Calvinistic Predestination Q&A

[BirdandBee]

I have a question. It may have been asked before.

In Calvinist theology there are two kinds of decrees made by God, right? Those things he wants people to do and those he is saying WILL come to pass. Since humanity is predestined to do evil things, those two decrees are different in content.

Why is that?

 

[Confessor01]

I have a question. It may have been asked before.

In Calvinist theology there are two kinds of decrees made by God, right? Those things he wants people to do and those he is saying WILL come to pass. Since humanity is predestined to do evil things, those two decrees are different in content.

Why is that?

I wouldn’t say there is such a thing as God decreeing that something will come to pass without His actively willing it to occur. That would imply some independent or self-existent nature of created being, which is a contradiction.

The way that God carries out a decree might be passive in some sense (e.g. by allowing an evil person to continue in his sin), but ultimately speaking, all decrees of God must be active (e.g. God has to create, and choose to create, the aforementioned evil person, place him in his environment, etc.).

 

[BirdandBee]

Okay, but that’s not really the meat of my question. What I am asking is: why is what God says he wants people to do (his commandments) different from what he predestines people to do?

 

[Confessor01]

Okay, but that’s not really the meat of my question. What I am asking is: why is what God says he wants people to do (his commandments) different from what he predestines people to do?

Oh, that’s the distinction between God’s decretive and preceptive will. I’m going to copy what I said in this post: There are two aspects of God’s will: His decretive will, or what He decrees to occur, and His preceptive will, or what He commands humans to do. (They are not really separate “wills,” but the term “will” is placed on them.) Scripture speaks of what occurs to be the will of God to refer both to what actually occurs (Acts 4:28; 18:21; Romans 1:10; 9:19; 15:32; Lamentations 3:37; James 4:15), and to what God commands humans to do (Exodus 18:15-16; Mark 3:35; John 7:17; Romans 8:27; 12:2; 2 Corinthians 8:5; 1 Thessalonians 4:3; 5:18; 1 Peter 2:15).

While it is certainly not God’s will that we sin in the preceptive sense, it most definitely is God’s will that we sin in the decretive sense – otherwise no sin would occur. God is sovereign over everything.

 

[BirdandBee]

See, in that post you do point out the problem (or what I see as the problem) of the inconsistency between these two aspects of God’s will. He commands things that he doesn’t predestine. So it seems, at least to me, the uninitiated Catholic outsider, that you have God contradicting himself, saying, “I want this from you, but I’m going to have you do this instead.” Now, I could see this making sense for the reprobate to some extent, but the elect do bad things too, and that I don’t understand, if God is predestining them? Do you at least see my problem here?

 

[Confessor01]

See, in that post you do point out the problem (or what I see as the problem) of the inconsistency between these two aspects of God’s will. He commands things that he doesn’t predestine. So it seems, at least to me, the uninitiated Catholic outsider, that you have God contradicting himself, saying, “I want this from you, but I’m going to have you do this instead.” Now, I could see this making sense for the reprobate to some extent, but the elect do bad things too, and that I don’t understand, if God is predestining them? Do you at least see my problem here?

Well, there’s a problem, but only if you have God’s “will” used in the same sense – e.g. that God wants us not to murder (by precept) in the same sense that He wants a murderer X to murder someone (by decree). In Reformed theology, this is why God’s precepts are not properly termed what He desires to occur, but more what He commands to occur. What God truly desires to occur is what He decrees (cf. Psalm 115:3). The distinction between what the Bible means when it says that God wants something qua precept and when it says that God wants something qua decree is the distinction that avoids the contradiction.

And, either way, as I’ve pointed out, the Bible itself uses “will” in these two senses, so I’m not sure how this is a distinctly Calvinistic issue. The Bible teaches that God both wills sin and does not will sin, and therefore some distinction has to be made to prevent a contradiction.

