Can a Catholic Still Maintain the Death Penalty?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Alainval
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Uh . . . I’m fairly certain Catholic moral theology is a little deeper than “Here is a list of things you can’t do, everything else is cool.”
That is not at all what I’m trying to say. Let’s look at what makes a person’s action immoral: if the object of the act is intrinsically evil then the act is evil, but if that is not the case how do we judge it? We have to judge it based on the intent (which we cannot usually know) and the circumstances, but note this: we are talking about judgments, and that’s the point I’m making. Disagreements over judgments can be legitimate. Opposite positions cannot both be right (correct), but they can both be morally justified given that errors in judgments are not necessarily sins.

That’s all I’m saying. If any act is not intrinsically evil then each of us may judge whether or not it should be committed, and to disagree with a judgment - even a pope’s - is not prohibited.
 
40.png
o_mlly:
Death is always an evil effect that one may tolerate under the principle of the double effect.
Punishment itself can be considered an evil depending on the perspective from which it is viewed, but it is in fact considered a good when it is applied.
Punishment, as a harm, is evil and also must have an offsetting proportionate good which is intended in order to be moral. The citation from Aquinas demonstrates the same point. The upright judge wills the common good and tolerates the punishment of the offender only to that end.
Death, being not the only just penalty for murder, gives the state other options.
As the teachings of JPII and Francis morally argue, the fact that the states do not put all murderers to death is sufficient evidence that CP is not the only option , i.e., life imprisonment.
 
As the teachings of JPII and Francis morally argue, the fact that the states do not put all murderers to death is sufficient evidence that CP is not the only option , i.e., life imprisonment.
There is nothing to suggest this is a moral argument rather than a prudential on. Since all punishment, and not just death, is harmful, and therefore in that sense evil, there is nothing unique about death in that regard. Nor is the fact that all states do or don’t do something indication of anything at all. We would certainly not assume that abortion is legitimate simply because all states allow it.
 
If an act is not intrinsically evil then the decision to commit it is a prudential judgment.
No, in order for an act to be moral, the act must also be good in its circumstances (assuming the intention is good).
There is nothing to suggest this is a moral argument rather than a prudential one.
JPII’s moral argument introduces a doctrinal development in teaching that a necessary circumstance – bloodless means are not available – as necessary in order for CP to be moral.
 
No, in order for an act to be moral, the act must also be good in its circumstances (assuming the intention is good).
I just said this in my response to billsherman (#680), and since I accounted for it before I shouldn’t need to do it again.
JPII’s moral argument introduces a doctrinal development in teaching that a necessary circumstance – bloodless means are not available – as necessary in order for CP to be moral.
No, we’re beyond JPII; Francis changed 2267 from what it was under JPII. Argue from what is, not what was.
 
The claim that unless something is intrinsically evil, it’s just a matter of personal opinion is as far from Catholic theology as can be.
You are welcome to provide an analysis of CP in terms of the fonts of morality that establishes its definitive immorality. But I do take from your statement that you concur CP is not intrinsically evil.
 
Death is always an evil effect that one may tolerate under the principle of the double effect.
Or put another way - there are offsetting positive effects. In the case of self-defence, the equation (balance of consequences) is straightforward to assess, but in CP (and in many other acts/cases) far less so, and sometimes nigh impossible.
Death, being not the only just penalty for murder, gives the state other options.
Quite true and this fact of the modern world enables the avoidance of CP by states who judge it undesirable.
 
Last edited:
If any act is not intrinsically evil then each of us may judge whether or not it should be committed, and to disagree with a judgment - even a pope’s - is not prohibited.
So . . . since Capitol Punishment is not intrinsically evil, I can decide to execute the person who left an empty pack of cigarettes in my yard this morning?

A nation could pass a law that says the punishment for being gay is execution?

My town could execute people who attend the wrong church on Sunday?

I’m fairly sure you are wrong. Catholic moral theology has no place for you to freely decide that some people do not have the right to live.
 
Note always popular on CAF, but Mr Conte addresses CP:


Another writer on CP on the same site:

 
So . . . since Capitol Punishment is not intrinsically evil, I can decide to execute the person who left an empty pack of cigarettes in my yard this morning?
Please, it should be obvious that this is not the case any more than since it is a practical judgment on your part how you get to work you would be justified in stealing your neighbor’s car. In order for me to communicate an idea you have to cooperate. I’m not trying to say anything different than what the church already says regarding the morality of an action. If you can phrase that (accurately) in your own words I’m sure I would agree with it.
 
So . . . since Capitol Punishment is not intrinsically evil, I can decide to execute the person who left an empty pack of cigarettes in my yard this morning?
Can you envisage any person (judge) who could act this way both while being well-intentioned and having a good faith belief that his actions will yield more good outcomes than bad? I cannot - but were there in fact such a person, who acted accordingly - would he have sinned?

Far more likely is that something else drives this extreme act - and leads to the conclusion immoral activity is afoot.
 
