Can a Philosophical Case Be Made for Immaterial Human Intellect?

[KyrieEleison17]

I think you are thinking of “qualia” or the experience the observer has at observing color for instance that is more than just detecting wavelengths of light. This is probably related to an immaterial component of the observer. This might be an absurd example, but it may be the case that you and I have an “inverted spectrum” where we have agreed to call a certain color “red” but are actually perceiving different colors. If we swapped spectra, then each of us would have a novel experience viewing a strawberry for instance. Since the physical (name removed by moderator)uts are the same regardless (same wavelengths of light), then maybe that would be proof of an immaterial component of the human person? I have no idea if inverted spectra are real though as it seems a little bizarre. There are probably better examples but I am not too familiar with the philosophy behind qualia so I wouldn’t know what they are off the top of my head. Thank you for your (name removed by moderator)ut though.

Yes, qualia are the just ghosts or re-emergence of philosophical qualities coming back to haunt modern philosophy and science. Again, sophistic arguments might conceal and confuse them and give the impression that there’s no problem or basis for qualia, but with work and training a really good philosopher or scientist will see past this and know that there is a giant explanatory hole here. This hole was classically filled with God, as in Descartes’ case.

When considering colour as I did in my above example it is stunning to see the ghost of Descartes (Dualism) reappear with a vengeance even though, no doubt, the authors of the theories involved by no means were consciously or deliberately Cartesian - indeed, it is unlikely the theorists and researchers involved had ever actually seriously studied Descartes. But there he is. After all, Descartes seems to have been very well aware of the assumptions and goals of the modern scientific experiment and worldview and his whole enterprise was to provide a philosophical basis or justification for it. In that he had mixed success.

Remember, according to theory, what we see or experience as colour does not emerge in reality until there is a sensitive observer with the capacity to see, one; and two, the “information” that is the basis of colour in things still requires (two) “interpretation”. Colour does not come into the picture until after “two”. Science is giving us an objective basis for colour assignment and differentiation (different wavelengths, which are really just frequencies) but not the actual source of the colours themselves. It must be remembered that the scientific “world” is neither black nor white: it actually has no colour in it at all.

 

[KyrieEleison17]

The concept of triangularity is not limited to these values. There is obviously a range of possible values leading to infinite combinations. We understand this without having to imagine all the possibilities.

Bingo. It would almost certainly be impossible for us to imagine all the possible realizations of a triangle. Notwithstanding, we could recognize each possible instance as one. That is largely the point and, for some, problem with the intellect. The concept of triangle can’t be defined as any one particular instance of a triangle with its particular characteristics (e.g. the lengths of its sides) or mentally associated with the image/memory of it (as only one kind of triangle would be a triangle, say, equilaterals), otherwise every other possible triangle would not count as a triangle.

Moreover, the definition of a triangle does not include matter and makes it an obvious instance of a classical Form.

Where I think we naturally struggle is in differentiating between the imagination, the memory and the rational intellect: the usual source or basis of our abstractions (and in a sense their cause) and the subsequent abstracted nature or form we acquire from them. We imagine particulars when considering or thinking about triangles.

Now to help make this clearer for readers, my (and your) imagination can produce any amount or variety of triangles once we have abstracted or understood something of their essential nature - the skies the limit and we would quickly get bored of making up different triangles; but the particular triangles we imagined are produced based on something else ; namely, what we know about the nature of a triangle. The latter (knowledge or understanding) is the basis for the images and also what we “square” (so to speak) the particular with to verify that it is, indeed, actually an instance of a triangle. Thus we see that the two must be different. That knowledge or understanding of the nature is also what we abstract from considering particular triangles and are thereby enabled to have a universal concept or understanding of the nature of a triangle and hence recognize all of them regardless of their particular differences (e.g. size, colour or kind).

Thus the more clearly or correctly I understand the nature of a triangle (classically, the more devoid of matter it is in my understanding) the more readily I can actually recognize any instance of a triangle.

 

[ynotzap]

Except that we know that when the brain is no longer alive, no thinking or knowing takes place.