 

[rtconstant]

Confessor01,

Are your thoughts about Calvinism your own? What I mean is, is this just how you’ve come interpret those teachings through your own study and reasoning? Or, are these the views taught in your denomination? I ask because most Calvinists that I’ve known, typically view double predestination as a pejorative, and reject it. R.C. Sproul rejected the idea of double predestination and referred to its acceptance as “hyper-Calvinism”. Instead he held to a view which I’ve found to be the most common amongst Calvinists. That view is that God simply doesn’t intervene for the non-elect.

You though have embraced with idea of double predestination, and do so unabashedly. I’ve just never personally met a Calvinist who has done that before. Though I do agree with you that your views would be the natural conclusion of the Institutes. So I was just curious if your views are more common than I realized, or if you’re just less shy about “going there”, in your theology?

 

[BirdandBee]

Well, there’s a problem, but only if you have God’s “will” used in the same sense – e.g. that God wants us not to murder (by precept) in the same sense that He wants a murderer X to murder someone (by decree). In Reformed theology, this is why God’s precepts are not properly termed what He desires to occur, but more what He commands to occur. What God truly desires to occur is what He decrees (cf. Psalm 115:3). The distinction between what the Bible means when it says that God wants something qua precept and when it says that God wants something qua decree is the distinction that avoids the contradiction.

I dont really see how that avoids the problem, which as I see it, is this: God decrees that you do X, makes you do not-X, then gets mad because you went against his commands. It’s like creating a puppet that can feel pain but can’t do anything except what you make it do. Then casting it as the bad guy in your puppet show. Then punishing it afterwards. I allow that there may be an answer to this problem, but I can’t understand how anyone could fail to see the problem.

And yes, I know this is a little heavy-handed and a problem restated so often it is almost cliche just to bring up, but for me it is the insurmountable problem of predestination (and by extension, Calvinism).

And, either way, as I’ve pointed out, the Bible itself uses “will” in these two senses, so I’m not sure how this is a distinctly Calvinistic issue. The Bible teaches that God both wills sin and does not will sin, and therefore some distinction has to be made to prevent a contradiction.

My knee-jerk answer to that is God allows human beings to sin despite his commands. He ‘wills’ that they freely obey him. Part of the free will thing donchaknow. The cost of letting your creations learn to love you on their own, or not. But I understand you are not interested in a doctrinal debate and I am trying to avoid one.

 

[Confessor01]

Confessor01,

Are your thoughts about Calvinism your own? What I mean is, is this just how you’ve come interpret those teachings through your own study and reasoning? Or, are these the views taught in your denomination? I ask because most Calvinists that I’ve known, typically view double predestination as a pejorative, and reject it. R.C. Sproul rejected the idea of double predestination and referred to its acceptance as “hyper-Calvinism”. Instead he held to a view which I’ve found to be the most common amongst Calvinists. That view is that God simply doesn’t intervene for the non-elect.

You though have embraced with idea of double predestination, and do so unabashedly. I’ve just never personally met a Calvinist who has done that before. Though I do agree with you that your views would be the natural conclusion of the Institutes. So I was just curious if your views are more common than I realized, or if you’re just less shy about “going there”, in your theology?

Well, there are two senses in which double predestination. Some people use it in the sense that God wills sin in the reprobates in the same way that He wills grace in the elect. This is false and could be called hyper-Calvinism. The other sense is that God decrees reprobation in the same way that He decrees election; this I accept as logical and Biblical.

In other words, there is a distinction between double predestination in terms of decree and double predestination in terms of carrying out the decree. I accept the former and reject the latter. Some Calvinists also reject the former, but I believe they are mistaken. (I think Sproul would fit into this category.)

 

[Confessor01]

I dont really see how that avoids the problem, which as I see it, is this: God decrees that you do X, makes you do not-X, then gets mad because you went against his commands. It’s like creating a puppet that can feel pain but can’t do anything except what you make it do. Then casting it as the bad guy in your puppet show. Then punishing it afterwards. I allow that there may be an answer to this problem, but I can’t understand how anyone could fail to see the problem.

