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Ron_Conte
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“As for acts which are themselves sins, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives, they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?”
(St. Augustine, Contra Mendacium, VII, 18.)
(St. Augustine, Contra Mendacium, VII, 18.)
J
Jaaanosik
Guest
Ron,“As for acts which are themselves sins, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives, they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?”
(St. Augustine, Contra Mendacium, VII, 18.)
The fact remains that an intent can change meaning of an act, its definition if it’s a sin or not.
We are in the same boat. I am trying to find out rules to these exceptions.
We can do it here or via email. Whatever you prefer.
God bless,
Jano
L
Leegal
Guest
Yes, when it prevents the natural death process from occuring. The Church, though, does not recognize the term “vegetative state.” We are never “vegetables.”Orthodox Judaism agrees with Catholicism regarding the moral evil of euthanasia, even if the patient is suffering intensely and requests to be put out of their misery. Medication cannot be used for the explicit purpose of killing the patient, but can be used to alleviate pain even if it inadvertently results in death. I believe the Church states this as well. However, although doctors should engage in what methods they can to keep their patient alive and reduce their suffering, extraordinary measures used to resuscitate a person need not be maintained if they are preventing the natural death process: for example, if a ventilator is artificially keeping a person alive, it may be removed to enable the death process to proceed naturally. Is this true according to Catholic teaching?
Interesting article – though long – on the use of feeding tubes, for example, when confronted with conditions or different states as in the difference between dying and “post-coma unresponsiveness” since the Papacy does not use “vegetative” to describe a person.
Are Feeding Tubes Morally Obligatory?
I would add though that not all sterilization and ABC is banned. When necessary to confront a medical condition, the Church will allow dispensation. A woman with cancerous cysts on her ovaries is NOT to leave the ovaries untreated. The cancer must be removed, along with the ovary. A woman with amenorrhea can use ABC to control the condition hormonally. This is not an evil when required.
ABC, sterilization may be objective evils when wrongly used to prevent conception, but not instrinsically evil because they can have other purposes which is to treat some other underlying condition.
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Ron_Conte
Guest
Pope John Paul II: “Hence human activity cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject’s intention is good.” Veritatis Splendor 72The fact remains that an intent can change meaning of an act, its definition if it’s a sin or not.
“But the consideration of these consequences, and also of intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice.” Veritatis Splendor 77
“a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed” Veritatis Splendor 78
“Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object’.” Veritatis Splendor 80
“If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” Veritatis Splendor 81
Catechism of the Catholic Church: “Legitimate intentions on the part of the spouses do not justify recourse to morally unacceptable means (for example, direct sterilization or contraception).” CCC 2399
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Nate13
Guest
Your banging your head against a wall because you are talking about two different “intents”.Ron,
The fact remains that an intent can change meaning of an act, its definition if it’s a sin or not.
We are in the same boat. I am trying to find out rules to these exceptions.
We can do it here or via email. Whatever you prefer.
God bless,
Jano
“I’m going to use the pill/condom to prevent fertility during this sexual act…” is always intrinsically evil no matter what comes after that statement.
This statement:
Can be summed up in one word: “contracepting”. If I say “contracepting” it implies an intent to the act.I’m going to use the pill/condom to prevent fertility during this sexual act
Its like saying “murder” which is the same as “killing an innocent person unjustly”. The term “murder” has an inbuilt intent to it as does the term “contracepting”.
It would be wrong to say killing is intrinsically evil.
It is right to say murder is intrinsically evil.
Thus why it is accurate to say contraception is intrinsically evil.
N
Nate13
Guest
Thank you for that link. Very informative.Y
Interesting article – though long – on the use of feeding tubes, for example, when confronted with conditions or different states as in the difference between dying and “post-coma unresponsiveness” since the Papacy does not use “vegetative” to describe a person.
Are Feeding Tubes Morally Obligatory?
J
Jaaanosik
Guest
Ron,Pope John Paul II: “Hence human activity cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject’s intention is good.” Veritatis Splendor 72
“But the consideration of these consequences, and also of intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice.” Veritatis Splendor 77
“a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed” Veritatis Splendor 78
“Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object’.” Veritatis Splendor 80
“If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” Veritatis Splendor 81
Catechism of the Catholic Church: “Legitimate intentions on the part of the spouses do not justify recourse to morally unacceptable means (for example, direct sterilization or contraception).” CCC 2399
we can go around whole year. You can post anything and I’ll come back with the question.
Cutting a limb with bad intentions is consider mutilation. Veritatis Splendor 80 defines mutilation as an intrinsically evil act.
