Calvinistic Predestination Q&A

[Confessor01]

(continued from above)

I believe our doctrine is similar, but more for the logical reasons I gave, that to sin in heaven would admit a logical contradiction, rather than that individuals in heaven are intrinsically unable to sin. Is this distinction clear?

I do not think the distinction is cogent. When heaven is discussed and the contradiction between sinning and being in heaven is established, it is not at all implied that this contradiction exists because all sinners are thrown out of heaven. Rather, the contradiction is meant to say that there will not possibly be any sinners in heaven in the first place – not only that no sin will be present in heaven (because sinners will be thrown out), but also that every single person will not sin in the first place.

Others have already described this to you via the analogy of God looking at space-time as if it were a calendar or a line already drawn - since He is outside of time, all time to Him is the present, so when He delivers a message of future events, He is stating what we might say He has already done, but in reality it is something He is presently doing, and that goes for past-events as well. When we say “God did X”, reality is that “God is doing X in the past”; and “God will do Y” is “God is doing Y in the future”. Make sense?

Really, I shouldn’t have even asked the question concerning time and God as it detracts from the issue, viz. concerning how two events can be causally related and yet simultaneous (discussed below). For now, I’ll accept that view of God and time, though I will personally give more thought on the issue.

“Whenever two things are causally related, by definition one must be the cause and the other the effect” is false because it eliminates the possibility of a third thing, namely the effect of simultaneous causes.

Implied in “whenever two things are causally related” is “whenever only two things are causally related.” (I apologize if this implication was unclear.) As a result, I don’t believe your objection is legitimate.

I would not employ notions of simultaneity in regard to who chose whom first since God is eternal and chose to make each of us in turn before we ever had the power of freedom to turn to Him in gratitude.

How does this comport with the notion that God “chose us before the foundation of the world”? More importantly, if He had to wait to see what we might do with the gift, then doesn’t that imply a logical priority of human choice over divine choice?

Other than the freedom part, I think we’d both agree that God first chooses us, which is part of the doctrine of sola gratia that we prolly both accept. What we also both accept is that God’s grace is given specifically as you contend, but you believe He gives it only to certain people (the elect) whereas Catholics hold that while He is free to give or withhold, He indeed freely gives His grace to all people, each individual specifically, and each individual is likewise free to accept or refuse the specific gift he has been offered.

I have a few questions regarding this:

(1) If you believe that it is within God’s rights to withhold grace to whomever, then why do you find the fact that God does so, according to Reformed theology, to be hateful? (If you don’t think that, then I apologize for assuming you did.)
(2) Do you believe sola gratia implies the total sufficiency of grace in salvation? If so, why is human cooperation also seen as necessary? If not, do you believe John 6:39, 44 teach the sufficiency and necessity of grace?
(3) If God chooses us first, then is there really no particularity implied in “God chose us before the foundations of the world”? If God freely gives grace to all people, and only those who choose Him back (by cooperating with His grace) are saved, then does that imply that God’s choice of the redeemed is not particular at all (and actually, ineffectual)?

Lastly, don’t worry at all about the later replies. I especially have no room for complaint, as this is going to be my last reply for the day.

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So then, in your view, God desires or wants (command) all to repent, but He may make someone not repent (decree). Correct? In an earlier post you said that you did not believe that a person could do something contrary to their desires. Would not the above separation suggest that God is doing that very thing?

First, I’d say that what God decrees more accurately expresses His desires than what He commands. So His decreeing sin would not be contrary to His desires in this respect.

Second, I do not know if a compatibilist model of freedom would fit for God at all. He’s the Creator and could have some totally different structure than anything we can imagine at the moment.

Alright, later gents. I’ll talk to ya tomorrow.

 

[BirdandBee]

First, this same objection could be launched against any free-willist view of God, because He created the universe either way with the knowledge that many sins would occur.

Granted. I don’t believe in Libertarian free will, actually. I’m not sure where I stand, but neither explanation really lines up with my experiences or understanding of God and scripture.

Second, here is the distinction that avoids the contradiction: It is not the case that God desires sin to occur in the same sense that He desires sin not to occur. The former represents more strongly what He wants to occur in order to bring about His plans on earth, thereby glorifying Himself and leading to the good of those who love Him. The latter represents not exactly what He wants but what is consistent or inconsistent with His moral character, and is in that sense what He “wills” or does not “will.”

You seem to be saying that God is inconsistent with his moral character, which I find an astonishing claim. That said, it is a good explanation. Thanks.

 

[paul_c]

Ben:
We agree that the entire discussion of Calvinistic vs Catholic predestination is a function of our vision of Man.

The Catholic Vision of Man is that every man has been given at least 4 gifts: life, Free will, reason, conscience and through baptism a 5th can be recieved: Grace.

Scripture focuses on the free will choices given man and the ramifications of those choices. We are exhorted to follow the ten commandments and to love God and neighbor.and warned that the wages of sin is death. We are told repeatedly that life is a test and that we will be judged on our actions. We are given multiple versions of Christian morality: the ten commandments, the beatitudes, the Sermon on the Mount. Paul lays out in several of his Epistles direction on how to live the Christian life.

Now, logically, why would the Bible put these choices before us, if we really had no choice at all? Why bother to explain the choices and ramifications, if our free will was illusionary and that nothing we did mattered in the grand scheme of things because everything was decided? How could we be judged, if we had no choice in our actions? Why would we need a conscience to direct our actions? Why would we need reason, if there were no ramifications to what we do. Wouldn’t instinct be enough?

