Can a timeless God create time?

[polytropos]

I don’t have to identify the state of affairs at which God exists but time does not, because there is no such state of affairs. That’s the point of my argument.

“3 conclusion: There is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist.”

As a matter of fact, in order to counter my argument, ***you ***have to indentify such state of affairs.

I am afraid you have misunderstood me.

You’ve claimed that the conclusion “there is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist” implies that time has no absolute beginning. When I denied that and said that if time is past-finite then it is still true (or can be true) that time exists at every state of affairs, you replied, “No, because in that case, there is also a state of affairs at which (or for which) God exists and time doesn’t.” I have asked you to produce the state of affairs which would be included in a past-finite universe that would make the past-finite universe inconsistent with your conclusion that “there is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist.” If you can’t do that, then we have no reason to believe that your conclusion rules out a past-finite universe.

You seem to think that if every state of affairs includes time, then time extends infinitely in the past. Why? This is why I say we have different pictures before us; we clearly do not conceive of God’s eternality in the same way. This is why I have suspected sempiternality of lurking in your conception. The suggestion that a past-finite universe needs to have a state of affairs where God exists but time does not only seems to work if one conceives time as ontologically prior to God.

I am glad you don’t concede that, because in order to counter my argument, you have to concede it. as long as you don’t, my argument stands.

I don’t have to concede it; I believe that a past-finite universe is consistent with time existing at every state of affairs. You seem to think that in a past-finite universe, time would not exist in some state of affairs; that is what I don’t concede. Which state of affairs would it be? Surely not a state of affairs before time began. So then what?

That is irrelevant, polytropos. This has nothing to do with necessary facts.

It is relevant, because the scope fallacy makes the inference from (2) to (3) invalid.

(2) There is no state of affairs at which God doesn’t will the existence of time.
(3) There is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist.

God’s willing the existence of time at a state of affairs doesn’t imply that time exists at that state of affairs. (Unless, perhaps, you try to collapse everything into a single state of affairs, so that for any s1 and s2, s1 = s2. I will examine whether that is coherent below.)

Temporal states of affairs can occur at different times. Eternal states of affairs can’t. That’s the whole point. Becasue my argument shows that, given a timeless being “creates” time, time is eternal.

This is why I claim your states of affairs (particularly if you try to collapse everything into one state of affairs, but in general if states of affairs can span time) are not well-defined.

Suppose x is some created object. x exists at t1 and does not exist at t2. In your single eternal state of affairs, does x exist or not? Well, obviously both. Why is there no contradiction? Because it is not the case that x exists and doesn’t exist in the same respect; it exists at t1 and doesn’t exist at t2. We can’t infer that x exists eternally because you have described it in your single eternal state of affairs.

Nor can we infer that time exists eternally because you have described it in your single state of affairs.

Note also that if there is only one state of affairs and time exists in it, then the conclusion of your argument is satisfied. That says nothing of whether time extends infinitely into the past. Just like any other created thing, it does not have to exist for the “entirety” of a time-spanning state of affairs, so the inference to time being eternal is plainly invalid.

 

[MacQ]

It’s not necessary to demean the value of the OP. While it is true to say that “God is timeless,” perhaps that doesn’t provide enough for the reader to understand. After all, we have heard that so-and-so had “timeless beauty” or that “diamonds are forever.” So if a beautiful diamond is timeless and God is timeless, then is God a beautiful diamond? Or, is a beautiful diamond God?

Other members in this thread have already drawn out the principle that “God exists outside of time,” and it seems to me that is what you could say to help answer these questions better. Also, God is not a contingent being, but is an essential being – but even more than that, for God is being, in itself. That is, God is being AS being.

Therefore, the first argument fails as follows:

"The first one is, that if time began to exist, then so did God, because when God created time, God existed, and God didn’t exist at any time before that (because it’s the beginning of time)." This fails because “God existed” is a fallacy, because in fact, God IS existence, per se. So this means God is not subject to the rules to which the rest of creation is subject.

Furthermore, the second argument fails as follows:

"The second one is that if God is timeless, He can’t create time, because doing something, like creating the universe, presupposes a succession of events in order to create the universe." This fails because once again, the same rules to which all of us must abide are rules to which God is not subject, and consequently we are given to know that for Him to create, there is no need of successive events, for everything God does is from the singularity of His oneness of act. God created the heavens and the earth, God died on the Cross, God is with us all days even unto the consummation of the world, and God will come to judge the living and the dead on the last day, and it’s all the same NOW for God, WHO IS, outside of time.

But beyond that, God is more than a single act, for God is ACT itself. God is pure act. There is no division in the act of God, nor is there any division in the parts of God, for God has no parts. We say there are three persons, but that is not a division but a distinction. God is one in substance AND three in persons, all in the same essence, the same act of being.

We distinguish but we do not separate.

.

Like I said…
(ie, that’s pretty much what I said).

I admit I should have left out the notion that I considered it a silly question.
There’s probably a better word. The question contained assumed false equivalences IMO.

 

[polytropos]

The suggestion that a past-finite universe needs to have a state of affairs where God exists but time does not only seems to work if one conceives time as ontologically prior to God.

I’m worried this might seem obviously false. What I mean is: The suggestion that a past-finite universe needs to have a state of affairs where God exists but time does not only seems to work if one conceives God and time as on the same ontological par.

 

[belorg]

I am afraid you have misunderstood me.

You’ve claimed that the conclusion “there is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist” implies that time has no absolute beginning.

Yes, I have claimed that.

When I denied that and said that if time is past-finite then it is still true (or can be true) that time exists at every state of affairs, you replied, "No, because in that case, there is also a state of affairs at which (or for which) God exists and time doesn’t."I have asked you to produce the state of affairs which would be included in a past-finite universe that would make the past-finite universe inconsistent with your conclusion that “there is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist.” If you can’t do that, then we have no reason to believe that your conclusion rules out a past-finite universe.

If God is eternal and the univesre isn’t, then , in order to make that distinction, you need a state of affairs with God and without time. But the problem is: you cannot identify such state of affairs. Niether can I , of course, but that doesn’t matter.

You seem to think that if every state of affairs includes time, then time extends infinitely in the past.

