotelian argument of the Prime Mover as referring to some primitive push, or some rotary motion started in the primitive nebula, at the first creation of matter. Matter, to Aristotle, to Plato, and to the Greeks generally, is eternal, not created. I need hardly add that between an immovable Prime Mover and a Personal God a wide gulf intervenes which Aristotle does not bridge over. See however Chapter XXIIIof this Book. The whole idea of a Prime Mover has vanished from modern physics. … These bodies act and react on each other. And besides
these molar motions there are also molecular motions quite as real. The causes of these motions are innumerable forces. The study of them carries us back to consider the ‘primitive collocation’ of the forces of the universe, a collocation whereby they were arranged in a ‘position of advantage,’ so that out of their interaction has ensued this orderly world, and in it our earth, fit habitation for living things. On this ‘primitive collocation,’ Father Bödder writes (Natural Theology, p. 56): “Although we have nothing to say against the assumption made by astronomers, that our cosmic system resulted from the condensation and division of a primitive rotating nebula; yet we cannot admit this nebula without observing that there must have been a firstarrangement of the mateial elements which constituted it, one which already contained the present system, or else the said system could never have resulted from it. Now this first arrangement was neither the effect of the forces of matter, nor was it essential to matter. . . . Therefore if we would explain the origin of that system without violation of reason, we are forced to say that its first beginning, nebular or otherwise, is due to an intelligent cause.” To this effect he
adds this quotation from Huxley (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, II, 201, 202): “The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe are consequences, and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe.”Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, I translate “Everything in motion is put and kept in motion by another”: such is the sense of St Thomas and of Aristotle. The ab aliohowever is not in Aristotle. His words are: “Everything in motion must be put and kept in motion by something” (Phys. vii, 1); and he adds: “Everything in local motion is moved either by itself or by another” (Physics, vii, 2) Things that had souls he thought were moved by themselves, and especially the heavenly bodies, which were guided by some sort of animating soul in perpetual circular motion. St Thomas (B. III, Chap. LXXXVII, in the Latin) has his doubts as to the heavenly bodies being animated. He considers however (B. III, Chap. LXXXII) “that sublunary bodies are ruled by God through the heavenly bodies.” Taking ‘movement’ for ‘local motion,’ the argument of the Prime Mover, for a modern mind, resolves itself into the question of ‘primitive collocation.’ Some collocation is presupposed to every mechanical problem. ‘Why this collocation rather than that?” is a question answerable only
either by a regressus in infinitum(Q.E.A.) or by an invocation of Mind and Design. The argument however may, avail itself of a wider meaning of motus, namely, change; and contend that, at the back of the changes apparent everywhere, there must he some Changeless Being, author and guide of this changing universe. So presented,it is sometimes called the ‘argument from contingent to necessary being.’

continued below…

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Personally I agree with Rickaby’s final observations above.
Aquinas’s First Way does not hold water if we limit motion to local motion and exclude the other types of motion (i.e. change in quality, quantity or substance). Arguments from local motion always connect to intermediate causal agents that are non-corporeal and hence not in local motion.

This may not have been true for Aristotle who, when speaking of the Celestial Bodies, may well have considered the highest one (the Sun?) to have been “animated” by the “Unmoved Mover” directly. Aquinas does not accept this cosmology and hence “fudges” his shift from Aristotle’s local motion to a more generic concept of “motion”, i.e. “change” due to an agent/efficient cause. I believe the First Way, for moderns, could be better named. Argument from Change? Unchanged Changer?

Would Aristotle accept universal gravitation (unknown to him) as equatable with his non-corporeal Unmoved Mover that moved the outermost celestial sphere (which pulls all the others)? I do not know, though it seems to meet all his requirements re arguments based on local motion alone.

But what about when I drop a cricket ball? What would Aristotle say? I do not know.

Aquinas would no doubt argue that it was my “releasing fingers” that “moved” the cricket ball rather than gravity…which probably sounds strange to a scientist. And I am but a contingent intermediary mover…ultimately caused by God. For Aquinas local motion can never terminate in his Unmoved Mover. The causal chain from local motion always ends up including intermediary agents involved in other types of “motion” (i.e. of quality, quantity or substance).