Last edited:
Can you envisage any person (judge) who could act this way both while being well-intentioned and having a good faith belief that his actions will yield more good outcomes than bad?
Absolutely. I suspect most people think that their actions, whatever they are, are justified. Just like dissenters from Catholic moral theology or God’s commands always think that their dissent is justified (it never is).
 
So what’s the answer to my question? Do they sin?
I don’t know.

But I do know that the death penalty is inadmissible and all Catholics are obligated to work for its abolition.
 
40.png
o_mlly:
No, in order for an act to be moral, the act must also be good in its circumstances (assuming the intention is good).
I just said this in my response to billsherman (#680), and since I accounted for it before I shouldn’t need to do it again.
The post #680 (at least as CAF numbers posts on my login) does not provide an answer to the fact that JPII made a moral argument in introducing a circumstance that now must be considered and found good in order for CP to be moral.
No, we’re beyond JPII …
No, we are not. Unless you claim JPII was in error.
Francis changed 2267 …
Yes, and I have noted the ambiguity requires, and I hope, will be clarified in due course.
 
I
Or put another way - there are offsetting positive effects. In the case of self-defence, the equation (balance of consequences) is straightforward to assess, but in CP (and in many other acts/cases) far less so, and sometimes nigh impossible.
JPII cited the offsetting good for CP as also self-defense citing society’s duty to protect and conditioned the use of CP on the circumstance that bloodless means are not available. "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means … "
 
40.png
billsherman:
Uh . . . I’m fairly certain Catholic moral theology is a little deeper than “Here is a list of things you can’t do, everything else is cool.”
That is not at all what I’m trying to say. Let’s look at what makes a person’s action immoral: if the object of the act is intrinsically evil then the act is evil, but if that is not the case how do we judge it? We have to judge it based on the intent (which we cannot usually know) and the circumstances, but note this: we are talking about judgments, and that’s the point I’m making. Disagreements over judgments can be legitimate. Opposite positions cannot both be right (correct), but they can both be morally justified given that errors in judgments are not necessarily sins.

That’s all I’m saying. If any act is not intrinsically evil then each of us may judge whether or not it should be committed, and to disagree with a judgment - even a pope’s - is not prohibited.
This is the very essence of the Americanist heresy. ‘Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae’

" in this present matter of which we are speaking, there is even a greater danger and a more manifest opposition to Catholic doctrine and discipline in that opinion of the lovers of novelty, according to which they hold such liberty should be allowed in the Church, that her supervision and watchfulness being in some sense lessened, allowance be granted the faithful, each one to follow out more freely the leading of his own mind and the trend of his own proper activity.

It is alleged that now the Vatican decree concerning the infallible teaching authority of the Roman Pontiff having been proclaimed that nothing further on that score can give any solicitude, and accordingly, since that has been safeguarded and put beyond question a wider and freer field both for thought and action lies open to each one. But such reasoning is evidently faulty, since, if we are to come to any conclusion from the infallible teaching authority of the Church, it should rather be that no one should wish to depart from it, and moreover that the minds of all being leavened and directed thereby, greater security from private error would be enjoyed by all. And further, those who avail themselves of such a way of reasoning seem to depart seriously from the over-ruling wisdom of the Most High-which wisdom, since it was pleased to set forth by most solemn decision the authority and supreme teaching rights of this Apostolic See-willed that decision precisely in order to safeguard the minds of the Church’s children from the dangers of these present times.

These dangers, viz., the confounding of license with liberty, the passion for discussing and pouring contempt upon any possible subject, the assumed right to hold whatever opinions one pleases upon any subject and to set them forth in print to the world, have so wrapped minds in darkness that there is now a greater need of the Church’s teaching office than ever before, lest people become unmindful both of conscience and of duty."
 
But I do know that the death penalty is inadmissible…
Then would you know whether or not the death penalty is intrinsically evil?
The post #680 (at least as CAF numbers posts on my login) does not provide an answer to the fact that JPII made a moral argument in introducing a circumstance that now must be considered and found good in order for CP to be moral.
What moral argument? I think this is your perception of what was said.
No, we are not. Unless you claim JPII was in error.
JPII admitted that CP could be admissible. Francis said it could not. Those positions don’t seem reconcilable.
 
JPII cited the offsetting good for CP as also self-defense citing society’s duty to protect and conditioned the use of CP on the circumstance that bloodless means are not available. "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means … "
And Cardinal Ratzinger told us JP II’s position was a prudential judgement that Catholics need not necessarily concur with.
 
Last edited:
40.png
o_mlly:
JPII cited the offsetting good for CP as also self-defense citing society’s duty to protect and conditioned the use of CP on the circumstance that bloodless means are not available. "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means … "
And Cardinal Ratzinger told us JP II’s position was a prudential judgement that Catholics need not necessarily concur with.
That came as a side note in a letter regarding the conditions for receiving Holy Communion in 2004. 16 years later there’s likely much more to consider since the Church has deemed it ‘inadmissible’.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top