Are you saying that cutting a limb with good intentions to save one’s life is not OK?
God bless,
Jano
F
fix
Guest
As I said in the other post medication cannot be intrinsically evil, only certain actions can be evil.Ron,
we can go around whole year. You can post anything and I’ll come back with the question.
Cutting a limb with bad intentions is consider mutilation. Veritatis Splendor 80 defines mutilation as an intrinsically evil act.
Are you saying that cutting a limb with good intentions to save one’s life is not OK?
God bless,
Jano
Please see this
S
seekerz
Guest
I think here you need to differentiate between contraception and contraceptives as it may cause confusion. Contraception is intrinsically evil per CCC but it does not mean that the use of any drug with a contraceptive effect is necessarily also intrinsically evil.Pope John Paul II: “Hence human activity cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject’s intention is good.” Veritatis Splendor 72
“But the consideration of these consequences, and also of intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice.” Veritatis Splendor 77
“a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed” Veritatis Splendor 78
“Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed ‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object’.” Veritatis Splendor 80
“If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” Veritatis Splendor 81
Catechism of the Catholic Church: “Legitimate intentions on the part of the spouses do not justify recourse to morally unacceptable means (for example, direct sterilization or contraception).” CCC 2399
Theological discussions of a medical nature can get very frustrating for me because some straight line relationships are sometimes assumed which are not necessarily true. Many drugs which act on the a woman’s reproductive system, either because they were fomulated to do so, or as a side effect, are used for multiple purposes - some licit, some not. Therefore, intent does carry much weight in medical decision-making for any woman. Other considerations in addition to intent: in the case of drugs of a contraceptive nature used for medical reasons, relief of a disease/disorder is the common consequence and the situation may be that alternatives have not been tried/do not exist/have failed.
What makes intent in these situations very complicated (at least in my mind) is that it can vary with the persons involved as well as with time. The provider’s intent may be two-fold: e.g. using contraceptive pills to stop abnormal bleeding patterns in a teenaged girl. The parent and the patient may initially consent to treatment only with the intent of stopping the bleeding, but one or both may come to tacitly approve of the contraceptive effect all the same.
Ultimately I believe that blanket statements should not be made about particular drugs/treatments or individual cases because of the multiple factors which have to be considered in deciding whether their medical use is licit or not.
B
Bookcat
Guest
I have not followed the conversation …but I would note this.Ron,
we can go around whole year. You can post anything and I’ll come back with the question.
Cutting a limb with bad intentions is consider mutilation. Veritatis Splendor 80 defines mutilation as an intrinsically evil act.
Are you saying that cutting a limb with good intentions to save one’s life is not OK?
God bless,
Jano
It is not the good intentions that change an intrinsically evil act into a good. Nothing can do that.
What is different here is the object itself.
Mutilation
Vs
Surgical Amputation
(yes there are different intentions “embedded” in these different object in addition but they are different moral objects is the reason for the one being intrinsically evil and the other being potentially good)
J
Jaaanosik
Guest
What is a moral object of the surgical amputation?I have not followed the conversation …but I would note this.
It is not the good intentions that change an intrinsically evil act into a good. Nothing can do that.
What is different here is the object itself.
Mutilation
Vs
Surgical Amputation
(yes there are different intentions “embedded” in these different object in addition but they are different moral objects is the reason for the one being intrinsically evil and the other being potentially good)
What is an intent of the surgical amputation?
What happens to object if you separate the intent from it?
B
Bookcat
Guest
Surgical AmputationWhat is a moral object of the surgical amputation?
What is an intent of the surgical amputation?
What happens to object if you separate the intent from it?
Again remember there is an intent that is “embedded” within a particular object.
The Church teaches that the circumstance or intention* cannot change an intrinsically evil moral object into a good*. It cannot justify it. But such does not mean there is not “intents” or “circumstances” that* go into making up a moral object*.
Note that the marital act, fornication and adultery are all “sexual intercourse” (as mutilation and amputation can both be “cutting off an arm”…or murder and just capital punishment are both “killing a man”)…but all three are different moral objects.
Fornication is an intrinsically evil moral object. No intention or circumstance can make it good. But certainly the very definition of Fornication -sexual relations between to unmarried persons who are not married to others …involves that very “circumstance” etc…embedded in the object. The circumstance that is being addressed in the three sources of morality --that cannot change an intrinsically evil into a good are things like “we love each other and are planning to get married this year”…etc or take the example of “Adultery” …well yes the “circumstance” of it being at least one married person having relations with another they are not married too is part of “Adultery”…again that is not what is meant by “circumstance” …whereas the circumstance that someone would seek to change the evil into a good would be things like “well my spouse does not love me anymore” etc etc…can never make it good.