Maybe I am doing an injustice to Aristotle.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Personally I agree with Rickaby’s final observations above.
Aquinas’s First Way does not hold water if we limit motion to local motion and exclude the other types of motion (i.e. change in quality, quantity or substance). Arguments from local motion always connect to intermediate causal agents that are non-corporeal and hence not in local motion.

This may not have been true for Aristotle who, when speaking of the Celestial Bodies, may well have considered the highest one (the Sun?) to have been “animated” by the “Unmoved Mover” directly. Aquinas does not accept this cosmology and hence “fudges” his shift from Aristotle’s local motion to a more generic concept of “motion”, i.e. “change” due to an agent/efficient cause. I believe the First Way, for moderns, could be better named. Argument from Change? Unchanged Changer?

Would Aristotle accept universal gravitation (unknown to him) as equatable with his non-corporeal Unmoved Mover that moved the outermost celestial sphere (which pulls all the others)? I do not know, though it seems to meet all his requirements re arguments based on local motion alone.

But what about when I drop a cricket ball? What would Aristotle say? I do not know.

Aquinas would no doubt argue that it was my “releasing fingers” that “moved” the cricket ball rather than gravity…which probably sounds strange to a scientist. And I am but a contingent intermediary mover…ultimately caused by God. For Aquinas local motion can never terminate in his Unmoved Mover. The causal chain from local motion always ends up including intermediary agents involved in other types of “motion” (i.e. of quality, quantity or substance).

Maybe I am doing an injustice to Aristotle.

I think the question should be: " have you done justice to Thomas and has Ricaby done justice to Thomas? "

I think Ricaby is wrong. If you read the " Proofs " Thomas uses in S.C.G. and the S. T., you cannot conclude that Thomas’ arguments are dependent on the Ptolomy movement of the Heavens. In the S.C.G. he references them to " cover all bases, " not as proof of anything. And he doesn’t mention them at all in the S.T. So that objection has to be rejected.

Nor is he correct in making Thomas’ arguments dependent on " local motion. " In fact as long as Thomas can prove that there is one change or movement demanding the existence of a First Unmoved and Unmoveable First Mover then he has proven the existence of God. And , per force, if God exists, He is the cause of being and all change and movement of created beings, even of all local motion.

However, ignoring this, the case of local motion is no problem. Why things move locally can only be explained by answering the question, " …what caused them to move?" And this can only be god. Otherwise we are faced with an infinitely long line of moving freight cars, one pulling the other, without any engine providing the moving energy. Obviously, if such a case of local motion existed, its moving cause would have to exist outside the line of moving cars, transcendent to them. For otherwise the cars would not move at all.

And this is the same with any local movement. So any objection based on local movement does not hold. And to intrduce principles of science like gravity, does not prejudice the argument. The underlying principle is that there is ultimately a Prime First Cause of the movement, irregardless of how many instrumental, secondary causes come into play - gravity, magnitism, your hand, your will, etc. Whatever the instrumental cause of the local movement, ultimately the Prime Cause of the movement is God.

FYI, " Aquinas " will be available in a good library, it was available in my local public library. I should certainly be available in a university library.

Also, " An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing " is partially available on google books.

Also, many good books are available for online reading on Gutenberg and Archive.org. I know " A Modern Manual of Scholastic Philosophy ( Vols 1 & 2 ) by Cardinal Mercier is available on Archive.org.

Also, many good philosophy/ theology works are available on " Ite ad Thomam " at iteadthomam.blogspot.com/

Linus2nd

 

[Ismael]

Aquinas would no doubt argue that it was my “releasing fingers” that “moved” the cricket ball rather than gravity…

I am not sure. I think people were aware that things were attracted to the ground.

So they were aware the concept of gravitational force. Of course they were mistaken regarding where it came from and how it worked (Newton partially solved that, then Einstein), so I am not sure if Aquinas would have argued in those terms.

