Can a Catholic Critique this Moral Philosophy?

[lelinator]

If life is meaningless, it is also worthless, at least to a person who is not the one whose life is under consideration.

Why do you equate absurd with meaningless? Why do you equate it with worthless? Despite the absurdness of my life it still has value to me. But it’s not just my life…in and of itself that has value…it’s everything that makes my life what it is… it’s everything that gives it the richness and fullness of life, with love, and sorrow, and hope, and gain, and loss, and beauty. It’s not my life alone that has value, but it’s everything that enriches that life. And that includes you.

So no, even if life is absurd, it’s not meaningless or worthless.

 

[Stidlet]

There’s no such thing as a good triangle and a bad triangle. Something either is a triangle, or it isn’t. Everything is an absolutely perfect example of whatever it is, even if whatever it is, is very close to being what you presume it was supposed to be.

I disagree here, we can see something meets all of the essential requirements of a certain form, but is not perfect. You propose an unnecessary dichotomy of perfect, and simply not.

 

[Stidlet]

Thus to proclaim something to be flawed you must either project upon it what you assume it was meant to be, or know specifically what it was meant to be.

This I also disagree with, for we can deduce simply from Aristotle’s four causes; the form, matter, ends, and such that are necessary for natural law. Are you a nominalist? Our words obviously correspond with objects/concepts in the real world. We need not know the intention to know what an object is.

 

[lelinator]

I disagree here, we can see something meets all of the essential requirements of a certain form, but is not perfect. You propose an unnecessary dichotomy of perfect, and simply not.

You can for example, only say that something is an imperfect triangle, if it was in fact meant to be a triangle. But who’s the arbiter of whether it was meant to be a triangle?

 

[lelinator]

This I also disagree with, for we can deduce simply from Aristotle’s four causes; the form, matter, ends, and such that are necessary for natural law. Are you a nominalist? Our words obviously correspond with objects/concepts in the real world. We need not know the intention to know what an object is.

When it comes to the nature of reality, I’m an epistemological solipsist, so no, I don’t accept that our words necessarily correspond to objects in the “real” world.

 

[Stidlet]

You can for example, only say that something is an imperfect triangle, if it was in fact meant to be a triangle. But who’s the arbiter of whether it was meant to be a triangle?

This directly ties into your next quote, so let me branch them

When it comes to the nature of reality, I’m an epistemological solipsist, so no, I don’t accept that our words necessarily correspond to objects in the “ real ” world.

So this underpins it, often when debating the existence of God and morality and such, we come to realize that the opponent doesn’t accept crucial steps in the process of debate (not necessarily unjustified arguably). It’s different than debating those who cling to “science trumps all” as you can simply appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and then argue Aquinas’ ways. With someone who rejects even the intelligibility of reality, it’s quite harder. I would argue that of course we can know something exists, and can prescribe certain attributes. I would argue that definitionally, God must exist for even the self to, in the Cartesian uncertainty sense. From there we have two things we can prescribe attributes to, and we can slowly argue more and more, eventually deducing our morality objectively.

 

[Dimmesdale]

Dimmesdale:

meant the appearance or subjective experience of red qualia, which I think is universal among humans. In other words, not the state of red in-itself but the quality of red-ness .

But that’s a different question altogether, no?

What question do you have in mind? I’m talking about consensus regarding subjective realities, insofar as they have a degree of reality. Redness has a degree of reality, just like moral intuitions, in my thought.

Appearances exist subjectively, though, right? To a greater or lesser extent, we might wonder whether they are commonly experienced. (If that were the case, then we might ask what that common experience is. We might even conjecture whether and to what extent that “common experience” converges on the “objective reality.”)

Dimmesdale:

they could not be “true” in the same way as objective things are, being of a lesser grade as it were that just does not qualify.

Subjective experiences are as ‘true’ subjectively as objective realities are ‘true’ objectively, no? You just can’t blithely cross the two and expect the standards for the one to hold up for the other.