No, I don’t. I think that if every state includes time, then time did not have an absolute beginning, just becasue it is impossible to identify a state of affairs with God and no time. So there is no basis to claim that God is eternal and time isn’t.

Why? This is why I say we have different pictures before us; we clearly do not conceive of God’s eternality in the same way. This is why I have suspected sempiternality of lurking in your conception. The suggestion that a past-finite universe needs to have a state of affairs where God exists but time does not only seems to work if one conceives time as ontologically prior to God.

But, polytropos, that is not my suggestion. I don’t think tha makes sensen, and that is why it is impossible to claim that God, provided he created time, is eternal and time isn’t.

I don’t have to concede it; I believe that a past-finite universe is consistent with time existing at every state of affairs. You seem to think that in a past-finite universe, time would not exist in some state of affairs; that is what I don’t concede. Which state of affairs would it be? Surely not a state of affairs before time began. So then what?

I have no idea what state of affairs it would be, because my argument shows there is no such state of affairs, which is my point.

It is relevant, because the scope fallacy makes the inference from (2) to (3) invalid.

(2) There is no state of affairs at which God doesn’t will the existence of time.
(3) There is no state of affairs at which it is true that time does not exist.

(2) is a necessary and sufficient condition for (3). In that sense it is "necessary ", as in x is necessary for y to obtain, which doesn’t entail that x is logically or metaphysically necessary.

God’s willing the existence of time at a state of affairs doesn’t imply that time exists at that state of affairs.

And , in order to claim this, you will have to show that there is in fact a state of affairs with God and without time, but you deny this.

Suppose x is some created object. x exists at t1 and does not exist at t2. In your single eternal state of affairs, does x exist or not?

If x exist at t1 and doesn’t exist at t2 then x does not exist in a single eternal state of affairs, so i have no idea what this question is about.

Well, obviously both. Why is there no contradiction? Because it is not the case that x exists and doesn’t exist in the same respect; it exists at t1 and doesn’t exist at t2. We can’t infer that x exists eternally because you have described it in your single eternal state of affairs.

Not obviously both.

Nor can we infer that time exists eternally because you have described it in your single state of affairs.

If I describe in in an eternal state of affairs, it exist eternally and it doesn’t stop existing between t1 and t2.

Note also that if there is only one state of affairs and time exists in it, then the conclusion of your argument is satisfied. That says nothing of whether time extends infinitely into the past. Just like any other created thing, it does not have to exist for the “entirety” of a time-spanning state of affairs, so the inference to time being eternal is plainly invalid.

If there is only one eternal state of affairs and time exists in it, then time is eternal. otherwise we end up with at least two states of affairs.

 

[polytropos]

If God is eternal and the univesre isn’t, then , in order to make that distinction, you need a state of affairs with God and without time.

I do not need to identify such a state of affairs because I can mark the distinction between God and the universe in any other number of ways (ie. that time need not exist, that God is outside of time, that creating time or existing at any time is not essential to God’s nature, etc. etc. etc.).

You introduced the clunky and non-standard “states of affairs” talk because it is impossible to formulate your argument in temporal terms. But states of affairs ignore all temporal distinctions that a theist would make, so they are obviously not going to be a necessary component of the theist’s philosophy of time (which will obviously be the ultimate arbiter of how the theist gives an account of eternity). So there is no reason that my account of God’s eternity should be formulated in terms of your states of affairs (especially if your states of affairs are intended to eliminate temporal commitments).

There is a timeline:
<----------------------------] 0
God causes this timeline to exist and is no way dependent on it. God’s eternal, single act is to will [his own goodness & the existence of the above timeline & its corresponding universe]. I don’t know what you mean by “a complete description of everything that exists” (I will point out below why I don’t think it is being used consistently, ie. with respect to time and substances existing in the universe). But any “complete description of everything that exists” is going to include: (a) God and (b) the universe’s existence. This is simply because there is nothing that corresponds to “before” the universe’s existence. Apart from the universe’s existence, there is just God–but God is willing that the universe exist. The universe’s existence is tensed, so time exists in every such “complete description of everything that exists.” But time nevertheless has an absolute beginning, on this model.

I think that if every state includes time, then time did not have an absolute beginning, just becasue it is impossible to identify a state of affairs with God and no time. So there is no basis to claim that God is eternal and time isn’t.

As I’ve said, I regard the bolded requirement as specious (which is to say I don’t think it is actually a requirement that there be a state of affairs without time for time to have an absolute beginning). However, I should also ask what the difference between time having an absolute beginning and time not extending infinitely into the past (or being past-finite). I have been using the expressions interchangeably.

One thought I would have is that you might regard the interval (0, inf) as having no “absolute beginning” (lowest term), while [0, inf) does have an absolute beginning. I could adopt that terminology, although I don’t think it is relevant to my conception of God. (The distinction there would arguably be relevant to the kalam argument, but that’s another issue.) I regard either as theologically satisfying, however.

But, polytropos, that is not my suggestion.
I didn’t say that you had made it explicit or even implicit. As I’ve said, I am just trying to understand your “picture” of eternality, because it is not at all clear to me even though we’ve been going on for several posts now.

quote=belorg;12082738 is a necessary and sufficient condition for (3). In that sense it is "necessary ", as in x is necessary for y to obtain, which doesn’t entail that x is logically or metaphysically necessary.

And , in order to claim this, you will have to show that there is in fact a state of affairs with God and without time, but you deny this.

I do deny that there is a state of affairs with God and without time, true. That is to say, in denying that, I claim that “time does not have an absolute beginning” does not follow from your conclusion because the past-finitude of time is consistent with your conclusion. (In other words, if I were to concede that your argument is sound, it would not tell against a past-finite universe.)

But that is not the only reason I believe your argument fails. What I am arguing here is that the argument is not even valid because it commits a formal fallacy. So here the point is: Suppose that I’m wrong and a past-finite universe does require a state of affairs at which God exists but time does not. Fair enough! Let s1 be that state of affairs, and let s2 be the state of affairs at which time does exist. Then the following is consistent: God wills that [time exist at s2] at s1, but time does not exist at s1.

In other words, no: (2) is not a necessary and sufficient condition for three, because God can will that time exist without willing that it exist in the state of affairs in which he wills it.

