Can a materialist conception of the mind really preserve free will?

[Bahman]

I have been contemplating if to even answer any more.

This is the kind of “reductionism” what materialists propose. In the materialist view there is no need to introduce some nebulous “soul” of “animating principle”, because the emergent property of “life” can be “reduced” to the matter AND the structure of the matter. But that is NOT what you proposed in your OP. You explicitly asserted that our “free will” cannot be explained on materialistic grounds, because the materialistic concept of the mind can ultimately be reduced to physical processes and therefore it is either deterministic or random. As such you expressed the kind of reductionism which NOW you categorized as senseless.

Yes, of course! When it comes to explaining the function of more complex structures it is necessary to keep in mind the properties of the underlying matter, too. This is simply trivial. By the way that observation that water is only “wet” because we perceive it to be wet, is really dumb. The property is objectively there, whether we are there to perceive it or not. Combine hydrogen and chlorine atoms and the resulting hydrogen chloride is not only “acidic” in our perception. Chemistry does not discard physics, it builds on it. Biology does not discard physics and chemistry, it builds upon physics and chemistry. But biology has its own properties, which cannot be FULLY reduced to the lower levels, but those lower levels are still necessary.

What a huge misunderstanding. That is not what it means! I said: “If it looks like thinking…” not “It must looks like thinking…”. If there is no objective sign that the other entity “thinks” (and it does not have to be verbal), then we have no grounds to make a decision either way. On the other hand, if it “looks like” (or sounds like) thinking then the only rational conclusion is that it IS thinking, be it a very sophisticated computer, or a higher ape, or a hypothetical space alien. It is true that some people might miss the Turing test (infants would miss it) but then the test is not supposed be the one and only method to detect thinking. It only says that IF someone or something DOES pass the test, then it is irrational to assume that it does not think. But it does not say: “If you cannot pass the test, you cannot be considered to be able to think”.

Unless you respond with something new, I consider this conversation closed. It is definitely boring to be forced to correct elementary misconceptions like the one I had to quote directly above.

Materialism plus reductionism cannot lead to free will since a complex system like brain function deterministically hence it cannot describe free will. The laws of nature which describe how beings interact and move are deterministic. It is based on these set of laws that a more complex forms with specific properties can arise but this property can be explained by underlying law of nature otherwise we are dealing with a paradox, meaning that a property that emerges from underlying laws cannot be describe by underlying laws. What is left is to show that reductionism lead to determinism:

1. Each system is made of beings each moves deterministically based on laws of nature
2. A finite system could not have anomalous behaviour unless is made of anomalous beings
3. Indeterminism is an anomalous behaviour for a finite system which is made of beings each moves deterministically
4. A finite system is made of beings each evolve deterministically evolves deterministically itself

 

[SentinelofTruth]

This leads to determinism hence free will turns into a delusion.

Oops, looks like I made a typo in the sentence you quote. I meant to say He does not know what we will do.

 

[Bahman]

Oops, looks like I made a typo in the sentence you quote. I meant to say He does not know what we will do.

Then how he could have the knowledge of future being omniscience?

 

[Bagheera]

Bahman:

Materialism plus reductionism cannot lead to free will since a complex system like brain function deterministically hence it cannot describe free will.

The definition of “free will” is:

1. An agent has some goal in mind, which it wishes to achieve.
2. There are at least two ways to reach that goal.
3. The locus of decision rests with the agent.That is all. It says nothing about the process of reaching that decision.

Bahman:

Each system is made of beings each moves deterministically based on laws of nature.

Not all of the laws of nature are deterministic. For example, the second law of thermodynamics or the Brownian motion of the molecules is not deterministic. The movements of the economy or the stock market are also stochastic, because the behavior of the individuals is unpredictable (which is not the same as random).

 

[polytropos]

This is the kind of “reductionism” what materialists propose. In the materialist view there is no need to introduce some nebulous “soul” of “animating principle”, because the emergent property of “life” can be “reduced” to the matter AND the structure of the matter.

As I have been saying on, and on, and on. But the problem for you is that if the emergent property of life can be reduced to matter and the structure of the matter, then the matter does impose limits in principle on what can emerge. As such, your emergence of the gaps doesn’t cut it.