I don’t know if they are true. Can they be said to exist in the same way as objective realities? (Taking into account the equivalence of truth and existence). Take a shadow. A shadow is the absence of light. It is cast by something which arguably has actual existence, say a chair. The chair can be said to exist and so is real, hence it is true that “a chair exists.” Take away the chair, and the shadow vanishes. Was the shadow ever real in the same sense as the chair was? Or was it a by-product, something ethereal that doesn’t truly count as real even if it appears to.

So if morals have truth values then appearances might not count.

I would say that, in terms of morality, there is an objective standard, and the work of our conscience is to move from the purely individual, subjective experience and attempt to conform oneself to the objective reality.

It seems I am at a bit of an impasse now, doubting whether human intuitions can ground morality, but at the same time being rather clueless regarding what objective moral reality is or consists of apart from the human.

 

[lelinator]

With someone who rejects even the intelligibility of reality,

I don’t reject the intelligibility of reality. In fact, the intelligibility of reality is just as self-evident as I am.

Plus, the fact that I question the objectivity of reality doesn’t mean that I summarily reject any arguments that are based upon such an objective reality. Solipsism simply means that I don’t know, and thus any plausible arguments must be given equal consideration.

It’s just that every argument must inevitably come up against the egocentric predicament.

I would argue that of course we can know something exists, and can prescribe certain attributes. I would argue that definitionally, God must exist for even the self to, in the Cartesian uncertainty sense. From there we have two things we can prescribe attributes to, and we can slowly argue more and more, eventually deducing our morality objectively.

I’m completely open to considering such arguments. I accept that whether objectively or subjectively, things exist, and that they can be ascribed certain attributes. Whether this leads inevitably to the existence of God and an objective morality is another matter however. But you’re welcome to try. But be forewarned…it’s been tried many times before without success. Then again, who’s to know which time will be the first time.

 

[Stidlet]

I don’t reject the intelligibility of reality. In fact, the intelligibility of reality is just as self-evident as I am.

By intelligibility I refer to our ability to discern truth and such, which is directly contradicted by solipsism.

Plus, the fact that I question the objectivity of reality doesn’t mean that I summarily reject any arguments that are based upon such an objective reality.

This is well, often I will start a debate by the outline “If you accept the PSR, and our ability to discern the external world, etc. then…”

Whether this leads inevitably to the existence of God and an objective morality is another matter however.

I’m sure based on your other claims, you’ve heard Aquinas’ ways. I would still like to give them a go with you though. I will quote Edward Feser’s first 14 points of Aristotle’s argument

1. Change is a real feature of the world.
2. But change is the actualization of a potential.
3. So, the actualization of a potential is a real feature of the world.
4. No potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it (the principle of causality).
5. So, any change is caused by something already actual.
6. The occurrence of any change C presupposes some thing or substance S which changes.
7. The existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence.
8. So, any substance S has at any moment some actualizer A of it’s existence.
9. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A’s being purely actual.
10. If A’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then either there exist a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
11. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a hierarchical causal series, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization of A.
13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.
14. So, there is a purely actual actualizer.

If any of the terms are unfamiliar, or you disagree with a premise, just let me know.

 

[lelinator]

By intelligibility I refer to our ability to discern truth and such, which is directly contradicted by solipsism.

Let’s begin here.

How do you discern that reality is objectively real?

 

[Stidlet]

How do you discern that reality is objectively real?

You understand the self evidence of the reality of the self. So we can discern that at least that facet of reality is objectively real. We can know ourselves to exist in some manner.

 

[lelinator]

You understand the self evidence of the reality of the self. So we can discern that at least that facet of reality is objectively real. We can know ourselves to exist in some manner.

Rather than getting bogged down in semantics, with some possible caveats…I agree.

 

[Stidlet]

Rather than get bogged down in semantics, with some possible caveats…I agree.