Here you might deny that there are multiple states of affairs. I won’t pursue that here because I have argued elsewhere that I don’t find the “states of affairs” talk coherent anyway. The reason I originally developed this line of argument was that at the beginning of our discussion (when you were using terms like “never” and “instant” rather than “states of affairs”), it was not clear that you had a single eternal state of affairs in mind.

In any case, the argument is not valid. If it were reformulated with a premise stating that there is only one state of affairs, then the scope fallacy could perhaps be removed (because the move isn’t formally fallacious if s1 = s2 for all s1, s2). However, the argument would still be unsound, since I do not find that “states of affairs” talk coherent.

 

[polytropos]

If x exist at t1 and doesn’t exist at t2 then x does not exist in a single eternal state of affairs, so i have no idea what this question is about.

I don’t think you are approaching time and the existence of created substances consistently.

First, you’re now saying that your single eternal state of affairs (ie. “a complete description of everything that exists”) excludes an object x that exists. But that is the only state of affairs. So how can x exist at t1 if it is not included in the one and only “complete description of everything that exists”? This is the consequence of steamrolling all temporal distinctions, and why your “states of affairs” talk is not coherent. Maybe this defect could be repaired by introducing time distinctions within a state of affairs. But then there is no reason why these couldn’t be applied to time itself (which will probably be considered as parasitic on the existence of other created substances), so the inference to time sharing the same temporal modality with God (ie. eternity) cuts no ice.

Consider the following:

(1) There is no state of affairs at which it is true that God does not exist.
(2) There is no state of affairs at which God doesn’t will the existence of x.
(3) Therefore, there is no state of affairs at which it is true that x does not exist.

Why does this argument fail? Because (2) is false (or indeterminate, at least) if x exists at t1 but not at t2. Rather we need:

(2’) There is no state of affairs at which God doesn’t will [the existence of x at t1].

I doubt you can infer anything interesting from this. There is an analogous defect in the argument you gave. We have both been using the locuation “time exists,” which is unclear. But if I hold that “time exists” should be analyzed in terms of God’s creation of a mutable substance at some time, then I don’t see how your argument could hold up.

If there is only one eternal state of affairs and time exists in it, then time is eternal. otherwise we end up with at least two states of affairs.

I can’t comment on this until you clarify how the one and only complete description of everything that exists is supposed to exclude some of the things that exist.

 

[belorg]

I don’t think you are approaching time and the existence of created substances consistently.

First, you’re now saying that your single eternal state of affairs (ie. “a complete description of everything that exists”) excludes an object x that exists. But that is the only state of affairs.

Sure

So how can x exist at t1 if it is not included in the one and only “complete description of everything that exists”?

x doesn’t exist at t1.

This is the consequence of steamrolling all temporal distinctions, and why your “states of affairs” talk is not coherent. Maybe this defect could be repaired by introducing time distinctions within a state of affairs. But then there is no reason why these couldn’t be applied to time itself (which will probably be considered as parasitic on the existence of other created substances), so the inference to time sharing the same temporal modality with God (ie. eternity) cuts no ice.

There is no defect.

Consider the following:

(1) There is no state of affairs at which it is true that God does not exist.
(2) There is no state of affairs at which God doesn’t will the existence of x.
(3) Therefore, there is no state of affairs at which it is true that x does not exist.

Why does this argument fail? Because (2) is false (or indeterminate, at least) if x exists at t1 but not at t2. Rather we need:

You are the one who claims that x exists at t1 but not at t2. I am not claiming that at all. What I am actually claiming is that given a single state of affairs it is not the case that x exists at t1 and not at t2.

(2’) There is no state of affairs at which God doesn’t will [the existence of x at t1].

There is no t1 in the eternal state of affairs of God.

I can’t comment on this until you clarify how the one and only complete description of everything that exists is supposed to exclude some of the things that exist.

If we take the hypothetical state of affairs in which God exists as a timeless being then a complete description of everything in that hypothetical state of affairs does cannot include t1 and t2 because the existence of t1 and t2 is temporal (they are successive moments of time), but by definition, in the “timless God state of affairs” there can be no successive moments.

 

[belorg]

You introduced the clunky and non-standard “states of affairs” talk because it is impossible to formulate your argument in temporal terms. But states of affairs ignore all temporal distinctions that a theist would make, so they are obviously not going to be a necessary component of the theist’s philosophy of time (which will obviously be the ultimate arbiter of how the theist gives an account of eternity).

For a theist’s to make temporal distinctions in a timless state is simply incoherent, so I can ignore this refutation.

There is a timeline:
<----------------------------] 0
God causes this timeline to exist and is no way dependent on it. God’s eternal, single act is to will [his own goodness & the existence of the above timeline & its corresponding universe]. I don’t know what you mean by “a complete description of everything that exists” (I will point out below why I don’t think it is being used consistently, ie. with respect to time and substances existing in the universe). But any “complete description of everything that exists” is going to include: (a) God and (b) the universe’s existence.

Yes, and both are eternal.

This is simply because there is nothing that corresponds to “before” the universe’s existence.

That is true.

Apart from the universe’s existence, there is just God–but God is willing that the universe exist. The universe’s existence is tensed, so time exists in every such “complete description of everything that exists.” But time nevertheless has an absolute beginning, on this model.

That’s an assertion I have heard countless time, but up to now nobody has been able to make it stick.

As I’ve said, I regard the bolded requirement as specious (which is to say I don’t think it is actually a requirement that there be a state of affairs without time for time to have an absolute beginning).

If there is no description of reality that doesn’t include time, then time does not begin.

However, I should also ask what the difference between time having an absolute beginning and time not extending infinitely into the past (or being past-finite). I have been using the expressions interchangeably.

One thought I would have is that you might regard the interval (0, inf) as having no “absolute beginning” (lowest term), while [0, inf) does have an absolute beginning.

That is a possibility, yes.

I could adopt that terminology, although I don’t think it is relevant to my conception of God. (The distinction there would arguably be relevant to the kalam argument, but that’s another issue.) I regard either as theologically satisfying, however.

Adopting that terminology means that time has no absolute beginning, which is what I have been arguing all along.