But that is NOT what you proposed in your OP. You explicitly asserted that our “free will” cannot be explained on materialistic grounds, because the materialistic concept of the mind can ultimately be reduced to physical processes and therefore it is either deterministic or random. As such you expressed the kind of reductionism which NOW you categorized as senseless.

This is clearly relevant to the argument made in the OP; the argument in the OP is that the nature of the interactions going on the brain, on the materialist view, impose limits on what can emerge (namely, free will). That is not the type of reductionism I am not calling senseless, because I’m not claiming that what emerges is identical to the constituents. I am just arguing that the nature of the constituents impose limits on what can emerge, which is a principle that any materialist is committed to. Specifically, it causes issues for your second and third criteria for free will:

1. There are at least two ways to reach that goal.
2. The locus of decision rests with the agent.

If the physical processes are either determined or random, then there are not two ways for the agent to reach the goal, even if there seem to be, because the agent is not actually making a decision between two things; the decision has either been determined for him or happens regardless of what he wills, whether or not he seems to will whatever he ends up doing. Which would mean that the locus of decision does not rest with the agent (except, perhaps, in the vacuous sense that the agent does whatever the agent does - the point being that he can’t choose it when his efferent neural activity is determined or random).

When it comes to explaining the function of more complex structures it is necessary to keep in mind the properties of the underlying matter, too. This is simply trivial.

It is not trivial; it implies that the constituents can impose limits on what emerges.

By the way that observation that water is only “wet” because we perceive it to be wet, is really dumb. The property is objectively there, whether we are there to perceive it or not. Combine hydrogen and chlorine atoms and the resulting hydrogen chloride is not only “acidic” in our perception.

The analogy is imperfect. The wetness is our perception of specific qualities of water (its specific heat, adhesion, liquidity, etc.), whereas acidity is a chemical property. It would be more analogous to say that the HCl’s burning is analogous to water’s wetness; HCl burns when it touches our skin, water feels wet, both being consequent of other properties.

What a huge misunderstanding. That is not what it means! I said: “If it looks like thinking…” not “It must looks like thinking…”.

I apologize for being unclear. I am not objecting to the epistemic issue of whether something might think without looking like it is thinking. I am objecting to the fact that the test takes as its criteria that something thinks if it looks like it thinks, but the idea of “looking” is not really something the test accounts for (since a machine, by mapping (name removed by moderator)uts to outputs, could pass the test without actually being able to “look at” things). Whether a machine consciously experiences its (name removed by moderator)uts - as images and other perceptions are “represented” to me - simply has no place in the Turing test. If it can give appropriate outputs for some (name removed by moderator)uts, then it is called “thinking”; but when we refer to ourselves as thinking, we are clearly referring to a largely internal process. So a machine can pass the Turing test without any of that internal process; but when that internal process is in part characterized by representation of the outside world to a human (as opposed to a process that maps (name removed by moderator)uts to outputs), it’s clear that the Turing test is missing a piece of thinking that we regard as essential.

This is, of course, because the Turing test is meant to test artificial intelligence to see if it looks intelligent. We don’t discover that a machine passing the Turing test is thinking; we define that machines that pass the Turing test are artificially intelligent.

It is true that some people might miss the Turing test (infants would miss it)

I was referring to the irony that the human controls occasionally fail the Turing test.

Unless you respond with something new, I consider this conversation closed. It is definitely boring to be forced to correct elementary misconceptions like the one I had to quote directly above.

Somewhat ironic, since I brought up a handful of new points in post #111 and #112, many of which were not responded to. And now that we seem to be in agreement that what emerges depends on constituent matter and structure, the argument that the constituents of the brain impose limits in principle on what can emerge (namely, free will) is still unanswered.

 

[Bahman]

The definition of “free will” is:

1. An agent has some goal in mind, which it wishes to achieve.
2. There are at least two ways to reach that goal.
3. The locus of decision rests with the agent.

That is all. It says nothing about the process of reaching that decision.

Free will is exactly related to the process of decision making, in another word your definition of free will is incomplete. Free will in simple word is the ability to choose between at least two options.

Not all of the laws of nature are deterministic. For example, the second law of thermodynamics or the Brownian motion of the molecules is not deterministic. The movements of the economy or the stock market are also stochastic, because the behavior of the individuals is unpredictable (which is not the same as random).