I understand the humility in ascribing everything to God but at the same time, this view that God could not plan with Man’s free will in mind sells God short. He is, after all omnipotent and omniscient. Through God’s absolute love for us, he gave us the gifts described above. He made us all value our freedom for a reason. Its one of his great gifts.
He gave us reason and conscience to make use of this freedom. He also gives us the grace to seek him and his only begotten son to teach us and to lay down his life for us,as a sacrifice, as proof of his divinity and as an example to us . He made our lives count and gave us he ultimate motivation to do his will: if we do, we will share eternity with him in heaven and if we don’t, we will be exiled to hell. Remember, in Genesis 1, we are told that God made man in his own image and likeness. We are truly independent beings with choices and responsibilities and those choices and responsibilities have ramifications.

So please, Ben, explain how Calvinism can deny these truths about man and claim that there is no free will. What am I missing?

 

[Chiral]

Asking questions about God’s “chosen people,” without explaining what exactly you mean by “chosen people,” can be hazardous to understanding the text. Israel was God’s chosen people in one sense (that they received all His temporal blessings, including the preaching of the Gospel, the Temple worship, etc.) and the remnant in Israel was God’s chosen people in another (that they were imparted regeneration, faith, etc.). [In fact, this is the intention of Romans 9: “For not all who are descended from Israel are Israel,” but I only make this in passing.]
Now, God has promised to His chosen people in the latter sense (i.e., the elect) that He will work for their good in all that He does, but He has not promised such magnanimous blessings upon His chosen people in the former sense – in fact, He often cursed the people of Israel and brought disaster upon them for their apostasy. Consequently, it should be pretty easy to see – especially given God’s dealings with Israel in the past – that there is no contradiction with God callousing the hearts of His chosen people.

My apologies, by “chosen people” I do in fact mean “chosen race” and not “chosen individuals”, but we seem to understand one another. And now you have given the reason - “for their apostasy” - God makes a covenant with them, then punishes the individuals who silently or actively consent to the breaking of the convenant - that is the reason, and you have been aware of it all along. (Now I suppose you’ll deny it?)

I think the fact that this callousing of their hearts is for the purpose of denying them repentance should be more important, for it is not unlikely that these people did something wicked to deserve punishment. But nonetheless we see God acting towards their destruction by denying them repentance.
This shows that forgiveness of sins is not something that is “within reach” of everyone no matter what they do or that everyone has some innate capacity to accept the universal, prevenient grace of God. Rather, it is wholly dependent on the sovereign grace of God. This doesn’t change the fact that the Gospel is to be preached indiscriminately to many, but it nonetheless does explain what is actually occurring when that Gospel is being preached.

The likelihood that the people “deserve” punishment is exactly the point of importance! It suggests that God does not punish people for what He made them do but for what they themselves did independently of His action. It in now way denies the presence of free will or the open gift of God’s grace but rather defends them, for it shows in real danger in not turning to God immediately! This is exciting, you’ve found an excellent Biblical example of how people could miss out on salvation entirely despite His ever-enduring mercy! Neat. Lastly, we agree on the necessity of grace, just not your suggestion that its action is irresistible. This verse does not suggest that it is, only that without it we are lost.

The gambler’s fallacy is not what I am currently utilizing. That would be saying (e.g.) that if some event E has a 10% chance of occurring, and over 10 events have passed without E’s occurring, then E is more likely to occur in subsequent attempts. That is not my argument. I, on the other hand, am treating heaven as one singular event. I am not saying that as more time passes, sin becomes more likely than whatever probability it is (that would be the fallacy); I am rather taking the perspective from the beginning and giving the probability for the entire series taken as a whole. This is not the gambler’s fallacy.

Cool! There’s a wiki-link to it! We always just called it that in highschool, I guess we weren’t alone And yes, that is still the “gamblers fallacy”, because the entire series can never be taken as a whole, for one; and also because of the mathematical equations I presented to you, (2^N)-1]/(2^N) for a sequence and 1/2 for the event itself. If you separate the two, you have fallen into the fallacy.

…If I can argue that it is extremely likely that a coin will land on heads at least once if a coin is flipped a trillion times, then certainly I can say that a sin is extremely likely if the occasions for sinning are as high a number as you’d like, no matter what the percentage chance is for sinning (so long as it’s not zero). And given an extremely likely chance for every person in heaven, well, the chances aren’t looking too good for the saints.
Also, you remarked in the above quote that I am arguing for logical necessity, which I have already conceded is not true, by virtue of the fact that an actual infinite cannot occur to completion. I am arguing for an extremely high probability

My apologies, I recall the concession, I brought in logical necessity again in order to emphasize the difference between a logician and a statistician, the former basing his conclusion on the nature of an independent event vs the latter basing it on the predicted activity of the object over a series of events. You can argue that a coin flipped a trillion times will very likely give at least 1 alternate result, and with regard to souls in heaven that is probably Satan’s bet as well, but that is what really makes a saint, isn’t it? One who consistently chooses not to sin despite the efforts of the devil. You have basically proved the perseverance of the saints! God: “Do you reject Satan and all his works and all his empty promises”, Saint: “I do, forever.”, the angels: “Amen.” :getholy:

 

[Chiral]

(continued from above)
I do not think the distinction is cogent. When heaven is discussed and the contradiction between sinning and being in heaven is established, it is not at all implied that this contradiction exists because all sinners are thrown out of heaven. Rather, the contradiction is meant to say that there will not possibly be any sinners in heaven in the first place – not only that no sin will be present in heaven (because sinners will be thrown out), but also that every single person will not sin in the first place.