I didn’t say that you had made it explicit or even implicit. As I’ve said, I am just trying to understand your “picture” of eternality, because it is not at all clear to me even though we’ve been going on for several posts now.

Nobody has a clear picture of eternity.

I do deny that there is a state of affairs with God and without time, true. That is to say, in denying that, I claim that “time does not have an absolute beginning” does not follow from your conclusion because the past-finitude of time is consistent with your conclusion. (In other words, if I were to concede that your argument is sound, it would not tell against a past-finite universe.)

On that account, God is past-finite too. Yet He is eternal. Time is eternal is exactly the same way.

But that is not the only reason I believe your argument fails. What I am arguing here is that the argument is not even valid because it commits a formal fallacy. So here the point is: Suppose that I’m wrong and a past-finite universe does require a state of affairs at which God exists but time does not.

You are the one using the word “past-finite”. I don’t commit to that.

Fair enough! Let s1 be that state of affairs, and let s2 be the state of affairs at which time does

exist. Then the following is consistent: God wills that [time exist at s2] at s1, but time does not exist at s1.

But that’s impossible since God’s will(at s1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for time to exist, so time must exist at s1. From a timeless eternal point of view, “at s2” is meaningless. It would mean something like “not now, but later”, which is obviously incoherent from a non-temporal point of view.

In other words, no: (2) is not a necessary and sufficient condition for three, because God can will that time exist without willing that it exist in the state of affairs in which he wills it.

I have explained why that is incoherent.

In any case, the argument is not valid. If it were reformulated with a premise stating that there is only one state of affairs, then the scope fallacy could perhaps be removed (because the move isn’t formally fallacious if s1 = s2 for all s1, s2). However, the argument would still be unsound, since I do not find that “states of affairs” talk coherent.

The soundness of an argument is not determined by what you “find”, polytropos. It is determined by whether or not you can produce counter arguments.
[/quote]

 

[polytropos]

My comments will be brief, since we have pursued this at sufficient length that any one interested can weigh the arguments for himself. This’ll be my last response.

x doesn’t exist at t1.
…]
You are the one who claims that x exists at t1 but not at t2. I am not claiming that at all. What I am actually claiming is that given a single state of affairs it is not the case that x exists at t1 and not at t2.

There is no t1 in the eternal state of affairs of God.

If we take the hypothetical state of affairs in which God exists as a timeless being then a complete description of everything in that hypothetical state of affairs does cannot include t1 and t2 because the existence of t1 and t2 is temporal (they are successive moments of time), but by definition, in the “timless God state of affairs” there can be no successive moments.

First: You’ve introduced “states of affairs” talk by ad hoc stipulation. You never endeavored to show that it makes any sense, but for your argument to succeed, the theist has to be committed to states of affairs talk. What you’re now saying is that an object of our general experience that goes out of existence does not exist in that state of affairs. That is obviously incoherent.

Second: There is an illegitimate inference being made here from “God exists in this single state of affairs in a particular temporal modality (eternity)” to “everything that exists in this single state of affairs exists in that same eternal modality.” Since states of affairs bear no temporal commitments, this is unwarranted.

For that reason it cannot be inferred that time is eternal. Nor can it be inferred that there are no temporal distinctions within the single state of affairs.

This “states of affairs” language, as you are using it, is an absolute mess. If you introduce an incoherent notion, I have no commitment to it.

That’s an assertion I have heard countless time, but up to now nobody has been able to make it stick.

My claim is pretty weak, just that time can begin even if time exists at every state of affairs. Your argument relies on this being impossible. The only justification you provided in support of this was that there would have to be a state of affairs without time to distinguish the universe’s non-eternal modality from God’s eternal modality. But that is wrong, because states of affairs bear no temporal commitments and are therefore useless for distinguishing temporal modalities, and the theist has several other means for making the distinction. You said you could ignore that refutation because the theist cannot make temporal distinctions in a timeless state. But the inference to the timelessness of a state of affairs on the basis of one of its constituents is invalid, because states of affairs do not make temporal distinctions.

That is a possibility, yes.

Adopting that terminology means that time has no absolute beginning, which is what I have been arguing all along.

If “time has no absolute beginning” can refer to an interval (0, inf) rather than (-inf, inf), then it poses no threat to Christian theism anyway.

The soundness of an argument is not determined by what you “find”, polytropos. It is determined by whether or not you can produce counter arguments.

Then it is a good thing I have produced several.

 

[belorg]

First: You’ve introduced “states of affairs” talk by ad hoc stipulation. You never endeavored to show that it makes any sense, but for your argument to succeed, the theist has to be committed to states of affairs talk. What you’re now saying is that an object of our general experience that goes out of existence does not exist in that state of affairs. That is obviously incoherent.

I have never said anything like that. What I say is that, approaching timeless eternity as what it really is, namely a state (of affairs), there can, in that state of affairs be no object that goes out of existence, for the simple reasons that going our of existence is a temporal notion that has no place in an a-temporal modality

Second: There is an illegitimate inference being made here from “God exists in this single state of affairs in a particular temporal modality (eternity)” to “everything that exists in this single state of affairs exists in that same eternal modality.” Since states of affairs bear no temporal commitments, this is unwarranted.

Unless God is sempiternal, God does not exist in a temporal modality and neither does anything that exists in the same a-temporal modality. There is no temporal commitment anywhere. In fact, it now seems that you are the one conflating timeless eternity with sempiternity.

For that reason it cannot be inferred that time is eternal. Nor can it be inferred that there are no temporal distinctions within the single state of affairs.

The single state of affairs is defined as a-temporal. That is a direct consequence of your view on God’s eternal a-temporal existence.

This “states of affairs” language, as you are using it, is an absolute mess. If you introduce an incoherent notion, I have no commitment to it.

If you know of another way to talk about a-temporal eternity, ypu are very welcome to do it. But whichever way you use, you must always be careful not to sneak in temporal modalities. And that is what you have been doing all along.

My claim is pretty weak, just that time can begin even if time exists at every state of affairs. Your argument relies on this being impossible. The only justification you provided in support of this was that there would have to be a state of affairs without time to distinguish the universe’s non-eternal modality from God’s eternal modality.