Second laws of thermodynamics has nothing to do with underlying laws which determine how small particles, atoms or molecule moves and interact with each other. You are always free to use kinetic theory if you wish. Brownian motion in fact is deterministic motion if you know the position and speed of all particles in the container.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bagheera:

The definition of “free will” is:

1. An agent has some goal in mind, which it wishes to achieve.
2. There are at least two ways to reach that goal.
3. The locus of decision rests with the agent.

That is all. It says nothing about the process of reaching that decision.

I object to this definition. The first point seems to imply that free will can only be used in the pursuit of one’s desires. I know from experience that free will can also be used to do something that is not in accord with my desires.

Bahman:

Then how he could have the knowledge of future being omniscience?

He himself is outside of time, so, while his interventions in the timeline are not made in light of our subsequent decisions, in his eternal state he does know what will happen.

 

[tonyrey]

This I have discuss it in a long thread. The argument is very simple: Creation is made of things (that move based on laws of nature) and beings (who decide but God knows their decisions). This means that given creation at specific moment, creation state can be known in later time from God point of view. This means that creation evolves deterministically from God point of view hence it is deterministic in its nature.

It doesn’t follow that creation evolves deterministically because God is capable of giving His creatures the power of choice. It is absurd for a minuscule creature with limited knowledge and intelligence to presume to impose a limit on divine power as if the Creator of the inconceivably immense and mysterious universe can be put in a box of human dimensions!

 

[tonyrey]

Free will is exactly related to the process of decision making, in another word your definition of free will is incomplete. Free will in simple word is the ability to choose between at least two options.
“ability” is the key word. We are not biological machines.

 

[Bagheera]

bahman:

Free will in simple word is the ability to choose between at least two options.

Aha. So in your opinion if one is locked in a burning room, then one has the two “options”. One is to stay put and burn, and the other one is to jump to his death. Or, if a woman is being raped, then she has the two “options” of laying back an “enjoy” it, or fighting back in vain. Or maybe a mafioso holds a gun pointing to the victim’s family, and demands the victim to perform an illegal act - or else!. Not much of an “option” in either case. Neither one offers a real option, in the first one: to survive, in the second and the third one: to escape the predicament.

bahman:

Brownian motion in fact is deterministic motion if you know the position and speed of all particles in the container.

Not true, not even in principle. Consider “chaos theory”. If the equations describing the event are non-linear (quadratic or more complicated), then the outcome is not predictable and not computable. There cannot be an accurate weather forecast, even if one knew the position and speed of all the air molecules, because the equations are non-linear.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

As I have been saying on, and on, and on. But the problem for you is that if the emergent property of life can be reduced to matter and the structure of the matter, then the matter does impose limits in principle on what can emerge.

The fact that there is SOME limitation is again obvious and trivial. You need to demonstrate that a certain limitation prevents a specific outcome. Of course there is something even more important going on. Even if the physical particles move according to some deterministic and/or random rules, the structure is neither deterministic nor random. Just consider the six carbon atoms, and the two different arrangements of the graphite or the diamond. As such the emergent attribute, which is contingent upon BOTH the particles and the structure cannot be discarded based upon the attributes of one of them. Also, it would be really interesting to learn, just what does “free” mean in your vocabulary? As I asked in my first post, it is not clear, what do you mean by “free will”? And you never answered that fundamental question.

polytropos:

The analogy is imperfect. The wetness is our perception of specific qualities of water (its specific heat, adhesion, liquidity, etc.), whereas acidity is a chemical property. It would be more analogous to say that the HCl’s burning is analogous to water’s wetness; HCl burns when it touches our skin, water feels wet, both being consequent of other properties.

First, it is not an analogy, it is an example, and it is even more precise than the “wetness” was. It shows that the chemical attribute emerges and it is qualitatively different from the attributes of the elements. Biology is even more pertinent. The molecules within a living cell are neither determined, nor random. And yet, the cell is still living, as long certain molecules and their proper structure remains.

polytropos:

…it’s clear that the Turing test is missing a piece of thinking that we regard as essential.