And yes, I know this is a little heavy-handed and a problem restated so often it is almost cliche just to bring up, but for me it is the insurmountable problem of predestination (and by extension, Calvinism).

Well, in that case, it’s not the case that you have a problem with the actual distinction between preceptive and decretive will or with the Reformed understanding of God’s desires. You just don’t like predestination.

My knee-jerk answer to that is God allows human beings to sin despite his commands. Part of the free will thing donchaknow. The cost of letting your creations learn to love you on their own, or not. But I understand you are not interested in a doctrinal debate and I am trying to avoid one.

The thread very quickly turned into debate mode earlier, so you don’t have to withhold anything in that department. But nonetheless, I am trying to end this thread at the moment, so only if you don’t have a debate (1) that you really want to discuss and (2) that has not been discussed earlier in the thread, then you can get started.

 

[rtconstant]

Well, there are two senses in which double predestination. Some people use it in the sense that God wills sin in the reprobates in the same way that He wills grace in the elect. This is false and could be called hyper-Calvinism. The other sense is that God decrees reprobation in the same way that He decrees election; this I accept as logical and Biblical.

In other words, there is a distinction between double predestination in terms of decree and double predestination in terms of carrying out the decree. I accept the former and reject the latter. Some Calvinists also reject the former, but I believe they are mistaken. (I think Sproul would fit into this category.)

First thanks for answering those questions, I would take it then that views on this would range from Calvinist to Calvinist as opposed to denomination to denomination?

You bring up another question for me. I’ve heard you make the distinction between will and decree. Like above you say that God does not will someone one to be a reprobate, but He does decree them to be. Did I state that correctly? If I did, then how is it possible for God to decree that which He does not will? If I’ve completely botched the point you were making let me know.

 

[BirdandBee]

Well, in that case, it’s not the case that you have a problem with the actual distinction between preceptive and decretive will or with the Reformed understanding of God’s desires. You just don’t like predestination.

It’s not just a personal preference. I see a logical inconsistency here. I understand the distinction but not why there has to be a distinction, and the simple act of making the distinction does not seem to make the problem go away. I do not understand why God predestines people to do things he has commanded them not to do, and how he can hold them responsible for that. These are slightly different objections but are related.

The thread very quickly turned into debate mode earlier, so you don’t have to withhold anything in that department. But nonetheless, I am trying to end this thread at the moment, so only if you don’t have a debate (1) that you really want to discuss and (2) that has not been discussed earlier in the thread, then you can get started.

Well, ok. I am sure this is not a new topic, and I am afraid it will continue into a debate if I keep on in this same manner. So this will be my last post.

 

[Confessor01]

First thanks for answering those questions, I would take it then that views on this would range from Calvinist to Calvinist as opposed to denomination to denomination?

I’m not sure. . .at the moment I do not know if any denominations take a particular stand on the issue. It might be the case that the Reformed confessions already take a stand on it.

You bring up another question for me. I’ve heard you make the distinction between will and decree. Like above you say that God does not will someone one to be a reprobate, but He does decree them to be. Did I state that correctly? If I did, then how is it possible for God to decree that which He does not will? If I’ve completely botched the point you were making let me know.

I wouldn’t say it’s between “will” and “decree,” since “will” does not conclusively refer to God’s will decretively speaking or preceptively speaking. Usually, when referring to God’s decretive will, I will talk about what He decrees, and usually when referring to God’s preceptive will, I will talk about what He commands. What God wills is in Scripture used to signify either of those, hence the need for the distinction.

Now using the altered terminology, I would say that God decrees someone to be a reprobate, but still commands him to repent (it is still his duty). (It is not within someone’s ability to reprobate themselves, and therefore it would be wrong to say that God commands someone not to be a reprobate.)

---

It’s not just a personal preference. I see a logical inconsistency here. I understand the distinction but not why there has to be a distinction, and the simple act of making the distinction does not seem to make the problem go away. I do not understand why God predestines people to do things he has commanded them not to do, and how he can hold them responsible for that. These are slightly different objections but are related.