That is simply what it means to say that God is timelessly eternal. That means that God exists in a modality without time. Which also means without beginning. And that is what my argument is all about.

But that is wrong, because states of affairs bear no temporal commitments and are therefore useless for distinguishing temporal modalities, and the theist has several other means for making the distinction. You said you could ignore that refutation because the theist cannot make temporal distinctions in a timeless state.

Of course atheist cannot do that

But the inference to the timelessness of a state of affairs on the basis of one of its constituents is invalid, because states of affairs do not make temporal distinctions.

And yet, you keep making them.

If “time has no absolute beginning” can refer to an interval (0, inf) rather than (-inf, inf), then it poses no threat to Christian theism anyway.

Actually it does, but that’s a matter for another discussion. What is important for this discussion is that time has no absolute beginning, which is what I have been claiming all along. And which is also what I was claiming in my original argument that CatholicSoxFan came up with.

1 God is timelessly eternal
2 God has no beginning (from 1)
3 God does not begin to do something.(from 2)
4 God’s decison has no beginning. (from3)
5 God’s decision is a necessary and sufficient condition for God’s creative act.
6 God’s creative act has no beginning (from 4 and 5)
7 God’s act to create time has no beginning.(from 6)
8 God’s act to create time is a necessary and sufficient condition for time to exist.
9** conclusion: time has no absolute beginning.**

**I **have never claimed in this thread that God cannot create time, just that he cannot create time that has an absolute beginning. And the argument for that is still iron-clad.

Then it is a good thing I have produced several.

Your argument show a lack of understanding of mine, which, I admit, is also because I fail to make it absolutely clear what I mean. And that is because I wish, at any cost, to avoid temporal references to talk about an a-temporal framework. That is extremely difficult because we, as spatio-temporal beings, are so used to spatio-temporal notions.

 

[polytropos]

Unless God is sempiternal, God does not exist in a temporal modality and neither does anything that exists in the same a-temporal modality. There is no temporal commitment anywhere. In fact, it now seems that you are the one conflating timeless eternity with sempiternity.

I won’t give a response, but I should clarify that when I say “temporal modality” I am denoting to a specific category of modalities. I contrast “temporal modality,” then, not with “a-temporal modality” but with other modalities used in philosophy like logical necessity. (This should have been clear from my referring to eternity as a temporal modality.) So “existing at t” is one sort of temporal modality. “existing outside of time” is another sort of temporal modality. That does not mean that an eternal being is in time, just that I am denoting its relation to time, viz. being outside of it.

As you have defined states of affairs, they are not a temporal modality because they shirk all temporal distinctions. The single state of affairs is not eternity (which is a temporal modality, ie. “existing outside of time”).

One line I have not bothered to pursue is that there are arguments against your position that time could be eternal as God is eternal (in the Summa):

I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

Since your arguments have been unclear in several respects and Thomas’s reasoning rests on less dubious notions (ie. not on states of affairs), we would do well to adopt his position.

There seems to be something of a circularity here. When I say that an object x exists at t1 but not t2, you say that it is not in the single state of affairs because it is not eternal. But due to the unchanging nature of God’s will, God wills it at all times (or in all states of affairs). (God is a necessary condition of its existence, so he must will it in the single eternal state of affairs.) If your argument works, this must work as well:

(7’) God’s act to create x has no beginning.(from 6)
(8’) God’s act to create time is a necessary and sufficient condition for x to exist
(9’) Conclusion: x has no absolute beginning.

But x does have an absolute beginning (or we can easily stipulate that it does, by saying that it doesn’t exist at t0). The reasoning is lazy; the scope fallacy is so glaring when we frame the problem in terms of an object rather than time itself. (Technically there is no scope fallacy, because the above argument “steamrolls” temporal distinctions that would be needed to represent the theist’s position charitably.)

To say that God’s willing of x to exist for a finite period keeps it from being an object of God’s eternal will (or the single eternal state of affairs) begs the question, because time could just as well exist for a finite period rather than an object of God’s eternal will (especially if, as a Thomist would say, “time is a measure of movement,” ie. change, and is therefore parasitic on the existence of things like x that come into and go out of existence). If God is a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of x (and I don’t see how he couldn’t be, if he is a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of time), then x is an object of God’s will, his eternal act. So there is an inconsistency in excluding x from your eternal modality but including time. That your argument relies on something like this (or seems to–as far as I can discern–you will, I’m sure, deny it) is probably a consequence of the incoherence of “states of affairs.”

I apologize for giving a response when I said I wouldn’t. My ego got the better of me.

 

[polytropos]

As you have defined states of affairs, they are not a temporal modality because they shirk all temporal distinctions. The single state of affairs is not eternity (which is a temporal modality, ie. “existing outside of time”).

Short argument: belorg has defined states of affairs as bearing no temporal reference. He has said that because God exists at the single state of affairs, everything else in that state of affairs must be eternal as well.

But since a state of affairs is not a temporal modality, this does not follow.

To take an analogous case: If x is a contingently existing thing and y is a necessarily existing thing, I could not take the mereological sum of x and y, ascribe it to my own new modality, the “state[sub]2[/sub] of affairs,” and infer that the “state[sub]2[/sub] of affairs” is a “necessary” modality, because one of its constituents is necessary. (This would be true even if x depended on y, etc.)

No more can belorg’s state of affairs be inferred to be an eternal modality.

 

[belorg]

I won’t give a response, but I should clarify that when I say “temporal modality” I am denoting to a specific category of modalities. I contrast “temporal modality,” then, not with “a-temporal modality” but with other modalities used in philosophy like logical necessity. (This should have been clear from my referring to eternity as a temporal modality.) So “existing at t” is one sort of temporal modality. “existing outside of time” is another sort of temporal modality. That does not mean that an eternal being is in time, just that I am denoting its relation to time, viz. being outside of it.

OK, but that doesn’t solve the problem.

As you have defined states of affairs, they are not a temporal modality because they shirk all temporal distinctions. The single state of affairs is not eternity (which is a temporal modality, ie. “existing outside of time”).

My use of states of affairs was in response to your claim that I used temporal references to describe the a-temporal state of God.

