God orders genocide to protect someone? He needs women and children killed ‘in self defence’? Are we talking about the same omnipotent God? Seriously?
And He gave ample warnings over a long period of time? Maybe you (and Williams) have forgotten that God is omniscient. He KNEW that warnings would do no good. He KNEW what the outcome would be. What on earth is the point of issuing a warning if you KNOW it’s going to be ignored?
Like hacking children to death is the best way to solve a problem for someone who is omnipotent. It makes zero sense whether you are a Christian or an atheist. None. Dawkins doesn’t believe it. Neither do I. But some people do.
I think you are completely missing the argument that Williams proposed. I have watched several of his presentations so perhaps just the correct amount of emphasis may not have been put into this one.
He does, in another talk, place more emphasis on the situation of the two jet fighter pilots who were scrambled after the first two planes hit the Twin Towers on 9/11. Those two pilots had made up their minds that should another airliner have been hijacked (the fourth one that crashed) they would have flown their own jets into the airliner – one taking the nose, the other the tail. Their own fighter jets were not armed with air to air missiles, which necessitated using their own planes as missiles.
Now their intention was to take out the airliner so it couldn’t be flown into another building. Clearly, there were innocent men, women and children on board but the intention of the pilots was not to kill them but to prevent greater numbers of deaths had the plane been flown into another building.
Now you might argue, as you do in post #62, that the argument is merely one of ends justifying any means, but the argument could really be one of choosing the lesser of two evils – the principle of double effect.
The two fighter pilots, at some point, would have been placed into the position of having to act and if they didn’t take a specific action the consequences of not doing so would have been, as far as they could ascertain, worse than not acting. They would have been compelled to act by the situation and because of the constraints of the situation since not taking direct action would reasonably have been expected to bring about a much worse result.
Now, I am taking WIlliam’s argument to be as follows…
If the two fighter pilots – given the limitations of human knowledge and foresight – could reasonably be said to have acted morally if they had chosen to destroy the plane and kill innocents on board in order to save a larger number of innocents on the ground, then a fortiori, God with perfect knowledge of the future would be in a much stronger position to determine when direct action was required to stave off a much greater evil by ordering the commission of an interceding lesser evil. So, your portraying the argument as merely one of the ends justifying the means is incorrect.
Williams is arguing that the salient feature that CANNOT simply be dismissed in the assessment of the moral rightness of God-commanded acts in the OT is that the character of God in the OT is as the omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent Creator of the universe, NOT merely some human-like and fallible moral agent. This is what Dawkins conveniently forgets when he launches his critique as if the God who ordered the actions is not any more competent, moral or knowing than any other human moral agent. This is why his argument fails, actually.
God would have – given his omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence – perfect knowledge of the consequences of all human actions from that point in history forward through all time. Given also that God respects the moral autonomy of human agency, there could very well be times when certain specific actions must be carried out by human agents to prevent the fallout of the resulting series of consequent effects. God would be perfectly within his rights as the supreme moral authority to command certain acts because he and he alone is in the required position to make such decisions – humans are not.
This is not to say – anticipating your objection – that anytime some individual or group presumes to be carrying out the command of God that they are legitimately doing so; what it does mean is that if God truly did issue a certain command, human agents do not have access to the kind of privileged knowledge required to make an adequate moral assessment with regard to the correctness of the command.
We do not have perfect knowledge of the future, nor do we have any certain sense of ultimate moral goods nor about which actions will guarantee or forever defeat the realization of crucial moral outcomes. God would, however.
That means that if God really did issue the commands in the Old Testament, Dawkins is in no position to question their morality. He can’t even claim that the apparent immorality of the commands necessarily entails that they are immoral because if they were, indeed, issued by the omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God of the universe he would be in a far better position to decide upon their moral rightness than Dawkins could ever possibly be.
Neither can he argue that the acts were immoral and therefore they could not have been commanded by God because he is not in the position to know whether or not they were immoral to begin with – if they were, indeed, commanded by the omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God.
Oh, sure, Dawkins can go on about the “appearance” of immorality, just as he can go on about the “appearance” of design, but that is as far as he can logically go.