Well, I’ve attempted at answering your bolded objection at least, so it would be helpful if you point out a particular problem with my defense in that arena, rather than just state that I have a logical inconsistency.

Regarding your underlined objection, my general means of defending that is by (1) showing the impossibility of free will, which is being attempted in this thread, and (2) shooting down all objections to the compatibility of human responsibility and theological determinism, usually because such objections beg the question.

 

[BirdandBee]

The problem is that you defined the difference between the two sorts of will but did not explain why the one contradicts the other, which I see happening.

God commands X, predestines man to do not-X, and holds man responsible for this wrongdoing, as I said. Putting aside the responsibility thing for a moment, God is seen here acting contrary to his own stated desire: that man do X. And nothing in your explanation makes this problem go away, because you did not really address the problem. How are the two wills not in tension? How can they be in tension without our whole conception of God becoming incoherent? You say they are not literally two wills but then proceed to treat them like they are. Why is God going against his own stated goals? I never see this addressed.

 

[Chiral]

I just now noticed that the KJV does not have quotation marks, …the NIV, NASB, and ESV, all have them. Even if they don’t have the marks, I think it is still the case that verse 10 is talking about the people, since it refers to the people in the third, rather than second, person. If Isaiah were talking directly to the people he would be using second person, which is why other versions did not use quotation marks there.

Hmm, now I see why you interpret it that way, although it would be nice if someone with knowledge of the original text would comment here - quotation marks are easy to mis-translate into a text… in the meantime, I concede the matter of 2 statements.

I’m not concerned at all presently with the issue of how God carries out this command, whether it be by bestowing the power on Isaiah directly, or some other option. I am merely concerned with the intent of God as expressed through His angel in vv. 9-10.

This is why I am concerned with the motive behind God’s intention. Why would God so curse His chosen people? Merely for His pleasure? Didn’t they freely do anything to warrant His wrath? Not to side-track you too much, but this is also a concern with the story of the Flood. If God ever wreaks havoc on the minds or freedoms of human beings, mightn’t it be wise to seek to understand the cause? Secondly, the mechanism of carrying out such an act, namely exerting irresistible control over the free will of another being OR employing another method (such as the denial of His freely given Grace on account of the object’s detestable actions/choices) really does come into play.
So now that I see why you read it that way, explain why it denies free will (verses another simple and popular interpretation…?

Now, onto the coin flipping and the statistical fallacy of the “gambler’s bet” you have fallen into…

 

[Chiral]

I’m not sure what you mean by an “empirically based assumption,”… For now, I’ll just say this: the chance of a coin landing on heads is (1/2), and the chance of its landing on heads twice consecutively is (1/2)^2, thrice is (1/2)^3… If we were to take (1/2)^(infinity) then we would have zero. True, for every individual flip, the chance is (1/2). But we are dealing not with individual flips, but with an extremely large collection of them.
Of course, as you are pointing out above, one error with this is that an actual infinity will never actually be reached; it will be ever increasing but never actually complete (as you demonstrated with asymptotes, etc.). But this is not a problem, in my estimation, for my argument. For given any probability of sinning, it follows that there must be some point at which the sin is extremely likely to occur. Even if you want to make the probability (1/10^(10^(10^10))) – or a trillion trillion trillion times smaller than that – there is some point along an everlasting timeline at which sinning becomes extremely probable.
For instance, if we take the probability of landing a coin on heads three consecutive times, we can say that given eight flips, it is reasonable to say that it will occur once (though not necessary); given fifty flips, it is even more reasonable to say that it will occur at least once (though not necessary); given a trillion flips, it is quite close to a guarantee (though not necessary) that it will occur at least once.
Likewise, given any probability of sinning – even the outrageously small probability given above – and a neverending duration of time, there will be some point at which it is a near guarantee that sinning will occur, such that it’d be absurd to deny its occurrence. However, as you pointed out, it is false for me to say that it is actually necessary, because it is never the case that the everlasting duration is complete. But I believe that by lowering my argument’s claims slightly, it becomes sound and much more convincing…