Still it is the opening of the fingers that creates the change and makes the ball fall down (or rather allows)!
Until the fingers move the ball is between two equal and opposite forces, so the net force on the ball is 0. Hence the ball experiences no change (i.e. no acceleration, since a=F/m).

Only when the fingers open one of the forces disappears and the ball can fall.

That there was some ‘actractive force’ between the earth and the rest was always more or ledd obvious… although less obvious was what caused it.

For example SOME Aristotelians though ‘solid objects’ (mainly composed of the earth element) in some way attracted each other (‘like likes like’) and that is why ‘gasses’ (ie smoke, although it’s not really a gas) went ‘up’ because it ‘liked’ air.

They were wrong about planetary motion, since they followed Ptolemaic astronomy, with ‘celestial spheres’ and such.

So the point is that even if an example is physically wrong in someway it can still be very sound methaphysically and it only needs to be ‘adjusted’ to account for a more correct physical explaination.

 

[JDaniel]

Aquinas’s discussion on certainty re the existence of “God” by reason alone in SCG had me thinking.

Aquinas asserts that certain knowledge of a cause can be had (demonstrated) from knowledge of its effects. Aquinas calls such inferences “a posteriori.”
Modern understanding of induction/deduction suggests that such an a posteriori demonstration is in fact inductive.
If the knowledge of the cause is through induction then its truth is only probable (as the case of “William’s Chicken” shows*).

How then can Thomas teach that such knowledge of the existence of God is “certain” rather than “probable”?

• Williams’s Chicken:
  The farmer’s wife comes out the back door every morning to feed grain to her chickens. Hence the chickens come running. After many months she comes out the back door and strangles the first chicken that reaches her. (Unbeknown to the chickens it was Christmas day.)

BlueHorizon:

You are describing a period (of time, perhaps) wherein a questioner’s dialectic is incomplete. No induction in the learned world proceeds without a dialectical plan to guide it. In all such cases, induction affords a proof of the propositions that are ultimately accepted by the mind. Only to the extent that an investigator is still engaged in such a dialectic preliminary to induction, are his conclusions provable but not yet proved. Your argument is a red herring.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Actually I think this falls over re the First Way because we now know Aristotle/Aquinas completely misunderstood a posteriori motion and inertia - at least inso far as they thought they knew about it by observing the world (especially the physical motion of the celestial spheres which this First Way appears to be empirically based upon).

Aquinas thought a body in motion would grind to a halt unless acted upon by an external mover/force. Newtonian physics teaches this is false. An object will remain in motion if left unaided. If it is acted upon it will either accelerate or slow down. A poor choice of worldly analogy/example by Aquinas even if his metaphysical principle is correct.

It seems his philosophic definition of “motion” here (if the principle is correct) then cannot be the same one as that of the celestial spheres.
And if his philosophic motion principle is correct then it must be apriori not aposteriori because his empirical example/induction from which he allegedly derives it actually fails.

BlueHorizon:

Where did you read this stuff?

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

SE yes I agree that “local motion” is, for Aquinas, one of the types of change that his generic definition of “motion” is meant to encompass.

However the observation I am making is that, by doing experiments (ie aposteriori) “local motion” does not in fact inductively prove his bigger philosophic principle of “motion”.

Aquinas thought observation of local motion (the celestial spheres, arrows etc) did support his motion principle.

Does his bigger philosophic principle of “motion” still stand then?
Yes it may well stand in other areas of change - but not when talking about change in speed.

Is his philosophic principle of “motion” proven aposteriori or apriori? I do not know. Induction from local motion appears seriously flawed. His principle of “motion” (as opposed to local motion) may well be justified apriori.

In that case we may as well forget the First Way and deal with the far meatier proofs from contingency and potency/act which are philosophically closer to what he really means than are contradicting laws derived from “local motion.” But I will argue these may be apriori anyway. I believe the whole point of the First Way is to inductively prove the existence of an unmoved mover from aposteriori principles to do with local motion.

What other “motion” examples are there from the real-world if “local motion” falls over?
And are they truly a posteriori?