Yes, I agree with you, but my point was that the saints in heaven do not sin not because they lack the ability but rather because it would violate the definition of heaven as a place where no one sins - no one sins in heaven because it is logically impossible based on the definition. If this were not part of the definition, then it would indeed be logically possible; but since it is part of heaven and also free will exists, then the very act of sinning would equal expulsion from heaven by the demands of logic. Then, if you regard heaven as a place within time and said that its occupants could never sin, the expulsion would take place instantly because (as I have been trying to make clear in another thread) what is true later on is also true beforehand, and logic must be satisfied. This explanation my only confuse you more, but the immutability of truth and the nature of heaven are not simple concepts

Really, I shouldn’t have even asked the question concerning time and God as it detracts from the issue, viz. concerning how two events can be causally related and yet simultaneous (discussed below). For now, I’ll accept that view of God and time, though I will personally give more thought on the issue.

Awesome - through grace and the God-given power of reason (which you certainly have), the investigation will not be poor use of time.

Implied in “whenever two things are causally related” is “whenever only two things are causally related.” (I apologize if this implication was unclear.) As a result, I don’t believe your objection is legitimate.

Nono, I realized the implication of your argument, I was trying to point out that you have no reason to suppose that the full causal relationship includes only those two elements - you assume that it does and thereby imprint the most reasonable orientation on the two things before you… but you may not sufficiently understand either of the two things and that is why you missed the third part of the causal relationship.
To illustrate, western science previously contended that the male human was sufficient for reproduction, that he created the sperm which itself contained the humunculus, and the female was only necessary to provide food and shelter for the developing creature. Thus, the man was the cause and the baby the effect… but they failed to grasp the full reality of the event and later came to realize the biological necessity of the female’s ovum and a better understanding of the sperm (no more humunculus). Does this help?

How does this comport with the notion that God “chose us before the foundation of the world”? More importantly, if He had to wait to see what we might do with the gift, then doesn’t that imply a logical priority of human choice over divine choice?

Well, if He had to “wait” it might, but he didn’t because He is outside of time! ( Back to that again) - All things and times are present to God.

I have a few questions regarding this:
(1) If you believe that it is within God’s rights to withhold grace to whomever, then why do you find the fact that God does so, according to Reformed theology, to be hateful? (If you don’t think that, then I apologize for assuming you did.)
(2) Do you believe sola gratia implies the total sufficiency of grace in salvation? If so, why is human cooperation also seen as necessary? If not, do you believe John 6:39, 44 teach the sufficiency and necessity of grace?
(3) If God chooses us first, then is there really no particularity implied in “God chose us before the foundations of the world”? If God freely gives grace to all people, and only those who choose Him back (by cooperating with His grace) are saved, then does that imply that God’s choice of the redeemed is not particular at all (and actually, ineffectual)?

(1) We (well, I) find it hateful if God does not provide us the opportunity to accept grace, i.e. He does not offer it ever or has not endowed us each with the power (freedom) to accept or reject it (i.e. He has decreed that we will reject it rather than prophesying our rejection of it). This is why we (well, I) hold the Reformed Theology (as you have clarified it) to be logically untenable with regard to justice and morality and my belief in an omnibenevolent creator God. I understand that Calvinist may correctly see God as the source of all justice and goodness, and therefore He cannot (logically) fail to even transcend the pinnacle of either of these. But their (er, your) view of free will (as we understand it through our human experience and Biblical support) as an illusion or mistake negates the logic of justice and morality all on its own, turning God into Chaos itself or into what Descartes would call an evil genius or deceiver. I don’t mean to sound offensive, just answering from the heart with only the information you have presented as to your position. (continued on next post)

 

[Chiral]

(Continued from previous post)
(2) Oh, I love that chapter! And no, i don’t believe it teaches the “sufficiency” of grace -
35Then Jesus declared, "I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will never go hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty. 36But as I told you, you have seen me and still you do not believe. 37All that the Father gives me will come to me, and whoever comes to me I will never drive away. 38For I have come down from heaven not to do my will but to do the will of him who sent me. 39And this is the will of him who sent me, that I shall lose none of all that he has given me, but raise them up at the last day… …44"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up at the last day.
Verse 44 shows the necessity of grace, and verse 39 shows that it is God’s will that salvation be the reward for accepting grace… but it does not say that none will be lost, only that Jesus Himself will never drive them away. I suppose this is where we differ on which understanding of God’s “will” is meant - has God decreed that none shall be lost or desire that none shall be lost?
Anyway, the chapter is awesome because it goes on to expound on the truth and importance of the Eucharist, but that is a discussion for another thread
3) My understanding of God “choosing” people with regard to dispensing grace is that it is always particular, i.e. it is always personal and specific to the individual, but that He does this “generally” in that He excludes no individual person from the offer. Thus, His grace effects faith in the redeemed through their free acceptance thereof (like a child letting his father help him swing the bat to hit the ball off the tee); but those who choose not to accept His grace (the stubborn “i can do it by myself” child who really can’t) prevent the effect, yes (that’s a lot of power in our puny mortal hands, isn’t it?). Thus, faith is the effect of grace but only through acceptance by the free agent.

 

[Confessor01]

So please, Ben, explain how Calvinism can deny these truths about man and claim that there is no free will. What am I missing?