One line I have not bothered to pursue is that there are arguments against your position that time could be eternal as God is eternal (in the Summa):

That is not and argument against my position. In fact, it even supports my position.
Up to now, I haven’t defended the postition that God cannot create time. I have limited myself to arguing why if God did create time, time would be co-eternal with God. But since it is impossible for time to be eternal, the logical consequence is that God cannot create time.

Since your arguments have been unclear in several respects and Thomas’s reasoning rests on less dubious notions (ie. not on states of affairs), we would do well to adopt his position.

I have no problem adopting his position.

There seems to be something of a circularity here. When I say that an object x exists at t1 but not t2, you say that it is not in the single state of affairs because it is not eternal.

t2 is not part of this state of affairs. So, x exists at t1 but of course not at t2, because there is no t2 in **this **state of affairs.
So seem to completely misunderstand what I am saying here. I am limiting my scope, for the sake of the argument, to a single, eternal state of affairs and in that stae of affairs, there is no such thing as t1 and t2. That does not mean that if we take another scope, t2 does not exist. But that is not relevant for my argument.

But due to the unchanging nature of God’s will, God wills it at all times (or in all states of affairs). (God is a necessary condition of its existence, so he must will it in the single eternal state of affairs.) If your argument works, this must work as well:

(7’) God’s act to create x has no beginning.(from 6)
(8’) God’s act to create time is a necessary and sufficient condition for x to exist
(9’) Conclusion: x has no absolute beginning.

Yes, it must work, and it does work.

The reasoning is lazy; the scope fallacy is so glaring when we frame the problem in terms of an object rather than time itself. (Technically there is no scope fallacy, because the above argument “steamrolls” temporal distinctions that would be needed to represent the theist’s position charitably.)

To say that God’s willing of x to exist for a finite period keeps it from being an object of God’s eternal will (or the single eternal state of affairs) begs the question, because time could just as well exist for a finite period rather than an object of God’s eternal will (especially if, as a Thomist would say, “time is a measure of movement,” ie. change, and is therefore parasitic on the existence of things like x that come into and go out of existence).

Again, you completely misunderstand me. God cannot create anything that has an absolute beginning, I haven’t said anything about an end.
IOW, God cannot create anything that comes into existence, so yes, if x comes into exsitence, then God cannot be the creator of x. That is a consequence of my argument.

If God is a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of x (and I don’t see how he couldn’t be, if he is a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of time), then x is an object of God’s will, his eternal act. So there is an inconsistency in excluding x from your eternal modality but including time. That your argument relies on something like this (or seems to–as far as I can discern–you will, I’m sure, deny it) is probably a consequence of the incoherence of “states of affairs.”

Well, as you see, I don’t exclude x from my eternal modality. So, there is no inconsistency.

I apologize for giving a response when I said I wouldn’t. My ego got the better of me.

No problems, polytropos.I always enjoy discussing this with you.

 

[belorg]

Short argument: belorg has defined states of affairs as bearing no temporal reference. He has said that because God exists at the single state of affairs, everything else in that state of affairs must be eternal as well.

But since a state of affairs is not a temporal modality, this does not follow.

To take an analogous case: If x is a contingently existing thing and y is a necessarily existing thing, I could not take the mereological sum of x and y, ascribe it to my own new modality, the “state[sub]2[/sub] of affairs,” and infer that the “state[sub]2[/sub] of affairs” is a “necessary” modality, because one of its constituents is necessary. (This would be true even if x depended on y, etc.)

No more can belorg’s state of affairs be inferred to be an eternal modality.

Two responses? Well, polytropos, it seems your ego is even bigger than I thought.
And your analogous case is not analogous at all.

 

[polytropos]

OK, but that doesn’t solve the problem.

What problem? It shows definitively that I am not conflating eternity and sempiternity.

That is not and argument against my position. In fact, it even supports my position.
Up to now, I haven’t defended the postition that God cannot create time. I have limited myself to arguing why if God did create time, time would be co-eternal with God. But since it is impossible for time to be eternal, the logical consequence is that God cannot create time.

It is an argument against your position. If an analysis of God’s causality in terms of states of affairs leads one to regard God and time as existing in the same temporal modality*, then it is incoherent. Since there are other analyses of God’s causality available, we select one of them instead.

t2 is not part of this state of affairs. So, x exists at t1 but of course not at t2, because there is no t2 in **this **state of affairs.
So seem to completely misunderstand what I am saying here. I am limiting my scope, for the sake of the argument, to a single, eternal state of affairs and in that stae of affairs, there is no such thing as t1 and t2. That does not mean that if we take another scope, t2 does not exist. But that is not relevant for my argument.

It would really help if you spelled out what a state of affairs is clearly.

Is there more than one state of affairs? If x exists at t1 but not t2, does x exist in any state of affairs? If y does not exist at t1 but does exist at t2, does y exist in any state of affairs?

How do you account for God’s causality in bringing things into and out of existence in time, though God is eternal? Since you’re trying to show that the Thomist’s view of eternity has undesirable implications, you must have some “picture” of this in your head. But it’s not at all clear to me. And if the analysis you are assuming is not coherent in this respect, then its incoherencies elsewhere will be not at all surprising.

Yes, it must work, and it does work.

The trouble, belorg, is that you are literally trying to defend formally invalid arguments. We really can’t have a productive conversation if you are going to do that.

(7’) God’s act to create x has no beginning.(from 6)
(8’) God’s act to create x is a necessary and sufficient condition for x to exist
(9’) Conclusion: x has no absolute beginning.

If God’s temporal mode is eternity and x’s temporal mode is not (as it will be in the general case where x = belorg, for example), then this argument patently equivocates on “has no absolute beginning,” since an eternal being and a sempiternal being do not lack an absolute beginning in the same sense, and (8’) comes out false because “for x to exist” will be indeterminate if x is a mutable object (by Aquinas’s argument, with slight adaptation) that does not exist at all times, and x’s existence is not univocal with God’s.

Saying that times are not constituents of your states of affairs does not save you, because it just means that your states of affairs are not adequate for analyzing God’s causation in the first place, and therefore have to be substituted for an alternative analysis like my own. If you insist on states of affairs, then the conclusion does not follow, because (8’) will come out false if it means that “God’s act to create x is a necessary and sufficient condition for x to exist in the same temporal mode (eternity) as God”. But that is what would be needed to head off the equivocation on “has no absolute beginning.”