Obviously thinking and knowing require the services of that live spheroid (and by extension, the body it is housed in).

ICXC NIKA

It does while we live is this mode of existence thats why I stated the soul with its faculty of intellect is extrinsically dependent on matter. that is, that matter is not needed for it to operate. Truth then becomes intuitive or infused by God. Reasoning in no longer needed when the souls’ activity can no longer be sustained by the body because the body becomes expended. Corruption due to sin. Since when does demension apply to something immaterial. The soul is the principle of activity of the whole human body. When the body can no longer support its activity, it separates.

 

[ynotzap]

I see where in addition to the ordinary three space coordinates of length, width, and depth in the theory of relativity time is regarded as the fourth dimention. ,an abstract immaterial concept also still a theory. I believe that it would involve the second degree of abstraction that St. Thomas speaks of. There are principles found in mathematical abstraction that are of a metaphysical nature. that make the mathematical abstractions work. I would assume the existence of the concept the unit one is one metaphysical principle used in mathematical abstraction. Existence, or being lies at the basis of the concept. it would fall into the field of Ontology I may be wrong in some of my ideas, but I try to convey to the best of my ability what I believe to be true. Reality will verify it one way or the other.

 

[polytropos]

It does while we live is this mode of existence thats why I stated the soul with its faculty of intellect is extrinsically dependent on matter. that is, that matter is not needed for it to operate. Truth then becomes intuitive or infused by God. Reasoning in no longer needed when the souls’ activity can no longer be sustained by the body because the body becomes expended. Corruption due to sin. Since when does demension apply to something immaterial. The soul is the principle of activity of the whole human body. When the body can no longer support its activity, it separates.

Indeed. As Aristotle said, the intellect has no bodily organ. His point was not so much about biology but about the fact that intellectual activities do not essentially require matter to perform (and, by arguments like those I cited earlier, cannot be performed strictly by virtue of matter).

The intellect is the highest activity of the human soul, so the human soul is essentially immaterial (because a rational soul entails the vegetative/appetitive/perceptive powers of other, “lesser” souls, while the converse is not true). Humans do require our perceptive powers in the first place in order to think, because we obtain our conceptual knowledge by abstracting from the physical world, but this dependence is extrinsic to the soul’s operations.

 

[epan]

I’m not sure that spatial triplication is an equivalent of triangularity, but maybe an instantiation of the number 3 in space. My point is that if you instantiate triangularity or the number 3 or whatever you are giving discreteness to the concept that the concept does not require. The concept, once grasped via a triangle or some material object, does not need recourse to the same triangle to be understood: the thinker understands what triangularity is and can imagine any object that is triangular. Hence the understanding is immaterial because there’s no necessary correlation to any particular material object.

I appreciate your comments

It seems to me that all you have said is that abstract thinking exists.

Is thought immaterial? Try putting someone on life support, and then removing a brain from someone’s skull, and see how well they think. Thought seems (to me) to be a physical process which occurs inside of a material brain.

Though you might be interested in what Dawkins says about memes. He starts from the point of view that the only immortality that we see in the natural universe is that of genetic information. Then he advances the argument to include ideas. So, by his reasoning, thoughts are indeed independent of physical reality. The physical vessel exists for the purpose of preserving and passing on the information, which is itself abstract and not tied to any particular brain.

That is the closest I know to a scientific theory, as opposed to a philosophical one, of what you are getting at.

 

[tonyrey]

Truth is the main stumbling block for materialists. One stated on this forum that it is an “isomorphism of atomic particles” In other words one set of atomic particles corresponds to another set of atomic particles. He never explained how it corresponds nor how another set of atomic particles (the brain) recognises their correspondence. Such are the absurdities to which they resort in their futile attempt to evade the reality of the mind and reduce its activity to purposeless processes which have no idea of what they are doing.

Do materialists actually live as if they are impotent machines?