When I deny free will, I am not denying man’s freedom, but rather disagreeing with a specific notion of freedom, philosophical libertarianism, often assumed as the correct view simply because experience furnishes us with the information that there is some sense in which we have the ability to do otherwise. That said, I think I’ve certainly done plenty at this point to make my case for the compatibility of moral responsibility and theological determinism, mostly in this thread, specifically in and around this post.

Frankly, if the case can be made that (1) libertarianism (free will) is impossible and (2) all objections to the incompatibility of determinism and responsibility are shot down, then there is no logical problem at all with my understanding, and consequently the only objections that could be raised against it are emotional or personal, expressing nothing more than a preferential distaste, e.g. “I can’t imagine God doing such a thing.” I might compare this to the issue of un/limited atonement. Some Arminians think that Jesus dying only for His elect is mean or wrong, and they might hold that unlimited atonement, while it might have its paradoxes (read: contradictions), is the “nicer” and therefore more loving, and therefore Biblical, doctrine. On the contrary, I would contend that it has severe logical problems and that any matters of preference or dislike are problems in us and not problems in God.

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My apologies, by “chosen people” I do in fact mean “chosen race” and not “chosen individuals”, but we seem to understand one another. And now you have given the reason - “for their apostasy” - God makes a covenant with them, then punishes the individuals who silently or actively consent to the breaking of the convenant - that is the reason, and you have been aware of it all along. (Now I suppose you’ll deny it?)

First, I don’t appreciate it when you say things such as, “Now I suppose you’ll deny it?”, as it implies that (1) I am wrong, (2) I know I am wrong, and (3) I am dishonest in dealing with my knowledge that I am wrong. Even if all three of those things are true, it still doesn’t warrant your saying them. Please refrain from such statements.

Second, the fact that they are guilty of something is totally irrelevant to the discussion, for the entire point is that God is ordaining that they not repent of their wrongdoing and acting towards that end. Your argument would hold up only if it could be established that they blasphemed the Holy Spirit (the unforgivable sin), in which case the onus is on you. And even if that could be established, you would still have to explain if these Israelites would be held responsible for failing to repent – because if they were, then you’d be conceding that morality and determinism are compatible, and if they weren’t, then you would have to explain how God would not hold someone responsible for such a grievous offense. Even if you could establish those two things above, you would have to explain why God would still keep them from repentance, considering that the unforgivable sin is supposed to be performed by those people who are too seared and hardened by sin to repent in the first place, e.g. those demonic Pharisees.

You can argue that a coin flipped a trillion times will very likely give at least 1 alternate result, and with regard to souls in heaven that is probably Satan’s bet as well, but that is what really makes a saint, isn’t it? One who consistently chooses not to sin despite the efforts of the devil. You have basically proved the perseverance of the saints! God: “Do you reject Satan and all his works and all his empty promises”, Saint: “I do, forever.”, the angels: “Amen.”

This does not avoid the problem. Either it is possible to sin in heaven, or it is not. If it is possible, then it is extremely likely that many saints will be kicked out of heaven (per my argument from before); if it is not, then free will is denied. This is an exhaustive dichotomy; it employs all conceivable options (either possibility or impossibility of X), and therefore one cannot appeal to some statement like, “Well, saints would never do that; they’re saints!” Nor can one appeal to a distinction between actual and perceived impossibility without dealing with the exhaustive dichotomy above.

Yes, I agree with you, but my point was that the saints in heaven do not sin not because they lack the ability but rather because it would violate the definition of heaven as a place where no one sins - no one sins in heaven because it is logically impossible based on the definition. If this were not part of the definition, then it would indeed be logically possible; but since it is part of heaven and also free will exists, then the very act of sinning would equal expulsion from heaven by the demands of logic.

First, you must still disprove the argument based on an exhaustive dichotomy I posited earlier. Second, I didn’t really think I had to bring this up, but apparently I now have to: when you say that it is logically impossible to sin in heaven by definition, you cannot consistently say that an application of this impossibility is that all sinners are kicked out. That would be a contradiction. For, if a person is kicked out of heaven for sinning, then it follows that they sinned in the first place before being kicked out, in which case sin occurred in heaven, contrary to your previous statement that doing so is impossible.

(continued below)

 

[Confessor01]

(continued from above)

Then, if you regard heaven as a place within time and said that its occupants could never sin, the expulsion would take place instantly because (as I have been trying to make clear in another thread) what is true later on is also true beforehand, and logic must be satisfied. This explanation my only confuse you more, but the immutability of truth and the nature of heaven are not simple concepts

The new heavens and new earth, established after Christ returns, are not going to be timeless. While the postmortem location for saints prior to Christ’s return might be timeless (in which case the situation gets more complicated), the new heavens and new earth are simply not timeless. However, if you really want to bank all of this on the fact that there are not intervals of time, and therefore not separate events, in heaven, I would still perceive that to be a very precarious attempt at resolution, for then you have a problem with asserting that sin is possible in terms of a timeless arena. What does possibility even mean in a timeless world?

Nonetheless, it does not seem that we must go down that path in the first place, but if you really want to, I’ll just concede it right now.

Nono, I realized the implication of your argument, I was trying to point out that you have no reason to suppose that the full causal relationship includes only those two elements - you assume that it does and thereby imprint the most reasonable orientation on the two things before you… but you may not sufficiently understand either of the two things and that is why you missed the third part of the causal relationship.