I’ll try not to be dishonest in semantics of course. So we can say that we ourselves exist, and that we change and are composed, whether we are simply an incorporeal mind or not.

 

[lelinator]

So we can say that we ourselves exist, and that we change and are composed, whether we are simply an incorporeal mind or not.

This becomes somewhat trickier. Obviously the things around me change…the things that are “not me”. Also my perceptions, experiences, and memories change…but are those things the quintessential nature of “me”? If I take away my memories, if I forget all of my experiences, and there’s nothing for me to perceive, do I cease to be?

That’s the question, what is the quintessential nature of “me”, and does that quintessential nature ever actually change?

 

[Stidlet]

Obviously the things around me change…the things that are “ not me ”.

If we were to grant that the things around you exist and change, this part of the conversation would be unnecessary.

That’s the question, what is the quintessential nature of “ me ”, and does that quintessential nature ever actually change?

So my argument for this states that either (a) the things around you exist and change, or (b) you yourself change in some respect in order for your memories, and your experiences and such to change. Your nature needs not change for yourself to undergo motion.

 

[Stidlet]

If I take away my memories, if I forget all of my experiences, and there’s nothing for me to perceive, do I cease to be?

There is also interesting debate to be had on what constitutes the person, but that would just hinder this discussion for now.

 

[Gorgias]

But does it really matter if there’s an objective morality if you can never know what it is?

Wait – who ever said that we cannot know an objective morality? All we’ve talked about is our experience of the objective, right? We know the objective standard, because God has revealed it to us!

Sure, a majority of people can agree that murder is immoral, but they will likely disagree about precisely what circumstances constitute murder.

The standard isn’t “what folks think”, but “what God has revealed”, no?

So lacking omniscience, for us mere mortals, it would seem that morality will always be subjective.

Nope. “Omniscience” isn’t needed – only access to God’s revelation is! (And, in lieu of that, then listening to His word in our hearts suffices, right?)

 

[Freddy]

lelinator:

But does it really matter if there’s an objective morality if you can never know what it is?

Wait – who ever said that we cannot know an objective morality? All we’ve talked about is our experience of the objective, right? We know the objective standard, because God has revealed it to us!

I think you mean that you believe He has revealed it to you. What He reveals seems to vary from person to person. And He hasn’t revealed anything at all to me.

 

[Freddy]

lelinator:

I don’t reject the intelligibility of reality. In fact, the intelligibility of reality is just as self-evident as I am.

By intelligibility I refer to our ability to discern truth and such, which is directly contradicted by solipsism.

Plus, the fact that I question the objectivity of reality doesn’t mean that I summarily reject any arguments that are based upon such an objective reality.

This is well, often I will start a debate by the outline “If you accept the PSR, and our ability to discern the external world, etc. then…”

Whether this leads inevitably to the existence of God and an objective morality is another matter however.

I’m sure based on your other claims, you’ve heard Aquinas’ ways. I would still like to give them a go with you though. I will quote Edward Feser’s first 14 points of Aristotle’s argument

1. Change is a real feature of the world.
2. But change is the actualization of a potential.
3. So, the actualization of a potential is a real feature of the world.
4. No potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it (the principle of causality).
5. So, any change is caused by something already actual.
6. The occurrence of any change C presupposes some thing or substance S which changes.
7. The existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence.
8. So, any substance S has at any moment some actualizer A of it’s existence.
9. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A’s being purely actual.
10. If A’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then either there exist a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
11. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a hierarchical causal series, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization of A.
13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.
14. So, there is a purely actual actualizer.

If any of the terms are unfamiliar, or you disagree with a premise, just let me know.

4 is an assumption. And 7 assumes the conclusion.

 

[Gorgias]

I think you mean that you believe He has revealed it to you . What He reveals seems to vary from person to person. And He hasn’t revealed anything at all to me.

Nope. Revelation is objective. Acceptance of the revelation is subjective, and although you might not believe that God has revealed anything to you, that doesn’t change the objective reality.