The attached article deals very thoroughly with possible solutions to this conundrum.
Though I think there are still some holes in the arguments presented.

Blue:

For instance . . .?

God bless,
jd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think Ricaby is wrong. If you read the " Proofs " Thomas uses in S.C.G. and the S. T., you cannot conclude that Thomas’ arguments are dependent on the Ptolomy movement of the Heavens. In the S.C.G. he references them to " cover all bases, " not as proof of anything. And he doesn’t mention them at all in the S.T. So that objection has to be rejected.

I believe the First Way cannot hold if we understand “motion” as solely local motion.
Do you believe Aristotle intended his argument to so stand on local motion alone?
Clearly Aquinas did not, somehing he appears to have become clearer about in the ST some time after SCG.

Re Ptolomy movement of the Heavens - what exact characteristics of this view do you see as salient to Aristotle’s argument (weakening it). Rickaby makes clear he does not believe Aquinas was as strong a believer as Aristotle was in that the Celestial Bodies were moved by a “soul/intelligence”. (Which suggests Aristotle considered the Unmoved Mover to be the "biggest soul? Which, if he was hung up on local motion,…could be an ancient understanding of the property of matter we now call “gravity”.)

Nor is he correct in making Thomas’ arguments dependent on " local motion. " In fact as long as Thomas can prove that there is one change or movement demanding the existence of a First Unmoved and Unmoveable First Mover then he has proven the existence of God. And , per force, if God exists, He is the cause of being and all change and movement of created beings, even of all local motion.

OK, I give you that. But Rickaby actually said it was only “problematic” for Aquinas. And it is. The First Way cannot hold if the chain of instrumental causes is limited to only locally-moved movers. At some point we must link to a mover who is not in local motion. That does not mean we have arrived at the Unmoved-mover. It means the mover is no longer in local-motion but must be “intelligent” (ie a human, angel or … the Unmoved-mover). Aquinas obviously understands motion in its fullest sense.

However, ignoring this, the case of local motion is no problem.

For those not scholastically trained it is indeed a problem sorry.
I could not think of a better name for the First Way than Unmoved Mover if one wanted to unjustifiably destroy Aquinas’s credibility. A paraphrase rather than a transilteration is surely called for: Unchanged Changer?

Thanks for the further references.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I believe the First Way cannot hold if we understand “motion” as solely local motion.
Do you believe Aristotle intended his argument to so stand on local motion alone?
Clearly Aquinas did not, somehing he appears to have become clearer about in the ST some time after SCG.

I don’t think the first way has anything to do with local motion specifically. All Thomas has to do is show that God is the First Unmoved Mover for only one movement/change. From that one, it follows the God is the First Cause of everything because, by defiinition, nothing is beyond God’s reach or causality. But as a matter fact, it don’t think Thomas’ argument fails for local motion. I’m not worried about Aristotle said, I only want to know how Thomas interpreted him.

Re Ptolomy movement of the Heavens - what exact characteristics of this view do you see as salient to Aristotle’s argument (weakening it). Rickaby makes clear he does not believe Aquinas was as strong a believer as Aristotle was in that the Celestial Bodies were moved by a “soul/intelligence”. (Which suggests Aristotle considered the Unmoved Mover to be the "biggest soul? Which, if he was hung up on local motion,…could be an ancient understanding of the property of matter we now call “gravity”.)

Yes, that is what Feser said and the exact reference is in my quotation.

OK, I give you that. But Rickaby actually said it was only “problematic” for Aquinas. And it is. The First Way cannot hold if the chain of instrumental causes is limited to only locally-moved movers. At some point we must link to a mover who is not in local motion. That does not mean we have arrived at the Unmoved-mover. It means the mover is no longer in local-motion but must be “intelligent” (ie a human, angel or … the Unmoved-mover). Aquinas obviously understands motion in its fullest sense

If we do not arrive at a Prime Mover, how does the chain move? The entire chain is of things in potency being moved to act, each moved by something in act, which itsel had been moved from potency to act. If you do not arrive at a mover who is unmoved the chain will not move and this mover being pure act is outside the chain. .