Our primary datum and sole certainty is our stream of consciousness frpm which we infer the existence of material objects. They certainly exist but they are not the fundamental reality. As Pascal remarked, we are superior to the universe because we know it exists but the universe doesn’t know we exist…

 

[epan]

Truth is the main stumbling block for materialists. One stated on this forum that it is an “isomorphism of atomic particles” In other words one set of atomic particles corresponds to another set of atomic particles. He never explained how it corresponds nor how another set of atomic particles (the brain) recognises their correspondence. Such are the absurdities to which they resort in their futile attempt to evade the reality of the mind and reduce its activity to purposeless processes which have no idea of what they are doing.

Do materialists actually live as if they are impotent machines?

Is that what was meant? I think that references to isomorphisms in thought or in computer algorithms, or in mathematical systems, refers to the abstract representation of reality. The sense that an that all isomorphic representations are atomically identical is not mainstream thinking at all, and false, based on what I know of neurochemistiry and neurophysiology.

 

[balto]

Actually, all of his articles are available online, some of which pertain to philosophy of mind.

Thanks for the links. I have some time off from school so maybe I’ll do something productive this year.

Despite the fact that some people are rather convinced by computational theories of mind, I think consideration of what computers intrinsically lack is a good way to grasp what Feser means by intentionality. Physical symbols depend on humans for their meaning. When I type “meaning” into my computer, the text only has semantic content as an extension of my understanding of it; as pixels lit up on a screen, it lacks semantic content. But similar points might be made regarding any operations of a physical system. The binary that my computer reads is an indeterminate system. It is physically active, but semantically meaningless until used for human purposes.

So physical systems, even computers, do not beget real semantic content. Computers (or handwriting, or any physically instantiated symbol) have at best “derived” intentionality. Humans have intrinsic intentionality (and we could not even speculate that they have “derived” intentionality, since human cognition seems to be the only source of intentionality we know of).

Yeah, I was thinking that he meant something along these lines, but your wording of it helps make it clearer! I always appreciate when analogies to computer science can be drawn.

 

[tonyrey]

Is that what was meant? I think that references to isomorphisms in thought or in computer algorithms, or in mathematical systems, refers to the abstract representation of reality. The sense that an that all isomorphic representations are atomically identical is not mainstream thinking at all, and false, based on what I know of neurochemistiry and neurophysiology.

The materialist in question is a computer programmer who denies the reality of abstractions for which he substituted “isomorphisms of atomic particles”:

Originally Posted by tonyrey

 

[balto]

It seems to me that all you have said is that abstract thinking exists.

Is thought immaterial? Try putting someone on life support, and then removing a brain from someone’s skull, and see how well they think. Thought seems (to me) to be a physical process which occurs inside of a material brain.

Though you might be interested in what Dawkins says about memes. He starts from the point of view that the only immortality that we see in the natural universe is that of genetic information. Then he advances the argument to include ideas. So, by his reasoning, thoughts are indeed independent of physical reality. The physical vessel exists for the purpose of preserving and passing on the information, which is itself abstract and not tied to any particular brain.

That is the closest I know to a scientific theory, as opposed to a philosophical one, of what you are getting at.

I see what you are saying and you are correct about the necessity of the brain for thinking. But my contention is that the brain, although necessary, is not sufficient for thinking. Yes, the material components are necessary to do the abstractions, but the abstractions do not correspond to a specific material object. If we assume for the sake of argument that all material data of the brain’s processes are known, what would be the common signal in the data, since there are presumably an infinite number of specific material objects that could be imagined? True, the data may be able to supply a probability that the subject is thinking of a particular concept, but not a determinate answer. It could only be an educated guess, and that would depend entirely on the researcher’s ability to parse the semantic content of the subject’s thoughts. If thinking is purely physical there should exist a common signal that will tell you for certain what abstraction the thinker is entertaining.

As to the Dawkins point, that’s very interesting, especially considering the worldview he espouses. I guess it’s weird when certain people semi-agree on something. Thank you for your comments

 

[tonyrey]

Is thought immaterial? Try putting someone on life support, and then removing a brain from someone’s skull, and see how well they think. Thought seems (to me) to be a physical process which occurs inside of a material brain…

If thought is a physical process we have no control over our thoughts with devastating consequences for our claim to be rational beings. How valuable are conclusions for which we are not responsible?