On the contrary, my limiting the components to two was because those are all the factors mentioned or implied. When the Bible teaches that “God chose us” and the “us” being referred to is those who chose God, then God’s choice and man’s choice are the only two factors. Moreover, if you want to say that “God chose us” implies that God’s choice and man’s choice are simultaneous causes and, when conjoined, a sufficient cause for some (unmentioned) effect, well, no offense, but that totally destroys the meaning of “God chose us,” which itself immediately implies God’s choice’s causal priority.

Well, if He had to “wait” it might, but he didn’t because He is outside of time! ( Back to that again) - All things and times are present to God.

I’m not implying that He is temporally consequent in His “waiting,” but logically or causally consequent. If you want to say that because of God’s knowing our choices, He chooses us, then you are implying the priority of our choices to His. Appealing to His timelessness simply does not remove this conclusion.

We (well, I) find it hateful if God does not provide us the opportunity to accept grace

You previously said that God is allowed to withhold grace from whom He may, but now you are saying that He is obliged to present it to everyone. How are these not contradictory statements? Presumably, you could avoid the contradiction by making a distinction between God’s offering grace and God’s efficaciously applying grace and say that only the latter is what He is not obliged to do, but once you do that you essentially concede to the Calvinist position by stating that irresistible grace still allows for human freedom.

And, of course, even with that distinction, it is still extremely odd to say that God is obliged to offer grace, given the definition of grace.

Verse 44 shows the necessity of grace, and verse 39 shows that it is God’s will that salvation be the reward for accepting grace… but it does not say that none will be lost, only that Jesus Himself will never drive them away. I suppose this is where we differ on which understanding of God’s “will” is meant - has God decreed that none shall be lost or desire that none shall be lost?

Verse 44 states that grace is necessary in the sense that the Father must draw a sinner to Christ. Verse 39 states that none whom the Father has given to Christ will be lost. Now, unless you want to make a huge distinction between “draw” and “give” (such that “give” somehow means that the sinner singlehandedly accepted the grace), I don’t see how v. 39 is teaching anything other than the pure, overwhelming sufficiency of divine grace.

And it is rather clear, to me at least, that God has decreed that none whom the Father has given will be lost, since it is stated as fact, not as command or desire.

(continued below)

 

[Confessor01]

(continued from above)

My understanding of God “choosing” people with regard to dispensing grace is that it is always particular, i.e. it is always personal and specific to the individual, but that He does this “generally” in that He excludes no individual person from the offer. Thus, His grace effects faith in the redeemed through their free acceptance thereof …] Thus, faith is the effect of grace but only through acceptance by the free agent.

If I’m understanding you correctly (please correct any misinterpretations I might be making), what you’re saying is that “God chose us” entails that God did not choose to lavish more grace on any humans in particular – since He applied the same grace to everyone universally – and the “us” whom God chose us are the ones who responded. In effect, you are saying that “God chose us” means “God chose everyone and we were the ones who were smart/good/strong enough to respond.”

And I realize that you would likely not say that God gives the same amount of grace to everyone, but I am referring to the initial grace God gives (the kind He is supposedly obliged to offer, as you said above), not to the graces that are given after more good works.

In other words, there is no philosphical contradiction between having motives and libertarian freedom or libertarian freedom and morality. For in any world, choice will always involve the intellect and the will.

If you believe that you have established this point, then it would follow that all arguments attempting to show their incompatibility would be false. Please demonstrate that mine is false, or else concede the point.

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That’s it for me for the day, and also for the weekend. See ya guys Monday.

 

[paul_c]

When I deny free will, I am not denying man’s freedom, but rather disagreeing with a specific notion of freedom, philosophical libertarianism, often assumed as the correct view simply because experience furnishes us with the information that there is some sense in which we have the ability to do otherwise. That said, I think I’ve certainly done plenty at this point to make my case for the compatibility of moral responsibility and theological determinism, mostly in this thread, specifically in and around this post.

Quote:
Originally Posted by paul c
So please, Ben, explain how Calvinism can deny these truths about man and claim that there is no free will. What am I missing?

Therein lies the rub. I don’t think you can make the case that free will is impossible.
That was the entire point of my original post . I also took the opportunity to answer your post in the other thread.

 

[Chiral]

First, I don’t appreciate it when you say things such as, “Now I suppose you’ll deny it?”…Please refrain from such statements.
Second, the fact that they are guilty of something is totally irrelevant to the discussion, for the entire point is that God is ordaining that they not repent of their wrongdoing and acting towards that end. Your argument would hold up only if it could be established that they blasphemed the Holy Spirit (the unforgivable sin), in which case the onus is on you. And even if that could be established, you would still have to explain if these Israelites would be held responsible for failing to repent – because if they were, then you’d be conceding that morality and determinism are compatible, and if they weren’t, then you would have to explain how God would not hold someone responsible for such a grievous offense. Even if you could establish those two things above, you would have to explain why God would still keep them from repentance, considering that the unforgivable sin is supposed to be performed by those people who are too seared and hardened by sin to repent in the first place, e.g. those demonic Pharisees.