No good intention can make a moral object that is evil “in itself” into a good. Can not justify it.
Do “moral objects” involve certain “intentions or circumstances” within their very nature…yes sure…but it is not the “intentions or circumstances” that being referred to in the Catechism in the sources of morality.
scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c1a4.htm
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Ron_Conte
Guest
The Magisterium has never taught that intentions and circumstances go into making up a moral object. You cannot find any magisterial document saying anything like that, because it is not the teaching of the Church. By saying that intentions and circumstances “go into making up” the moral object, you are contradicting your own assertion that intentions and circumstances cannot change an intrinsically evil act into a good act.The Church teaches that the circumstance or intention* cannot change an intrinsically evil moral object into a good*. It cannot justify it. But such does not mean there is not “intents” or “circumstances” that* go into making up a moral object*.
Do “moral objects” involve certain “intentions or circumstances” within their very nature…yes sure…
By the way, the act itself is called intrinsically evil, not the moral object. If the moral object is evil, then the chosen act is intrinsically evil, because it is intrinsically ordered toward that evil end (the moral object).
There are three fonts of morality: intention, moral object, circumstances. Since intention and circumstances cannot change an intrinsically evil act (an act with an evil moral object) into a good act, intention and circumstances are not found in the moral object.
The moral object is the end, in terms of morality, toward which the deliberately chosen act is intrinsically ordered. It is this inherent ordering of the act itself toward an evil proximate end (its moral object) that makes the act good or evil. Choosing such a disordered act is a sin.
Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, n. 78:
The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”, and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him.
A human person must make a “correct choice of actions”, in other words, the chosen act must be good in itself, not evil in itself. No intention or circumstance can justify the choice of an act that is inherently disordered. Nor do intention or circumstances comprise, even in part, the moral object.
**
Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, n. 80:**
Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature “incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object”.
B
Bookcat
Guest
Actually I am not.The Magisterium has never taught that intentions and circumstances go into making up a moral object. You cannot find any magisterial document saying anything like that, because it is not the teaching of the Church. By saying that intentions and circumstances “go into making up” the moral object, you are contradicting your own assertion that intentions and circumstances cannot change an intrinsically evil act into a good act.
And weither or not the Magisterium has never taught that there are intentions and circumstance that “go into making making up the moral object” is immaterial. These are not the intentions and circumstances that that Church is speaking of in terms of the sources of morality. They have nothing to do with them. The have nothing to do with seeking say that they change an intrinsically evil object into a good. They have to do with the nature of the moral object itself. Marital relations is sexual intercourse that takes place within a marriage and are open to life etc. Fornication is sexual intercourse that takes place between two persons who are not married to each other or another.* Adultery* is sexual intercourse with the circumstance that at least one of the persons is married to someone else.
Without those kinds of “circumstance” the moral object would not exist.
The circumstance that is meant in the sources of morality is not that which is part and parcel of the moral object but rather outside such. “My boyfriend and I are getting married soon so it is ok to have intercourse” or “I need this abortion because I have too many Children to feed already” or “I need this abortion because if I do not I will die” etc etc.
That is what is meant by the CCC when it states:
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39
1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
The circumstance or intention does not change the intrinsically evil moral objects of fornication or abortion here into something good. Even the most laudable intention or otherwise important circumstance can not do so.
.
S
seekerz
Guest
Here’s one circumstance for you: I was reading on another thread of a wife who is allergic to her husband’s sperm, a condition for which condoms were prescribed. In considering the morality of condom use in such a case, it’s important to note that this allergy, when severe, is associated with infertility and such couples would need special fertility procedures in order to conceive. Condoms are only one treatment option, but supposing all else had proved futile, would their use in this case be immoral? I’m leaning toward no, because the intent here is to prevent a harmful allergic reaction from recurring and because procreation by natural means is already rendered unfeasible by the condition itself. I have seen arguments to the contrary though.Actually I am not.
And weither or not the Magisterium has never taught that there are intentions and circumstance that “go into making making up the moral object” is immaterial. These are not the intentions and circumstances that that Church is speaking of in terms of the sources of morality. They have nothing to do with them. The have nothing to do with seeking say that they change an intrinsically evil object into a good. They have to do with the nature of the moral object itself. Marital relations is sexual intercourse that takes place within a marriage and are open to life etc. Fornication is sexual intercourse that takes place between two persons who are not married to each other or another.* Adultery* is sexual intercourse with the circumstance that at least one of the persons is married to someone else.