 

[epan]

If thought is a physical process we have no control over our thoughts with devastating consequences for our claim to be rational beings. How valuable are conclusions for which we are not responsible?

I don’t understand why you would think that we have no control over our own thoughts. We have control over many of the physical processes in our bodies. Do you type on your keyboard involuntarily, or do you have control over the muscles in your fingers?

Anyone who meditates can tell you that they have a good deal of control over their own cognition. Some yogis can slow their heartbeat down voluntarily.

 

[epan]

I see what you are saying and you are correct about the necessity of the brain for thinking. But my contention is that the brain, although necessary, is not sufficient for thinking. Yes, the material components are necessary to do the abstractions, but the abstractions do not correspond to a specific material object. If we assume for the sake of argument that all material data of the brain’s processes are known, what would be the common signal in the data, since there are presumably an infinite number of specific material objects that could be imagined? True, the data may be able to supply a probability that the subject is thinking of a particular concept, but not a determinate answer. It could only be an educated guess, and that would depend entirely on the researcher’s ability to parse the semantic content of the subject’s thoughts. If thinking is purely physical there should exist a common signal that will tell you for certain what abstraction the thinker is entertaining.

As to the Dawkins point, that’s very interesting, especially considering the worldview he espouses. I guess it’s weird when certain people semi-agree on something. Thank you for your comments

Well, a brain is not all that is required for thinking. There are people with no brainwave activity who are probably not thinking anything at all. However, I would say that “thought” as we perceive it requires a brain to think it. It is pretty simple to prove.

Maybe this is a symantecs thing. Thinking may produce thoughts. Thoughts persist as ideas independently of any brain. But… they cannot be perceived without a brain. So, while in some sens they are independent of any particular brain, once predicated, they are dependent on the existence of some brain or brains to continue to exist.

 

[KyrieEleison17]

I don’t understand why you would think that we have no control over our own thoughts. We have control over many of the physical processes in our bodies. Do you type on your keyboard involuntarily, or do you have control over the muscles in your fingers?

Anyone who meditates can tell you that they have a good deal of control over their own cognition. Some yogis can slow their heartbeat down voluntarily.

I suspect he meant that a physical process as ordinarily understood has no room for free will. In an examination of the physical process involved in lightning there is no choice or determination or control. It is a necessary consequence of certain factors. Similarly, he worries, if thinking is an entirely physical phenomenon, then our sense of freedom of will or thought is an illusion. That is in fact the primary theory offered for thinking modernly by scientists: i.e., that free will or choice of what to think about is necessarily an illusion. Hence the meme theory by Dawkins, for example.

 

[epan]

I suspect he meant that a physical process as ordinarily understood has no room for free will. In an examination of the physical process involved in lightning there is no choice or determination or control. It is a necessary consequence of certain factors. Similarly, he worries, if thinking is an entirely physical phenomenon, then our sense of freedom of will or thought is an illusion. That is in fact the primary theory offered for thinking modernly by scientists: i.e., that free will or choice of what to think about is necessarily an illusion. Hence the meme theory by Dawkins, for example.

I think that is a misunderstanding of Dawkins. I gave examples of a physical/biological process which can be controlled - the beating of your heart. There are, in face yogis who can slow down and stop their own hearts through meditative practices. There is nothing about the fact that many processes in the body are physiological which precludes the personal control of those processes. The examples are numerous. Locomotion is an example of a complex physical process, which is voluntary and controllable for most people. Without volition and practice, it does not occur.

 

[polytropos]

Well, a brain is not all that is required for thinking. There are people with no brainwave activity who are probably not thinking anything at all. However, I would say that “thought” as we perceive it requires a brain to think it. It is pretty simple to prove.

I think if a materialist were to claim that a brain is sufficient for thinking, then that would include neural activity, action potentials, energy (name removed by moderator)uts into the brain, etc. What is contested is whether all of that is sufficient. The contingency of the mind’s operations on the physical brain do not show that sufficiency; they only show that the brain is necessary. Further argumentation would have to be supplied to argue that the brain can account for certain aspects of our thought, but IMO none is forthcoming, since physical systems cannot in principle account for intentional semantic content.