(I made the “deny it” statement to tease you, didn’t mean it so offensively, sorry )
You make an excellent point - Would God ever violate free will to the point of eternal damnation as is suggested by the text? I guess I would have to use the rest of Scripture to contend that God is not necessarily eternally damning these people but only cursing them in order to fulfill His will with regard to Israel, or indeed somehow prove that they deserve eternal damnation without resorting to “Well clearly they do, if that is what is suggested by the text”. The amusing part is, you would say “clearly they do deserve it” because your idea of God is that He is both completely just but also exercises total control, but with that view you needn’t resort to any explanation as to what they did, because the justice of divine control is implicit in your premises… In conclusion, the onus is always on the free-will supporters! That’s really quite curious…
Confessor01;5483462:

This does not avoid the problem. Either it is possible to sin in heaven, or it is not. If it is possible, then it is extremely likely that many saints will be kicked out of heaven (per my argument from before); if it is not, then free will is denied. This is an exhaustive dichotomy; it employs all conceivable options (either possibility or impossibility of X), and therefore one cannot appeal to some statement like, "Well, saints would never do that

; they’re saints!" Nor can one appeal to a distinction between actual and perceived impossibility without dealing with the exhaustive dichotomy above.
Again, it is not really “likely” as your argument was a logical fallacy (as I pointed out before) and also because it is part of what defines a saint - called that a petitio principii if you like, but it fits into the dichotomy, despite what the devil may prefer. It is always logically possible for a free person, saint or otherwise, to sin, but it is never logically necessary that they do so - You have yet to prove otherwise, your only argument being the gambler’s bet that on a long enough timeline all events are likely to be actualized in reality. Do we need to go through this again?

I’ll get to the rest, but have a bus to catch!

 

[Chiral]

(continued)

This does not avoid the problem. Either it is possible to sin in heaven, or it is not. If it is possible, then it is extremely likely that many saints will be kicked out of heaven… if it is not, then free will is denied. This is an exhaustive dichotomy…either possibility or impossibility of X, and therefore one cannot appeal to some statement like, “Well, saints would never do that; they’re saints!” Nor can one appeal to a distinction between actual and perceived impossibility without dealing with the exhaustive dichotomy above.

As I stated above, your “exhaustive dichotomy” (i.e. the law of bivalence) is satisfied by any statement that is not logically contradictory, and “likely” does not constitute a contradiction, sorry. Now, should I continue to explain why your argument remains a fallacy?
Let’s more thoroughly examine your “likely”. You base this on the probability equation 1/(2^N) for the N consecutive “heads”, yes? Now calculate the probability at N of exactly 1 “tails”; 2 “tails”; 10 “tails”; 10^10 “tails”… have you noticed the result? 1/(2^N), the same as for all “heads”! Now go ahead and add all those probabilities of “tail” results together. The resultant equation is N/(2^N) – notice anything about that equation? Take N to infinity – which increases faster, the numerator or denominator? The result is that the probability at infinity is approximately 0% for (drum-roll) ALL RESULTS. Now how awesome is that? You know that’s awesome, especially since you are hypothetically guaranteed by logic (100% probability) to get some result… aren’t you?
The lesson to be learned – don’t play statistician with infinity, and never bet against logic

…Second… when you say that it is logically impossible to sin in heaven by definition, you cannot consistently say that an application of this impossibility is that all sinners are kicked out. That would be a contradiction. For, if a person is kicked out of heaven for sinning, then it follows that they sinned in the first place before being kicked out, in which case sin occurred in heaven, contrary to your previous statement that doing so is impossible.
….The new heavens and new earth, established after Christ returns, are not going to be timeless… (and)… then you have a problem with asserting that sin is possible in terms of a timeless arena. What does possibility even mean in a timeless world?

Let’s state the premises, shall we? (we can add to the list together when you comment)
A) Saints are truly free (i.e. they have the innate ability to choose between exclusive options, including good & bad).
B) Saints are in heaven (and we can even presume, for eternity, though that is not certain).
C) In heaven (which is eternal, and we can even assume somehow temporal) there is no sin.

Now, if these premises are acceptable, you must demonstrate some inherent contradiction. I have already endeavored to show how there is not. That was why I employed the hypothetical “expulsion from heaven” scenario, based on the hypothesis that heaven’s residents could possibly be expelled or fall, Lucifer and the angels prophesied in Revelation for instance? But let’s say heaven’s residents do not ever fall? My previous logical argument demonstrated irrefutably (as yet) that no truly free being need ever sin, i.e. freedom and sinlessness for all eternity are not mutually exclusive – I don’t mean to sound arrogant, just stating how things stand. Now let’s say one could fall from heaven, i.e. eternity in heaven is not guaranteed – in that case, any sinner would be instantly expelled to satisfy premise C, and NO that does not mean they sinned and then were expelled but rather the two occur simultaneously as logic demands.
Lastly, you are right, I have no idea how one would explain action (including sin) in a timeless arena as I myself contend that action (which implies an event) is necessarily contingent on time – so we agree there is some kind of “time” in heaven.
(continued below)

 

[Chiral]

(continued)

On the contrary, my limiting the components to two was because those are all the factors mentioned or implied. When the Bible teaches that “God chose us” and the “us” being referred to is those who chose God, then God’s choice and man’s choice are the only two factors. Moreover, if you want to say that “God chose us” implies that God’s choice and man’s choice are simultaneous causes and, when conjoined, a sufficient cause for some (unmentioned) effect, well, no offense, but that totally destroys the meaning of “God chose us,” which itself immediately implies God’s choice’s causal priority.