Okay, everyone should be taught this before reaching legal gambling age - the above statement is a fallacy, “sounds convincing” but fails. I will try to explain:

1. Why is the probability of flipping “heads” 3x in a row 1/(2^3)? Because there are exactly 8 logically possible results and 3 “heads” is one of them. Note, this does not make it reasonable to assume you will get this result if you flip the coin 8x - that is an empirically based assumption (i.e. it requires experience for justification). There are 8 possible outcomes, each with a 1 in 8 chance of occurring. When you look at a collection of flips rather than at each individual flip, you are looking at a singular event which is not equivalent.
   Flip the coin x10^20 - there are 2^(10^20) possible outcomes, each with a probability of 1/(2^(10^20))… flip the coin x(N) and take N to infinity - now there are 2^N possible outcomes each with a 1/(2^N) probability! Statistically, the probability of each outcome is estimably 0%, yet an outcome is logically necessary and therefore 100%!!! So with a 0% chance of the occurrence of an event, an event is logically 100% probable. Neat, huh?
   You argue that the probability of alternate results to all “heads” is (2^N)-1)]/(2^N), yes? Simplified, the probability is [1 - (1/2^N)], and taken to infinity the equation simplifies to 1 - 0 = 1, giving a nearly 100% probability, “guaranteeing” an alternate result. So, if you’ve flipped 100 “heads” in a row (1/[2^100] chance), would you bet on “tails” or “heads” next? Are your chances of being right calculated as (2^100 -1)/(2^100)? NO! The probability is 50:50, every time you flip regardless of the collective probability because the actual event itself (coin-flip) is bivalent, i.e. there are 2 possible outcomes, each 50% probable! Do you think just because you haven’t gotten “tails” yet that one is “due”?? Collectively, you’d be right; but not logically due to the nature of each individual event. And heck, if I had to bet, I’d go with the same result that has occurred the last however-many times. The statistician would also look at the results and say, “Hmm, after 10^20 flips the same result has occurred each time - perhaps the alternate is impossible!” and then he would guarantee “heads”, but he’d be wrong, because the next flip might be “tails”!
   Now, given a free soul in eternity, who may be (like us here) increasingly less likely to sin with each good choice (say each choice makes him 50% less likely to sin the next time), is there ever a time when it is logically impossible for him to sin (since the graph of events in time continues upward to infinity against likelihood of sin)? No. Is it logically necessary for him to sin even if the probability remains (50:50) with each choice? No. Draw the graphs, and don’t try to consider a set of individual events as a singularity.

 

[Chiral]

Calling God good is a metaphor? What’s the metaphor a metaphor of?

The metaphor is anthropomorphic - we call God good because we understand how humans can be good or bad, and thus we talk as if God were one of His creations and could be judged as we can. To talk about omnibenevolence, we begin with mere benevolence and then extrapolate, the same with all the other omni’s. See what I mean?

That might be acceptable, but when generally understood the doctrine of heaven has insisted that no one falls from it. Is there anything in the Catholic Church’s teaching on whether saints can (or do) fall from glory?

I believe our doctrine is similar, but more for the logical reasons I gave, that to sin in heaven would admit a logical contradiction, rather than that individuals in heaven are intrinsically unable to sin. Is this distinction clear? That said, there is some Church teaching regarding the fall of Lucifer, but someone else on this forum would be better suited to answer that. (sorry, I’m more logic than doctrinal in my learning)

How does God, in your view, make prophecies and understand time?

Others have already described this to you via the analogy of God looking at space-time as if it were a calendar or a line already drawn - since He is outside of time, all time to Him is the present, so when He delivers a message of future events, He is stating what we might say He has already done, but in reality it is something He is presently doing, and that goes for past-events as well. When we say “God did X”, reality is that “God is doing X in the past”; and “God will do Y” is “God is doing Y in the future”. Make sense?