 

[polytropos]

I think that is a misunderstanding of Dawkins.

I think deploying his meme theory to argue that thoughts are not material is a misunderstanding of Dawkins.

In any case, memes have been harshly and justly criticized… because they are basically a pseudoscientific and ad hoc way to introduce the mechanism of natural selection into a realm where it doesn’t apply. The theory suffers from more problems than one can count. It lacks evidence despite purporting to be scientific. It’s vague (what is a meme? how are they transferred? how do they persist?). What qualifies as a “meme” is unclear: some suggestions have been faith, tolerance, the SALT agreement (I’m not kidding), goodness, beauty. To be like genes, memes need to be units - but as the previous examples show, this is practically incoherent: there seems to be no clear level of generality that the concept is supposed to encompass (SALT agreements and even tolerance are very specific, while beauty is incredibly broad). There seems to be no way to count them (as we can with genes) because there is no clear division between one meme and another. There also seems to be no upper limit on how many “memes” one could have. How they are physically realized is not clear either.

 

[polytropos]

I suspect he meant that a physical process as ordinarily understood has no room for free will. In an examination of the physical process involved in lightning there is no choice or determination or control. It is a necessary consequence of certain factors. Similarly, he worries, if thinking is an entirely physical phenomenon, then our sense of freedom of will or thought is an illusion. That is in fact the primary theory offered for thinking modernly by scientists: i.e., that free will or choice of what to think about is necessarily an illusion. Hence the meme theory by Dawkins, for example.

To say that genes (and by extension, memes) are in some way immortal/nonphysical, and so avoid some purported conflict between determinism and free will, would be to equivocate as to the meaning of “nonphysical.” (This is on top of the problem that there seems to be no reason to suppose that the principles of natural selection translate neatly onto “memes,” or that memes are a coherent concept.) One might note that the content of genes, for instance, is “nonphysical” because it is “informational,” in a sense, and that it carries over across generations, multiply realized in different material substrata. That does not seem to offer, say, nonphysical causation as an available solution to the problem of free will, since genes are only “nonphysical” in an attenuated, acausal way.

That said, I don’t think that free will was Dawkins’ motivation for his meme theory. To quote Raymond Tallis, “The idea [meme theory], then, is daft, so it must have other attractions than plausibility. And the attraction is, of course, the dream of an all-encompassing theory, based on Darwinism, that would, to use Dennett’s…claim, unify ‘the realm of life, meaning and purpose with the realm of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law’. The extension of evolution from genes to memes props up the exaggerated assessment of the scope of Darwin’s great theory.”

 

[epan]

I think deploying his meme theory to argue that thoughts are not material is a misunderstanding of Dawkins.

In any case, memes have been harshly and justly criticized… because they are basically a pseudoscientific and ad hoc way to introduce the mechanism of natural selection into a realm where it doesn’t apply. The theory suffers from more problems than one can count. It lacks evidence despite purporting to be scientific. It’s vague (what is a meme? how are they transferred? how do they persist?). What qualifies as a “meme” is unclear: some suggestions have been faith, tolerance, the SALT agreement (I’m not kidding), goodness, beauty. To be like genes, memes need to be units - but as the previous examples show, this is practically incoherent: there seems to be no clear level of generality that the concept is supposed to encompass (SALT agreements and even tolerance are very specific, while beauty is incredibly broad). There seems to be no way to count them (as we can with genes) because there is no clear division between one meme and another. There also seems to be no upper limit on how many “memes” one could have. How they are physically realized is not clear either.

You seem to be confusing thoughts with ideas. One leads to the other, but they are not the same thing.

I’m aware of the criticisms of Dawkins meme theories, and I am still deciding what I think of them. I will say that in person, he is quite disarming and likable. I was rather struck by his generosity and kindness to Christians who were attacking him vehemently during the last talk I attended of his. He has later commented that he should have had the hecklers ejected.