Okay, you lost me. We were first discussing the notion of causality in relation to our willing anything at all, like picking up a pen. I was explaining simultaneity of wills as two causes conjoined to one single effect. My point about simultaneity still holds. The scripture verse explaining how God chose us before we chose Him has nothing to do with this! Perhaps I should trace back to the post where we began this tangent…
Didn’t I already agree that God chose us first? He is the creator afterall, and we agree that without grace we are lost, but how does that make our choosing Him a necessary effect? The effect of God choosing us would be grace, and you could argue that our choosing Him is the effect of grace but not to the exclusion of other acting agents. You would have to demonstrate that grace was sufficient for salvation, but you have not; nor have you negated the possible necessity of free will – rather the notion of us choosing Him supports the need for free will as a separate cause capable (through the assistance of grace) of its own effects.
Thirdly, have you ever heard the phrase, “I want you to want me”? If I pick someone to be my dance partner, is the effect that they reciprocate? I can say from experience, it is not! A subject choosing an object does not necessitate reciprocation – the effect on the object of choice is the state of “being chosen” which is not at all equivalent to “choosing in return”. Why again do you think these two “choosings” causally related?

I’m not implying that He is temporally consequent in His “waiting,” but logically or causally consequent. If you want to say that because of God’s knowing our choices, He chooses us, then you are implying the priority of our choices to His. Appealing to His timelessness simply does not remove this conclusion.

I think we’re way off track now, see above.

You previously said that God is allowed to withhold grace from whom He may, but now you are saying that He is obliged to present it to everyone. How are these not contradictory statements?..

Sorry, where did I say God is “obliged” to offer grace? I don’t believe I ever did, so the rest of that section of your post I’ll ignore as non-applicable. We agree that God’s grace is a freely offered gift, that it is efficacious… but you don’t believe it is offered to everyone, and I don’t believe it is irresistible.

Verse 44 states that grace is necessary in the sense that the Father must draw a sinner to Christ. Verse 39 states that none whom the Father has given to Christ will be lost. Now, unless you want to make a huge distinction between “draw” and “give” (such that “give” somehow means that the sinner singlehandedly accepted the grace), I don’t see how v. 39 is teaching anything other than the pure, overwhelming sufficiency of divine grace.
And it is rather clear, to me at least, that God has decreed that none whom the Father has given will be lost, since it is stated as fact, not as command or desire.

Read verse 39 again and tell me how that is a decree rather than a desire? Jesus says, God draws these people to Himself through me, I will not drive them away, and it is His will that none be lost… He does not state it as a fact that none would be lost, but rather says that that is the Father’s will – sounds like a desire rather than a decree to me. And if it were a decree, you’d have serious issues confronting the loss of Judas (and Huiou Theoiu has already explained to you how the language of the text really does mean “lost”). Thus, it cannot be a decree! So much for the overwhelming sufficiency of grace?

 

[Chiral]

(final segment)

If I’m understanding you correctly (please correct any misinterpretations I might be making), what you’re saying is that “God chose us” entails that God did not choose to lavish more grace on any humans in particular – since He applied the same grace to everyone universally – and the “us” whom God chose us are the ones who responded. In effect, you are saying that “God chose us” means “God chose everyone and we were the ones who were smart/good/strong enough to respond.”
And I realize that you would likely not say that God gives the same amount of grace to everyone, but I am referring to the initial grace God gives (the kind He is supposedly obliged to offer, as you said above), not to the graces that are given after more good works.

 Again, who said “obliged”? Free, specific, and yes offered to all – as to the amount offered, I think mikeledes answered this somewhere… anyway, the answer is “enough” – there is a scripture verse related to it, I’ll find it later as my wife wants me to stop typing a few hours ago , but the idea (from scripture) is that God always offers us enough grace such that if we accept it we will be empowered to persevere in faith, hope, and love. The amount of grace necessary to empower us to ask for more may vary from person to person, but the grace He offers is never insufficient for the purpose. Seek and ye shall find… ask and it shall be given unto you. Those who do not ask, who do not turn to their Creator, that is their right as free children of God, but God rejoices whenever a person does turn to Him. Why doesn’t everyone turn to Him if He offers sufficient grace to all? Probably for the same reason Adam & Eve sinned (for they were certainly capable of refraining) – temptation. But treading that path may be too tangential, I’ll let you decide.

If you believe that you have established this point, then it would follow that all arguments attempting to show their incompatibility would be false. Please demonstrate that mine is false, or else concede the point.

My apologies, but could you restate your argument in a logical (A,B,C) format? This thread has gotten long and I’m not sure which points you are referring to.

 

[paul_c]

(continued)

Let’s state the premises, shall we? (we can add to the list together when you comment)
A) Saints are truly free (i.e. they have the innate ability to choose between exclusive options, including good & bad).
B) Saints are in heaven (and we can even presume, for eternity, though that is not certain).
C) In heaven (which is eternal, and we can even assume somehow temporal) there is no sin.

You and Ben are doing a great job of debating but your debate will only be as good as the (name removed by moderator)uts and assumptions.
There are missing premises here.
In the Catholic view,
we have :
A) Saints are Free
B) Saints get to heaven only after full purification on earth or in purgatory. During this purification, man is made perfect (not proclaimed perfect, MADE perfect) so that they will not sin.
C Hence, there is no sin in heaven.

Support for B can be found in Hebrews 12: 22-24 ==>
22 But you are come to mount Sion, and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the company of many thousands of angels,
23 And to the church of the firstborn, who are written in the heavens, and to God the judge of all, and to the spirits of the just made perfect,
24 And to Jesus the mediator of the new testament, and to the sprinkling of blood which speaketh better than that of Abel.

and also Revelations 21:27 (speaking of Heaven:
27 There shall not enter into it any thing defiled, or that worketh abomination or maketh a lie, but they that are written in the book of life of the Lamb.

I believe this eliminates the argument that free will isn’t possible for the saints in heaven.