 

[Chiral]

(I am SO far behind )

Every effect does have some sufficient cause for it, whether it be a conjunction of many lesser causes or not. But this is not my contention anyway. I am concerned with what Paul means when he says that God “chose” us, when by “us” he is referring to the elect, those who have themselves chosen God in some way or another. How are these choices related?
One thing I dislike is when people believe that God’s choice of His elect and His elect’s choice of Him are causally related in some manner, but to avoid the implication from that relation that either Calvinistic predestination is true or God is entirely contingent on human choices, they say that the two choices, though causally related, are simultaneous. Whenever this is said, this is nonsense: it implies that either both are causes (with no effects), or both are effects (with no causes). Whenever two things are causally related, by definition one must be the cause and the other the effect; simultaneity is an impossible third option. Therefore, if you have some other understanding of the simultaneity of God’s choice of His elect and His elect’s choice of Him, I want to ensure that it is not this unacceptable hypothesis of causal simultaneity.
With God’s and the elect’s choices, we have two parties who choose each other specifically: the God choose only His elect and His elect choose only Him. If you want to say that God chooses you in the sense that He gives you the options to choose Him or something else, then God is not choosing you specifically. In this case, then, you have to account for the texts which say that God “chose us,” which certainly signifies a very particular choice made by God, and then explain how this is causally related to the fact that the elect themselves choose God (and only God).

When we were discussing causation with regard to will and simultaneity, we were not discussing man choosing God vs Him choosing us, but rather the choice in particular individual events of the will. “Whenever two things are causally related, by definition one must be the cause and the other the effect” is false because it eliminates the possibility of a third thing, namely the effect of simultaneous causes. For example, an ovum and fetus are causally related, but the ovum is insufficient to cause the fetus; similarly, an ovum and sperm are causally related, but each is insufficient to cause the other. Do you see your mistake?
I would not employ notions of simultaneity in regard to who chose whom first since God is eternal and chose to make each of us in turn before we ever had the power of freedom to turn to Him in gratitude. Other than the freedom part, I think we’d both agree that God first chooses us, which is part of the doctrine of sola gratia that we prolly both accept. What we also both accept is that God’s grace is given specifically as you contend, but you believe He gives it only to certain people (the elect) whereas Catholics hold that while He is free to give or withhold, He indeed freely gives His grace to all people, each individual specifically, and each individual is likewise free to accept or refuse the specific gift he has been offered. Mikeledes and the others here have probably already explained the Scriptures you refer to where Paul does not make this clear… that’s probably where the discussion stands at the moment (my being so late to reply, sorry).

 

[rtconstant]

I’m not sure. . .at the moment I do not know if any denominations take a particular stand on the issue. It might be the case that the Reformed confessions already take a stand on it.

Good enough.

I wouldn’t say it’s between “will” and “decree,” since “will” does not conclusively refer to God’s will decretively speaking or preceptively speaking. Usually, when referring to God’s decretive will, I will talk about what He decrees, and usually when referring to God’s preceptive will, I will talk about what He commands. What God wills is in Scripture used to signify either of those, hence the need for the distinction.

OK, thanks for clarifying your use of the above terms that is very helpful.

Now using the altered terminology, I would say that God decrees someone to be a reprobate, but still commands him to repent (it is still his duty). (It is not within someone’s ability to reprobate themselves, and therefore it would be wrong to say that God commands someone not to be a reprobate.)

So then, in your view, God desires or wants (command) all to repent, but He may make someone not repent (decree). Correct? In an earlier post you said that you did not believe that a person could do something contrary to their desires. Would not the above separation suggest that God is doing that very thing?