“WE”? Who? There is no way to “peek” into actual process, so we can only make a decision based upon the appearance. The same problem can be solved in many different ways, and the internal process will be different. Take a chess problem, for example. One human can solve the problem by trying all the different possible moves - just like a computer would do. Does he not “think” because he uses a “brute force” approach?

polytropos:

This is, of course, because the Turing test is meant to test artificial intelligence to see if it looks intelligent. We don’t discover that a machine passing the Turing test is thinking; we define that machines that pass the Turing test are artificially intelligent.

What is the difference? And the fact that some humans will fail the test is again obvious, since not all humans are intelligent. But the fundamental question is: what is the difference between the “natural” and “artificial” intelligence, if both deliver the same product?

 

[Peter_Plato]

What is the difference? And the fact that some humans will fail the test is again obvious, since not all humans are intelligent. But the fundamental question is: what is the difference between the “natural” and “artificial” intelligence, if both deliver the same product?

And a superintelligent being who somehow had access to the thoughts of the tester might intentionally fail the test to deceive the tester or distort results. The test cannot be conclusive since there is no privileged access to the “thinker” in order to determine whether conscious thought and intention are aspects of the “intelligent” agent in question. To assume there is or is not based upon the “appearance of” is to admit “We can’t know so we’ll presume.”

 

[polytropos]

The fact that there is SOME limitation is again obvious and trivial. You need to demonstrate that a certain limitation prevents a specific outcome.

I have. The nature of the causal interactions going on in the materialist conception of the mind do not leave room for genuine free will. Saying that it mysteriously emerges does not rebut this, it just begs the question.

Of course there is something even more important going on. Even if the physical particles move according to some deterministic and/or random rules, the structure is neither deterministic nor random. Just consider the six carbon atoms, and the two different arrangements of the graphite or the diamond. As such the emergent attribute, which is contingent upon BOTH the particles and the structure cannot be discarded based upon the attributes of one of them.

Erm, no, this last sentence does not make sense; it seems to be false. The nature of the constituents can limit what, with any structure, might emerge from a substance. Take the uranium example: a certain amount of uranium constitutes a critical mass. But the same is not true of water. Why? Well, it either has to do with the differences between water and uranium, or it does not have an explanation.

Why does my wooden desk lack the emergent properties of wetness or acidity? Because those just can’t emerge from the constituents of the wood, no matter what structure it has.

Invoking structure doesn’t save your argument.

Also, it would be really interesting to learn, just what does “free” mean in your vocabulary? As I asked in my first post, it is not clear, what do you mean by “free will”? And you never answered that fundamental question.

I have answered this before, multiple times. I’m not a materialist, so my definition of free will does not matter ITT. As I implied in the OP and clarified later, for a definition of free will to be substantive, the conceptual content of thought must have a causal relationship to efferent neural activity.

Furthermore, in the post you responded to (but, for whatever reason, not in the part you quoted), I specified why I think my considerations in this topic cause problems for the second and third criteria for your definition of free will.

First, it is not an analogy, it is an example, and it is even more precise than the “wetness” was. It shows that the chemical attribute emerges and it is qualitatively different from the attributes of the elements.

The problem with both wetness and acidity (if one is taking acidity broadly to include what we might mean when we touch something and calling it acidic) is that they are properties contingent on conscious observers. You can either talk about them impersonally, noting the water’s cohesion, specific heat, etc. or the properties consequent of an acid’s proton content, but speaking about wetness or acidity in relation to how humans perceive them is obviously a question that depends on mind and consciousness. As such, they are poor examples. They are “qualitatively different” if you are right about mind… but you are only right about mind if they are “qualitatively different” absent mind, which the examples don’t show.

Biology is even more pertinent. The molecules within a living cell are neither determined, nor random. And yet, the cell is still living, as long certain molecules and their proper structure remains.

I’m not sure what this is getting at. I agree that molecules in a living cell are neither determined nor random. I also agree that structure is important. The thing is, though, that this is starting to sound a whole lot like Aristotelian formal causality…

“WE”? Who?

I regard it as uncontroversial that any definition of thinking which does not refer to it as an internal process is lacking. The fact is that the Turing test does not require any sort of conscious thought analogous to our own. It literally stipulates that we’ll look at another factor instead. To infer that what we deliberately decided not to look for is there, is a blatant non-sequitur.