But there is no attempt on your part to solve any of these numerous defects.

And as I’ve pointed out before, we are being somewhat irresponsible in using the locution “time exists.” I would analyze that by “some changeable substance exists at some time,” where “at some time” will be clarified in terms of the substance’s relations to other changeable substances. On this view, though, “time exists” is analyzed in terms of an argument like (7’)-(9’), so while your treatment of that remains defective, your original argument will likewise remain defective.

Again, you completely misunderstand me. God cannot create anything that has an absolute beginning, I haven’t said anything about an end.

Above you say, “So seem to completely misunderstand what I am saying here. I am limiting my scope, for the sake of the argument, to a single, eternal state of affairs and in that stae of affairs, there is no such thing as t1 and t2. That does not mean that if we take another scope, t2 does not exist. But that is not relevant for my argument.”

How this is all suppose to work out is not clear to me; you haven’t tried to make it clear. But it is far from obvious why your reasoning for why x can go out of existence should not apply to x coming into existence. You haven’t said anything about an end, and the past and future are not symmetrical, but if the non-existence of x can be described in some other state of affairs (or scope) after x has already existed, why not before?

Another issue: I doubt you can fix the problem by “taking another scope.” A state of affairs is “a complete description of everything that exists.” Consequently, “every scope”* is going to include God and so be eternal, and God does not will that x exist at all times (or eternally). (This is, I think, wrong, because it is a category error to consider a state of affairs to be eternal.)

*I don’t know if a “scope” here is to be a “state of affairs”. My use of “scope” was in the technical, formal sense of a scope fallacy, ie. moving “at t1” inside and outside of a “God causes that (___ exist at t1)” operator without warrant. This is clearly not your usage of the term.

 

[polytropos]

Well, as you see, I don’t exclude x from my eternal modality. So, there is no inconsistency.

But x is, say, an object of our general experience which we watched come into and go out of existence. So x is not eternal, so x is not in your eternal modality. (Not that the single state of affairs is an “eternal modality.”)

Or, I could say: If objects that come into and go out of existence can be included in your eternal modality, then it does not follow from time’s inclusion in them that time has no absolute beginning. (I say “objects that come into and go out of existence” because, although you distinguish between objects that absolutely begin and those that end, the distinction is at best unclear, as I’ve said above.)

And your analogous case is not analogous at all.

Would you care to argue for that? Your single state of affairs, I claim, is not an “eternal modality,” because it is not in the category of temporal modalities at all. It can’t be argued that all of its constituents share eternity because one of them does (or that all that is willed “in” that state of affairs bear the eternity of the willer).

Another point: A state of affairs is “a complete description of everything that exists.” “A complete description of everything that exists” cannot be a modality because a description of what exists is not the sort of thing that is a modality (ie. logical necessity, eternity, etc.); it is at best a mereological sum. Therefore a state of affairs is not a modality, eternal or otherwise.

Two responses? Well, polytropos, it seems your ego is even bigger than I thought.

Oh it is bigger still.

 

[belorg]

It is an argument against your position. If an analysis of God’s causality in terms of states of affairs leads one to regard God and time as existing in the same temporal modality*, then it is incoherent. Since there are other analyses of God’s causality available, we select one of them instead.

The analysis in terms of states of affairs is a valid analysis, if it leads to incoherent conclusions, there is most probably something wrong with God’s causality itself.

It would really help if you spelled out what a state of affairs is clearly.

I have done this several times already.

How do you account for God’s causality in bringing things into and out of existence in time, though God is eternal?

I don’t account for God’s causality. God cannot bring things in and out of existence if he is eternal.

The trouble, belorg, is that you are literally trying to defend formally invalid arguments. We really can’t have a productive conversation if you are going to do that.

Seems completely valid to me. I don’t see how accepting (7’) and (8’) can lead to any other conclusion than (9’). That’s what validity is about.

Saying that times are not constituents of your states of affairs does not save you, because it just means that your states of affairs are not adequate for analyzing God’s causation in the first place, and therefore have to be substituted for an alternative analysis like my own. If you insist on states of affairs, then the conclusion does not follow, because (8’) will come out false if it means that “God’s act to create x is a necessary and sufficient condition for x to exist in the same temporal mode (eternity) as God”. But that is what would be needed to head off the equivocation on “has no absolute beginning.”

Necessary and sufficient condition shave nothing to do with time. If x is a NSC for y, then if x exists, then y exists, or in every state of affairs in which x exists, y exists too.

The trouble is not that my analysis is incohernt, the problem is that the concept of God as timlessly eternal is incoherent.

But there is no attempt on your part to solve any of these numerous defects.

There is no defect. It is not because my analysis doesn’t lead to the conclusion you desire that my analysis is wrong. Another possibility is that the conclusion you desire is wrong.

And as I’ve pointed out before, we are being somewhat irresponsible in using the locution “time exists.” I would analyze that by “some changeable substance exists at some time,” where “at some time” will be clarified in terms of the substance’s relations to other changeable substances. On this view, though, “time exists” is analyzed in terms of an argument like (7’)-(9’), so while your treatment of that remains defective, your original argument will likewise remain defective.

we can analyse it in terms of subtstance relations, that doesn’t make a diffrence.

Above you say, “So seem to completely misunderstand what I am saying here. I am limiting my scope, for the sake of the argument, to a single, eternal state of affairs and in that state of affairs, there is no such thing as t1 and t2. That does not mean that if we take another scope, t2 does not exist. But that is not relevant for my argument.”

It means that I am limiting my scope to a single state of affairs, regardless of possible ( or impossible) other states of affairs. That’s all.

How this is all suppose to work out is not clear to me; you haven’t tried to make it clear.

What do you mean by ‘supposed to work’ ?

But it is far from obvious why your reasoning for why x can go out of existence should not apply to x coming into existence. You haven’t said anything about an end, and the past and future are not symmetrical, but if the non-existence of x can be described in some other state of affairs (or scope) after x has already existed, why not before?

I am not sure whether the non-existence of x can be described in some state of affairs. That’s not my concern here.