 

[Confessor01]

God commands X, predestines man to do not-X, and holds man responsible for this wrongdoing, as I said. Putting aside the responsibility thing for a moment, God is seen here acting contrary to his own stated desire: that man do X. And nothing in your explanation makes this problem go away, because you did not really address the problem. How are the two wills not in tension? How can they be in tension without our whole conception of God becoming incoherent? You say they are not literally two wills but then proceed to treat them like they are. Why is God going against his own stated goals? I never see this addressed.

First, this same objection could be launched against any free-willist view of God, because He created the universe either way with the knowledge that many sins would occur.

Second, here is the distinction that avoids the contradiction: It is not the case that God desires sin to occur in the same sense that He desires sin not to occur. The former represents more strongly what He wants to occur in order to bring about His plans on earth, thereby glorifying Himself and leading to the good of those who love Him. The latter represents not exactly what He wants but what is consistent or inconsistent with His moral character, and is in that sense what He “wills” or does not “will.”

---

This is why I am concerned with the motive behind God’s intention. Why would God so curse His chosen people? Merely for His pleasure?

Asking questions about God’s “chosen people,” without explaining what exactly you mean by “chosen people,” can be hazardous to understanding the text. Israel was God’s chosen people in one sense (that they received all His temporal blessings, including the preaching of the Gospel, the Temple worship, etc.) and the remnant in Israel was God’s chosen people in another (that they were imparted regeneration, faith, etc.). [In fact, this is the intention of Romans 9: “For not all who are descended from Israel are Israel,” but I only make this in passing.]

Now, God has promised to His chosen people in the latter sense (i.e., the elect) that He will work for their good in all that He does, but He has not promised such magnanimous blessings upon His chosen people in the former sense – in fact, He often cursed the people of Israel and brought disaster upon them for their apostasy. Consequently, it should be pretty easy to see – especially given God’s dealings with Israel in the past – that there is no contradiction with God callousing the hearts of His chosen people.

Didn’t they freely do anything to warrant His wrath?

I think the fact that this callousing of their hearts is for the purpose of denying them repentance should be more important, for it is not unlikely that these people did something wicked to deserve punishment. But nonetheless we see God acting towards their destruction by denying them repentance.

This shows that forgiveness of sins is not something that is “within reach” of everyone no matter what they do or that everyone has some innate capacity to accept the universal, prevenient grace of God. Rather, it is wholly dependent on the sovereign grace of God. This doesn’t change the fact that the Gospel is to be preached indiscriminately to many, but it nonetheless does explain what is actually occurring when that Gospel is being preached.

Now, onto the coin flipping and the statistical fallacy of the “gambler’s bet” you have fallen into…

The gambler’s fallacy is not what I am currently utilizing. That would be saying (e.g.) that if some event E has a 10% chance of occurring, and over 10 events have passed without E’s occurring, then E is more likely to occur in subsequent attempts. That is not my argument. I, on the other hand, am treating heaven as one singular event. I am not saying that as more time passes, sin becomes more likely than whatever probability it is (that would be the fallacy); I am rather taking the perspective from the beginning and giving the probability for the entire series taken as a whole. This is not the gambler’s fallacy.

I might have misstated myself because I was not trying to phrase my words so as to preclude a “gambler’s fallacy” interpretation, and in that case I apologize. But please recognize that the gambler’s fallacy is not what my argument is employing.

Apparently there is a problem with my framing the problem this way, as you said the following:

Is it logically necessary for him to sin even if the probability remains (50:50) with each choice? No. Draw the graphs, and don’t try to consider a set of individual events as a singularity.

However, I do not see why. If I can argue that it is extremely likely that a coin will land on heads at least once if a coin is flipped a trillion times, then certainly I can say that a sin is extremely likely if the occasions for sinning are as high a number as you’d like, no matter what the percentage chance is for sinning (so long as it’s not zero). And given an extremely likely chance for every person in heaven, well, the chances aren’t looking too good for the saints.

Also, you remarked in the above quote that I am arguing for logical necessity, which I have already conceded is not true, by virtue of the fact that an actual infinite cannot occur to completion. I am arguing for an extremely high probability

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