There is no way to “peek” into actual process, so we can only make a decision based upon the appearance. The same problem can be solved in many different ways, and the internal process will be different. Take a chess problem, for example. One human can solve the problem by trying all the different possible moves - just like a computer would do. Does he not “think” because he uses a “brute force” approach?

Which algorithm is used is not really what is at issue. I can do 2+2 in my head. As I’ve said, I regard it as uncontroversial that that is “thinking.” But my calculator does not think when I type 2+2 into it. If one holds that it does think, then I would regard that as a reductio ad absurdum of their position, because the definition of thinking is trivial. We could expand the issue further. The calculator uses an algorithm to add 2+2. If a human traces the algorithm, he would still be thinking, although I suppose that the “work” the algorithm is doing is not itself thinking.

And the fact that some humans will fail the test is again obvious, since not all humans are intelligent.

That is true, but it is generally a lack of social intelligence that leads a human to fail the Turing test. (The joke is that computer scientists are very intelligent, yet stereotypically antisocial, and so might fail the Turing test.)

 

[polytropos]

But the fundamental question is: what is the difference between the “natural” and “artificial” intelligence, if both deliver the same product?

Natural intelligence is what we have. Artificial intelligence, as the name implies, is made to look like intelligence. If you define the “product” behaviorally, then you can say they deliver the same product. But when artificial intelligence does not even measure a large portion of what we commonly think of as intelligence, it just doesn’t follow that they are delivering the same product.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bagheera:

Aha. So in your opinion if one is locked in a burning room, then one has the two “options”. One is to stay put and burn, and the other one is to jump to his death. Or, if a woman is being raped, then she has the two “options” of laying back an “enjoy” it, or fighting back in vain. Or maybe a mafioso holds a gun pointing to the victim’s family, and demands the victim to perform an illegal act - or else!. Not much of an “option” in either case. Neither one offers a real option, in the first one: to survive, in the second and the third one: to escape the predicament.

True, but one could still choose either way in all of these cases.
PS: to polytropos’s entire last post!

 

[Bahman]

Aha. So in your opinion if one is locked in a burning room, then one has the two “options”. One is to stay put and burn, and the other one is to jump to his death. Or, if a woman is being raped, then she has the two “options” of laying back an “enjoy” it, or fighting back in vain. Or maybe a mafioso holds a gun pointing to the victim’s family, and demands the victim to perform an illegal act - or else!. Not much of an “option” in either case. Neither one offers a real option, in the first one: to survive, in the second and the third one: to escape the predicament.

If you have one option then there is no room left for free will.

Not true, not even in principle. Consider “chaos theory”. If the equations describing the event are non-linear (quadratic or more complicated), then the outcome is not predictable and not computable. There cannot be an accurate weather forecast, even if one knew the position and speed of all the air molecules, because the equations are non-linear.

It is deterministic but not computable precisely to the last digit hence not predictable. For the problem you mention either an analytical solution is known or not. The fact that we don’t have an analytical solution does not mean that it does not exist. We normally strive to computational analysis when we don’t know analytical solution which requires approximations which unfortunately does not lead a satisfactory result once the computational error accumulate.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

If you have one option then there is no room left for free will.

Agreed, but we don’t have only one option

Bagheera, this discussion is getting rather sidetracked. I apologize if this is just my bad memory, but as far as I recall either me or polytropos had the last word on both the argument from free will and the argument for free will. Do you have objections left to either?

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

But my calculator does not think when I type 2+2 into it.

A young ant was reading his book of folk-tales. One of the stories was about an elephant. He asked his mother: “Mommy, what is an elephant?”. And the mother replied: “It is a big, enormous, huge ant!”.

 

[polytropos]

A young ant was reading his book of folk-tales. One of the stories was about an elephant. He asked his mother: “Mommy, what is an elephant?”. And the mother replied: “It is a big, enormous, huge ant!”.

Which once again begs the question, since whether our minds could fully emerge from causal interactions in some (possibly loose) way analogous to lower computational systems is precisely what is at stake.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

Which once again begs the question, since whether our minds could fully emerge from causal interactions in some (possibly loose) way analogous to lower computational systems is precisely what is at stake.

You still think in a linear fashion. A learning, self-modifying system (whether it is made of electronic chips or neurons) cannot be compared (even analogously) to a pocket calculator.