[For those not scholastically trained it is indeed a problem sorry.
I could not think of a better name for the First Way than Unmoved Mover if one wanted to unjustifiably destroy Aquinas’s credibility. A paraphrase rather than a transilteration is surely called for: Unchanged Changer?

Call it the Prime Mover or First Cause if you like.

Try this, read the article on the Cosmological argument at the bottom.
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2012-10-14T22:34:00-07:00&max-results=40&start=50&by-date=false

Also: ewtn.com/library/theology/reality.htm REALITY—A Synthesis Of Thomistic Thought
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.

You need to get " Aquinas " by Feser

You can’t learn Thomas overnight and you will never know everything about him.
I think I understand him fairly well, but I have been at it, on and off, for fifty years and I have a pretty nice library.

Linus2nd

Thanks for the further references.
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[Blue_Horizon]

Quote:

The First Way cannot hold if the chain of instrumental causes is limited to only locally-moved movers. At some point we must link to a mover who is not in local motion. That does not mean we have arrived at the Unmoved-mover. It means the mover is no longer in local-motion but must be “intelligent” (ie a human, angel or … the Unmoved-mover). Aquinas obviously understands motion in its fullest sense

Linus I am not sure I have communicated my concern as your response seems unrelated… Let me try again.

Lets start with an example of local motion. Say, dropping a cricket-ball.
Are you able to show me a chain of efficient causes (that of course ends in an unmoved-mover) that does not involve at least one efficient cause not in local motion.

I maintain it is impossible. At least one of the “movers” in that chain must effect a motion that is not local (which also implies that agent must be an intelligent being).

In this way the existence of God, I believe, cannot be proven by arguments based purely on local motion (ie speed/acceleration) alone.

On another tack I find it interesting that Aristotle’s UnMoved Mover argument was apparantly based more on final causality while Aquina’s equivalent argument was based on efficient causality.

This, it appears, was because Aristotle was rather keen on the principle that all beings (except God) had an inherent “appetite” for their causes. Hence local motion was a very good examplar of this principle… This appetite can be seen at work when a rock is dropped. In this way Aristotle could say that the First Cause was in fact unmoved when causing effects…it was the inherent appetite in the lesser being that wholly caused motion. The First Cause was totally unmoved. (In the case of a stone dropping to earth this is in fact incorrect of course so far as local motion is concerned. The Earth actually lifts slightly to meet the falling stone.)

Aquinas, from my reading, had no problem with also using efficient causality in his arguments for proving the Unmoved Mover. Aquinas srongly maintains that efficient causes never enter into the movement they cause in the moved thing. The cause receives nothing from the effect. Something like a “catalyst” I suppose. I do not know how he proves that principle re efficient causes.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I am not sure. I think people were aware that things were attracted to the ground.

So they were aware the concept of gravitational force. Of course they were mistaken regarding where it came from and how it worked (Newton partially solved that, then Einstein), so I am not sure if Aquinas would have argued in those terms.

Still it is the opening of the fingers that creates the change and makes the ball fall down (or rather allows)!
Until the fingers move the ball is between two equal and opposite forces, so the net force on the ball is 0. Hence the ball experiences no change (i.e. no acceleration, since a=F/m).

Only when the fingers open one of the forces disappears and the ball can fall.

That there was some ‘actractive force’ between the earth and the rest was always more or ledd obvious… although less obvious was what caused it.

For example SOME Aristotelians though ‘solid objects’ (mainly composed of the earth element) in some way attracted each other (‘like likes like’) and that is why ‘gasses’ (ie smoke, although it’s not really a gas) went ‘up’ because it ‘liked’ air.

They were wrong about planetary motion, since they followed Ptolemaic astronomy, with ‘celestial spheres’ and such.

So the point is that even if an example is physically wrong in someway it can still be very sound methaphysically and it only needs to be ‘adjusted’ to account for a more correct physical explaination.

Ismael not quite sure what you are saying…
The chain of motion causality that leads back to God can only thread through my will when my will moved my fingers to let go of the cricket ball.

How would it work otherwise?