Without those kinds of “circumstance” the moral object would not exist.
The circumstance that is meant in the sources of morality is not that which is part and parcel of the moral object but rather outside such. “My boyfriend and I are getting married soon so it is ok to have intercourse” or “I need this abortion because I have too many Children to feed already” or “I need this abortion because if I do not I will die” etc etc.
That is what is meant by the CCC when it states:
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39
1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
The circumstance or intention does not change the intrinsically evil moral objects of fornication or abortion here into something good. Even the most laudable intention or otherwise important circumstance can not do so.
.
R
Ron_Conte
Guest
You are admitting that your position on this issue is not the teaching of the Magisterium.And weither or not the Magisterium has never taught that there are intentions and circumstance that “go into making making up the moral object” is immaterial.
A moral sexual act has a threefold moral object, the marital, unitive, and procreative meanings. When a sexual act is inherently ordered towards this end, then it is intrinsically good.Marital relations is sexual intercourse that takes place within a marriage and are open to life etc. Fornication is sexual intercourse that takes place between two persons who are not married to each other or another.* Adultery* is sexual intercourse with the circumstance that at least one of the persons is married to someone else.
Sex outside of marriage is intrinsically evil because it is inherently disordered; it is deprived of the marital meaning in its object.
Adultery is intrinsically evil because it is inherently non-marital; its end (object or moral object) is non-marital. Adultery is also intrinsically evil because it is ordered toward the breaking of the marital vows.
The intrinsic ordering of the act itself toward a good or evil proximate end is not a circumstance, nor is it an intention.
**
Veritatis Splendor says the same thing:**
“The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”… (VS 78)”
The human person must make a correct choice of action, by choosing an act that is ordered or disordered. The moral object depends on that ordering, not on intention.
“One must therefore reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species – its “object” – the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned. (VS 79)”
The holy Pontiff requires us to reject any theory that claims it is impossible to determine the good or evil of the moral object without considering intention and circumstances. The theory that intention and circumstances are part of the moral object is one such thesis that must be rejected.
“The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of the human act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to the good and to the ultimate end, which is God. (VS 79)”
The moral object is not a combination, in whole or in part, of intention or circumstances. It is the ordering of the act toward a good or evil proximate end (the moral object) and for a moral act, it is ultimately its ordering toward God as our ultimate end.
“that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision (VS 78)”
The human person deliberately chooses a type of act, and that act is good or evil in itself based on its object, i.e. the proximate end of the chosen act. That is why intrinsically evil acts are called evil “in and of themselves” and “by the very nature” of the act. An intrinsicallly evil act is one “which of its very nature contradicts the moral order”.
“If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain “irremediably” evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act “subjectively” good or defensible as a choice. (VS 81)”
R
Ron_Conte
Guest
The use of a condom in an act of natural intercourse is the deliberate choice of an inherently contraceptive, and therefore inherently immoral, act. The good effect of preventing an allergic reaction is obtained by means of a barrier contraceptive. So an evil means is being used to a good end. The end does not justify the means. The deliberate choice of an intrinsically disordered act cannot be justified by a medical purpose (intention), nor by difficult circumstances.Here’s one circumstance for you: I was reading on another thread of a wife who is allergic to her husband’s sperm, a condition for which condoms were prescribed. In considering the morality of condom use in such a case, it’s important to note that this allergy, when severe, is associated with infertility and such couples would need special fertility procedures in order to conceive. Condoms are only one treatment option, but supposing all else had proved futile, would their use in this case be immoral? I’m leaning toward no, because the intent here is to prevent a harmful allergic reaction from recurring and because procreation by natural means is already rendered unfeasible by the condition itself. I have seen arguments to the contrary though.
B
Bookcat
Guest
It is rather like water being wet.You are admitting that your position on this issue is not the teaching of the Magisterium.
The Magisterium is not going to disagree here.
The nature of a particular moral object is just that --what it is.
B
Bookcat
Guest
The “circumstance” that is being referred to in the sources of morality is not the “circumstance” that is part and parcel of the moral object.
(all the quotes given are wonderful and true…no disagreement with the quotes (I profess the Catholic Faith! Amen!)…but they are not referring to the what I am referring to)
(all the quotes given are wonderful and true…no disagreement with the quotes (I profess the Catholic Faith! Amen!)…but they are not referring to the what I am referring to)
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