Another issue: I doubt you can fix the problem by “taking another scope.” A state of affairs is “a complete description of everything that exists.” Consequently, “every scope”* is going to include God and so be eternal, and God does not will that x exist at all times (or eternally). (This is, I think, wrong, because it is a category error to consider a state of affairs to be eternal.)

I don’t have to fix any problem. If it turns out that on my analysis, x cannot exist, then that means the concept of causility is incompatible with the concept of an eternal God.

*I don’t know if a “scope” here is to be a “state of affairs”. My use of “scope” was in the technical, formal sense of a scope fallacy, ie. moving “at t1” inside and outside of a “God causes that (___ exist at t1)” operator without warrant. This is clearly not your usage of the term.

My state of affairs is a scope limited to the eternal situation in which God timlessly exists and creates something. That’s it. Other points of view, or scopes, or states of affairs are not my concern here.

 

[belorg]

But x is, say, an object of our general experience which we watched come into and go out of existence. So x is not eternal, so x is not in your eternal modality. (Not that the single state of affairs is an “eternal modality.”)

Then there is something wrong with an eternal modality. But i did not invent this eternal modality. It is a direct consequence of the claim that God is timelessly eternal and the creator of x. So it would mean that that claim is wrong.
This is one of the reaons why I am an atheist, BTW.

Would you care to argue for that? Your single state of affairs, I claim, is not an “eternal modality,” because it is not in the category of temporal modalities at all. It can’t be argued that all of its constituents share eternity because one of them does (or that all that is willed “in” that state of affairs bear the eternity of the willer).

My argument follows from the definition of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Oh it is bigger still.

Well, mine is big too, but still, if you don’t have anything to add , I would like to bow out of this. I fear we will keep running in circles if we continue this.
Again, thank you for the interesting discussion.

 

[polytropos]

Well, mine is big too, but still, if you don’t have anything to add , I would like to bow out of this. I fear we will keep running in circles if we continue this.

Fair enough. I do have a couple comments. I’ll try to restrict them to things we haven’t covered before.

Again, thank you for the interesting discussion.

And thank you as well.

Then there is something wrong with an eternal modality. But i did not invent this eternal modality. It is a direct consequence of the claim that God is timelessly eternal and the creator of x.

The analysis in terms of states of affairs is a valid analysis, if it leads to incoherent conclusions, there is most probably something wrong with God’s causality itself.

The trouble is not that my analysis is incohernt, the problem is that the concept of God as timlessly eternal is incoherent.

The problem is that this is not how refutations in philosophy work. To refute a position, it is not enough to show that it can be rendered incoherent, but rather that it cannot be rendered coherent. (As Peter Geach pointed out, every argument instantiates infinitely many invalid argument forms. To be valid, an argument only needs to instantiate one valid argument form, and to be sound it requires true premises. Consequently the task of a person disputing an argument is to show that it cannot be rendered sound, not that on one particular reading or analysis it is unsound.)

It is not sufficient, then, to show that if you adopt state of affairs talk, then God’s eternity runs into incoherences. This is obviously the case, as can be seen if we were to stipulate for instance that states of affairs were internally inconsistent, ie. that every state of affairs both includes and does not include God. Another way would be if one stipulated an analysis that contradicted some conclusion of natural theology, ie. if the analysis said that God causes the world to exist while it does exist. One has to be careful in adopting analyses that one is not begging any questions. If one is to show that a position is inconsistent, one has to begin with conclusions of that position. So you’d have to show that a theist is for some reason committed to states of affairs talk (since it is nothing that any Thomist has endorsed, nor any other philosopher), on his own principles.

If the analysis you are invoking is incoherent to begin with, then it is worthless in unveiling incoherencies in the position you are attempting to critique. So any position can be rendered incoherent if one adopts an incoherent analysis of it.

And there are other ways to analyze God’s causality from eternity. Thomists are moderate realists; they regard time as real. It is a real feature of the world that belorg came into existence in the past and exists now; we may expect that someday he will exit the world. (Since belorg is a temporal entity, any analysis which excludes time will be insufficient for characterizing his existence.) The conclusion of arguments from natural philosophy is that God is a necessary and sufficient cause for belorg’s existence at every moment at which he exists. Another conclusion is that God exists outside of time and has a single will, a single act.

Clearly, though, this single act must have multiple effects. However counterintuitive this might be, it is not contradictory. So one analyzes the effects of God’s causation as creating substances that exist at times. The existence of belorg is simply not well-defined unless time, a real feature of the universe, is specified. If the “existence of time” depends on the existence of changeable substances, then it will depend on the existence of changeable substances at specific times.

An account of God’s causation would have to be constructed out of these facts. God can’t be characterized as differing in will at different times, but that does not imply that time can be eliminated from a description of the objects of his will, which cannot share his temporal modality (eternity).

An analysis that eliminates temporal reference from God’s willing that x exist at a state of affairs is illegitimate.

Seems completely valid to me.

It equivocates on “has no absolute beginning.”

Necessary and sufficient condition shave nothing to do with time. If x is a NSC for y, then if x exists, then y exists, or in every state of affairs in which x exists, y exists too.

You haven’t responded to the issue that on your state of affairs analysis, (8’) is false. Ergo the conclusion does not follow, whether or not the argument is valid.

God’s act to create x is not a necessary and sufficient condition for x to exist if that is to mean “exist in the same temporal modality” as God. (If no qualification is given to “for x to exist,” but x is a changeable substance, then the statement is just nonsense, for the existence of a natural changeable substance cannot be specified without time references.) The metaphysics and natural theology that are prior to developing an analysis of God’s causation dictate that time cannot be eliminated from a complete description of the existence of a changeable substance, so (8’) is not true. (And to say this is not to deny that God is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of changeable substances while they exist. It merely denies what is contrary to observation and that to which natural theology already rejects: that God is a necessary and sufficient condition for a substance which comes into and goes out of existence when it doesn’t exist. Since this can be construed as a temporal difference in the effects of God’s eternal act, rather than a temporal difference in God’s act itself, there is no incoherence here.)

 

[polytropos]

Another way would be if one stipulated an analysis that contradicted some conclusion of natural theology, ie. if the analysis said that God causes the world to exist while it does exist.

Sorry–if the analysis denied that God causes the world to exist…