 

[Portrait]

The Calvinistic scheme of biblical interpretation stands or falls with the teaching of “indefectable grace” or stated simply once saved always saved. This is really the fundamental tenet of Calvinism and since it cannot be sustained by an unbiased interpretation of the New Testament (or the Old for that matter); clearly the whole tenor of sacred scripture is decidedly against it. Sadly in many Reformed/Evangelical communities it is held as a test of Christian orthdoxy or “biblical soundness”. As a former member of the Church of England (Evangelical Party) I once held this view but was compelled to abandon it following an honest examination of the biblical data. This plainly reveals that all baptised Christians have been, or are in a state of grace, which state they are in constant danger of falling and being cast away eternally. Thus to the biblical evidence:

1. Our Lord distinctly spoke of a) the good seed becoming “unfruitful” (S. Matt. 13:22); b) the salt losing its “savour” (S. Matt. 5:13); the branch being “cast forth” from the vine (S John 15:6). If all these expressions don’t teac the poossibility of a Christian falling away from grace once given, then what do they teach?

2.St. Paul distinctly contemplates the possibility of becoming a “castaway” or rejected (I Cor. 9:27). Now if St. Paul had reason to fear that, when he had preached to others, he himself should be rejected, it is hard to understand the the Calivinists who deny the same possibility in the case others.

3.Of all passages in the N.T. Hebrews 6:4-6 has proved a real stumbling-block to the Calvinism. Notwithstanding what Calvinists say to the contrary, the case supposed is of those who have had a real Christian experience of salvation, actually the writers whole emphasis is nullified if he he is thought to be speaking of those who have only had a “glimmer of light” and no genuine experience of regeneration. No, his awful warning shows that he had in mind a threatened lapse on the part of the Hebrews, whom he clearly regarede a Christians of long standing. The writer is not alarming them with some hypothetical description of something which cannot happen; he is deadly serious becuase the peril is so real.

Predestination is always to privilleges not necessarily or automatically to eternal life. Basicly the whole course of this life is a state of probation and the old maxim is still true: “no holinesss, no heaven”. Predestination, at least in the Calvinistic sense is inseparable from the indefectability of grace dogma, Catholicism rightly rejects the latter.

Yours affectionately,

Nigel

 

[Confessor01]

Okay, we’ve been going around in circles on this thread, so I’m just going to call it for the most part. I have only a few things to say:

Chiral,

(1) The fact that you believe God’s choice is prior or antecedent, as taught in Ephesians 1 – and with which I agree – moves the question to whether or not God’s grace is sufficient, discussed below, in (3).

(2) You said that God’s grace is “efficacious” but not “irresistible”; assuming that by “efficacious” you mean that it has the power to work good in a sinner if the sinner freely accepts grace, I would advise choosing a new word. The effectual calling in Reformed theology is the internal, irresistible calling by the Spirit of the sinner to repentance, showing that you would be sharing terminology with Calvinistic principles you do not share. I am fairly certain that “efficacious” signifies total sufficiency and irresistibility.

(3) John 6:39 is a decree, not a desire, because it is restated in v. 40, and v. 40 is a decree. Verse 39 states that it is God’s will that none whom the Father gives Jesus will be lost, and verse 40 states that all believers will be saved; moreover, in both verses the same people (those whom the Father gives/believers) are said to be raised up. So, unless it’s possible for someone to be a believer and also be denied eternal life (which would contradict v. 40, among other Scriptures), those two verses are stating facts and are therefore decretive.

 

[Chiral]

We indeed have been going around in circles. I just wish the logical arguments were clearer to you, especially regarding infinity, but you’ll come to realize and understand those concepts after enough investigation as they are not subjective in nature (no Biblical interpretation necessary).

…You said that God’s grace is “efficacious” but not “irresistible”; assuming that by “efficacious” you mean that it has the power to work good in a sinner if the sinner freely accepts grace, I would advise choosing a new word. The effectual calling in Reformed theology is the internal, irresistible calling by the Spirit of the sinner to repentance, showing that you would be sharing terminology with Calvinistic principles you do not share. I am fairly certain that “efficacious” signifies total sufficiency and irresistibility.

Confessor01, actually the Calvinist principles post-date the Catholic principles regarding Grace as always have the power (i.e. capability) to effect a result without the necessity of actually doing so. Also, the definition of “efficacious” as found in various dictionaries matches the Catholic use of the term rather than the Calvinist. A Calvinist should therefore make sure to specify what he means when using the term (e.g. “always and irresistibly efficacious”) in order to avoid confusion with the rest of the English-speaking world. Sorry, my use of the term is precisely accurate.

(3) John 6:39 is a decree, not a desire, because it is restated in v. 40, and v. 40 is a decree. Verse 39 states that it is God’s will that none whom the Father gives Jesus will be lost, and verse 40 states that all believers will be saved; moreover, in both verses the same people (those whom the Father gives/believers) are said to be raised up. So, unless it’s possible for someone to be a believer and also be denied eternal life (which would contradict v. 40, among other Scriptures), those two verses are stating facts and are therefore decretive.

NIV, John 6: 37All that the Father gives me will come to me, and whoever comes to me I will never drive away. 38For I have come down from heaven not to do my will but to do the will of him who sent me. 39And this is the will of him who sent me, that I shall lose none of all that he has given me, but raise them up at the last day. 40For my Father’s will is that everyone who looks to the Son and believes in him shall have eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day."

The only certain decrees I see are Jesus’: “…I will never drive away… and I will raise him up at the last day”. If the Father decreed that none be lost, what about Judas? Be careful what you decide are decreed facts and what are not.